Articles producció científica> Economia

Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues

  • Identification data

    Identifier: imarina:6389343
    Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina6389343
  • Authors:

    Osório A
  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: Osório A
    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Osório da Costa, António Miguel
    Keywords: Sabotage Rights Rent-seeking Multi-issue competition Game theory Game Equilibria Electoral competition Effort maximization Contest success functions Contest success function Allocation Agenda
    Abstract: © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Real life disputes, negotiations and competitive situations involve multi-issue considerations in which the final outcome depends on the aggregated effort over several dimensions. We consider two allocation systems, the I-system, in which each issue is disputed and award independently, and the A-system, in which all issues are aggregate in a single prize award. In the A-system, we propose a contest success function that aggregates the individuals' multi-issue efforts in a single outcome. Among other results, we found that the A-system tends to induce higher total effort than the I-system. The model is also able to reproduce a large set of strategic behaviors. For instance, under decreasing returns to effort, individuals maximize their payoffs by distributing effort over all issues, while under increasing returns to effort, individuals focus on a single issue. Hybrid equilibria, in which one individual focus in a single issue while the other individual diversifies effort over all issues, may also emerge when individuals hold different returns to effort. Strategic behavior is simultaneously influenced by the weight of each issue on the final outcome and by comparative advantages. Throughout the manuscript, we link our results with strategic behavior observed in electoral competition, i.e., issue ownership,issue divergence/convergenceandcommon value issues. We expect that our findings will help researchers and practitioners to better understand the process of endogenous selection of issues in competitive contexts and to provide guidance in the implementation of the optimal allocation mechanism.
    Thematic Areas: General economics,econometrics and finance Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous) Economics, econometrics and finance (all) Economics Ciencias sociales
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 19351704
    Author's mail: antonio.osoriodacosta@urv.cat
    Author identifier: 0000-0003-3376-0164
    Record's date: 2023-02-19
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Link to the original source: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2016-0149/html
    Licence document URL: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Papper original source: B E Journal Of Theoretical Economics. 18 (2):
    APA: Osório A (2018). Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues.
    Article's DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0149
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2018
    Publication Type: Proceedings Paper
  • Keywords:

    Economics,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Miscellaneous)
    Sabotage
    Rights
    Rent-seeking
    Multi-issue competition
    Game theory
    Game
    Equilibria
    Electoral competition
    Effort maximization
    Contest success functions
    Contest success function
    Allocation
    Agenda
    General economics,econometrics and finance
    Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous)
    Economics, econometrics and finance (all)
    Economics
    Ciencias sociales
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