Author, as appears in the article.: Giménez-Gómez J, Osório A, Peris J

Department: Economia

URV's Author/s: Giménez Gómez, José Manuel / Osório da Costa, António Miguel

Keywords: Teoria de jocs Jocs no cooperatius Economía matemática Economia de la informació Claims rules Bargaining problem

Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution. © 2015 by the authors.

Thematic Areas: Statistics, probability and uncertainty Statistics and probability Social sciences, mathematical methods Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Economics Ciencias sociales Applied mathematics

licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/

ISSN: 20734336

Author's mail: josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat antonio.osoriodacosta@urv.cat

Author identifier: 0000-0003-0202-4623 0000-0003-3376-0164

Record's date: 2023-04-01

Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Link to the original source: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/1/32

Licence document URL: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/

Papper original source: Games. 6 (1): 32-38

APA: Giménez-Gómez J, Osório A, Peris J (2015). From bargaining solutions to claims rules: A proportional approach. Games, 6(1), 32-38. DOI: 10.3390/g6010032

Article's DOI: 10.3390/g6010032

Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Journal publication year: 2015

Publication Type: Journal Publications