# POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF TURKEY AND SPAIN. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

## Gokhan Duman

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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

DOCTORAL THESIS

Supervised by Dr. Joan Maria Thomas I Andreu

Department

of History and History of Art



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## ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the separatist terrorism problem of Spain and Turkey in order to highlight the similarities and differences. The countries different as Spain and Turkey have been affected by the separatist terrorist attacks. The comparative study of these two terrorist idiosyncratic phenomena puts the debate on the argument that even in different territories and with different historical backgrounds, similar problems could occur. The focus of the thesis based on the study of two historical problems from 19th century, which later emerged the armed terrorist organizations. It also includes a brief analyze of the issue of IRA in Northern Ireland in order to see what had been done in the United Kingdom to solve the terrorism problem, which have taken into account as a reference point for the cases of Turkey and Spain. The thesis studies the actual situations of the problems and their possible future in both countries.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, ETA, PKK, IRA, Turkey, Spain

## RESUMEN

Este estudio pretende analizar el problema del terrorismo separatista en España y en Turquía con el fin de loner de relieve las similitudes y diferencias. Diferentes países como España y Turquía se han sido afectados por los ataques terroristas separatistas. El estudio comparativo de estos dos fenómenos idiosincrásicos terroristas plantea el debate sobre la question de que, incluso en territorios diferentes y con diferentes antecedentes históricos, pueden darse problemas similares. El enfoque de la tesis esta basado en el estudio de dos problemas históricos del siglo XIX y XX tras los cuales surgieron más tarde las dos organizaciones terroristas armadas objeto de estudio comparado. También incluye un breve análisis de la cuestión de IRA en Irlanda del Norte con el fin de analizar y comparar el proceso de resolución del conflicto en Reino Unido en relation con el Ulster y cotejandolo con los casos de Turquía y España. La tesis estudia la situación actual de los dos conflictos así como las perspectivas de futuro en los dos países.

**Palabras claves:** Terrorismo, ETA, PKK, IRA, Turquía, España

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*To my family*

*And*

*To the 'one'*

x

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## NOTES ON TERMS AND TURKISH PRONUNCIATION

As Turkey both with its political history and being the recent homeland of Alevism is the central focus of this study, official names have been used with abbreviations regarding their Turkish version, with inclusion of their translation to the first usage of related names. Besides, private names of people have been kept as they are in Turkish in terms of special letters (ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, and ü.), those do not exist in English language.

For the pronunciation of aforementioned additional letters, the information below will be beneficiary:

| Letter | International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) Value | Example |
|--------|--------------------------------------------|---------|
| c | /ʤ/ | As j in jump |
| ç | /ʧ/ | As ch in church |
| ğ | N/A, although /ɣ/in some dialects | Lengthens preceding vowel |
| ı | /ɯ/ | As e in happen |
| j | /ʒ/ | As s in pleasure |
| ö | /œ/ | As oo in soot |
| ş | /ʃ/ | As sh in ship |
| u | /u/ | As oo in root |
| ü | /y/ | As ü in über |

## ABBREVIATIONS

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **AKP** | : | Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) |
| **AP** | : | Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) |
| **ANAP** | : | Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) |
| **BDP** | : | Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **CHP** | : | Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) |
| **CNV** | : | Basque Nationalist Communion (*Comunión Nationalista Vasca*) |
| **DEHAP** | : | Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*) |
| **DEP** | : | Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **DFLP** | : | Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine |
| **DP** | : | Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*) |
| **DTH** | : | Democratic Society Movement (*Democratik Toplum Hareketi*) |
| **DTK** | : | Democratic Society Congress (*Demokratik Toplum Kongresi* |
| **DTP** | : | Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) |
| **EA** | : | Basque Solidarity (*Eusko Alkartasuna*) |
| **EE** | : | Basque Left (*Euzkadiko Ezkerra*) |
| **EH** | : | Basque Citizens (*Euskal Herritarrok*) |
| **EH Bildu** | : | *Euskal Herria Bildu* |
| **EIA** | : | *Basque Revolutionary Party (Euskal Imultzale Alderdia)* |
| **ERNK** | : | National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (*Eniya Rızgariya Netewa Kurdistan*) |
| **ETA** | : | Basque Homeland and Freedom (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*) |
| **ETA (m)** | : | ETA *Politico-Militar* |
| **ETA (pm)** | : | ETA *Militar* |
| **et. al.** | : | Et alia (and others) |
| **EU** | : | European Union |
| **EUROPOL** | : | European Police Office |
| **FLN** | : | National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*) |
| **GAL** | : | Antirerrorist Liberation Groups (*Grupos Antiterroristas De Liberación*) |
| **GP** | : | Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **HADEP** | : | People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **HB** | : | Popular Unity (*Herri Batasuna*) |
| **HEP** | : | People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*) |
| **HP** | : | People's Party *(Halkçı Parti)* |
| **HRK** | : | Kurdistan Freedom Brigades (*Hezen Rızgarıya Kürdistan*) |
| **Ibid.** | : | Ibidem (the same place) |
| **IRA** | : | Irish Republican Army (*Óglaigh na hÉireann*) |
| **JITEM** | : | Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism (*Jandarma İstihbarat Grup Komutanlığı*) |
| **KADEK** | : | Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (*Kongreya Azadi ù Demokrasiya Kurdistan*) |
| **KAS** | : | *Socialist Patriot Coordinator (Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista)* |
| **KCK** | : | Union of Communities in Kurdistan (*Koma Civakên Kurdistan*) |
| **KDP** | : | Kurdistan Democratic Party |
| **KKK** | : | People's Confederation of Kurdistan (*Koma Komalen Kurdistan*) |
| **KONGRA-GEL** | : | Kurdistan Peoples Congress (*Kongra Gelê Kurdistan*) |
| **MDP** | : | Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **MP** | : | Member of Parliament |
| **op. cit.** | : | Opere citato (in the work cited) |
| **ÖZDEP** | : | Freedom and Democracy Party (*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **PCTV** | : | The Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (*Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas*) |
| **PKK** | : | Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) |
| **PLO** | : | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| **PM** | : | Prime Minister |
| **PNV** | : | Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*) |
| **PP** | : | Party Popular (*Partido Popular*) |
| **PSE** | : | Socialist Party of the Basque Country (*Partido Socialista de Euskadi*) |
| **PSOE** | : | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol*) |
| **SODEP** | : | Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*) |
| **SHP** | : | Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*) |
| **TBMM** | : | Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) |
| **TİP** | : | Workers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **TRT** | : | Turkey Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*) |
| **TV** | : | Television |
| **UK** | : | United Kingdom |
| **UN** | : | United Nations |
| **USA** | : | United States of America |
| **YTP** | : | New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi)* |
| **WW I** | : | World War One |
| **WW II** | : | World War Two |

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The concepts of "terror" and "terrorism" are two of the major problems of every day life. Throughout history, terrorism has become a broad-based violence that shows no respect for ethnicity, social status, geographic location and demographic characteristics, such as sex, age or occupation. With its historical background and multiple perceptions of each state, terrorism has been a difficult term to define. However, understanding these two concepts might pave the way for finding a solution to threat of terrorism, which is one of the biggest problems that every nation faces.

After the 9/11 Events, perception of terrorism has evolved one more time, and the world faced that even the developed countries could become the target of terrorism and might suffer from terrorist attacks. It is true that every terrorist organization and every terrorist attack have different backgrounds, reasons and goals; hence, seeking a complete analysis over terrorism in wide-perspective would make any research project more complicated. However, with the globalization - the integration of countries - the borders started to fade away; consequently, any terrorism problem started to become a problem for the whole world. It will not be wrong to argue that, a terrorist attack in Western part of the world can be heard in Eastern part within a few minutes and can spread fear to the populations, who do not have direct relation with that attack. Briefly, in today's world, one country's problem can easily affect another. Consequently, the fights against terrorism require international cooperation among different nations, which lead us to the necessity of understanding every single case in wide-perspective.

Throughout history, idea of nationalism has spread out to the countries, especially with French and American revolutions. Consequently, the idea of

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nationalism has paved the way for creation of nation-states. However, while nation states were built over the idea of having common elements, like religion, ethnic background or shared history, having a common *identity* did not solve the problem of existence of different identities. For instance, nation-states like Iraq, Great Britain, Turkey, Spain, France and so on, have internal problems whether related to religion or ethnicity among their diverse populations.

Each problem of daily or political life is not related with terrorist attack; nevertheless, one can see that recent terrorist attacks and terrorist groups could be divided into two different groups: religion based terrorism and ethnic terrorism. As the religion based terrorism is not the focus of this thesis; for ethnic terrorism, it is possible to say that it has often targeted nation states and had political goals with outcomes. Hence, with its political goals, ethnic terrorism has transformed itself into *political terrorism,* which is the center point of this thesis.

The reason why this topic was selected for the thesis comes from the idea that we live in an insecure world, where the terrorism might affect anyone in a way or another. As a Turkish citizen, I grew up by hearing about terrorist attacks and seeing funerals those were brought by the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan,* Kurdistan Workers' Party) terrorism. On the other side, my current residence is Spain, where ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna,* Basque Homeland and Freedom) terrorism took place for many years. I would like to use my academic background to understand the reality of terrorism and connectedness of Turkish and Spanish experiences. In fact, for the Turkish case of terrorism, Spanish experience is often given as an example both for the fight against terrorism and for a possible solution. All these facts made me more curious about the similarities and differences of these two cases of political terrorism.

The methodology for this thesis is highlighting the common and different elements between two cases with the help of historical information concerning the history of countries and ethnic groups; Kurds and Basques. The British experience

on political terrorism was also taken into account in order to see the evolution of a *terminated* terrorism problem of the United Kingdom. This thesis takes the historical information and connects the reality of political terrorism with actuality of each cases up until the writing time. Written sources were used to gather related information throughout the history for each cases. Apart from relevant books; articles, legal documents and newspapers were also used for the purpose of this thesis. Necessary reading was made in Turkish, English, Spanish, Catalan and French. During the time period of doctorate, a mobility study was carried out in Paris in the *Institut Geopolique Français* for three months. As the terrorism problem of Spain has connection with France, this mobility study had become advantageous to see the French perception of the problem.

The main hypothesis of this thesis is that even the cases of Spain and Turkey have different historical backgrounds, ETA's and PKK's arguments, methods and goals have similarities in the sense of political terrorism. Each of them have pursued a political goal for many years with the intention of creating independent states for Basques and Kurds. Each case affected the daily life of citizens, and each state have fought against the political terrorism for many years. In addition to terrorist attacks, terrorist organizations had, and still have, links with political parties, and these relations made them illegal players in the game of democracy. While differentiating each case, this thesis points out common elements of political parties' relation with political terrorism by arguing that terrorist organizations with political goals use political parties in order to reach more people and to start a process of their legalization in a way.

During the reading process of political science and history bibliography, it comes to my attention that while books and articles are making limited comparison between ETA and PKK, majority of them gives neither historical background nor their relation with political parties. This thesis tries to fill this gap and to bring out a necessary contribution as an academic source on this subject.

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In order to reach the conclusion, this thesis explains the cases in four main chapters apart from introduction and conclusion. As this thesis argues that understanding the concept of terrorism is essential to evaluate each case, first chapter gives information about terrorism with its historical transformation. After the attempt of describing the terrorism, this thesis explains both Kurdish and Basque nationalisms and consequent emergence of terrorism. Since the existence of inevitable connection between terrorist organizations and political parties is one of the arguments of this thesis, third part describes the relation between Basque political parties and ETA; and Kurdish political parties and PKK; also, gives the IRA (Irish Republican Army)-Sinn Fein connection in order to understand the British perception. The fourth part tries to give actuality of both ETA and PKK problems and gives reasonable solution proposals to Spain and Turkey with the help of British experience. This thesis highlights the similarities and differences between the cases of Spain and Turkey as conclusion.

## 2. DEFINING TERRORISM

The politics may be the most ancient art in world history. From the beginning of humankind, people need to communicate among themselves, and need to manage their life, and properties. This lack of power management or institutions is the main reason of creation of the *State*. After the French Revolution, the world faced with the meaning of *modern states* as known today.

After the formation of modern states, the way of governance has changed; and a single person had lost his/her power that makes him/her the main actor of the state. Instead, a group of people/population has formed, and still forms, political parties in order to possess the power of governance. Hence, the most fundamental tool to gain the power of the state became the elections.

In modern day political life structure, political parties are in charge of making their policies and making promises to population to take their vote. Meanwhile, voters demand rights from the party in power, in a democratic way. As legitimacy of political parties is based on public opinion, they have to take into account what their electorates demand. In this context, after the World War Two (WWII), the destruction of external players gave European states a chance to look into their internal problems.

A new era has begun after the WWII. Within time and more experience, political parties got used to learn the way to attract the attention of population. Mostly they made propaganda campaigns before the elections, and tried to express their policies and ideas about governance in order to gain more support. To win the elections, political parties need population's approval.

In democratic states, the *rule of the game* is defined by the laws, and basically it is formed around societies' needs and public opinion. Every government is free to choose and pursue its policies. Within these rules of game, every group can demand their rights in democratic way, and when the party that they voted for comes in power, they may achieve their demands. In today's democratic world, the only way to achieve demands is forming a political party and participation to the elections.

In context of democratic states, one often sees the term of "terrorism" in newspapers in the same page among political news. In some cases, a group of people uses terrorism to attract the public attention and to force governments to accept their existence. Therefore, terrorism was used, and is still being used by these kinds of groups as a tool of politics; however, in terms of democracy, terrorism cannot be accepted as a tool or a way to achieve any demand or goal.

When one considers democracy as the best system of governance, at least it is the best one that the human race has experienced so far, where should "terrorism" be put in this context of democracy? What exactly is terrorism? Who uses the terrorism for what? How does the state acts against terrorism? etc. There might be many questions. However, the main questions for this part of thesis are; what terrorism is and how it affects daily life.

## 2.1. Terrorism as a concept

The concepts of *terror* and *terrorism* were significant problems that the world faces. Today, the violence has extended and transformed into a new form, which is called terrorism, regardless of ethnicity, social status, and geographical location or any particular characteristics in demography such as sex, age, or occupation. This extensive form of violence targets a significant portion of the world population. In order to define such a forceful concept, it is important to

understand its etymology as a word with its background and history of the words *terror* and *terrorism*.

The word "terror" has originated from the Latin word "*terrere*", which means "to frighten", but it also has relationship with the Greek word "*trein*", with the meaning of "to be afraid". Moreover, the usage of this word is related to the French word "*L'terreur*". Apart from all these, a basic explanation of terror mechanism can be taken from an old Chinese proverb: "Kill one, frighten ten thousand".[1]

The well known source on the English language, *Oxford English Dictionary* defines terrorism as following;

> "Terrorism: A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-94; the system of `Terror'. 2. *gen*. A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized."[2]

Additionally, according to the *Collins Cobuild Dictionary,*[3] this definition includes "something that makes you very frightened". Like Collins Cobuild, *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary* also defines the term with respect to the "political aspect" of terror. "Violence (as bombing) committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or government into granting their demands."[4] These two definitions show the political evolution of this word over time. According to that evolution, it will not be wrong to claim that the word "terrorism" indicates the usage of terror or unpredictable violence against a government, public, or individuals as a tool, in order to obtain certain objectives. According to some sources, the word terror is indicated as "Extreme fear, that agitates body and

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[1] Sun Tzu.
[2] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006 p. 2.
[3] Collins Cobuild Dictionary, 2001, p.1760.
[4] Merriam-Webster dictionary online, <http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=terrorism&x=5&y=18>, site visited on 24 March 2010.

mind, violent dread, fright."[5] In the same source, "that, which excites dread; a cause of extreme fear" is listed as a second meaning. Moreover, "a period characterized by political executions, as during the French Revolution" is also included to the meanings.[6]

With these definitions, one finds a somewhat linguistic-related description rather than learning what terrorism is, at first glance. The other definitions might be more beneficial, but again, it concerns the meaning of the *word,* not the *term*. While all definitions indicate the meaning of the word, they give a broad understanding of the term, which can be applied to nearly any actions that spread fear among society, in other words *terrorize* the population. Even tough, constructing an understanding from the definition of the word *terrorism* can be considered prematurely helpful, it is still insufficient for the purpose of this thesis.

Despite these dictionary definitions of the term, terrorism is a word that is in use in daily life. When one turns on the TV or reads newspapers, (s)he can see the usage of terrorism; however, most of the time (s)he never tries to define it. Because the public opinion believes that they already know the meaning of this term. However, terrorism is a term, which is hard to explain just with the help of dictionaries. The meaning of the term has evolved within time.

## 2.2. Evolution of Terrorism

According to related sources on history of terrorism, one of the earliest examples of terrorist acts was carried out by the radical Zealots, a Jewish sect active during the Roman occupation of the first century in the Middle East. The Zealots' main objective to Roman Empire's rule by attacks, involving assassinations. With their actions, Zealots wanted to send a message to the public,

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[5] Webster's International Dictionary.
[6] Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary.

which was their target audience. Hence, the Zealots launched attacks to any place, where people would be able to see their actions and receive the message that they were trying to give. Walter Laqueur states about Zealots as;

> "The sources telling of their activities are sparse and sometimes contradictory but it is known from Josephus that Zealots used unorthodox tactics such as attacking their enemies by daylight, preferably on holidays when crowds congregated in Jerusalem".[7]

Between the years of 1090 and 1272, the Assassins, an Islamic group, used similar tactics like the Zealots in combat against Seljuq Empire and Christian Crusaders.[8] Moreover, the Assassins used self-sacrifice and suicidal attacks as Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations often use today. A clear example is September 11 attacks in 2001 in the United States of America. Terrorists who have motivated with religion commonly believes that violence is a *divine act* to reach and have a place in the heaven. As written in the *"Almanac of Modern Terrorism",* some authors argue that these Islamic Assassins were first example of religion motivated terrorism, even the ancestors of modern terrorists.[9]

Religion kept its place as being a common motivation point on the usage the terror until the French Revolution. After King Louis XVI's execution, the Jacobins, launched terrorism period that the term "*reign of terror*" refers an example of state terrorism in the last decade of the 18th century.[10] In that time of terror, many French citizens were killed because of their opposition to the revolutionary regime.[11] In fact, this period of terror was made for political reasons to protect enlightenment ideas, which changed interest from religion to the ideas like nationalism and democracy.

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[7] Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 2001, p.7.
[8] Ibid. p.8-9.
[9] Jay M. Shafritz, E.F. Gibbons, Gregory E.J. Scott, *Almanac of Modern Terrorism*, New York, Facts on File, 1991.
[10] The French term *regime de la terreur* originated the English word 'terrorism'.
[11] Linton, Marisa, "The Terror in the French Revolution", Kingston University, <http://www.port.ac.uk/special/france1815to2003/chapter1/interviews/filetodownload,20545,en.pdf>, site visited on 10 April 2012.

With the nationalism, anarchism, Marxism, and other secular political movements effected the meaning of terrorism during the 19th century. These term were the motivations to challenge the rule of monarchs and even rule of Church. Most of the people in European countries challenged the Church in order to decrease its role in political life, and construct new societies around secular ideas. Walter Laqueur argues that the terrorism of the 19th century was majorly anti-monarchical and gained its concrete meaning by "Narodnoya Volya" of Russia.[12]

As Walter Laqueur states;

> "...of all these movements, Narodnoya Volya was the most important by far, even though its operations lasted only from January 1878 to March 1881".[13]

Even though Narodnoya Volya assassinated many governmental officials and effected the political system of Russia then, its most successful action was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on 1 March 1881.[14] After the assassination group of political radicals attended to anarchist conference in London to discuss how to achieve revolutionary change. One can see that usage of violence, or as the world called it today; terrorism seen as a tool to achieve unfair rules of monarchs. The main idea of the conference was to establish a larger organization - *Anarchist International-,* which was also called "Black International" after they adopted black flag, to support and to coordinate terrorism for defeating monarchies and elected governments around the World.[15]

Bruce Hoffman claims that;

> "this idea, like most of their ambitious plans, came to nought, the publicity generated by even a putative "Anarchist International" was sufficient to create myth of global revolutionary pretensions and thereby stimulate fears and suspicions disproportionate to its actual impact or political achievements".[16]

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[12] Laqueur, *op.cit.*, p.11.
[13] Ibid., p.12.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p.19.
[16] Ibid.

Like-minded anarchists who were pursuing similar objectives around the globe carried out operations as small cells, which made them hard to detect and capture. Eventually, this method became the main way of act in order to spread intense fear among public. For revolutionary ideas or not, the usage of violence, the implementation of terror has been used as a tool for groups and organizations, which were motivated differently.

On one side secular terms were motivating groups and individuals on the western part of world, on the other hand, in 1930s and 1940s, religious terrorism found its place in the Middle East by organizations those were influenced by Islamic fundamentalism to gain independence for their countries from colonialist states. In this context, it is possible to say that Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt fought against British Imperial rule and Front Liberation Army[17] battled against France in Algeria.

After the end of WWII, the motivation of terrorism changed once more. During 1940s and 1950s, nationalist and anti-colonialist organizations raised in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa in order to gain independence from European domination. While some of them motivated with religious ideas, others were motivated with western concepts. Countries like Algeria gained their independence with their nationalist movements that used terrorism against continued rule of colonial powers.[18] As Hoffman indicates, it was also during this period that usage of title of "freedom fighters" became popular, because of the international community's support and sympathy to struggles for national liberation and self-determination. Newly independent states argued that anyone or any movement that fought against colonial powers and/or Western domination should not be described as "terrorists", but they might be considered as "freedom fighters". This moment was also the start of the discussion on what is really terrorism. It is not wrong to argue that with the introduction of the term freedom fighters, one's terrorist started to become another one's heroes.

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[17] Also knows as *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN).
[18] Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p.25-26.

Terrorism continued to be viewed in revolutionary context during the late 1960s and 1970s. However, within time nationalist and ethnic separatist groups, which were not in fight with colonial powers also started to defend the revolutionary ideas and to try become freedom fighters of their target audiences. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Québec Liberation Front,[19] Basque Homeland and Freedom (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*, ETA)*,* employed terrorism to attract international community's attention to their causes. On 22 July 1968, three armed terrorists of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which became one of the six groups that constituted Palestine Liberation Organization later and fought to regain Palestine territories occupied by Israel, hijacked an Israeli plane en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. This incident drew significant attention from international community to Palestinian struggles. Hoffman argues that even though there had been several commercial aircraft hijackings before, this incident was the first political hijacking that started the process of the internationalization of terrorism. Besides, this hijacking was the first example with its international character seems similar to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001.

In 1972, Munich Olympic Games was the scene of terrorism. The Black September Organization,[20] attacked on Israeli athletes. The attack resulted with death of 11 Israeli athletes. Despite international community's condemnation of Munich massacre, it generated spectacular publicity that the Palestine Liberation Organization. Two years after Munich events, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was invited to the United Nations to address General Assembly and the organization subsequently gained the observer status in the main international political area.[21] During his address Yasser Arafat, defended the idea:

> "The difference between the revolutionary and terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by just a cause and fights for freedom and

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[19] Original name in French; *Front Libération du Québec* (FLQ).
[20] A Palestinian Paramilitary Unit, founded in 1970.
[21] Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p.75.

liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist…"[22]

Within this atmosphere, other nationalist groups such as Quebec Liberation Front, French-Canadian separatists effective at Quebec region of Canada, and Irish Republican Army in United Kingdom, started to follow the Palestinian example to get international publicity.

The internationalization process of terrorism in the late 1960s and 1970s was not only the product of Palestinian success, but also the activities of other movements. During these years, political extremists started to disagree the occupation of Vietnam by the United States of America and economic, social *unfair* rules of modern capitalist liberal-democratic state. The Red Army Faction[2] in Germany, and Red Brigades[24] in Italy were another examples of this movement. Red Brigades' famous act was the murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, which tried to establish socialist regimes by destroying their capitalist governments. In the beginning of the 1980s, the right-wing terrorism, started in response to left-wing movements that arose in some parts of the European countries and in the United States of America. The most famous actions of these groups were the bombing of Munich Octoberfest Celebration in 1980, killed 14 and injured 215 people; Bologna rail station bombing in 1980, killing 84 and injured 180; track bombing of Alfred Paul Murrah building in Oklahoma City by a Gulf veteran in 1995, killing 168 and injured over 800 people which was the most lethal terrorist attack in the United States of America's borders before the September 11 terrorist attacks. [25]

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[22] Yasser Arafat quoted in Hoffman, *op. cit*., p.26.
[23] Also known as *Baader-Meinhof Gang.*
[24] In Italian; *Brigate Rosso.*
[25] Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and International Political System*, London, Tauris Academic Studies, 1995,  pp. 61-63.

### 2.3. Terrorism in International Law

International attempts to define terrorism began on 1920s; however, the questions about some states, whether their actions were labeled as "terrorism" or the actions of the operating groups were labeled with this word prevented a consensus until today. As a result, an academic approach was adapted to define terrorism in international area.[26]

According to this approach, international scholars tried to list some specific events within the concept of terrorism, such as plane hijacking, taking of hostages, bombings and so on, instead of explaining the term in a general perspective. As a result, there are twelve international conventions such as; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,[27] including Diplomatic Agents, the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages[28], and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings[29].

Lately, this approach started to be questioned. As a result, a general definition of terrorism within a wider perspective started to be searched by the international community. In 1999, a concrete attempt to give a definition of terrorism was made in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. With this attempt, first, a definition made by referring to international conventions and listed acts were mentioned in these conventions. Secondly, a definition within a wider perspective was conducted. It refers to:

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[26] George Williams, and Ben Golder, "What is Terrorism: Problems in Legal Definition", *UNSF Law Journal*, vol. 27, no. 2, 2004, p. 273.
[27] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature on 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (Entered into force on 20 February 1977), <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cppcipp/cppcipp_e.pdf>, site visited 6 June 2011.
[28] International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature on 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (Entered into force on 3 June 1983), <http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv5.pdf>, site visited 7 June 2011.
[29] International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature on 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 284 (Entered into force on 23 May 2001), <http://www.un.org/law/cod/terroris.htm>, site visited on 8 June 2011.

> "Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."[30]

More recently, as a response to the September 11 terrorist action, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly attempted to give a comprehensive general definition of terrorism. Article 2 of the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism states a relatively clear definition of terrorist actions;

> "(1) Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention, if that person,by any means, unlawfully and intentionally causes:
> (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
> (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
> (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."[31]

When one looks at the positive and negative parts of the specific and general definitions, obviously, both have certain advantages and disadvantages. On the other hand, listing the crimes including acts of terrorism may not be adequate to clearly separate ordinary crime and terrorist action. This issue brought a confusion on examining every single case. While aforementioned actions may be useful to identify terrorist actions, they certainly does not give a definition on general understanding of terrorism. If listed actions are taken as a general definition, then general definition of terrorism might be expended to a wide range of activities, which may not be considered as terrorism. For instance, actions like

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[30] International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Opened for signature on 9 December 1999. 2178 ILM 229. (Entered into force on 10 April 2002), <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm>, site visited on 8 June 2011.
[31] Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism states, <http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup08/basicmats/unterrorism.pdf> site visited on 8 June 2011.

civil disobedience, public protest etc. may become the examples of activities, which could be considered as terrorism. Another example can be given from the universities, where are common places of protests. A manifestation of students about tuition fees against university authority or government may also be considered as terrorist action. Moreover, if the students start a fire or let off fireworks around a university buildings, authorities might interpret these actions as "serious damage to property".[32]

As the Western world, Eastern part also tried to define the terrorism according to their perception. In Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which was accepted in Cairo in April 1998, terrorism defined as;

> "Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying and seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources."[33]

## 2.4. Terrorism in National Laws

National laws need a proper description due to the nature of the legal system of every single country. In lack of absolute definitions of acts and actions, it will not be easy to separate a criminal, a terrorist, or a victim. Therefore, definition made by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations; "What looks, smells, and kills like terrorism is terrorism."[34] is not useful in any legislative system in today's world. On the other hand, The Texas Penal Code, section 22.07 could be a useful example to define a terrorist act in legal framework.

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[32] Williams, and Golder, *op.cit.*, p. 288.
[33] "The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism", *Al-Bab*, 18 June 2009, <http:// www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm>, site visited on 2 May 2011.
[34] Senior British Representative Iraq 2003-2004. British Ambassador to the United Nations, <http://www.p10k.net/terrorism_defined.htm>, site visited on 8 May 2011.

In this code, terrorism is defined as:

"(a) A person commits an offence if he threatens to commit any offence involving violence to any person or property with intent to:
   (1) cause a reaction of any type to this threat by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies;
   (2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
   (3) prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building; room; place of assembly; place to which the public has access; place of employment or occupation; aircraft, automobile, or other form of conveyance; or other public place; or
   (4) cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public transportation, public water, gas, or power supply or other public service."[35]

As one see that Texas Panel Code tries to identify the "terrorist" by listing and describing actions of individuals. Another example can be given from the United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism Act. Aforementioned act states;

"Section 1
(1) In this Act, "terrorism" means the use of threat of action where
   (a) The action falls within subsection (2)
   (b) The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and
   (c) The use of threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it
   (a) involves serious violence against a person,
   (b) involves serious damage to property,
   (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
   (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied....][36]

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[35] "Texas Penal Code, Section 22.07", *Baker's Legal Pages*, <http://www.bakers-legalpages.com/pc/2207.htm> site visited on 11 May 2011.
[36] The complete act can be found in: "Terrorism Act 2000", *The National Archive of United Kingdom*, 16 February 2009, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1>, site visited on 10 October 2011.

As stated earlier, the term terrorism evolved through history. In the age of Internet, virtual acts and actions started to be considered as actions may be in the framework of terrorism. Therefore, one can see that actions against electronic systems found its place in United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism Act.  Actions and attacks against certain electronic system with the intention of disrupt started to be called as "Cyber-Terrorism", which is a term to label the online acts and actions; however, there is no clear definition of them. When and how an online act could be accepted as terrorist action? This cyber-terrorism concept may be quite new for some countries even for the ones who are accustomed to fight against terrorism.

When one takes a look at countries legal documents, it is possible to say that they adopt more nationalistic approach on defining terrorism. For instance, the Indian Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in 2001 gives a definitions made by terror experts, and limits actions inside national borders regardless of international concern. In the said ordinance there is no complete definition of terrorism, but it tries to define the acts and actions;

> "An act done by using weapons and explosive substances or other methods in a manner as to cause or likely to cause death or injuries to any person or loss or damage to property or disruption of essential supplies and services or by any other means necessary with intent to threaten the unity and integrity of India or to strike terror in any section of the people."[37]

On European perspective, the European Union has common policies about political and terror crimes among its member and with third party states. However, every state has its proper legal system, in which a dedicated part to terrorism can be found. For the purpose of this thesis, in following paragraphs Turkish and Spanish legislations on terrorism will be given as a source for the upcoming chapters.

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[37] "Terrorist Act", *Embassy of India - Washington DC*, <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/ Terrorism/poto_2001.htm> site visited on 27 November 2011.

The Spanish Penal Code Book II, Title XXII, Chapter V, Section II[38] is dedicated to terrorist crimes, in which the definition of terrorist act, the precautions that state can apply, etc., can be found. According to Article 571, terrorist act would be punished as;

> "person who is serving as officers or collaborating with terrorist organizations or groups whose purpose is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously disturbing public peace, commit crimes under article 346[39] and 351[40], respectively, will be punished with imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years, subject to penalties attached to them if there is injury on physical or health of people."

Again, one can see that the Spanish legislation tries to identify the terrorist by listing the actions and acts one by one. In the case of Turkey, the Turkish National Anti-Terrorist Law also indicates how a nation tries to take necessary precautions legally to protect itself from terrorism. In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Law, both the effects of political, ideological and religious aims of terrorists and the effects of violence, intimidation and damage to private and governmental property can be clearly seen. In this law, which was adopted in 1991, terrorism is defined as:

> "[Terrorism] is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and Nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing

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[38] The complete Penal Code can be found in (Spanish): "Código Penal", *Agencia Estatal Boletìn del Estado / Gobierno de España*, <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-25444&lang=en>, site visited on 27 November 2011.

[39] Author's translation from Spanish original: "Those who, causing explosions or using any other means of similarly destructive power, which causes the destruction of airports, ports, stations, buildings, public buildings, warehouses containing flammable or explosive materials, roads, mass transit, or immersion ship or stranding, explosion of a mine or plant, lifting the rails of a railway track, malicious changes of the signals used for the safety of transportation, bridge blasting, destruction of public walkway, serious disturbance of any kind or media, shall incur the penalty of imprisonment of ten to twenty years, when the ravages behave necessarily a danger to the life or integrity of people. If, besides the danger, injury was produced for the life, physical integrity or health, the facts shall be punished separately with the punishment for the crime committed."

[40] Author's translation from Spanish original: "Those who provoke a fire causing danger to life or physical integrity of people, shall be punished with imprisonment from ten to twenty years. The judges or courts may impose the lesser sentence served in the minor degree of danger caused and other circumstances of the act."

the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."[41]

It is possible to say that, in these definitions, the main focus point is about endangering or damaging the State and its authority. It can be also accepted that, Turkish law uses more broad terminology to protect the State and its organs.

## 2.5. Different types of Political Terrorism

As mentioned earlier, various attempts have been made to define terrorism and to clarify its difference from regular crimes, political violence or violence related with a revolution. However, members of terrorist organizations try to legitimize their terror attacks. Generally, terrorists see themselves as they are revolutionaries and are convinced that they are fighting against the *evil.* As they deeply believe in their cause and do not respect the laws of certain state, they do not see themselves that they are criminals before the laws. Aforementioned information about the history of terrorism makes clear that in every age, terrorists have seen themselves as heroes, but the authorities label them as *rebels, bandits* or *terrorists*.

A common understanding about terrorism has been emerged through the history that usage of any violence by groups or individuals for achieving political goals and objectives cannot be legitimized , and it is basically an unjustifiable use of force and violence against legitimate and/or elected authorities in states. In modern democracy, terrorist acts and actions are considered as crimes against individuals and states rather than political offences to authorities.[42] Conor Cruise O'Brien argues; "*the force violence* of the terrorist is not legitimate";[43] and that

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[41] The complete Anti-Terrorism Law can be found in (Turkish): "Turkish National Anti-Terrorism Law", *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Justice*, <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/809.html>, site visited on 27 November 2011.
[42] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Herod, Reflections on Political Violence*, London, Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 24-39.
[43] Ibid., p. 33.

terrorist groups' claims to be revolutionary movements or groups engaged in "guerrilla" warfare are often attempts to introduce themselves as terrorist groups with some kind of legitimacy in their audiences' minds.[44] A *guerrilla warfare* basically defines irregular attacks of small groups against certain targets with wide range of actions including ambush, sabotage or raids. The common way to attack is using the elements of surprise, conducting an unexpected terrorist attacks with hit and runs.

Laqueur argues that the difficulty of defining terrorism lies in the fact that its character has considerably changed over the last century. For him;

> "Terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional strategy that can be used by people of very different political convictions… [it] is not merely a technique doctrine. It is truly all-purpose and value-free."[45]

Meantime Brian Michael Jenkins argues that terrorism is;

> "The threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear-to terrorize…Terrorism is violence for effects; not only, and sometimes not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact the victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause. Terrorism is a violence aimed at people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the by-product of terrorism."[46]

However, even if this notion of terrorism is accepted and one claims that terrorism is a theatre or public spectacle to frighten and attract attention, it must be remembered that this is not its *sole* objective. Moreover, terrorists like *power* and *to be respected* by others, they have goals over attracting media coverage for their activities, spreading fear among the public, support of their target audiences.

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[44] Ibid., p. 72.
[45] Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, pp. 4-5.
[46] Brian Michael Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Los Angeles, Crescent, 1975, p. 1.

In a similar meaning, Wolf argues that;

"[the terrorist's] strategic intent is to destroy the confidence a particular minority has in its government by causing it act outside the law…to bring about the moral alienation of the masses from government until its isolation has become total and irreversible…to make life unbearable for a democratic government as long as terrorist demons remain unsatisfied."[47]

As Wolf stated, terrorists often attack to governments assets and officials in order to show them weak before the public. Secondly they try to create a disobedience or rebellion against authorities. Juliet Lodge states that, the main goal for terrorists has been "to register a calculated impact on a target population and on other groups for the purpose of altering the political balance in favor of the terrorist"[48] and discrediting the authorities.

As the governments often think that the effective way to deal with violence is counter violence, terrorists tries to convince the target audiences that governments uses violence, so that their acts can become legitimate against states' violence. On the other hand, while the governments fight against terrorism, they basically deny to accept terrorism as an internal problem that terrorists try to undermine the state authority in some part of the country or entirely. It is possible to say that, governments always have concern about their vision among society, and try to avoid giving an impression that they are not capable of defending the legal system, their citizens and unity of the country and territory.

It is true that terrorist acts may be aimed at specific goals, such as the release of imprisoned members of organizations, taking of hostages, and so on. However, where terrorist demands are based in broader terms and linked with ideas of revolution, the question of whether terrorism was guerrilla warfare or takes a "revolutionary" or "sub-revolutionary" form is raised.[49] Paul Wilkinson

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[47] Juliet Lodge (ed.), *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State*, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981, p. 2.
[48] Ibid., p. 3.
[49] Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p.79.

indicates three types of terrorism: "revolutionary-terrorism", aimed at political revolution; "sub-revolutionary terrorism", having political motives other than revolution; and "repressive terrorism", aimed at restraining certain groups, individuals or forms of behaviour deemed to be undesirable.[50]

Lodge suggests that "revolutionary" terrorism aims at effecting a complete revolutionary change within a certain political system, while "sub-revolutionary" terrorism aims at changing various aspects in a particular political system, in a political structure. Instead of "repressive" terrorism, he refers to "establishment terrorism", and he argues that it may be applied externally by the government against other nation-states and internally "to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or move the populace to comply with [the] programs/goals of the state".[51]

A different attempt to classify terrorism and to differentiate its various forms from each other by mentioning the goals was done by Bowyer Bell. He pointed out several aspects, which he contributed to "revolutionary" terrorism by highlighting the internal and external dimensions of "revolutionary" terror, and according to him, elements such as; main goal, loyalty of militants, targeting large or specific targets in pursuit of terrorist goals, make difference within revolutionary terrorism concept. Bell refers to the first aspect of "revolutionary" terror as "organizational terror". With this, he refers organizational structure of a terrorist group with its internal discipline, strict rules and punishing members.[52]

The second aspect, "allegiance terror", he argues "a less restrained variant of organizational terror" involving the use of violence to create major "support" in the financial base, "support" among society or certain part of population in the form of actions like strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience obtained by threats of vengeance".[53]

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[50] Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism*, London, Macmillan, 1974, pp. 36-40.
[51] Lodge, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[52] Bowyer J. Bell, *Transnational Terror*, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1978, pp. 15-16.
[53] Bell, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-16.

The third aspect he describes as "functional terror" that involves actions to gain strategic advantages over authorities, even by killing state officials the aim is discrediting the virtue of victims.[54]

The forth aspect is defined as "provocative terror" concentrating on "exploiting the deed and escalating its impact";[55] while the fifth, "manipulative terror" is characterized as "the creation of a bargaining situation", in which threats are made to destroy assets or kill hostages unless certain demands are granted. Manipulative terror rests on the dread, if not the certainty, that such threats are real."[56] As final aspect, he uses "symbolic terror", with the explanation of why the target selected. According to him, the target becomes a victim because he or she "represents the epitome of the enemy".[57] For Bell, terrorism can take forms other than "revolutionary" terrorism. He refers to "psychotic" terrorism, which involves "ostensibly political actions with uncertain or irrational outward motivations" committed for personal, internal reasons.[58]

While Bell categorize terrorism by aspects of it, John Richard Thrackrah tries to make a simple categorization on terrorism by involving parties;

> "Academically, terrorism is categorized according to the parties involved, as follows: terrorism directed by a state against another state; terrorism directed by the state against its citizens; terrorism directed by an individual against another; and terrorism directed by an individual against the state."[59]

The discussion on defining and categorizing on terrorism still goes on today. However, one topic is clear and common in definitions; most terrorist activities have political and/or ideological aims. Therefore, terrorism should be dealt within political frame along with criminal laws of modern world. Nevertheless, lack of a

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[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid., p. 17.
[56] Ibid., p. 18.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid., pp. 10-12.
[59] John Richard Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 68.

common definition of terrorism delays the development of international cooperation in struggle against it. As Colin S. Gray mentions;

> "Political difficulties cannot usefully be denied or evaded by the elementary expedient of treating all candidate terrorist activity simply as the commission of criminal acts".[60]

Meantime, Laqueur argues;

> "Terrorism is not, as is frequently believed, a subspecies of guerrilla warfare and its political function today is also altogether different; the difference between guerrilla and terrorism is not one of semantics but of quality."[61]

Today, terrorism is defined differently almost in every country. European Countries see terrorism as a problem to be resolved politically, while United States of American think it should be resolved by military measures.

During the *International Conference on International Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation*, academics from Eastern world also suggested some ideas on defining terrorism. Professor Zhao Weiming argued for a universal definition of terrorism depending on political aims and targets of terrorism, rather than talking about subjects of terrorism and its methods. He also mentioned that determining what constitutes international terrorism would be the solution to the problem of a common definition of terrorism, may sweep away the double standard understanding on terrorism.[62]  Professor Liu Hua of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences pointed out;

> "the current international and regional conventions against terrorism
> include over one hundred different legal definitions of terrorism and the lack of a

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[60] Colin S. Gray, "Combatting Terrorism", *Parameters*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1993, p. 19.
[61] Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[62] "International Conference on International Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (No. 2002-1114-SAS)" *Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences*, <http://www.icasinc.org/2002/2002l/ 2002lsas.html>, site visited on 27 November 2011.

comprehensive definition of the problem clearly impedes further development of international antiterrorism cooperation".[63]

In condition of lack of consensus on definition of terrorism, regional definitions of terrorism are commonly in use. Laqueur claims that;

"The way states, organizations or integrated structures such as the European Union define terrorism and the concept related to it displays how they perceive the threat and what measures they would take to eliminate it".[64]

At the same time, there are some problems within the Western perspective regarding the issue of definition. European states aim at protecting the individual and individual rights within their definition of terror. According to LaPorte;

"The Union views terrorism as mainly a police problem, not a military problem as Americans do, and the response to increased terrorism in the Union is to increase European cooperation."[65]

It is possible to say that the Western and the Eastern parts of the world are not in position of finding a common understanding of terrorism, therefore international cooperation on fighting against terrorism is not very well established. In order to solve the problem of a definition of terrorism in a common legitimate way, the definitions and objectives of terrorism need to be redefined within the framework of international community.

Defining terrorism also depends on point of view of a person, who attempts to define. As commonly known, terrorism is a violence against civilians or military targets, which is the most popular, brief and basic definition of a difficult term; however, a common discourse is also popular among social scientists; one's terrorists is another man's freedom fighters or heroes. Nevertheless, taking into account that terrorism is a crime against humanity by

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[63] "International, *op. cit.*
[64] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 16.
[65] Erin LaPorte, "The Marriage of Venus and Mars: Europe and America - A New Relationship Against Terrorism", *Transatlantic Security*, 2003, <http://transatlantic.security.pronato.com/ EU.terrorism2.htm>, site visited on 5 April 2010.

killing *man* and disrupting the public order and political structure, makes the angle of this thesis very clear. There is no way to justify unlawful acts of terrorists in democratic state structures.

If one tries to find a single, *unique,* but insufficient definition of terrorism, Andreas Armborst's quotation from Louise Richardson will be helpful;

> "If there is one single explanation it is that terrorism is a tactic and people use it because they think that, at some level, it works"[66]

Despite the lack of general definition of terrorism, a common element is always pointed out in every attempt to define the term; a terrorist action has always goals, basically spreading fear among society in an audience larger than real target group, in other words the point is to kill one or few to terrorize a larger group. Terrorist organizations and its members like to be respected or be accepted as an actor in politics. All their actions intend to produce public support by fear for their cause and/or public pressure over legitimate authorities.

All aforementioned information shows how difficult to define terrorism is, especially political terrorism which is the gravity point of this thesis. Upcoming parts, with the help of case studies, will be beneficial to see the *big picture* about political terrorism.

The case studies of this thesis, PKK and ETA, which are terrorist organizations with separatist aims and goals, will be examined in dedicated parts. Separatist actions of terrorist organizations use violence against unarmed citizens, who are not directly related to the conflict; however, they become the victims of constructed terrorism. Among social scientists, PKK and ETA are considered as different types of *organizations* in terms of their methods and terrorist attacks. For

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[66] Louise Richardson, *What Terrorist Wants: Understanding the Terrorist Threat*, London, John Murray, 2006, p. 26, quoted in Andreas Armborst, "Modelling Terrorism and Political Violence", *International Relations*, vol. 24, no. 4, 2010, p.422.

this reason, a brief information about PKK's and ETA's methods that they use in *political terrorism* actions will be helpful for upcoming parts.

Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca give ETA and PKK as examples of distinct groups as organization, while one uses *terrorist methods*, the other uses *guerrilla warfare*. According to them, ETA is a terrorist organization which holds no territorial control in Spain and attacks clandestinely. From 1970s, ETA has perpetrated numerous attacks against security forces through shootings and selective killings aimed at informers, drug dealers, entrepreneurs, politicians and public officials; and it has majorly concentrated on bombings. On the other side, they claim that, PKK is a terrorist organization, which has base in the mountains in the southeastern of Turkey, attacks military targets and officials by guerrilla warfare, in other words by hit-and-run tactics.[67]

Calling them *guerrilla* or *terrorist*, and the difference in terms of methods do not make any distinction on the purpose of this thesis. The unequivocal truth is, they have an element in common, both of them are illegal separatist organizations, which uses dirty terror tactics such as killings, bombings, assassinations, and commit crime against humanity.

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[67] Luis de la Calle, and Ignacio Sánches Cuenca, "What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism", *Politics & Society*, vol. 39, no. 3, 2011, pp. 461-463.

## 3. HISTORY OF EACH CASES

As mentioned earlier, terrorism is hard to explain but deeply related to our lives. A regular citizen of any country, who follows international or national media, for sure (s)he has seen the usage of term. The term itself may have different meanings and definitions in every country; however, its *goal* is common; terrorizing *regular* people.

Apart from definition of word terrorism and its explanations based on its definition, understanding the meaning of terrorism is important; nevertheless, it is only one part of the *equation* to understand what people live with. The second part of the equation, which has an equal importance as the definition and meaning of the terrorism, is history of each cases. As terrorist attacks often are not individual acts and a group is always behind the actions, examining and knowing these groups are essential to understand what is happening and why.

For the purpose of this thesis, selected study cases are the separatist terrorist groups of Spain and Turkey, which are quite important in the contemporary history of the 20th century. The members/leaders and supporters of ETA in Spain and PKK in Turkey, believe that they have or had *reasons* to use armed struggle against their states. Maybe these two groups, ETA and PKK, are today's main security problem of Spain and Turkey, but the problems that they had/have in their own histories, is still shaping today's policies and political agendas.

On this part of the thesis, history of aforementioned terrorist groups, ETA and PKK, which are already labeled as *terrorist organizations* by the European

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Union and the United States of America Government, and history of Basque and Kurdish nationalism will be examined in order to understand *the reasons* behind terrorist attacks against the Spanish and the Turkish states. A proper examination of the history of each case will be helpful for the upcoming parts of this thesis.

## 3.1. History of Kurdish Nationalism, the Roots of PKK

In today's Turkey, the main discussion goes on the subject is: who came the region first. Kurdish writers and thinkers often claim that the Kurdish presence goes through the history of Mesopotamia, the territory corresponding to modern-day Iraq, the northeastern section of Syria and smaller parts of southwestern Iran.[68] İsmail Beşikçi, a Kurdish writer, claims that tribal families of Mesopotamia were Kurdish.[69] Others also claim that the historical Medes or Median Empire, also known as the ancient Iranian people, was the ancient of Kurds ethnic origin. According to the book of Safiye Dündar, most of the Russian historians, who work on Kurdish issue, defense and promote this idea, and even Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK, points out the Iranian Medes as ancestors of Kurdish people.[70]

On the other hand, Turkish historians and writers often claim that the people known as Kurdish held Turkish ethnic origin. Turkish writers claim that the Kurdish people migrated with Hun Turks from Khazar region to the West, until today's region of Turkey and the Middle East.[71]

As one can see, there is no accurate information about the origin of Kurdish people; however, their presence in the Middle East is unequivocally true. The reason behind the discussions about origin of Kurds in Turkish literature is

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[68] This defined area often called as 'Kurdistan'.
[69] İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller*, Ankara, Yurt Yayınları, 1992, p. 106.
[70] Safiye Dündar, *Kürtler ve Azınlık Tartışmaları*, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2009, p. 41.
[71] Ibid., p.42.

that Kurdish problem is deeply related with political questions of today's Turkey. As Kurdish authors claims that Kurdish people were in the region of Turkey even before the Turks and others, they identify Kurds as *real owner* of the region. On the other side, Turkish authors claim that Kurdish people are Turks in ethnic origin. With this assertion, they try to avoid the Kurdish problem.

The Kurds in the Middle East, historically, lived in mountainous areas and valleys. That made them exposed to different waves of invaders, who passed over the region, like Mongols, Safavid etc.; however, they always managed to have some relative autonomy and preserved their traditions. As Kurds lived as tribal large families, they ruled themselves not as big states, but just as tribal families.

After aforementioned information about Kurdish origin and discussions in Turkey on the subject of 'who was the first one in the region', this section of thesis focuses on the Ottoman Era of the region. As today's modern Republic of Turkey founded over the Ottoman heritage in terms of territory and population, the Kurdish presence in Ottoman history and first rebellion movements under the Ottoman rule can be taken as roots of armed struggle and the Kurdish desire for an independent state.

### 3.1.1. Kurdish Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1299 until 1922, the year of the abolishment of the Ottoman Monarchy. The Ottoman Empire was founded as tribal family state by *Osman Bey*, in north-western Anatolia.[72] With the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, at that time the name of the city was Constantinople, the tribal monarchic Ottoman State started to control of Byzantium population of the city, which was Christian. With the conquest of Istanbul, Christians started to live under the Ottoman rule, this meant that Ottoman had become more than a tribal family, this is to say, the Ottoman Empire.

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[72] "Ottoman Empire", *Britannica Online Encyclopedia*, <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire>, site visited on 11 January 2012.

When the Ottoman Empire continued to enlarge in the area, the first relation happened with Kurds under the rule of Sultan Selim I, in 1514. The Kurds played an important role within the Persian-Ottoman dispute, and managed to use the situation in their favor. The advisor of Sultan Selim I, Idrissi Bitlissi, had the idea of gaining Kurdish *agas'*[73] support with recognizing their rights and privileges. As Kurds accepted the Ottoman supremacy, they enjoyed their wide autonomy, and the Ottoman Empire was protected by Kurdish tribes against the Persian threat on borders.[74] For a while, Kurds did not have problem on ruling themselves under the Ottoman supremacy.

American and French Revolutions brought the idea of *nationalism* to the world politics, and in the early 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had difficulties on controlling the territories of large scale. The Sultan Mahmud II, who was 30th Sultan of the Empire and ruled between 1808 and 1839, saw the centralization reforms as the way of the salvation of the Empire. These reforms brought the end of Kurdish landowners' tribal autonomies in Kurdish populated areas. The end of power of the Kurdish *agas* made a significant transformation of the power and leadership from *agas* to *sheikhs* in the region.[75]

The modernization and centralization reforms, known as the *Tanzimat reforms* period, started with Sultan Mahmud II, and lasted until the declaration of the first constitution in 1876. The declaration of the first constitution aimed to secure the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against nationalist movements., which were affected by ideas of French Revolution. With the constitution, the religious minorities had certain rights under the Ottoman Empire rule. After the Tanzimat period, the new administrative system, which gave privileges to Ottoman Sultan's non-Muslim subjects, started to be called as *Millet System*.

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[73] Large landowner, tribal leader.
[74] Kendal Nezan, "A Brief Survey of the History of the Kurds", *Collated Contributions and Messages*, Paris, Kurdish Institute of Paris, 1992, p.30.
[75] Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880 – 1925*, Austin, University of Texas Press,, 1989, p. xvi.

Within the Millet System, people who lived under the same Ottoman flag, were divided into different groups in terms of religious identities. Each of them formed a single *millet* -can be translated as *nation*-. Under this new administrative system, millet was an autonomous religious group, which had rights to self-govern under its own laws and headed by their religious leader. The religious leader of every group had responsibilities to the central government, such as collecting and paying taxes and maintaining internal security.[76]

According to this definition of the Millet System, Muslims, Jews, Armenians and Rums composed different millets in the Ottoman Empire. While the Millet System used to define the people regarding their religion inside the Ottoman Empire; as Bernard Lewis states, the Europeans started to call Ottoman Empire as *Turkey* and its population as *Turks,* but Turks identified themselves as Muslims.[77] This was natural result of the Millet System. As Ottoman's Muslim population was not conscious about their ethnic identity, calling one as Turk meant that all Muslims in Ottoman Empire were Turks.

As the Kurds were Muslims, they had been accepted as 'one' with the rest of the Muslim population. According to Safiye Dündar, Kurds did not have any discrimination under the Ottoman Empire rule. The writer indicates that non-Muslim population were not obliged to be drafted, because they were paying a sum of money instead of going to the military service; however, Kurds were subjects to the military service, and this was one of the evidences of equal treatment to the Kurds under the Ottoman Empire rule.[78]

The centralization reforms and defining the population regarding their religion, Millet System, made power shift on Kurdish society from *agas* to

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[76] "Millet System", *Britannica Online Encyclopedia*, <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382871/millet>, site visited on 27 October 2012.
[77] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 2.
[78] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

*sheikhs*. The role of sheikhs and their importance in Muslim societies are important to understand the new type of this leadership among society.

In Muslim culture, a sheikh is frequently identified as the servant of God and even in some societies, he is accepted as the *voice of God*. On this point, a sheikh simply distinguishes himself as leader of his followers (*murids*), who are a group of people who listens and frequently follows what sheikh says. On his book Robert Olson says that a sheikh has strong personality, which is supported by his charismatic appearance. He indicates that in Muslim groups, sheikhs have responsibilities among the society, such as to settle disputes among followers. The high reputation of sheikh is deeply related on his family's saintly genealogy, sagacity, and charisma. Briefly, Olson states that a sheikh simply carries all the abilities of a modern politician.[79]

The followers of certain sheikh also believe that their leader is capable of performing miracles, such on medical problems. As because of their miracles, sheikhs have been respected by his followers during their lifetime, and also the belief that sheikhs even capable of performing miracles after death, which makes their tombs as special places for his followers. The importance of worship at the tombs of death sheikhs makes them iconic personalities, heroes after their death. In this sense, in a rural Muslim community, a sheikh briefly serves during their lifetime and even after death as doctor, lawyer, priest and even psychiatrist.[80] This importance of sheikhs made them natural leaders among society, and capable of mobilizing their followers easily. As their followers would listen to sheikhs' words as *ultimate advices* or even *orders* on a certain subject, a single sentence can create a huge effect over their followers.

After the disappearance of *agas* on Kurdish populated areas, the Ottoman Empire was not able to control the region. The disappearance of *agas* resulted in increased lawlessness, banditry. Briefly, one can say that political situation and

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[79] Olson, *op.cit.*, p. 3.
[80] Ibid.

the high importance of religion among society made the shift of power possible to the sheikhs.[81]

When the *agas* had been eliminated on the Kurdish populated areas, the lands started to be granted to the new leaders, sheikhs. Olson states that the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 helped sheikhs to gain more land and, as a consequence, more power among the society. With large landowners, tribal leaders, the officials, sheikhs were the  beneficiary ones of this law code. The idea behind this code was the desire of the Ottoman Empire to have more centralized power in the region.[82] Another way to gain power for the sheiks was through the marriage with the daughters of villages' authorities. On this condition of the Kurdish populated region, a Kurdish sheikh, Sheikh Ubeydullah, made his name, first as a religious leader then the political leader of the Kurdish population.

Apart from the land that he owned, Sheikh Ubeydullah gained more power because of the marriages. Many of tribal family leaders had been in allegiance with Sheikh Ubeydullah through marriages. His family name, his charisma, lands; alliances through marriages and having a large number of followers gave Sheikh Ubeydullah a higher power and bring a valuable respect. According to Olson, some tribal family leaders called Sheikh Ubeydullah as *Your Highness*,[83] which was the form of address to the kings and sultans.

The importance of Sheikh Ubeydullah for the Ottoman Empire showed itself during the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. The Ottoman Empire provided weapons and Sheikh Ubeydullah entered the war with his followers.[84] The war ended with the Berlin Treaty in 1878.[85] During the aftermath of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1878, Sheikh Ubeydullah did not give back the weapons those were provided by the Ottoman Empire and the Empire did not provide

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[81] Ibid. p. 4.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid. p. 3.
[84] Bilal Şimşir, *Kürtçülük 1887-1923*, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009, p. 179.
[85] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

compensations for the destruction of the war in the region, which created hunger in the Kurdish populated areas. Sheikh Ubeydullah made demands from the Empire and, meantime, he started to collect more weapons and people for his campaign against the Ottoman Empire.[86] He even created the first Kurdish alliance in the region, *Kurdish Tribal League*.[87] The Kurdish League was relatively supported by the Ottoman Empire with the idea that Kurds could be used against Armenian nationalist movements and had a success for short time.[88]

Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt movement had finished with his surrender in 1882, he exiled to Mecca where he died.[89]

What made Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt unique and famous is the letter that he sent to British Vice Consul in Başkale in July 1880;

> "The Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different (to that of others), and their laws and customs are distinct. They are known among all nations as mischievous and corrupt… The chiefs and rulers of Kurdistan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan (the Christians) one and all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on this way with two governments, and necessarily something must be done so that the European governments having under-stood the matter shall enquire into our state… We want our affairs to be in our hands… Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continued evil deeds, and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of the two governments of impure intentions."[90]

Because of the existence of this letter, Sheikh Ubeydullah's intention is often considered as that he was seeking to create an independent Kurdish State, not a kingdom or tribal governance. According to Olson, Sheikh Ubeydullah's letter to British Vice Consul was an evidence of Sheikh's aim to create an independent Kurdish State, which made his movement the first Kurdish

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[86] Christopher Houston, *Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2008, p. 53.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[89] Edgar O'Ballance, *The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, p. 8.
[90] Olson, *op. cit.*, p.2.

nationalist movement. Olson also stated that Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt was a great example of the role of sheikhs in the region, and also it is an evidence of Kurdish nationalism, in which the nationalist ideas and religion became nested.[91]

Attempts of the Ottoman Empire to control the region continued after the following years of Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt. Sultan Abdülhamid II established a new army from the people of eastern Anatolia; *Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments*. The Hamidiye Light Cavalry named by Sultan Abdülhamid II himself, and the word *Hamidiye* literally means 'belonging to Hamid'. The process of the creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments began in 1890 and finished in 1891.[92]

After Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt, there were other revolts in smaller scale. Sheikh Ubeydullah's revolt experience showed potential danger for another large-scale rebellion against the central Ottoman authority. As the Kurdish tribes were living in the region, they were recruited as soldiers to the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army. Briefly, tribes provided soldiers for the army and they constructed the main body of the new army of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments.[93] At first, most of the tribes, but not all, accepted to enter the army. The main mobilizing power was again the use of religion, as the army was created against non-Muslim powers; Russians and Armenians.[94]

In the creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army, the tribes of the region submitted population figures, which showed all men between 17 and 40. The selected ones who were to become the officers of each regiments, were sent to a special school (*Hamidiye Süvari Mektebi*), which was created to serve just for the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army. As Olson stated that a Kurd could rise to rank of colonel in the army; however, his assistant had to be regular Ottoman soldier.[95]

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[91] Ibid., p. xvii.
[92] Bayram Kodaman, *Şark Meselesi Işığı Altında Sultan 2. Abdülhamid'in Doğu Anadolu Politikası*, İstanbul, Orkun Yayınevi, 1983, p. 45.
[93] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[94] Olson, *op.cit.*, p. 8.
[95] Ibid., p. 9.

Hamidiye Regiments had been created mainly to be used against a possible threat from Armenians and Russians; however, Sultan Abdülhamid II also wanted to establish more central power by controlling tribes. As tribes were already armed to protect their assets and lands, taking them into the army was the logical way to make connection with the central Ottoman Government. As the Ottoman Empire gave tribes official statues (large tribes made a single regiment by themselves), and individuals could hold the colonel rank in the army, it succeeded to keep them away from any idea of rebellion against the central authority.

Apart from controlling the tribes by creating an army from them, Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army was a way of creating a new social-political balance to make government more effective in Kurdish populated areas, and the implementation of religion, Islam, as common point between Kurds and other Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[96]

One can call Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments as regional army, because of the recruitment of local people, but some regiments also fought under the Ottoman Empire flag in the Balkan Wars. The regiments, which had been in Balkan Wars, experienced warfare and exposed the nationalist ideas in Balkans. By this experience, they started to question their nationalist feelings about being Kurds, and tried to spread the idea among Kurdish society.[97] Briefly, the creation of Hamidiye Regiments, the education that the Kurdish officers had in Istanbul, and the Balkan experience gave chance to question their ideas on nationalism.

*The Young Turks* movement in 1908, which composed by young individuals who had education at abroad, mostly in France, brought a new era to the Ottoman Empire politics. The movement started as opposition against the Sultan Abdulhamid II. The driven idea for Young Turks was to form a government and to put back in force the constitution of 1876, which was abolished by

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[96] Olson, *op.cit.*, p. 8.
[97] Ibid., p. 12.

Abdülhamid II in 1878.[98] With the efforts of Young Turks, Sultan Adbülhamid II re-installed the constitution in 1908, which created a public sphere for political organizations.[99]

The Young Turks movement created the *Committee of Union and Progress* (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) which served as political party and ruled the state until the World War I ended in 1918.[100] As the Young Turks movement opened the way of creation of political organization by the Committee of Union and Progress, Kurds also created a similar organization in 1908;[101] Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid (*Kürt Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti*).[102] This society was the first Kurdish organization, which had members from famous Kurdish families. The political organizations started to be created in that time; however, the sheikhs were still effective among the society. Right after the Young Turks came into power and formed a government, sheikhs made a petition of following seven articles;

"(1) Adopt Kurdish administration in five Kurdish kazas (administrative districts).

(2) Adopt Kurdish as the language of instruction in the Kurdish areas.

(3) The appointment of Kurdish-speaking *kaymakam*s and *müdür*s (both administrative officials) as well as other officials.

(4) Administration of law and justice should be according to the Sharia.

(5) The positions of *kadı* (religious judge) and mufti (canon law Lawyer responsible for delivering formal legal opinions) to be filled by adherents of the şafii school of law.

(6) Taxes to be levied in accordance with the Sharia.

(7) Taxes collected for the exemption from labor service to remain in effect, provided they were set aside for the repair and maintenance of roads in the five Kurdish towns."[103]

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[98] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 12.
[99] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[100] Ibid.
[101] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[102] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[103] Ibid., p 17.

As the activities of Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid increased, Young Turks saw no advantage of having it open, and shut it down in 1909. A second Kurdish political organization, Kurdish Hope Society (*Hevi-i Kürt Cemiyeti*) was founded in the beginning of 1912, but not lasted very long and closed in very short time.[104]

According to Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, in World War I, Kurdish tribes majorly remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire.[105] The World War I was ended for Ottoman Empire by the Armistice of Mudros. It was signed on 30 October 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World War I.[106]  However, aftermath of the World War I brought interesting developments both for the upcoming Turkish Republic, and for Kurds. Olson states that the Armistice of Mudros was the time that the dilemma of autonomy or independence for Kurds started.[107] Kirişçi and Winrow indicate that while some tribes wanted to create their kingdoms, other supported the resistance movement in Anatolia. The Kurds were not completely conscious of their ethnic identity, and as a consequence they were defending the idea of preservation of their tribal power and autonomy for their tribes, not in Kurdish nationalism.[108]

After the Armistice of Mudros, the negotiations for further peace treaties started in January 1919, in Paris. During the series of conferences, various discussions took place between the Ottoman Empire representatives and representative of Allies. While the negotiations were continuing in Paris, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) started the resistance movement against Western powers to defend the *homeland*.[109] Mustafa Kemal was a General of the Ottoman Army, who started the revolt against Western powers and became the founder of the Republic of Turkey.

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[104] Ibid.
[105] Kemal Kirişçi, and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*, Oxon, Routledge Curzon, 2004, p.68.
[106] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[107] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 12;
    Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[108] O'Ballance, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
[109] Olson, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

Şerif Paşa, who was the leader of the Ottoman Empire representative group in peace negotiations that started in January 1919 in Paris, made an agreement on 20 November 1919 with Boghos Nubar, head of Armenian delegation, about Armenians and Kurds.[110] According to this agreement, Şerif Paşa accepted the formation of an Armenian State in some part of Kurdish populated areas, and had the guarantee for an independent Kurdish State.[111] As the agreement would split the Kurdish populated areas in favor of Armenians, Kurdish tribal leaders sent telegrams to central power of the Ottoman Empire stating that they were not accepting Şerif Paşa's agreement.[112] Moreover, some tribal leaders sent another telegram to the French Commissioner in Istanbul expressing that Kurds and Turks were brothers in terms of race and religion.[113] Şerif Paşa's actions brought Mustafa Kemal and Kurds closer to fight for resistance against others. Some Kurds supported the resistance movement in Anatolia.[114]

On 10 August 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was signed between the Ottoman Empire and Allies of the World War I. The treaty was basically a sharing plan of Empire territories by the Allies. Total article number of treaty was 433; however, only two of them held importance for Kurds. The Koçgiri Rebellion, which broke out in 1920, took following articles of Treaty of Sevres as reasons;

> Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the

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[110] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[111] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt Dosyası*, İstanbul, Tekin Yayınevi, 1993, p. 14.
[114] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.

Article 64: If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey.If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet.[115]

Right after the World War I ended on 11 November 1918, Kurds founded a new political organization with the name Society for the Progress of Kurdistan *(Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti)* based in Istanbul, which was active in Koçgiri rebellion, on 17 December 1918.[116] The Society opened branches in other cities and started to promote Kurdish nationalism among the people.[117] According to Olson, while Mustafa Kemal was forming his resistance movement in Anatolia, he became aware of the actions of Society for the Progress of Kurdistan and talked with one of the Kurdish organizers. The Kurds stated that they had the intention to create Kurdistan to Mustafa Kemal, by suggesting the Wilson's Principles[118] (also known as President Wilson's Fourteen Points). Mustafa Kemal's response was that the Wilson's Principles were meaningless for the peoples of East, and Kurds should stand beside him in his fight against invaders.[119]

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[115] "Treaty of Lausanne", *Brigham Young University Library*, <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne>, site visited on 6 January 2013.
[116] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
[117] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[118] The statement of President of Wilson in 8 January 1918, then known as "Fourteen Points". For the complete statement and list of principles, please see Appendix I.
[119] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

When the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920, the resistance government (Ankara Government) was already in power in Ankara. As the resistance movement started on 19 May 1919, Ankara Government took over the control of movement by 1920 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal organized two important congresses for the resistance movement; Erzurum Congress between 23 July-7 August 1919, and Sivas Congress between 4-11 September 1919. According to Olson, Kurds were invited by Mustafa Kemal and Mustafa Kemal gave the guarantee that Kurds and Turks would have equal rights in the new structure of state, if the resistance brought success.[120]

Meantime, some Kurds were gathering up support with the help of aforementioned Society for the Progress of Kurdistan and its branches.[1] According to Kirişçi and Winrow, between 1919 and 1921, Ankara Government had to deal with 23 rebellions, which were all against the efforts and actions of Ankara Government.[122] However, only the Koçgiri Rebellion held importance.

The Koçgiri Rebellion originally started in 1918 with the help of Society for the Progress of Kurdistan. As movements were organized in different areas of the region, it had three leaders; Nuri Dersimi (leader in Dersim area), Alişan Bey and Haydar Bey.[123] The rebellion started to spread fast and even attack Ankara Government's soldiers.[124] According to Olson, Ankara Government appointed leaders Alişan Bey and Haydar Bey as governor and mayor to defuse the rising rebellion; however, they did not stop gathering more and more tribes on their side.[125] Even some of the Kurdish tribes started to say that they were eager to have independence. As the number of Kurds who participated in the rebellion

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[120] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[121] Dündar, *op.cit.*, p. 122.
[122] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
[123] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 122-123
[124] Ayşe Hür, "Sene 1921: Koçgiri İsyanı, Alişer ve Zarife", *Radikal*, 10 March 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse_hur/sene_1921_kocgiri_isyani_aliser_ve_zarife-1124483>, site visited on 10 March 2013.
[125] Olson *op. cit.*, p. 28.

rose, they straightened their political position and continued to attack on Ankara Government's forces in the region.[126]

In November 1920 (the exact day of November differs from one source to another) tribal leaders had a meeting and made a list of their demands from Ankara Government. An immediate response was demanded for the followings;

"1) The Ankara Government should state whether or not it accepted officially the promise of Kurdish autonomy as agreed.

2) The Ankara Government should inform the leaders of the Dersim who wrote the declaration of their attitude toward the administration of an autonomous Kurdistan.

3) All of the Kurdish prisoners in jail at Elazig, Malatya, Sivas, and Erzincan should be freed.

4) Turkish officials must be withdrawn from all areas with a Kurdish majority.

5) The Turkish military forces sent to the Koçgiri region should be withdrawn."[127]

As a response to these demands, Ankara Government sent its representatives to Dersim from Elazig; however while they were on their way, Kurdish tribes sent a telegram to Ankara stating "If an independent Kurdistan will not be established in the vilayet of Diyarbakir, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis as stipulated in the Treaty of Sevres, the tribal chiefs of western Dersim will take armed action".[128] The imminent response of Ankara Government was that to consider the demands. As the month passed to December, heavy winter conditions came to the region, and tribal leaders considered to hold off the armed actions until the spring of 1921. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal issued an arrest order for Nuri Dersimi with the charge of creating an armed groups of 1200 men against Ankara Government. Eventually, on 20 December of 1920, Dersimi was arrested.[129]

The arrest of Dersimi did not stop the rebellion. Ankara Government's forces and Kurds started to attack each other in January 1921. More Ankara Government's forces were deployed to areas, where the rebellion broke out, and

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[126] Ibid.
[127] Hür, *op. cit.*
[128] Mumcu, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.
[129] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

Government demanded an immediate and unconditional surrender of the Kurds; however, they did not receive any response as they hoped and expected.[130] By the March of 1921, clashes between Ankara Government's forces and Kurds rose. Kurdish tribes killed one of the commanders of Ankara Government's forces, took most of their guns, ammunitions, and horses.[131] With the thought that they were victorious, rebels sent a telegram to Ankara with demand of a creation of quasi-autonomous *vilayet* (province, large town) staffed by Kurds, and received a negative response.[132] Ankara Government, first declared martial law in Elazig, Erzincan and Sivas, then sent more troops to the region. Eventually, by the April 1921, the rebellion was mostly suppressed.[133] The rest of the rebels either surrendered or were captured and the rebellion finished in June 1921.[134]

As already mentioned**,** by 1920, Ankara Government was functioning and active in the region of Turkey on controlling the resistance movement. The period between 19 May 1919 (starting day of the resistance) and 24 July 1923 (the day that Treaty of Lausanne was signed) called as 'Turkish Independence War'. During this time, Musfata Kemal and his companions started to form a new state model, rights for people etc. With this intention, Ankara Government announced the first constitution, 1921 Constitution (*Teşkilat-I Esasiye*), of the new era of Turkey. The 1921 Constitution was quite short, containing 23 articles;[135] however, it was the base of future constitutions in Turkey. The said constitution was accepted in January 1921, by the Grand National Assembly.[136]

### 3.1.2. Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey

The 1921 Constitution attempted to define certain points of the new state structure such as the definition of nation, name of the assembly and so on. The

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[130] Ibid, p. 32.
[131] Ibid, p. 32.
[132] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[133] Olson, *op. cit.*, 32.
[134] Dündar, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.
[135] "Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu", *Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa21.htm>, site visited on 12 January 2013.
[136] Ibid.

first article[137] of the constitution made a reference to a nation for the first time. It is important to point out that the usage of nation was significant, because all people under the Ottoman rule were the subjects of Sultan. Hence, calling them as *nation* was the premier evidence of the goal of the new movement. Article three[138] called the assembly as 'Grand National Assembly' and the State as 'State of Turkey'. This was an unofficial rejection of the Ottoman Sultanate and adaptation of the first label for a new state: the State of Turkey. According to Kirişçi and Winrow, the usage of these two terms, Turkey and the nation, paved the way for the usage of 'Nation of Turkey' by Mustafa Kemal to describe all population who were living in the region of Turkey as a nation.[139] The new partial description of the state and the nation used for a while without further explanation. One can say that the population under the new state's jurisdiction called as *sole nation* without giving any reference neither the race nor the religion. The importance of the use of this new nation description, might be interpreted as a reference to solidarity among Kurds and Turks.[140]

The process of the foundation of republic continued with the abolishment decision of the Ottoman Sultanate. On 2 November 1922, the Sultanate of the Ottoman Empire was officially abolished with a decision of the Grand National Assembly.[141] In his speech, Mustafa Kemal used the terms 'Turkish Nation' (*Türk Milleti*) and 'Turkish Government (*Türk Hükümeti*)'.[142]

The importance of this shift from the *Nation of Turkey* to *Turkish Nation* was quite significant on the way to identify the new nation. One can say that, while the use of 'Nation of Turkey' was addressing the people without any ethnic background references, the use of 'Turkish Nation' was understood as a reference to the Turkish race, which was interpreted as a denial of other ethnic backgrounds

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[137] Article 1: Sovereignty is vested in the nation without condition. Governmental system is based on the principle of self-determination and government by people.
[138] Article 3: The State of Turkey is governed by the Grand National Assembly and its government is titled as "the Government of Grand National Assembly.
[139] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[142] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

except *Turks*. In fact, as the land that the new state was rising called Turkey, usage of 'Nation of Turkey' made sense with respect to refer all *nations* in Turkey, not just *Turks*. On this shift, Kirişçi and Winrow indicate that the usage of these new terms was the beginning of 'Turkishness', which is the identity concerning the Turkish ethnicity. They also state that all these terms, 'Nation of Turkey', 'Turkish Nation', and even the 'People of Turkey' were used all together without any knowledge on which term means exactly what.[143]

When the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished, Ankara Government started to act as *sole* government, and unique authority in Turkey. As already mentioned, the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920; however, has never been put in force as Ankara Government declared that the Ottoman Empire's Government was insufficient.

After the Treaty of Sevres, Kurds expected to gain certain autonomy as the aforementioned Article 62 referred to a need for 'local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish Areas', while the Article 64 pointed out the possibility that the Kurds might be granted with independence. Since the Treaty of Sevres has never been put in force, the provisioned Kurdish rights stayed disused. Nevertheless, the expectation about independence or autonomy continued under the new state.

The resistance movement in Anatolia against Western powers became successful in 1923, and as there were no binding treaties for Ankara Government, it was able to sign peace treaties. The Treaty of Lausanne, which was the founding treaty of the State of Turkey, was signed on 24 July 1923.[144] With this treaty, the foundation of the State of Turkey was completed, and it was officially recognized in international area.

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[143] Ibid.
[144] "Treaty of Lausanne", *Brigham Young University Library*, <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/ Treaty_of_Lausanne>, site visited on 6 January 2013.

As stated before, some Kurdish tribes revolted during the Turkish Independence War (1919-1923); however, Ankara Government continued the resistance and won the war against Western powers and signed the Treaty of Lausanne. Kurds expected to be mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne; however, there was not an article concerning them.[145]

While the Treaty of Lausanne stated official basis of the new state, it only mentioned non-Muslims in Turkey. With respect to the Treaty, non-Muslims were accepted as minorities of Turkey, and Part I, Section III (Articles from 37 to 45)[146] of the Treaty of Lausanne explained minority rights and their protection. As the dedicated section of the Treaty of Lausanne did not mention Kurds, all the expectation of Kurdish tribes about a possible autonomy, as provisioned in the Treaty of Sevres, fell into the void. Some tribes and sheikhs were furious about the situation and the reforms of new state.

Mustafa Kemal and his companions declared the form of the state as *Republic* on 29 October 1923. This declaration made the official name of the state as Republic of Turkey as it is today.

The abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate made Ankara Government the only authority in administration of state affairs, and the Treaty of Lausanne brought the international recognition of the State; however, the Caliphate was still in force. The Caliph was the leader of all Muslims in the World, and Ottoman Sultans were called as Caliph from the beginning of the 16th century. The duality in the new state order, Ankara Government and the Caliph (although the sultan title was already abolished), was considered as an obstacle for planned reforms.[147] For further reforms, which were in mind of Mustafa Kemal, the Caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924, and in April in the same year National Law Court Organization Regulation abolished the Sharia courts.[148] Both

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[145] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[146] For the Articles, please see Appendix II.
[147] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[148] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

abolishment of office of Caliph and sharia courts made transformation possible to a laic state structure.

After the official foundation of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal and his companions started to apply series of reforms to transform the new state. First, the National Assembly of Turkey adopted a new constitution. For the first time, the 1924 Constitution tried explain what Turkish (*Turk*) is. Article 88 of the said constitution said;

> "The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, to be called Turk in terms of citizenship. Every child born in Turkey or in a foreign land from a Turkish father; any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining the age of consent to become Turkish subject; and any individual who acquires Turkish Nationality by the law, is a Turk. Turkish citizenship may be forfeited or lost in certain circumstances specified by law.[149]

Regarding this definition of Turk, one can say that the term was used in order to name the citizenship, not the ethnicity. When one accept the term Turk as a name of common citizenship, this also means that Kurds called as Turks, which indicates a single *nation,* the Turks or Turkish Nation. However, as *Turk* is one of many ethnicities in Turkey, using it to define every person regardless of his/her ethnicity can cause the sentiment of denial among others except ethnic *Turk*s.

The new state structure and the abolishment of Caliphate were reasons for rebellion under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. According to Andrew McGregor, the Office of Caliph was the source of the religious bond between Kurds and Turks, and its elimination was not welcomed by Kurds.[150] Because of the abolishment of Caliphate, some Kurdish tribal leaders and sheikhs accused the

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[149] Author's translation from Turkish.
Whole articles of the constitution can be found in (Turkish): "1924 Anayasası", *Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa24.htm>, site visited on 27 November 2012.
[150] Andrew McGregor, "The Shaykh Said Revolt and Ankara's Return to the Past in its Struggle with the Kurds", *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2008,

Republic of Turkey of not having a religion.[151] This accusation was made; although, the second article of the 1924 Constitution made a clear statement about religion of state;

> "Article 2: The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara."

The Treaty of Lausanne did not mention Kurds, either an independent state for them. According to Olson, conditions of the Treaty of Lausanne forced Kurds to revolt and claim rights with armed struggle.[152] The major rebellion in the new republic was Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. However, scholars suggest that the root of this rebellion may go back to 1923, the Kurdish political organization called *Azadi*.[153]

The organization was established first with the name *Ciwata Azadi Kurd* (Society for Kurdish Freedom), then was named as *Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd* (Society for Kurdish Independence) but it was always called as Azadi as abbreviation.[154]   Azadi, the nationalist Kurdish political organization was established in May 1923.[155]

British Intelligence Service reported the activities of Azadi and the preparations for the rebellion with following eleven points;

> "1)A new law regarding minorities already applied to Christians; it is Turkish Government intention to transplant all the Kurdish population of the Eastern Vilayets to Western.
> 2) The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Government, which has broken one of the few remaining bonds between the Turks and Kurds.
> 3) Limitation of language to Turkish in the law courts and schools and prohibition of Kurdish being taught in the latter. These measures are stated

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[151] Uğur Mumcu, *Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması 1919-1925*, İstanbul, Tekin Yayınları, 1991, pp. 57-58.
[152] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[153] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 103;
    Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[154] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[155] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

to have rendered education among Kurds practically nonexistent, a state of affairs which is favored by the Turks. The latter have also closed down religious institutions which were the only remaining source of education for the Kurdish race.

4) The word "Kurdistan"was omitted from all educational books and Turkish geographical names are gradually being substituted for Kurdish throughout the country.

5) The senior government officials in Turkish Kurdistan, are practically without exception Turks and Kaymakams (administrative officer) about half Turk and half Kurd. Although the majority of the minor officials are Kurdish, the Turks are extremely careful as to whom they employ and exclude all suspected Kurdish nationalists.

6) General absence of benefit from Government from any of the taxes paid, though these are not infrequently demanded more than once a year. No justice in the courts could be attained except through bribery.

7) Government interference in election of deputies to the Turkish National Assembly from the Kurdish Vilayets (large towns), resulting in almost all deputies being "elected" by Turkish Government orders and not in accordance with the free vote of the people.

8) Turkish policy of setting one Kurdish tribe continually against another to prevent racial unity and consequent power of resistance to Government exactions.

9) Military raids on Kurdish Villages, commandeering of animals, and corruption connected with receipts and payments for supplies requisitioned.

10) Abuse and ill-treatment of Kurdish rank and file in the army and the habit of selecting them for rough and unpleasant duties.

11) Attempts by Turkish Government to exploit Kurdish mineral wealth with the aid of German capital."[156]

According to Olson**,** Azadi had three objectives; to free Kurds from Turkish oppression, to lead the way to the creation of independent state and as the Kurds did not stand alone in this struggle, and to obtain British assistance.[157] The rebellion was named after Sheikh Said, who was a respected religious leader among Kurds; however, Mesut Yeğen indicates that even the Sheikh Said was the leader of rebellion, all preparation and plans were made by Azadi organization.[158] Sheikh Said travelled on the region to promote his idea, to select local leaders and to gather more support for rebellion by denouncing Ankara

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[156] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2011, p. 256.

Government and its policies, and also by saying that he came to restore the religion.[159]

In Azadi congress in 1924, Sheikh Said was present and Azadi decided over a detailed plan for rebellion, which later took place in 1925.[160] As the leader and *face* of the rebellion, Sheikh Said made his propaganda around Islam to gather more support. Consequently, followers of Sheikh Said walked at the center of towns carrying green flags (the flag of Sheikh Said, which represents Kurdish nationalism as well as the symbol of Islam)[161] and Qurans (the Holy Book for Muslims).[162]

In February 1925, the clashes between Kurds and Ankara Government's forces started in Piran (today known as Dicle in Diyarbakır city). In Piran, Turkish forces tried to arrest five fugitives, who came to seek Sheikh Said support. Sheikh Said's brother ordered to attack to Turkish forces, this incident made Sheikh Said to announce the rebellion earlier than planned.[163] Then Sheikh Said arrived Piran with nearly one hundred supporters.[164] After the incident, first clashes happened in Piran, and similar actions were quickly spread to other towns. While clashes were continuing between Sheikh Said's followers and Turkish forces, Sheikh Said continued to call other tribes to join rebellion in order to support Kurdish nationalism by putting his goal as restoration the Caliphate.[165]

The clashes continued until middle of April. As more Turkish forces deployed to the region, the circle narrowed for Sheikh Said and he tried to escape to Iran.[166] On 14 or 15 April Sheikh Said surrendered to Turkish forces.[167] On 16

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[159] Olson, *op. cit.,* p. 94.
[160] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[161] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
[162] McGregor, *op. cit.,*
[163] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 135;
     Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[164] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[165] Ibid, p. 107.
[166] Olson, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.
[167] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

April, most of the Sheikh Said's followers, who were close to sheikh, were captured.[168] They were all sent to the Independence tribunal (*Istiklal Mahkemesi*, War Tribunal) for trials, then were executed on 29 June 1925.[169]

According to Olson, Ankara Government pacified the areas, where the rebellion broke out, by disarming Kurds, burning houses and entire villages, and drove some tribes to Anatolia. Some Kurdish tribal leaders tried to revolt these pacification actions of the Government.[170]

After the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the Government continued on applying reforms in order to modernize the new 'nation'. With calling the population as 'Turkish Nation' and defining the citizenship as being *Turk*, government policies were centralized around the Turkish language.

Kirişçi and Winrow gave the Settlement Law of 1934 as an example to government policies centralized around the usage of Turkish language. The law took Turkish language as base and divided population into three groups; those who spoke Turkish and were of Turkish ethnicity; those who did not speak Turkish, but were considered to be part of Turkish culture; and those who neither spoke Turkish nor belonged to the Turkish culture.[171] One can see that, Turkish language accepted as a fundamental base of the new nation. With the Settlement Law, non-Turkish speakers were re-located to other regions of Turkey with intention of 'integration'. The importance of the Settlement Law for Kurds was also the re-localization. Under the Settlement Law, Kurdish tribes were re-located in western part of the country.

The idea of creating a *nation state* required a common base among society, and the government officials tried to place the Turkish Language as a common point among population; however, scholars considered the aforementioned law as

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[168] Olson, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.
[169] Dündar, *op. cit.*, pp. 134.
[170] Olson, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-122.
[171] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

a tool for assimilation of Kurds in Turkish society.[172] One can say that the main idea behind the law was *integration*, nevertheless; it is clear that forcing people to change their homeland and to immigrate to other regions without their desire can also be considered as *assimilation*.

While new regulations were being applied during the 1925-1938, the revolts of Kurds also continued. Small-scale rebellions against government policies took places in Kurdish populated areas. For the purpose of this thesis only large and significant uprisings have been described. With this intention, another significant revolt, which took place during Mustafa Kemal's lifetime, will be explained in upcoming lines.

Dersim (Tunceli) rebellion took place in Turkey in 1937-1938. Martin van Bruniessen states that Dersim has always had its complex relation with governments. He cited that tribal Kurdish families of Dersim never totally accepted the law of governments, for them; only law was traditional tribal law, they always refused to pay taxes to central government.[173]

After the suppression of Koçgiri Rebellion in 1921, military implied more security measures on the region where they thought that there was always a potential of a probable uprising.[174] Against this fear of a potential uprising, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey put in force a special law for Dersim in December 1935. With respect to the law, city of Dersim went under military governor's control, which had power to arrest individuals indefinitely and to deport families and persons.[175] In 1936, under the military government, construction of roads, bridges, and police posts were completed.[176] While the

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[172] İsmail Beşikçi, *Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı*, Ankara, Yurt Kitap Yayın, 1991, quoted in Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[173] Martin van Bruinessen, "Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)", *Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide*, George J. Andreopoulos (ed.), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp. 141-170.
[174] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[175] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit*., p. 105.
[176] Bruinessen, *op. cit.*

government brought a series of construction to the city, Seyyid Rıza, a religious leader in town, started to make calls for an uprising against government by saying that all these infrastructure constructions would take away sheikh's and large land owners authorities on the region, and these constructions would eventually destroy the tribal tradition.[177] The rebellion started on 21 March 1937 by the burn of a bridge.[178] The first troops entered to the region, but rebels did not give their leader; consequently, more troops arrived.[179] City of Dersim was surrounded by outside to cut the help, which might come from other cities, and on 10 September 1937, Seyyid Rıza, who did not receive any help, surrendered.[180]

The surrender of Seyyid Rıza did not finish the rebellion, the operations against rebels continued through 1938.[181] According to Bruinessen, during the Rebellion, almost 10% of entire population of Dersim was killed. He also states that Kurds often claim that total loss of Kurdish people was even higher than 10%.[182]

The Dersim Rebellion came into the political discourse of Turkey during the year of 2011. As it occurred during the time of single party governance of founder Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), Prime Minister (PM) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that CHP was responsible of the deaths during the Rebellion, he said that today's chairman of CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, should apologize for the deaths of Dersim. He also added, "If the State should apologize for certain incidents like Dersim, if there is a tradition like this, I, the Prime Minister of State of Turkey, apologize."[183]

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[177] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Bruinessen, op. cit.
[180] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
[181] Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[182] Bruinessen, *op. cit.*
[183] "Erdoğan Dersim için Özür Diledi", *Milliyet*, 23 November 2011, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-dersim-icin-ozur-diledi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/ 23.11.2011/1466430/default.htm>, site visited on 23 November 2011.

As in the example of Dersim Rebellion, the history itself is a common tool on political discourses. For the Kurdish issue, the history always comes on the political scene of Turkey.

The first Kurdish rebellion, Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion, hold the importance for Kurdish history as it happened during the Ottoman era and led the way to the creation of a new army from Kurdish population. Sheikh Ubeydullah was the first person, who tried to act with pre-nationalist Kurdish ideas. At that time Kurds did not clearly aware of their ethnic identity; however, they had the common life style, tribal interest, even language among them. He defined the Kurdish population as 'distinct people'. Because of all these reasons, as already explained, scholars accept the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion as the first attempt to create an independent Kurdish State.

Koçgiri, Sheikh Said, and Dersim rebellions were also important on the history of Kurdish nationalism. These three rebellions took place during the lifetime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One can see certain common points between these three rebellions; the importance of religion and the role of religious leaders, the importance of tribal tradition among Kurds, and idea of nationalism. Another common point was that all rebellions stayed local, and none of them created solidarity among the entire Kurdish population. Maybe some tribes acted together; however, they also had oppositions against their actions from Kurds. All rebellions happened against the policies and reforms of newborn republic.

As the Kurds were tribal society, their weakness to gather together for *sole* goal played significant part on why rebellions did not reach success. According to Olson; because of this weakness, tribal and religious leaders played an important role to mobilize people, not the goal or greater nationalism idea.[184] While these rebellions were accepted as early stages of Kurdish nationalism by scholars, the common state policy was to reject their nationalist roots. According to Mesut

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[184] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Yeğen, the State has never accepted the *Kurdish element* on these rebellions, and depending on the time of rebellion, chose to label them as; *tribal problems, banditry, reactionary actions, games of foreign states*.[185]

One can clearly see that after each rebellion, central power applied new measures, for instance; special laws, deploying special forces, creating an army, and so on. Nevertheless, uprisings among Kurdish population continued. Every rebellion brought more problems and more death.

Almost a decade after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death on 10 November 1938, in 1946 the State of Turkey adopted multi-party political system, which gave chance to population to enter politics and found political parties.

In it's early stages the Republic of Turkey was ruled by the founding group. During the single party period (1923-1946), there was no opposition party, and the Republican People's Party was the main and the only political party. After the WWII, the United States of America and other Western states criticized Turkey about having a single party system.[186] In 1946, first multi-party general election took place, and the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) entered to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as opposition party. Since CHP won the elections of 1946, single party rule period lasted for another four years but this time within democracy.

The founders of the new Democrat Party were also former members of CHP. Four years after the first multi-party election of 1946, Democrat Party won the general elections of 1950 and took the power from CHP for the first time. According to Kirişçi and Winrow, for that period, it is possible to say that Kurds began to gain consciousness on their ethnic identity.[187]

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[185] Yeğen, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-24.
[186] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[187] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

Until the foundation of DP, it is possible to say that tribes were collaborating with the Republican People's Party. First multi party election did not make any changes on this cooperation, and the alliance between tribal leaders and CHP continued until the elections of 1950.[188] Being party in power, gave DP more popularity, as a consequence Kurdish local leaders started to become member of DP. Existence of more than one political party provided more political sphere for Kurdish tribes.[189]

Between 1950-1960, government policies changed, and there were economic problems and political instability in Turkey.[190] The rule of Democrat Party lasted until 1960, when military took over the power by a *Coup D'Etat.* Military tried to re-form the State with a new constitution and even introduced a law to give Turkish names to Kurdish villages.[191]

The constitution of 1961 was more liberal than the previous ones, which gave more civil rights to people, autonomy to the universities, chance to students to organize their own organizations and associations.[192] Within the liberal atmosphere of 1961 Constitution, more political parties were founded, students' organizations were created. The students' organizations were majorly created around Marxist-Leninist ideas. Meantime in Kurdish areas, voting for independent candidates started to increase.[193]

One of the political parties which was effective on the creation of Kurdish awareness of ethnic identity was The Turkish Worker's Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TIP). TIP was founded in 1961, within the liberal political atmosphere of 1961 Constitution. Their target group was, majorly, villagers. In 1967, TIP started a series of conferences in eastern part of the country under the name of 'meetings of

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[188] Ibid.
[189] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
[190] Ibid., p. 161.
[191] N. Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, Colorado, Boulder, 1992, p. 88, quoted in Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[192] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[193] Ibid, p. 108.

East (*Doğu Mitingleri*)'.[194] The main goal of these meetings was to draw attention to the problems of eastern part of Turkey and to gain supporters for the party.[195] According to Kirişçi and Winrow, these meetings reached the goal and draw public attention to the problems in the region; although, the government called organizers and participants as *traitors*, and accused them of seeking a way to divide the country.[196] However, the participants declined that and said that during these meetings only the problems of the region were talked.

The student members of the Turkish Worker's Party started to see the party as incapable of forcing the Government to recognize Kurdish existence and to accept Kurdish language. Hence, they founded another organization in 1969, under the name of Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*).[197] The organization adopted the ideas of Marxist-Leninist approach. As Mustafa Akyol indicated, Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*), was working in the organization and as the organization adopted 'revolutionary' ideas instead of religion for the first time, that became the difference of the new organization model of Kurdish nationalism from previous rebellions.[198] The Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East was closed with its branches on 12 March 1971.[199]

Turkish Workers' Party was the first party that accepted the Kurdish reality in the history of Turkey. During its fourth congress in 1970, TIP accepted the Kurdish issue as a problem to be solved, and as a solution, they proposed that Kurds needed to be recognized as a separate nation, and the State's regime needed

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[194] Dündar, *op. cit.*, pp., 167-169.
[195] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 167;
 Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[196] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[197] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 169;
 Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[198] Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek - Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?*, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2006, p. 133.
[199] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
[200] Ibid., p. 65.

to be changed to federation.[200]  The Constitutional Court closed the Turkish Workers' Party on 20 July 1971.[201]

According to Kirişçi and Winrow, the Marxist-Leninist ideas and movements against fascism and imperialism were the common points between Turkish and Kurdish revolutionaries.[202]

As stated earlier, the Constitution of 1961 gave the freedom of creating organizations. Another association in Marxist-Leninist line was Ankara Higher Education Society and Abdullah Öcalan was a member of it, where he met others, who later would become the founding group of PKK.[203]

### 3.1.3. The Creation of PKK and Terrorist Attacks

Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, was founded around one man, Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. As Abdullah Öcalan was, and still is, the heart of the organization, brief information about him will be helpful to understand the PKK organization.

Abdullah Öcalan was born in a small village in Şanlıurfa, southeastern of Turkey, in 1949.[204]  The village was the hometown of Kurds, Turks and Armenians. Abdullah Öcalan grew up in this environment of diverse people, and according to Aliza Marcus, he stated that his grandmother was Turk, even his mother was, possibly, a Turk; however, Abdullah Öcalan learnt Turkish in elementary school.[205] After the elementary school, Abdullah Öcalan wanted to go the military school but he was not old enough;[206]  consequently, he went to vocational high school in Ankara, which trains students to work for the state

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[201] Ibid., p. 168.
[202] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[203] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 174.
[204] Aliza Marcus, *Blood and Belief: the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*, New York, New York University Press, 2007, p. 15.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Nihat Ali Özcan, *PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi*, Ankara, ASAM Yayınları, 1999, p. 27.

affairs in land registry offices.[207] During his vocational high school education, Öcalan had chance to observe the state, attend meetings and conferences in Ankara, read books about Marxism.[208] One can say that Ankara years were the time that Öcalan started to form an idea of 'revolution' around Marxist ideology.

Abdullah Öcalan graduated from high school in 1968, and was appointed as public officer to Diyarbakır, where he attended the aforementioned 'Meetings of East' and shaped his idea.[209] In 1970, Abdullah Öcalan was appointed to Istanbul as public officer, where he took university exams and enter Istanbul University and became the member of Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East.[210] Then, Abdullah Öcalan was transferred to Ankara and continued university education at Ankara University. During his time in Ankara, Öcalan became an active member of Ankara Higher Education Society in 1974, and even participated demonstrations.[211]

During 1975, Öcalan started to organize meetings with his friends to discuss ideas about 'revolution' that he was planning.[212] In one of these meetings (Dikmen meeting) he and his friends decided to give up university education and focus on planning the organization. Their main goal was to create a Marxist-Leninist organization, which could fight for independence of Kurds.[213] Their preparation lasted for three years; meanwhile, Abdullah Öcalan wrote the 'The Path of Kurdish Revolution' manifesto by himself, which later become the program of the PKK.[214]

The first result of three years preparation was the creation of a magazine, *Serxwebun*, in October 1978, in order to promote the ideas of the

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[207] Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[208] Özcan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[209] Ibid., p. 29.
[210] Özcan, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[211] Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[212] Emin Demirel, *Geçmişten Günümüze PKK ve Ayaklanmalar*, İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2005, p. 118.
[213] Marcus, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.
[214] Mumcu, *op. cit.,* pp. 14-34.

organization.[215] Then regular meetings continued, and the PKK was founded in the meeting on 27 November 1978, in Diyarbakır; and that meeting was accepted as the first congress of the organization.[216] Abdullah Öcalan and his friends decided not to make a public announcement after PKK's foundation. PKK made the public announcement in 1979, with attempted assassination of Kurdish tribal leader, Bucak tribe, who was also Member of Parliament (MP). PKK left signed leaflet, which contains the following sentences;

"Forward to an independent, united, democratic Kurdistan!
Down with imperialism and colonialism!
Long live independence and proletariat internationalism!
Long live the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)!!"[217]

The PKK's first activities were recruiting sympathizers and small-scale armed attacks; however, with the 'public announcement' of PKK, it increased its attack against other Kurdish groups and also the Turkish Armed Forces. Between its foundation and military intervention of 1980, PKK killed 354 and wounded 366.[218]

On 12 September 1980, Turkish history witnessed once again a military intervention. Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country trough the National Security Council for three years. A new constitution was written in 1982, and the country returned to the democracy in 1983.

Öcalan and some of his friends left Turkey before the military intervention. This action brought about rumors that Abdullah Öcalan knew that the military intervention would take place; and consequently, he ordered most of PKK militants to stop actions inside Turkey and to leave the country.[219] The

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[215] Özcan, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.
[216] Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 29;
Şamil Tayyar, *Kürt Ergenekonu*, İstanbul, Timaş Yayınları, 2011, p. 10.
[217] Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[218] Özcan, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
[219] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

leadership of PKK chose Bekaa Valley in Syria/Lebanon border as a base for the trainings and management.

After the military intervention, the National Security Council took over the governance of Turkey and, literally, closed all political parties and organizations, applied martial laws in the eastern part of Turkey. Many Kurds were arrested with the accusation of being traitors and helping to terrorists. In the meantime, the usage of Kurdish language was banned by the Military.[220]

Prison in Diyarbakır became the main gathering place for arrested Kurds. According to Hasan Cemal, many Kurds were tortured and humiliated; and soldiers treated them as they already stood trail and convicted.[221] Prison of Diyarbakir was the place that Kurdish population was treated in worst conditions and they started to *hate* the State of Turkey.

The military measures forced PKK to take its leadership to abroad;[222] however, its terrorist actions never completely stopped. While Turkey was under the military rule, PKK's priority changed and they focused on militants' training. The training period in Bekaa Valley started with the help of Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).[223] Bekaa Valley was also the training area for DFLP, and as a result of the cooperation between Democratic Front of Liberation Palestine and PKK, PKK militants learnt guerrilla warfare. The Palestinian militants educated PKK about 'militia tactics' to collect information about troop movements, arranging food and finding shelter in mountains, ceremonies for death militants.[224]

The leadership of PKK used time in Syria to complete the organizational structure. As PKK stands for Kurdistan Workers' Party, during time in Syria, party

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[220] Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler*, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2010, p. 133.
[221] Cemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-36.
[222] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[223] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[224] Marcus, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.
　Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

structure, recruitment ways, responsibilities of party organs, and unquestionable leadership of Abdullah Öcalan were established.[225] PKK specified its main goal to create an independent Kurdish State by attacking military targets, security forces, if necessary civilians, tourism facilities, in order to stop state from giving public services.

PKK had its second congress in Damascus, Syria in 20-25 August 1982, and in that congress, the leadership decided that it was time to start attacks inside Turkey again and they chose Northern Iraq as a way to pass Turkish border.[226] According to Marcus, between 1980 and 1982, around 300 PKK militants were trained[227] and got ready to start armed attacks. The Government of Syria provided support to PKK and demanded more attacks inside Turkey.[228] There were problems between Syria and Turkey about certain subjects; Turkey was building dams over the rivers Tigris and Euphrates for domestic and electrical purposes; however, these two rivers also provides water to Syria. Turkey's dams construction made them fear about the possibility of total control of Turkey over said rivers. Syria also believed that Turkey gave shelter the Muslim Brothers who attacked against Syrian Government.[229] PKK used the high-tension situation between Turkey and Syria in its favor and gained Syria's support on its attacks through Turkey.

While PKK was taking its time to train militants and complete the organizational structure, Turkey was under the military governance. Inside Turkey, many military officials considered PKK as a small-scale 'banditry' organization, and did not take seriously.[230]

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[225] Özcan, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
[226] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
[227] Marcus, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
[228] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[229] Marcus *op. cit.*, p. 60.
[230] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

Under the military governance, the existence of Kurds has become a question one more time, and General Kenan Evren, the head of National Security Council, said the following about the existence of Kurds;

> "There are no Kurds in Turkey, these people who describe themselves as Kurds are just Turks living in mountain, and make cracking sounds, *Kart Kurt*, when they walk over snow".[231]

With this, Kenan Evran tried to explain the name Kurd was coming from the cracking sound of snow. This meaningless definition of Kenan Evren, was considered as *official denial* of Kurds in Turkey.

A new constitution was written under the military governance and accepted by referendum in 1982. Likewise previous constitutions, the Constitution of 1982 did not mention the Kurds or their existence and explained who is Turk with following description in Article 66;

> "(1) Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.
> (2) The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.
> (3) Citizenship can be acquired under the conditions stipulated by law, and shall be forfeited only in cases determined by law.
> (4) No Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act incompatible with loyalty to the motherland.
> (5) Recourse to the courts in appeal against the decisions and proceedings related to the deprivation of citizenship, shall not be denied."[232]

With the new constitution, the main idea was to put the *Turkishness* back on track. As the Kurds and Turks had religion in common, this taken as base of the Turkishness. The 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' idea claimed that, all population living in Turkey as Turks and Muslims. Officials promoted this idea on that time, especially on eastern part of Turkey, where there were terror activities of

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[231] "Tansu Çiller: Ya Bitecek, Ya Bitecek", *Sabah*, 11 August 2009, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/ Siyaset/2009/08/11/tansu_ciller_ya_bitecek_ya_bitecek>, site visited on 4 April 2012.
[232] "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası", *Grand National Assembly of Turkey*, <http:// www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf>, site visited on 6 April 2011.

PKK.[233] New idea claimed that Kurds did not exist at that time. Additionally, it was claimed that Kurdish language did not exist, as well.[234] That year's articles and books were commonly claiming that the efforts to separate Kurdish identity from Turkish one were all games of *Western intelligence agencies* and separatist groups, which wanted to divide up Turkey.[235]

With the acceptance of 1982 Constitution, General Kenan Evren became the President of the Republic. In 1983, Turkey returned to democracy with elections, as the military intervention closed all political parties in 1980, new founded parties participated to the elections of 1983. Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) won the elections[236] and Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister, who later would become the President of the Republic.

The PKK returned to armed attacks in 1984 with raids against military stations in Şemdinli and Eruh.[237] Security forces of the Republic of Turkey started operations against PKK; however, militants quickly left the country via Turkey-Iraq border. With Şemdinli and Eruh attacks, PKK announced its army wing under the name *Hezen Rızgarıya Kurdistan* (HRK, Kurdistan Freedom Brigades).[238]

In 1985, Öcalan gained support of Greece, and PKK opened a branch in Athens under the name of *Eniya Rızgariya Netewa Kurdistan* (ERNK, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan).[239] This branch of PKK organized and controlled the organizations' activities in Europe.

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[233] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[234] Ibid.
[235] I. Giritli, *Kürt Türklerinin Gerçeği*, İstanbul, Yeni Forum Yayıncılık, 1992, quoted in Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[236] "1983 Yılı Genel Seçimleri", *Seçim Anketi*, <http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/1983-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>, site visited on 2 May 2011.
[237] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 180;
    Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.
[238] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[239] Demirel, *op. cit.*, p. 138;
    Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

In the same year, the Government introduced the village-guard system. With village-guard system, government recruited local people and provided weapons. The idea behind this system was to make villages enable to defend themselves against PKK attacks.[240] One can see the similarity with village-guard system and creation of Hamidiye Light Cavalry Army in the Ottoman Empire. With both, central power tried to control the local people and empower their loyalty to the central government. The creation of village-guard system is evidence that history repeats itself from time to time.

In 1986, PKK continued its attacks inside Turkey; meanwhile, it did necessary preparations for its third congress. As the PKK used Northern Iraq as a safe-heaven to penetrate and attack Turkey, Turkish Military Forces did an air assault in Northern Iraq and killed 165 PKK militants, and this assault became a problem between PKK and Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani's *Kurdistan Democratic Party* (KDP).[241] The third congress took place in Lebanon, Helve Camp, between 26-30 October 1986, the camp later was used as PKK's base of training and control until 1992.[242] During this congress, PKK decided a so-called 'tax law' in order to provide more financial assets to the organization.[243] With the 'tax law', PKK forced Kurdish business owners and workers to pay 'taxes'.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the dictator Saddam Hussein used chemical bombs in Kurdish town in Iraq, Halebja, on 16 March 1988; consequently, massive number of Iraqi Kurds started to migrate through Iran and Turkey as refugees.[244] PKK used this situation in its favor and settled in vacant areas in Iraq and propagated its ideas about why Kurds needed to be independent.

While PKK continued its attacks against the State of Turkey and established connections in Europe, it also started to publish magazines to promote

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[240] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
[241] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
[242] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[243] Ibid., p. 46.
[244] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

its ideas. On 15 June 1988, PKK started to publish "Social Resurrection" (*Toplumsal Diriliş*), in which Öcalan wrote under the alias of Ali Fırat.[245] Later that year, this magazine was closed; however, PKK continued to publish other magazines and newspapers. The organization saw the media as a functional tool to promote ideas and to gain more supporters and sympathizers. Also in 1988, PKK gained the support of France, as the wife of French President at that time, Danielle Mitterand showed interest in PKK's situation and PKK organized a conference in Paris.[246]

In June 1989, President Turgut Özal openly declared that he had a Kurdish blood by giving reference to his mother's origin.[247] With Özal's declaration, Kurdish existence came into the political discourse after the military intervention of 1980.

During 1990, PKK continued its attacks inside Turkey with the intention to create 'liberated zones'. With the help of liberated zones, PKK had the idea to gain control of some cities and to remain there. The idea behind its actions to assure the Kurdish population's support and create '*Serdilhan*' (insurrection) among Kurdish population. PKK's wing in Europe organized conferences in other countries to draw attention to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.[248]

In 1991, government adopted a new law on fight against terrorism. The Anti-terror Law of 1991 was introduced with the intention of more effective way to deal with terrorism. According to the law, terrorism was defined as;

> "[Terrorism] is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system,

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[245] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 151;
  Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
[246] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 62;
  Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
[247] Cemal *op. cit.*, p.101;
  Kirişçi, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[248] 15-17 March 1999, Stockholm, 27-28 September 1991, Bonn, *Tayyar, op. cit.*, p. 69.

damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and Nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."[249]

At the end of 1991, the fourth congress of PKK took place in Iraq, during which PKK decided to increase of attacks and of legal activities.[250] Meanwhile, PKK had some opposition inside itself and tried to suppress them. From its creation to 1991, PKK's attacks increased over the years. According to Tayyar, PKK attacked 47 times in 1984, 127 in 1985, 129 in 1986, 245 in 1987, 297 in 1988, 602 in 1989, 1.111 in 1990, and 1.192 in 1991.[251] While PKK was continuing its actions and activities, another official declaration about Kurdish existence was made. In December 1991, deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü made a public call for the recognition of cultural identity of Kurdish originated Turkish citizens.[252] The Gulf War affected the policies of Turkey as thousands of Iraqi Kurds migrated to Turkey as refugees. The ban of usage of Kurdish language, which was put in force after the military intervention of 1980, was removed.[253]

In 1992, PKK increased its movements again inside Turkey and made preparations for another attempt to create an insurrection in 21 of March celebrations. 21 of March is known as Nowruz, which is Persian New Year and also the starting date of spring. In Turkey and other countries, during 21 March daytime, people do celebrations. Since State of Turkey applied heavy security measures, PKK could not reach its goal to create an insurrection.[254] However, there were clashes between PKK militants and military forces, for instance in Cizre, because of the clashes 90 people died and many were wounded.[255] In the

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[249] "Turkish National Anti-Terrorism Law", *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Justice*, <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/809.html>, site visited on 27 November 2011.
[250] Demirel, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-152.
[251] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[252] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[253] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[254] Demirel, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
[255] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 163;
     O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

meantime, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel openly declared that he personally recognize the Kurdish existence in Turkey.[256] In April 1992, President Özal suggested that broadcasting in Kurdish in TV and radio, and teaching Kurdish in schools could help the government to deal with the question.[257] These declarations from high officials, like President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel, made public opinion to believe that the state would act politically to solve the Kurdish and terrorism problems. However, the National Security Council saw the situation in southeastern of Turkey as a product of separatist terrorism, which required a military solution rather than a political one.

PKK attacks and military operations against militants continued until the march of 1993. On 17 March 1993, Öcalan held a press conference in Lebanon, and declared a unilateral cease-fire until 15 April 1993.[258] With the cease-fire decision, Öcalan also abandoned his idea for independence and started to talk about 'autonomy'.[259] President Özal was in contact with Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who was acting as the *messenger* between PKK and the State of Turkey.[260] The first response from the State of Turkey was, as expected, demanding the total surrender of all PKK militants.[261] During the unilateral cease-fire time, possible amnesty rumors for PKK militants started to be circulated in official circles in Ankara. On 16 April 1993, Öcalan announced that he extended the cease-fire for two months.[262] President Özal was the main driven force about the possibility of amnesty and believed that this might start a solving process of terrorism problem.[263] While PKK was waiting a *gesture* about a possible amnesty for its militants, President Turgut Özal suddenly died because of a heart attack on

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[256] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[257] Ibid., p. 137.
[258] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 217;
     Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[259] O'Ballance, *op.cit.*, p. 218.
[260] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 187;
     Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[261] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
[262] "Geçmişten Bugüne PKK Ateşkesleri", *CNN Türk*, 28 June 2010, <http://www.cnnturk.com/ 2010/turkiye/06/28/gecmisten.bugune.pkk.ateskesleri/581570.0/index.html>, site visited on 25 April 2011.
[263] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

17 April 1993.[264] After Turgut Özal's death, officials did not know how to deal with the situation.

On 23 May 1993, National Security Council made suggestion to the Government for a partial amnesty for PKK militants; however, on 24 May 1993 PKK broke cease-fire by killing 33 unarmed soldiers and 5[265] civilians.[266] This PKK attack against unarmed soldiers raised the tension among society; consequently, military officials started to call for heavy measures against PKK.

After Özal's death, Süleyman Demirel was elected as the President of the Republic, and Tansu Çiller became the Prime Minister. In late 1993, Prime Minister Çiller considered a possibility of allowance of education and broadcasting in Kurdish and referred to the relevance of the Basque model and its provisions for wide-ranging autonomy.[267] However, the new President Demirel opposed the idea by saying, "Unless terrorism is solved, cultural issues cannot be debated".[268] This was an exact moment that, terrorism problem and Kurdish problem had started to be considered as one single problem.

Even-tough Prime Minister Tansu Çiller talked on possibility of allowance education and broadcasting in Kurdish, in late 1993 for a possible solution for Kurdish Problem, she introduced a new slogan in 1994 on the fight against PKK, 'either end or end' ('*ya bitecek ya bitecek*').[269] Heavy military operations started against PKK and as Kirişçi and Winrow stated the numbers of PKK attacks decreased.[270]

The education system was another target for PKK attacks. At the beginning of 1994 educational year; PKK declared that the teachers who would

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[264] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
[265] On some sources the number is 7.
[266] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.
[267] Ibid., p. 224;
    "Tansu Çiller: Ya Bitecek, Ya Bitecek".
[268] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
[269] Ibid., p. 132.
[270] Ibid.

work on the region needed to have permission from PKK. PKK did this announcement after the killing of six teachers in Tunceli, then another four in Erzurum.[271] Apart from schools and teachers, PKK also targeted tourism areas, big cities during the year of 1994.[272]

In January 1995, PKK made its fifth congress in Northern Iraq, during which the organization decided to do more sensational attacks in big cities and especially in North of Turkey.[273] PKK also increased its propaganda activities in media by founding a TV channel in England, Med TV;[274] in the meantime, it continued to organize meetings in European cities. On 19 March 1995, Turkey started operation against PKK militants in Northern Iraq, which lasted until July 1995 and respectively 35.000 troops involved.[275] On 12 April 1995, PKK announced that they founded the 'parliament in exile' in Netherlands.[276] With its actions in Europe, PKK tried to promote itself as legal organization, which seeks a 'peaceful' solution for the problems of Kurds inside Turkey. At the end of 1995, Turkish Armed Forces was in preparation for another operation on Northern Iraq; however, as Öcalan knew that, he suddenly declared another unilateral cease-fire on 15 December 1995.[277] The cease-fire was accepted as a proof of weakness by the Government and planned military operation was put in action.

Between 1996 and 1998, PKK's attacks and military operations against them continued. On this period, PKK started to use suicide bombers; however, Abdullah Öcalan claimed that, although suicide bombers were 'heroes', PKK did not accept this tactic as main tool to attack.[278] PKK declared that the year of 1997

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[271] Ibid., p. 128.
[272] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 188;
    O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.
[273] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 190;
    Tayyar, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.
[274] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
[275] Cemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-260;
    Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p.130.
[276] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
[277] Hüseyin Yayman, "Ateşkes Taktik mi, Taahhüt mü?", *Radikal İki*, 29 August 2010,
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/ateskes_taktik_mi_taahhut_mu-1016428>, site visited on 14 April 2011.
[278] Demirel, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

would be the 'final' and they would reach their goal. It started to organize meetings inside and outside Turkey in order to promote its ideas.[279] In the meantime, Turkish Government was forcing Syria for the capture of Öcalan, but Syria denied that Öcalan was in the country. Even though, Turkish intelligence agency had concrete evidence of Öcalan's presence in Syria and many journalists made interviews with Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus from time to time, Government of Syria had always given the same answer: there was no one under the name Abdullah Öcalan in Syria.

On the fight against PKK, Turkish security forces used every measure. Apart from Turkish military forces and police forces, another unit was formed in 1987 under the name of Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight Against Terrorism (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, JITEM). For many years, the existence of JITEM was a rumor among the society. State officials often tried to avoid any questions about JITEM. As in 1990s, many people were killed and their cases stayed unsolved, public opinion believed that all these cases were carried out by members of JITEM and the organization used tactics, which were considered as violation of human rights and interrogations. In July 2013, legal prosecutor in Diyarbakır re-opened the case of Musa Anter, a Kurdish writer who was murdered in 1992 and his killer has never been found. According to the indictment, JITEM was formed in 1987 by the approval of the Ministry of Interior of Turkey under the Turkish Gendarmerie Institution and the organization was active inside Turkey until 1997.[280] At the writing time of this thesis, the organizational structure of JITEM, its operations and unsolved cases of 1990s are still in the agenda of Turkey. JITEM is an important part of the puzzle to understand what really happened in Turkey, and who was murdered by whom in 1990s. Unfortunately, public opinion believes that, as JITEM was a secret organization of the State, the state might not solve the case completely in order the protect members of JITEM organization.

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[279] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[280] "JİTEM'in bilinmeyenleri iddianamede", *Radikal*, 05 July 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/jitemin_bilinmeyeleri_iddianamede-1140576>, site visited on 05 July 2013.

### 3.1.4. Abdullah Öcalan in Prison

While the Turkish pressure over Syria was rising, Öcalan declared another unilateral cease-fire on 1 September 1998.[281] Turkish Government continued to force Syria about him, and on 16 September 1998, a General from Turkish Armed Forces travelled to Hatay, a Turkish City at the Turkish-Syrian border, he talked in public and declared that Turkey had an intention of good relationship with neighbors, but neighbors like Syria supported Öcalan, and Turkey ran out of patience, and would take all necessary measures for its security.[282] General's declaration was forced Syria to expel Öcalan. This was the starting time of last journey for Öcalan before his capture.

After leaving Syria, Öcalan first went to Athens/Greece, then to Russia. As Turkish Government applied for his return from Russia, Öcalan went to Rome/Italy and made an application for political asylum to Italy. In the meantime, Turkey started a boycott against Italian products, and also applied to Italian Government for his return. As Öcalan did not receive any political asylum, he went back to Russia then Greece, and his last destination was from Greece to Kenya. He was captured in Kenya and brought to Turkey on 16 February 1999 for his trial. [283]

Abdullah Öcalan stood trail and was sentenced a death penalty on 29 June 1999. While Öcalan's case and death penalty decision was at waiting list for final approval from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, death penalty was removed in 2002 from the Turkish Penal Code. As a consequence, Abdullah Öcalan was sentenced lifetime imprisonment in İmrali, an island of Turkey.

The capture of Öcalan caused different feelings in people's mind in Turkey, on one side a disappointment for extremist Kurds and sympathizers of

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[281] Demirel, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[282] Metehan Demir, "Her Şey Atilla Paşa'nın Gözdağı İle Başladı", *Hürriyet*, 14 November 1998, <http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/hur/turk/98/11/14/gundem/08gun.htm>, site visited on 17 January 2013.

[283] Cemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 459-461.

PKK, who believed that they could reach their desire only by armed struggle, and on the other side a glory for Turkish nationalists.[284]

During his trial, Öcalan continued to control PKK via his lawyers. In August 1999, he made a call for PKK militants to stop attacks and leave Turkey.[285] In September 1999, PKK declared another unilateral cease-fire and announced that PKK would not attack, lay down arms and leave Turkey. However, while PKK militants were leaving country, Turkish military forces started operations against them and consequently many PKK militants were killed or captured.[286]

During cease-fire period, PKK organized its eighth congress on 4 April 2002 and changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, *Kongreya Azadi ù Demokrasiya Kurdistan*). The 'new' organization also selected Öcalan as president.[287] However, PKK changed its mind on the name KADEK and dissolved it. Instead of KADEK, they formed KONRA-GEL (Kurdistan Peoples Congress, *Kongra Gelê Kurdistan*) on 15 November 2003.[288] With changing its name, PKK started to promote that KONGRA-GEL and PKK's armed wing were separate organizations. All these name changes were PKK's effort to transform itself to a more-like political organization; however, even they changed the name of organization, they did not give up arms completely, and PKK was started to be called as PKK/KONGRA-GEL.

Meanwhile in 2002, Turkish political scenes changed and a new party, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) won the elections of 2002 with the majority of valid votes. AKP had 34.28% of valid

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[284] For the cover of Turkish national newspapers on Abdullah Öcalan's capture day, please see Appendix III.
[285] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 493.
[286] Mehmet Ali Birand, "PKK da Kuşku İçinde", *Hürriyet*, 11 January 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/22337474.asp>, site visited on 25 January 2013.
[287] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
[288] "PKK/KONGRA-GEL", *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa>, site visited on 3 March 2013.

votes.[289] This was the starting point of another single party period, AKP's rule in Turkey. The high percentage of the Turkish society saw AKP as a solution for all problems, including Kurdish Problem. AKP put a dedicated section for Kurdish problem in its party program under the label of 'The East and Southeast', and they explained AKP's aim to guard cultural diversity on the region. A part of the mentioned section explained AKP's language and territorial unity and integrity of Turkey as;

> "The cultural diversity in this region is considered richness by our Party. On condition that the Turkish remains the official and instruction language, our Party regards the cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, including broadcasting, as an asset, which reinforces and supports the unity and integrity of our country, rather than weaken it. The elimination of certain troubles originating from the under -development of the region, are intended to be solved within the scope of the general democratization project, rather than special arrangements aimed at the region."[290]

AKP also highlighted the importance of *citizenship* rather then ethnicity.[291]

This cease-fire period lasted until 2004, and in May 2004, PKK organized another congress to declare that so-called unilateral cease-fire was over and PKK militants would continue its attacks inside Turkey. That year, PKK started its attacks with claiming that government did not take necessary actions to solve the Kurdish Problem and demanding improvements on Öcalan's prison conditions.

In 2005, the leader of the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a public speech in Diyarbakir. He indicated that ethnical identities were needed to be considered as *sub-identities,* and the Turkish citizenship needs to be

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[289] "2002 Yılı Genel Seçimleri", *Seçim Anketi*, <http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2002-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>, site visited on 1 April 2011.
[290] All Party Programme can be found in (English): "Party Programme", *Justice and Development Party,* <http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>, site visited on 14 April 2012.
[291] "Cultural diversities do not require that what we have in common with the region's population should be pushed to the background. On the contrary, being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement of our society."

considered as an *upper identity*.[292] This was a significant moment for the acceptance of Kurdish reality. During the same year, PKK formed another organization under the name *Koma Komalen Kurdistan* (KKK, People's Confederation of Kurdistan). The new organization was a model of a 'state' that contained legislative, executive and juridical organs in itself. However, in 2007, PKK gave up on KKK and formed another organization under the name of *Koma Civakên Kurdistan* (KCK, Union of Communities in Kurdistan), which acts as 'state' with its organs, as well, in order to protect every Kurd in four countries, that was to mention the Kurds who were living in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

As the KCK was formed by PKK and started to act like a state, State of Turkey launched an investigation about KCK organizations. In 2009 multiple operations were carried out in Turkey, and many people were detained with the accusation of being members of illegal organization, in this case KCK. According the Kurdish politicians, with the operations of KCK, the State of Turkey tried to undermine the political activities of Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP). According to Selahattin Demirtaş, co-chairman of the party, more than 6000 people were detained by 2009, among them many were members of BDP.[293] At the writing time of this thesis, KCK trails were still continuing in many cities in Turkey. Kurdish politicians often demand the release of KCK detainees as the State of Turkey is in talks between the active members of PKK and the imprisoned leader, Öcalan.

PKK's attacks continued until 2009. In 2009, AKP Government started a democratic opening process with a report on its third congress on 3 October 2009. According to this report, the cure for terrorism was more democracy. This process was also known as 'democratic opening' as it had reform ideas to bring more democratic rights to Kurdish originated people of Turkey. AKP's efforts on

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[292] "Kimlikte Tartışma", *Sabah*, 22 August 2005, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/08/22/siy107.html>, site visited on 15 April 2012.
[293] Hasan Cemal, "KCK'dan 6300 kişi hapiste!", *Milliyet*, 17 February 2012, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/kck-dan-6300-kisi-hapiste-/siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/17.02.2012/1504147/default.htm>, site visited on 18 February 2012.

Kurdish issue brought another unilateral cease-fire of PKK in April 2009.[294] With 'democratic opening' process, government officials made contacts with PKK leadership and Abdullah Öcalan.

Cease-fire lasted until June 2010, then PKK started its attacks inside Turkey. During 2009-2010, government's contacts with PKK members continued in Oslo, Norway.[295]

In 2011, PKK continued its attacks. One of the most brutal attacks of PKK was carried out 14 July 2011, in which PKK killed 13 soldiers. In late 2012, AKP government announced that state officials were in contact with Öcalan for a possible solution to the terrorism problem.[296] The contacts have brought the last unilateral cease-fire of PKK on 21 March 2013. A message from Abdullah Öcalan was read during Nowruz celebration in Diyarbakir. Öcalan called for a cease-fire and ordered PKK militants to leave Turkey.[297] A response came from PKK's leader in charge, Murat Karayılan on 23 March 2013, and he declared the unilateral cease-fire.[298]

AKP's efforts, reforms and contacts with PKK leadership will be explained in detail in the 'solving the problem' part of this thesis.

The information about Kurdish nationalism from the Ottoman Era up to today was given briefly in order to provide an idea to the reader. One can see that Kurdish nationalist movements started during the Ottoman Era with tribal

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[294] "7. Ateşkes de Sona Erdi", *Sol Portal*, 1 March 2011, <http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/7-ateskes-de-sona-erdi-haberi-39776>, site visited on 25 March 2011.
[295] "Oslo'da PKK ile 5 Kez Müzakere Yapılmış", *Vatan*, 13 September 2011, <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/osloda-pkk-ile-5-kez-muzakere-yapilmis/399507/1/gundem>, site visited on 02 March 2013.
[296] "AKP'li Akdoğan: Öcalan'la Görüşülüyor", *Aktif Haber*, 30 December 2012, <http://www.aktifhaber.com/akpli-akdogan-ocalanla-gorusuluyor-712401h.htm>, site visited on 30 December 2012.
[297] "Öcalan'ın Tarihi Mesajı: Silahı Bırakın, Sınır Dışına Çıkın", *Radikal*, 21 March 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspxaType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1126129&CategoryID=78>, site visited on 23 March 2013.
[298] "PKK 'Resmi ve Açık! Ateşkes İlan Etti", *BBC Türkçe*, 23 March 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/03/130323_pkk_ateskes_ilan_etti.shtml>, site visited on 23 March 2013.

rebellions against central power. The main driven tool was religion and Kurdish tribes revolt against authority to protect their privileges. With the creation of the Republic of Turkey, a new nation-building process took place and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions tried to implement the 'Turkish Nation' as a common point for the population. As the Republic of Turkey rose over the Ottoman Empire's heritage, it contains many ethnic identities in itself. Placing the Turkish Nation with reforms like abolishment of Sultanate and Caliphate revoke religious and ethnic sensitivity among population, especially among Kurds. During lifetime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, The Republic of Turkey faced another major Kurdish rebellion in 1925, and another one in 1937. After the establishment of multi-party political system in 1946, Kurds entered the political area and rebellions had reduced. However, military interventions in 1960 and 1980 put democracy away and banned all political parties. The denial of Kurdish existence paved the way for the creation of PKK.

With creation of PKK, the Republic of Turkey faced again another 'rebellion'. However, this time, the motivation was not tribal rights nor religion. PKK differs itself from previous rebellions as the organization formed around Marxists-Leninist ideas and with the intention of building a large-scale Kurdish identity awareness.

Rebellions before PKK's creation were given in order to highlight the difference between PKK and previous movements. Annual information about PKK's attacks was only a little part of them to exhibit that organization's terrorist activities were continuous. PKK was attacking so often that during 90s, population of Turkey was 'accustomed'. As one can see that PKK has declared cease-fires many times; nevertheless, it has never finalized its activities. Political initiatives were started in 1993 to solve the terrorism problem; however, Turkey has never managed to achieve a solution for Kurdish problem or terrorism problem. All efforts and obstacles on solving the problems will be examined in a dedicated part of this thesis.

From its creation up until 21 March 2013, PKK was actively attacking Turkey while having all bases in Northern Iraq. The total cost of fight against PKK is very high, millions of dollars have been spent on military measures. According to number of Ministry of Defense of Republic of Turkey more than 40.000 people died and more than 20.000 people wounded during the period of 1984-2009. *Milliyet* Daily Newspaper published the following tables about the fight against PKK;

| Victims of PKK | | 1997 | 158 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | 43 | 1998 | 85 |
| 1985 | 141 | 1999 | 83 |
| 1986 | 133 | 2000 | 17 |
| 1987 | 237 | 2001 | 8 |
| 1988 | 109 | 2002 | 7 |
| 1989 | 178 | 2003 | 63 |
| 1990 | 204 | 2004 | 28 |
| 1991 | 233 | 2005 | 30 |
| 1992 | 832 | 2006 | 38 |
| 1993 | 1479 | 2007 | 37 |
| 1994 | 992 | 2008 | 51 |
| 1995 | 313 | 2009 | 18 |
| 1996 | 170 | **TOTAL** | 5687 |

Table I:[299] Victims of PKK by Year

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[299] Source: *Milliyet,* <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/26-yilin-kanli-bilancosu/guncel/haberdetay/ 24.06.2010/1254711/default.htm>, site visited 20 September 2012.

|  | Dead | Wounded |
|---|---|---|
| **Military Forces** | 4968 | 9855 |
| **Police Forces** | 217 | 617 |
| **Village Guards** | 1335 | 1932 |
| **TOTAL** | 6520 | 12404 |

Table II:[300] Death and Wounded State Forces by Type

Within this fight, Turkey lost a lot of lives, money and opportunities.

**3.2. History of Basque Nationalism, Roots of ETA**

Basque people is one of the historical populations in Spain. The history of Basque people and Basque Nationalism are effective both in Spanish politics and the problem of terrorism. The geographical description of the Basque Country (*Euskal Herria* in Basque) contains territories from Spain and France. Briefly seven regions in total describe the Basque Country. Alava, Navarra, Vizcaya, Guipúcoa are in Spain, and Soule, Lower Navarra, Labourd are in France. In the state structure of Spain Alava, Vizcaya, Guipúcoa are under the control of Basque Country (*País Vasco* in Spanish and *Euskadi* in Basque), and Navarra also is an autonomous community like Basque Country. Basque territories in France are also known as Northern Basque Country or *Iparralde* in Basque. Even though Basque Country and Navarra are autonomous communities of Spain, the desire for a *united* Basque Country existed among Basque people and in the roots of ETA.

To understand the terrorism problem in Spain, it is necessary to look throughout history of Basque nationalism and the Foral System.

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[300] Ibid.

### 3.2.1. Fueros and Carlist Wars

Local governments and local rights are maybe two of the newest terms in our world order, nowadays. For countries which have different type of populations - that is mostly ethnically different groups - local government is a suitable solution to protect the union of nation state. Local rights are the tools which hold different groups of people together.

Spanish's political system of today was established after Dictator Franco's period[301]. After 40 years of dictatorship, transition to democracy after Franco's death was a success. The 1979 constitution offered a new political framework within which Spaniards could organize their lives. One of the major issues that the new regime was facing, was the national question, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The new constitution radically transformed the centralist non-democratic regime inherited from Francoism by creating the Autonomous Communities System.[302]

This local governments or autonomous system can be difficult to understand and apply for some countries; however for Spaniards, it is like an updated version of an old experience.

In their long history from time to time some nations of Spain had some privileges or some rights, which were given by the Central State. The roots of these rights were going back to medieval time. In medieval Spain they were called as *Fueros*.

For the term *fuero* there is not an exact translation to English. Some dictionaries define *fueros* as;

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[301] 1936 - 1975.
[302] Montserrat Guibernau, "Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country", *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 1, 2000, p. 55.

"Fueros were the charters granted to villages, towns and regions by Spanish monarchs in the Middle Ages and which established their rights and obligations. The fueros under which the Basques and Navarrese received certain privileges (some fiscal autonomy, their own local administration system and exemption from military service outside their province) became a political football in the 19th Century, being alternately abolished and restored depending on the interests of the monarch or administration in power. Today, Navarre is recognized in the Estado de las Autonomías as the   Comunidad Foral de Navarra."[303]

"in the medieval states of the Iberian Peninsula:

(1) A corpus of general law relating to all the subjects of a kingdom. The first code of this type was the Lex Visigothorum, which came to be known in the 13th century as the Fuero Juzgo.

(2) A charter of feudal liberties granted to a particular province, class, or family.

(3) A municipal charter. This type of charter, the most common *fuero*, was usually granted in the name of the king and set forth the rights, privileges, and obligations of the inhabitants of an urban or rural community.

The development and proliferation of municipal *fueros*, which were particularly numerous from the 11th to 13th centuries, was associated with the Reconquest. As lands were won back from the Arabs, it became necessary to provide for their military defense and to develop their economies. The crown was compelled to provide incentives in order to attract settlers. In the early period of the Reconquest, municipal *fueros* merely fixed the location and boundaries of settlements; later, they defined the status of the settlers, made official the settlers' exemption from *corvée*, and established rates of taxation. They also granted a measure of autonomy that included the right to elect a magistrate, freedom from seignorial jurisdiction, and the right to maintain a militia.

The *fuero* also defined the rights of the seignior over a particular community. The seignior could alter the *fuero* only with the approval of all the settlement's inhabitants. Almost every city and the adjacent rural communities, hamlets, and villages had their own *fueros*. The cities jealously defended from encroachment by the crown the privileges granted under the *fueros;* alliances of cities, known as *hermandades*, were formed for this purpose.

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[303] "Fueros", *Collins Dictionary*, <http://dictionary.reverso.net/spanish-english/fueros>, site visited on 28 November 2010.

Until the 14th century *fueros* of all types were the basic form of legislation in the states of the Iberian Peninsula. In the 14th and 15th centuries local *fueros* were of equal standing with royal codes of law; they were affirmed by the king, and new *fueros* were introduced. As the state government became centralized and royal power increased, the *fueros* lost much of their force. With the unification of Spain, they became nugatory.

The *fueros* are extremely important sources for the socioeconomic, political, and military history of medieval Spain."[304]

Basically *fueros* - rights of the people - is a term which is related to Spanish history of medieval time. For the Basque people, these *fueros* were bases of their autonomy. In the history of the Basque people, *fueros* were fundamental to their relation with the Spanish State. Within this relation, *fueros* were not just codes of daily life, they were the power, rights and their position against the Spanish King. With the fueros, administrative, economic, political and daily lifes were created.

Traditional Basque social organization had their own civic life as a part of the kingdom of Castile since the medieval times. The four Basque provinces had their own financial, legal and administrative structures.[305] These special structures were depending on *fueros*. On that sense, these *fueros* were also agreements between the King and Basque provinces. The Basque provinces accepted the King as their sovereign and the King recognized their privileges. With this agreements local organizations of Basque provinces were sovereign on their provinces. For instance, each province retained the power of tax collecting and used to have their own soldiers which could not be subject to the royal army automatically. While Basque people defend that historical *fueros* are the base of their today's autonomy, even the self determination, nationalist Spaniards often claim that *fueros* were just *privileges* given by the Spanish King.[306]

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[304] "Fueros", *The Free Dictionary*, <http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Fueros>, site visited on 28 November 2010.
[305] Watson Cameron, *Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of ETA*, Reno, Center for Basque Studies-University of Nevada, 2008, p.32.
[306] Gloria P. Totoricagüena, *Identity, Culture, and the Politics in the Basque Diaspora*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2004, p. 29.

Besides these privileges, there was a possibility to veto any laws introduced by the King. Moreover, as a symbol of royal allegiance, any ascending Spanish monarch had to travel to the Basque provinces in order to swear an oath of loyalty to their fueros. In the case of Bizkaia, this act took place under the oak Tree of Gernika (*Guernika*), traditional meeting place of the Bizkaian representatives. From the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, Basque society maintained social and economic autonomy within the emergent Spanish State.[307]

Until the Cadiz Constitution (1812), Basque people defended their rights. Cadiz Constitution established revolution over political system, which abolished ancient foral regime depending on *fueros,* and for the first time, it identified all Spaniards as a nation. As a consequence, Cadiz Constitution had also abolished the *fueros*. While abolishing it, the new system was providing a uniform system of government, administration, and law; although these provisions also allowed for clear local and regional decision-making powers through *ayuntamientos* (city halls) and *diputaciones* (provincial councils).[308]

Between 1814 and 1833, Ferdinand VII ruled Spain as a king. On his death in 1833, Ferdinand named his daughter, Princess Isabel II, as a successor in opposition to his brother, Don Carlos María Isidro. Even though Princess Isabel took the seat of the Kingdom, Don Carlos proclaimed himself as the legitimate King of Spain. This situation risen tension in the Kingdom of Spain. A part form the debate over the throne, debates over the position of the church, Spain's economic future and the question of foral privileges were occurred in Kingdom.[309] Both Isabell II and Don Carlos had their supporters. As the supporters of Don Carlos known as 'carlists', the wars between 1833 and 1874 were named as 'Carlist Wars'. Carlism emerged as a political ideology in base of

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[307] Watson, *op.cit.*, p. 32.
[308] Ibid., p. 34.
[309] Watson, *op.cit.*, p.35.

religious and rural movement, there were three Carlist Wars in this period which were partly effective on Basque nationalism.

In the Basque Country, Carlism was often linked with the question of *fueros*. At the beginning of Carlism period, Basque people saw the Carlism as a way to defend the ancient *fueros*; however, it turned to a way to defend Basque culture itself within time. Carlism put religion as a point of motivation for the wars. Basque people accepted the Carlism not only a way to defend *fueros,* but also to defend the religion.[310]

The First Carlist War (1833-1839) occurred after the death of Spanish King Ferdinand VII. It lasted six years as a brutal, guerrilla war in which Basque people were well-trained in this type of warfare. For the Basque people, it was not a war of national liberation, but it was more like a struggle of two different ideas: liberal and traditionalist ideas. The war caused a split among Basque people, as some part of the Basque territories were with Isabel II and other parts were with Don Carlos. In these conditions, Navarra started to become more and more different from other Basque regions, which effected today's Basque Country map in Spain.[311] While the Spanish Basque Country composed by three Basque regions, Navarra stood alone as a different autonomous community. At the end of the War, in October 1839, a law passed in Madrid. This law confirmed that Basque people had rights to have *fueros,* and also it stipulated that they should not brake the constitutional unity of Spain. However, during this time, a liberal government was ruling the country. Since the end of the First Carlist War, Basque politics became dominated by a growing upper-middle-class liberal elite who used to take full advantage of the erosion of foral system.

The Second Carlist War (1846-1849) was a relatively short civil war which broke in Catalonia to overthrown Isabel II by Carlists. Carlists moved under the control of General Ramón Cabrera against the forces of Isabel II. The

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[310] Jeremy MacClancy, *The Decline of Carlism*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2000, p.57.
[311] Roger Collins, *The Basques*, 2. Edition, London, Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1990, p. 275.

rise against the Kingdom began in Catalonia; however, within time, it spread to other regions. Theoretically, the war was carried out to facilitate the marriage of Isabella with Carlos VI, son of Carlos V. Eventually, the marriage never took place, as Isabel was wed to Francis, Duke of Cádiz. For three years, sides fought each other. In 1849, Carlos VI forced to go to the United Kingdom and the troops of Spanish Kingdom entered Catalonia, General Ramón Cabrera fled from Spain. As a result, Isabel II won the second Carlist war as the previous one.[312]

Third Carlist War (1872-1876) was effective nearly in every part of Spain. Carlists managed to occupy several cities and forced Isabel to exile. The King Amadeus I was not popular. In that context of the country, the Carlist pretender, Carlos VII, proclaimed the restoration of Catalonian, Valencian and Aragonese *fueros*.[313] In 1874, the son of Isabel II, Alfonso returned to country, and he was proclaimed as the King Alfonso XII with the alliance of liberals. This was the defeat of Carlists. Right after that, a new constitution was proclaimed in 1876. For the Basque People, the effect of this constitution was the end of the foral system, a victory for Spanish liberalism and the ultimate defeat of Carlist ideology as a political force.[314]

With the help of aforementioned historical information, it is possible to say that Basques always know how to rule themselves. The *fueros*, mostly codified during the 17th and 18th centuries, though some of them date back to the 7th century, exempted the local population from both military service and taxation, and gave provincial assemblies the right to veto royal edicts. These institutions embodied the 'rights' of the people, rather than concessions granted to them. Throughout their history, the Basques defended the *fueros*, ensuring their autonomous status within the Spanish State.[315]

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[312] "Second Carlist War", *The Spanish War History*, <http://www.spanishwars.net/19th-century-second-carlist-war.html>, site visited on 17 April 2013.
[313] "Third Carlist War", *Wikipedia*, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Carlist_War>, site visited on 15 January 2011.
[314] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[315] Guibernau, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

### 3.2.2. Emergence of Basque Nationalism

In history of the Basque Country, Basque nationalism was created around these *fueros* by Sabino Arana.

Sabino Policarpo de Arana y Goiri, the father of the Basque nationalism and also the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV* [316]), was born in 1865 and died in 1903. During his short life, he basically created the feeling of being a Basque. He defined himself as a Carlist like his father until a conversation that he made with his older brother Luis in 1882. Luis convinced Sabino Arana that the Basque people were different than the Spanish people in senses of blood, *race*, and traditions.[317]

Sabino Arana was a law student in Barcelona (1883-1888) and decided not to complete his study to go back to Basque region in order to learn Basque language. During his time in Catalonia, he had chance to observe Catalan nationalism. In this sense, it is possible to say that he was affected by Catalan nationalism and learnt the importance of having a different mother tongue. During these years, he began to create a new ideology which contained the foralism (in base of *fueros*), traditional values and regionalism.[318] According to Arana, the history of foral system should be accepted as the history of Basque people also. During his years in the Basque Country, Sabino Arana used history and historical terms on his speeches and papers with the hope of awakening nationalist ideas among Basque people. In 1892, he published his book under the title *Bizkaya por su independencia (*Bizkaia throughout its independence) as the first explicitly political public statement, which sold out with two thousand copies.[319]

Sabino Arana was not only the founder of Basque nationalism, the founder of political organization, PNV and a political doctrine, Aranism, above all he was

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[316] Basque: *Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea*, EAJ; Spanish: *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV.
[317] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[318] Ibid., p. 50.
[319] Ibid., p. 54.

the father of the Basque nation by the sense of providing their main symbols: the name *Euzkadi,* the Basque Flag (*ikurriña*), the hymn.[320] The description of *great Basque Country - Euskal Herria -* was also made by Sabino Arana.[321] The flag was composed of two crosses, one white and the other green, superimposed on a red background. The white cross represented the importance of religion, while the green one represented the Basque race, its ancient laws-fueros-, and Euskara - Basque language-. The red background, according to Arana, symbolized the fact that Basque people were 'ready to shed their blood in defense of the two crosses.'[322] In terms of nationalism, flags are the main symbols to create a national consciousness. For the case of Basque nationalism, the flag is more than a symbol of nationalism, it is also an icon to demonstrate collective memory and Arana's ideas of nationalism.

For the Basque nationalism, the Spanish influence was severe. Sabino Arana claimed that Basque people were *independents* until the *fueros* were abolished and Spanish people *colonized* the Basque region.[323] According to Arana, Basque people should not accept the autonomy, as in case of an autonomy, Basque region would become one of the *regions* of Spain.[324] For the total independence, Arana suggested that Basque people should protect their own identity against the Spanish effect.

The Basque regions were common targets for immigration, as these regions were popular with industrial sector. Arana saw the immigrated Spanish speaking population as a threat to the existence of Basque language, culture and tradition.[325] The early nationalists, Arana and friends, considered Spanish

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[320] José Luis de la Granja Sainz, *El Oasis Vasco: El Nacimiento de Euskadi en la República y la Guerra Civil*, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 2007, p. 190.
[321] Jan Mansvelt Beck, "Geopolitical Imaginations of the Basque Homeland", *Geopolitics*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2006, p. 508.
[322] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
[323] Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O'Leary, John Tirman (eds.), *Terror, Insurgency and The State: Ending Protracted Conflicts*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, p. 24.
[324] José Maria Magone, *Contemporary Spanish Politics*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 245.
[325] Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, The Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 2000, p. 219.

language as a language that forced to be learnt. Because of this, importance of the Basque language (Euskara) became vital in their minds. Additionally, the race and blood were essential to create a common consciousness. According to Arana, the Basque people had to be ready to shed their blood for their independence and for their right to live as Basques.

In the creation of the PNV, the blood was at the center as well. Through the blood, Arana explained how different Basque people were as a race. Sabino Arana often tried to differentiate the Basque people from Spanish people. During the summer of 1895, he published an article under the title of "*Who Are We*?", and he said that, Basque people were not Spanish by nature; however, they were forced to believe that they were Spanish. As they were not Spanish, they were not supposed to engage with any Spanish either. In other articles, he indicated the idea by saying "it is necessary that we isolate ourselves from Maketos (Spanish People). Otherwise, here on earth that we walk on, it is not possible to work for the glory of God".[326] According to him, the language was an important element to preserve the traditions and nationalism of certain people. For the importance of Basque language, he said that Basque Language should be spoken only by Basque people, because if any Spaniard speaks the Basque language, this could ruin the Basque traditions. He even suggested that Basque people should not marry with the Spanish people in order to protect the Basque language.[327]

In the second part of the article, "Who Are We?", he indicated "the Bizkanian that lives in the mountains...the true Bizkanian, is through [his] natural character, religious" while "the Spaniard that lives far from the town...the true Spaniard either knows no word of religion...is a fanatic, or is ungodly".[328] With

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[326] Author's translation.
"Citas Sabino Arana", *Instituto de Tecnologías Educativas*, <http://ficus.pntic.mec.es/jals0026/documentos/textos/citasarana.pdf>, site visited 23 April 2013.
According to document Sabino Arana called Spanish people as *Maketos*.
[327] Daniele Conversi, "Language or Race?: The Choice of Core Values in the Development of Catalan and Basque Nationalisms", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1990, pp.51-52 / 58-59.
[328] Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

this part, he showed the importance of religion and how Basque people differed from Spanish people.

Sabino Arana often tried to differentiate Basque cultures and traditions from Spain. For instance, he opened the discussion about fueros. Even he defended and wanted to construct the Basque independence over fueros, he criticised that even the word of fueros was Spanish. Arana explained fueros as basic laws of sovereign peoples, not as privileges by the Spanish Empire. And he described Basque provinces as independent sovereign states (*estado*), the Basque population as people (*pueblo*) and defined Spanish as a nation (*nación*).[329]

The legacy of Arana was and still is effective on Basque nationalist politics. His differentiation of the Basque nation from Spain was at the center of the Basque nationalism. He recalled their history, he created the symbols, basically he defined the meaning of being Basque in order to create a general consciousness among Basque People. We can consider his ideology as an original one, as he combined historical myths and recalled *fueros*, created flag, gave a name to their language, wrote the national hymn etc. In the real meaning, he became the *father* of the Basque nationalism.

Sabino Arana's efforts to mobilize people on politics gave outcome on 31 July 1895, with the formation of the Bizkanian Council (*Bizkai Buru Batzar*), which later evolved into the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV. With the creation of PNV, Sabino Arana marked Basque nationalist movement that he founded with an indelible mark. Because, the Aranism was merely an ideology, but also an actual political-religious doctrine, which was based on so much in terms of ideas and reasons in particular beliefs and feelings.[330]

A part from his contribution to Basque identity and nationalism, Sabino Arana's legacy was the formation of the Basque Nationalist Party. Party's name in

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[329] Ibid., p. 82.
[330] Granja, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

Basque language is *Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea,* which means literally 'Basque Party of Supporters of God and Old Laws'. Basque name of PNV shows Arana's idea of nationalism based *fueros*. The PNV was formed in 1895; however, it gained more importance after the death of Sabino Arana. As the Basque people lived in the foral system with their own traditions and culture, PNV made its organization among Basques with giving references to the fueros and Basque history. As PNV had a 'closed' organization system, which only targeted traditionalist Basque people, José Luis de la Granja Sainz described its organization as *'partido-comunidad'*, community party.[331]

At the beginning of the 20th century, Spain was in political disorder. The Kingdom lost its colonies like Cuba, Porto Rico, and discussions on Spanish political system and life started among the politicians. As the Spanish Kingdom's political power was decreasing, nationalist and regional ideas of historic peoples, like Basques, Catalans and Galicians were increasing. The situation paved the way for demands on regional reforms by parties like PNV. As a result of the political sphere in Spain, PNV transformed itself to Basque Nationalist Communion (*Comunión Nationalista Vasca*, CNV) in 1916. The ideological challenges among the party continued these years, as a wing was supporting independence, others were supporting to wide-range autonomy. The understanding of autonomy at that time was being part of Spain but having all administrative organs under their control.

The political instability in Spain finished with the military intervention of General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923. As he took the control of the State, all parties and political organizations were closed. So, the CNV was also closed; however, it continued to operate secretly.[332] The Dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera ended in 1930. On 12 April 1931, elections took place and the Second Republic proclaimed. With the proclamation of the Second Republic,

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[331] Ibid., p. 159.
[332] Robert P. Clark, *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1990, p. 15.

King Alfonso XIII went to exile. With the Second Republic, political parties were opened again and Basque people returned to politics with the name of PNV. After years, Sabino Arana's political movements retook its name, and continued its political actions under the leadership of Sabino Arana's brother, Luis Arana Goriri. In the new political atmosphere, PNV centered its policies around autonomy and made alliances with other parties. The Second Republic government made promises about giving autonomies to the regions; however, it never happened.

In 1936, Spanish nationalist under General Franco started rebellion against the Republic by saying that the Second Republic lost its legitimacy among population. As the Second Republic provided autonomy to the Basque region, PNV supported Republic's forces against Franco's supporters.[333]   However, Franco's forces occupied Bilbao in 1937, and the war practically ended for PNV and for Basque people.

After three years of bloody war between Republicans and Nationalists, General Franco established its dictatorship. Under Franco's rule, all regional languages were banned, and regional powers and autonomies were removed. Franco's administration promoted the unity of Spain with single identity. Being a member of historical societies, such as Catalan, Basque and Galician, became impossible. All names were changed with Spanish names and regional or ethnic identities suppressed by the dictatorship. Under the heavy unitary policies of Franco's dictatorship, some Basques fled away from Spain to France, to the United States of America and to other countries.

Spain was isolated from international scene under Franco's rule, first postwar, until 1953-1955. For instance, Spain's application to become a member of the United Nation was rejected and the United Nation cut entire diplomatic relationship with Spain. As Franco's regime took away every chance to be in

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[333] Ramon Zallo, *Basques, Today: Culture, History and Society in the age of Diversity and Knowledge*, Irun, Alberdania, 2007, p. 283.

regional politics, Basques could not find any place on Spanish system for themselves. Basque Autonomous Government in exile often tried to revive to issue in international scene; however, it did not managed to do so. Franco's heavy suppression on regional communities paved the way for the creation of Basque Homeland and Freedom (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, ETA) organization.

As General Franco stayed in power for 36 years and suppressed all political activities, PNV continued its activities secretly. Franco's policies over regional peoples pushed minds to act against this dictatorship. Young members of PNV split from the party and started a new political action under the name of EKIN (means 'to learn' in Basque language) in 1953. The movement was started by a small group of students, but grew in short time.[334] The group started to publish a secret journal under the name of '*Cuadernos EKIN*' in which the idea of independent Basque Country was promoted. Similar to Sabino Arana, EKIN considered the Basque language as a base of Basque existence and according to them the Basque Country, had not only parts in Spain but also in France, should become independent in order to set Basque language free. EKIN even accused PNV by saying that the party was not defending the Basque language efficiently. The EKIN movement declined the idea of autonomy and defended the total independence for Basque regions. In this sense, the group later transformed itself to ETA in order to fight against Franco's dictatorship with the aim of gaining independence for Basque Country.

ETA was founded on 31 July 1959;[335] however, the organization's first armed attack against Franco's forces was carried out in 1968.[336] From its creation, ETA built the idea of total independence over Sabino Arana's ideas. The main strategy of ETA was to create a revolutionary war, which would contain public participation with armed struggle. According to Robert P. Clark, ETA's intention

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[334] Conversi, *The Basques*, p. 91.
[335] Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country 1975-1988*, Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1990, p. 8.
[336] Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship To Democracy, 1939 To The Present*, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007, p. 226.

was to apply action-repression spiral theory.[337] With armed attacks, ETA wanted to create an atmosphere among the Basque population that would support ETA from bottom to top in spiral way. On the creation of ETA, it is possible to say that nationalist movements around the world became the inspiration point for the founders of ETA. For instance, Cuban Revolution (between 1953 - 1959) was a revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro against the Dictator Fulgencio Batista. ETA, similarly, was created around the revolutionary ideas against the Dictator Franco. On this sense, it is possible to say that ETA wanted to create a revolution like Cuban one and expected to have similar outcomes; however, ETA's intention did not bring any revolution to Basque people, just brought death in Spain.

ETA promoted that Basque people should struggle against the system and should engage the war for the total independence. As ETA adopted the Marxist ideas on the war against capitalism, the struggle was often called as 'people's war' against the status-quo. ETA saw that it needed to have the proletarian support, for which Marxist ideas were an efficient tools, in order to achieve its goals. ETA accused PNV by saying that the party was defending the status-quo in Spain, and called all Basque people to join the "revolution". Even the ETA promoted Marxist ideas for the proletarian support, its main goal of revolution for the total independence of Basque country took Sabino Arana's nationalist ideas as base. In this sense, one can say that ETA took Marxist ideas as a tool for support; however, thought about an independent Basque Country *just* for Basque people for the preservation of Basque language and culture.

Until 1968, ETA continued its propaganda actions and small-scale activities like burning the Spanish flag or painting Basque flag to walls; however, none of these activities carried out with weapons or resulted with any death. In 1968, two ETA militants were stopped by the Spanish forces and the militants opened fire. The event resulted with the death of one Spanish force and that event

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[337] Clark, *Negotiating with ETA*, p. 8.

was noted as the first terrorist attack of ETA. During aforementioned event, one of ETA militant was killed by the Spanish forces, and became the symbol of ETA movements against the Franco's dictatorship. The Basque people showed reaction to the death of ETA militants and ETA managed to turn this reaction into support for the movement. For the second attack of ETA, the target was one of Franco's high rank representatives in the Basque region, Melitón Manzanas, who was killed by attack in 1968.[338] As a response to ETA's attack, Franco administration increased the security measures and pressure over people in Basque region and many Basques, even ones who did not have any connection with ETA, was detained for interrogation. In this condition, ETA's actions against Franco's unfair measures were supported more and more by the Basque people.

With each attack, ETA militants and Basques were detained and set on trail; however, every trail increased the tension in Basque region and people protested Franco's regime. Detained ETA militants were seen as 'heroes' among the Basque people and protest increased in 1970. Consequently, Franco's administration declared martial law, not only in Basque region but in whole of Spain.[339]

During 1970s, ETA continued its attacks against Spanish forces, and especially selected its targets from General Franco's inner circle. In 1973, ETA assassinated Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco.[340] After the assassination, none of the ETA members were captured and that was accepted as weakness of Franco's regime. As Franco was old and in no condition to rule anymore, people started to believe that with Franco's death, the dictatorship could not stand for long and should be collapsed. Meanwhile, an internal discussion inside ETA organization occurred and members gathered around two different ideas. Eventually, ETA split into two fractions; ETA *Politico-Militar (pm)*, which

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[338] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 9;
  Jean-Marie Izquierdo, *La Question Basque*, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe, 2000, p. 107.
[339] John Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986,* New York, Routledge, 1988, p. 94.
[340] Clark, *Negotiating with ETA*, p. 9.

defended that a part from military attacks, ETA should engage into politics also; and ETA *Militar (m)*, which claimed that ETA should pursue its armed attacks for ethnic, cultural and linguistic freedom of the Basque people and for the independence of the Basque Country.

During 1974, ETA (m) and ETA (pm) were effective in Basque's struggle against Franco's administration. During Franco's last years, ETA increased its attacks against Franco's forces. In 1975, General Franco died; however his dictatorship lasted until 15 June 1977, when first democratic elections took place. With the elections a new era in Spanish political history started; nevertheless, this change did not effect ETA's position. Following week after Franco's death, ETA declared that they would continue to fight against any central authority, at that time the King Juan Carlos I by publishing the following announcement;

> "ETA against JuanCarlismo"
>
> "We cannot postpone the struggle because liberal democracy is nothing more for us than a tactical objective. . . . Pacifist organizations are worthless for us; instead we have to create struggle organizations capable of winning over the power of the oligarchy, just as much if this power is exercised under dictatorial forms as if it is done under liberal forms . . "[341]

### 3.2.3. Aftermath of General Franco, Transition to Democracy

After the death of Franco, general elections were held and writing process of a new constitution started. General amnesty for political captives were declared and political parties and regional parties, like PNV, allowed to act in political sphere. On the negotiations for the new constitution, PNV became a side of the talks and tried to defend Basque regional rights within the frame of politics and avoided to obstruct the talks with other parties. On the other hand, ETA continued its attack against the Spanish State and the new government.

A part from ETA's attacks, another political movement emerged among Basque people. An umbrella organization for the Basque political movements,

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[341] Ibid., p. 74.

except PNV, was formed under the name of *Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista* (KAS, in English; Socialist Patriot Coordinator). The formation of KAS had started back in 1974; however, it became a political movement after the death of Franco.

While the negotiations were continuing, ETA (pm) wanted to be in the process of democratic transformation of the Spanish State. In September and October 1976, in its 7th assembly, ETA (pm) accepted the new policy under the name of '*el desdoblamiento*' (opening-up) and declared its intention to end the armed struggle against the central Spanish Authority. ETA (pm) formed a new political party under the name of Basque Revolutionary Party (*Euskal Imultzale Alderdia*, EIA). The party later merged itself with Basque Left (*Euzkadiko Ezkerra*, EE).[342]

In 1976, KAS published the following objectives as the common Basque demand on new political scene;

> "-the complete independence of Euskadi, that is, the full capacity of the Basque people to decide their own destiny, which means the achievement of an independent and reunified Basque state;
>
> -the achievement of the socialist revolution, which must mean the installation of that Basque state as a popular and democratic socialist republic, headed by the workers, in which the constitutional forms will guarantee the full and direct participation of the people in the total management of Basque society;
>
> -the euskerizacion [restoring Euskera as a working language of the Basque Country) and full normalization of Euskera based on a situation of bilingualism;
>
> -the destruction of the capitalist and imperialist structures that exploit and oppress our people."[343]

On one side, KAS basically rejected any negotiation over Basque rights during the writing process of the new constitution; on the other side, PNV defended that Basques should be recognized as *pueblos (*peoples), while the

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[342] Ibid., p. 77.
[343] Ibid., p. 80.

whole population of Spain accepted as *nación* (nation). According to PNV's proposition, Basque region should have a wide-range autonomy.

On 1 February 1978, ETA (m) declared via a public newspaper that they would talk about for a cease-fire, if their five demands were accepted by the authorities. These five demands, known as the KAS alternative, were;

"1-Total amnesty

2. Legalization of all political parties/ including those whose program includes the creation of an independent Basque state without having to reduce their statutes.

3. Expulsion from Euskadi of the Guardia Civil and other security forces.

4. Improvement of the living and working conditions for the popular classes and especially for the working class, satisfaction of their immediate social and economic aspirations as expressed by their representative associations.

5. An autonomy statute that, as a minimum, recognizes the national sovereignty of Euskadi, authorizes Euskera as the principal official language of the country, provides for Basque government control over all law enforcement authorities and all military units garrisoned in the Basque country, and endows the Basque people with adequate power to adopt whatever political, economic or social structures they deem appropriate for their own progress and welfare."[344]

Even there were some contacts with ETA (m) and the Spanish central authorities - all attempts to solve the ETA problem will be discussed in dedicated part- the KAS alternative was not accepted by Spanish authorities and writing process of the constitution continued. As the written constitution recognized the Basques as one of *nationalities* in Spain and gave autonomy to the region, but not as wanted by PNV, PNV decided not to participate the constitutional referendum. However, the new constitution was accepted by 88% of voters' support in December 1978.

In April 1978, a new nationalist Basque political party, *Herri Batasuna*, HB (Popular Unity) was founded. The HB was formed as a coalition of several groups. At the beginning Herri Batasuna did not have any relation with ETA;

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[344] Clark, *Negotiating with ETA*, p. 82.

however, within time, HB started to have a role in terrorism problem and connections with ETA. HB's relation with ETA will be examined in upcoming part of this thesis.

With the new constitution, a new state structure was introduced and 17 autonomous-communities and two autonomous cities were created, and Basques, Catalans and Galicians were recognized as nationalities, which form the Spanish *Nation.* The constitution contains 169 sections, with which State structure, citizenship, rights and duties of Spaniards, language of State, Spanish flag etc. were explained and also the regional rights and languages were mentioned.

The State structure of Spain is described by Section I as;

> "The political form of the Spanish State is the Parliamentary Monarchy."[345]

Section II describes the Spanish state as unitary State and explains the legal status of regions as;

> "The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all."[346]

One can see that, with the new constitution, regions and historical nationalities gained the right of self-government. Section III stated that Castilian is the official language of the State; however, other languages were recognized as well by saying;

> "The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Self-governing Communities in accordance with their Statutes."[347]

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[345] Constitution, Congreso de los Diputados webpage, <http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf>, site visited 7 March 2013.
[346] Ibid.
[347] Ibid.

It is possible to say that, with the aforementioned article, regional languages, including Basque language, obtained semi-official status in Spain. Section IV gave chance to autonomous communities to determine and to use their own flags in accordance with official Spanish flag.

After the constitution, the faith of Basque region was determined with the referendum for autonomy in 1979. PNV defended the new status of Basque region; however, ETA (m) carried out many attacks to scare people and to force them not to vote in referendum. Nevertheless, total participation to referendum was 58,86% and the autonomous status of Basque region was accepted by 94,6% of total votes.[348] According to the new structure, Basque Country and Navarre became autonomous communities.

Aforementioned sections show that Basque language and rights were accepted by the central Spanish authority. According to new autonomous-communities system, the Basque Country and Navarre became two different autonomous communities among all 17. After the approval of the constitution, communities of historical nationalities started to enjoy their regional rights while others needed to wait for five year of adaptation time.

After the approval of the new constitution, ETA (m) attacks continued and even increased during the year of 1980. As the ETA's, both ETA(m) and ETA(pm), attacks increased, heavy security measures were applied on Basque region and even a new antiterrorist force was formed. Meantime, as the ETA (pm) had intention to end its armed struggle, after their attack in Madrid in February 1980, they published following five-point-list for cease-fire;

> "1-that the Basque autonomy statute be expressly exempt from any contradictory or conflicting legislation
> passed by the Spanish parliament;

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[348] "Archivo de Resultados Electorales", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/ q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 March 2013.

2-there be a referendum

held in Navarra to ascertain the preferences of the Navarrese people regarding integration into the Basque Autonomous Community;

3-that all ETA prisoners be returned immediately to Euskadi, and that there be a general amnesty when the Basque autonomy statute went into effect;

4-that all special police measures in the Basque Country be halted, and the law enforcement power be transferred to an autonomous Basque Police Force. The Spanish government rejected any negotiations about these demands."[349]

As expected, Spanish government rejected the demands and continued to fight against terrorism.

In late 1980, ETA violence and killings increased, ETA targeted high rank state officials. The political party EIA made a call to both wings of ETA to stop the attacks and to declare cease-fire. ETA's response was more attacks and kidnapping of three diplomats in Madrid. The high tension resulted with an attempt of coup by security forces in February 1981.[350] Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and some military personal tried to take over the power of Spanish parliament, the *Cortes*, by saying that the government became incapable to stop ETA's attacks. The King called military to obey the constitution and restore the order.[351] The attempt failed; however, many protests took place all over Spain.

After the unsuccessful coup attempt, ETA (pm) declared the cease-fire. However, the decision caused split among ETA (pm) and the group split into two; ETA (pm) VII -known as *septimos*- which were in favor of an end of armed struggle, and ETA (pm) VIII - known as *octavos* - which were against the idea of having a truce with central authorities. In 1982, ETA (pm) VII ended its actions after the contacts with Spanish authorities. And in 1983, ETA (pm) VIII merged with ETA (m).[352]

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[349] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
[350] "1981: Rebel Army Seizes Control in Spain", *BBC*, 23 February 1981, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/23/newsid_2518000/2518825.stm>, site visited on 04 May 2013.
[351] Julio C. MacLennan, *Spain And the Process of European Integration 1957-85*, London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, p. 166.
[352] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

While political participation increased and Basques became more and more engaged with politics, ETA's attacks continued. During 1980s, unsuccessful attempts took place to communicate with ETA and to solve the terrorism problem. As mentioned earlier, all these attempts will be explained in dedicated part of this thesis.

The rights of Basque people caused the terrorism problem not only in Spain but also in France. Since the early 1960s, ETA maintained its headquarters and some support facilities on the French side of the border, mostly in the small towns and villages of the French Basque region. During 1960s and most of 1970s, French authorities tolerated ETA's existence in France, as long as the organization did not organize attacks in the country.[353] As ETA members often attacked targets in Spain then passed to France to get away from security forces, ETA problem became an issue between France and Spain. Spain wanted from France the return of known ETA militants to Spanish security forces, but most of the time France did not accept this proposition and proposed to deport ETA militants to the third countries. Within this context, during 1980, a new organization hit the surface under the name of *Grupos Antiterroristas De Liberación*, GAL (Antirerrorist Liberation Groups), which targeted ETA members both in Spain and France. The GAL was effective between 1983 and 1987. Later on 1990s, trails opened against the actions of GALs, and Spanish High Court stated that GAL was formed under governments approval and financial aid accumulated for the organization from State's budget.[354]

The main idea behind to creation of GAL was to force government of France to hand-over ETA militants back to Spain and to increase the cooperation between two countries. For many years, ETA had relations with French government and often use France territories as safe heaven to plan attacks and hide-out.

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[353] Ibid.., p. 30-31.
[354] "İspanya'da Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anti-Demokratik Uygulamalar: GAL Anti-Terör Özgürlük Örgütü", *UTSAM*, 2009, p. 7, <http://www.utsam.org/images/upload/attachment/GAL %20Anti-Terör%20Özgürlük%20Örgütü.pdf>, site visited on 3 May 2013.

### 3.2.4. 1990s and 2000s

In late 1980s, a new initiative occurred for the solution of Basque problem and ETA. On 12 January 1988, a pact was signed by multiple parties including nationalist PNV, and EA (*Eusko Alkartasuna*, Basque Solidarity). This pact also was known as Ajuria Enea Pact, as it signed in Ajuria Enea Palace, which is the presidential compound of Basque regional president. According to the Pact, ETA's actions were considered as an obstacle on legal struggle for Basque rights. Parties stated that armed actions were not a way to achieve political goals. The pact affected 1990s on fight against terrorism. As HB often supported the ETA's actions, it did not sign the pact.

As the problem of Basque region was a concern for both Spain and France, two countries cooperation against ETA members increased during 1990s. Many high rank ETA directors were captured in France. More and more, ETA gave up to see France as a safe heaven. One of the major operations against ETA leaders in France was against the ETA leader Peio El Viejo. With the operation French police forces captured the ETA leader and many other ETA militants with him.[355]

As the French-Spanish cooperation increased and state of Spain adopted heavy security measures, ETA took its armed attacks out of Basque Region. Starting from early 1990s, ETA carried out attacks in big cities like Madrid and Barcelona. ETA militants even tried to assassinate King Juan Carlos I and party leader and future Prime Minister José María Aznar. In 1996, Aznar took the office of Prime Minister and Spanish policies against ETA's actions were hardened. After Aznar came into power, ETA shifted its attacks to Party Popular (PP, *Partido Popular*). A mayor of PP, Miguel Angel Blanco, was kidnapped by ETA. With the kidnap, ETA published a list of demands and gave 48 hours to Aznar's Government to fulfill them. As ETA's demand on transfer of convicted ETA

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[355] Edward F. Mickolus, and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism 1992-1995: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography*, Weitport, Greenwood Press, 1997, p. 160.

militants to prisons in Basque country rejected by the government, ETA killed Blanco.[356] The death of Blanco, raised the tension against ETA and protests took place all over of Spain. During the funeral of Blanco, nearly two million people gathered in Madrid and protested ETA.[357] People shouted the famous slogan '*Basta ya*!' (Enough!). The slogan later was carried as banner in other manifestations and in 1999 became the name of the civil initiative against the terrorist attacks and became the platform of victims of terrorist attacks. The HB was also protested, people threw rocks on HB offices and shouted as 'HB you have to pay!'.[358] As a result of protests, ETA did not attack for two months; however, afterwards it returned to terrorist attacks. In September 1998, ETA declared an indefinite and unconditional cease-fire; however, it broke out its cease-fire decision in late 1999.[359]

Since the beginning of 2000s, a new solution seeking process started among Basque political sphere for the rights of Basque people. In 2003, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, the president of the Basque Country Autonomous Community between 1999 - 2009 came up with a plan for the rights of Basque people. As the plan was majorly formed by Ibarretxe and announced by him, the plan was also known as "Ibarretxe Plan". According to the plan, the new "Euskadi Community" described its relation with Spanish state as "Free Association". This the plan tried to overthrown legal rights of Spanish State over the Basque Country. The plan also described that the Basque people of Basque Region would have Basque 'nationality' in addition to Spanish citizenship, and the Spanish people who would live in Basque Country would have 'the Basque citizenship'. According to the new Basque nationality explanation, Spaniards other than Basques would become 'legal aliens' in Basque Country, which is a part of state of Spain. One can see

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[356] Israel Viana, "Todos los Atentados de la Banda Terrorista", *ABC*, <http://www.abc.es/especiales/eta/atentados/11.asp>, site visited on 15 May 2013.
[357] Elizabeth Nash, "Spain Gripped by Mass Protest Against the ETA Gunmen", *The Independent*, 15 July 1997, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/spain-gripped-by-mass-protest-against-the-eta-gunmen-1250773.html>, site visited on 09 May 2013.
[358] Pablo Ordaz, "ETA, Aquí Tienes Mi Nuca!", *El País*, 14 July 1997, <http://elpais.com/diario/1997/07/14/espana/868831204_850215.html>, site visited on 09 May 2013.
[359] "ETA Rompe la Tregua y Responsabiliza a PNV y EA de la Decisión", *El Mundo*, 28 November 1999, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/1999/noviembre/28/nacional/eta.html>, site visited on 09 May 2013.

that, adaptation of citizenship-nationality duality would cause big problems in the minds of Spaniards. Nevertheless, introducing the Basque nationality even could be considered as a step away from the proclamation of independent Basque State.

As the plan described the Basque regions of France as Basque country, the idea of unification of Spanish and France Basque regions was also introduced basically. The plan had explanations for every thing concerning an independent Basque State, including international relations of Euskadi Community, economical rules and internal affaires and so on. According to the plan, the Basque people of Euskadi Community would determine their future by referendum, and Spanish State would not veto the possible separation and declaration of an independent state decision of Basque people.

The Ibarretxe Plan was considered as "treason" by Spanish politicians, who commonly stated that more autonomy to Basque country could end the unity of Spanish State. Mariona Rajoy, then Deputy Prime Minister, declared that the Ibarretxe Plan had the same objectives as ETA.[360] Common belief regarding the plan was that, Basque people already had autonomy and they tried to gain independence by that plan.

The Ibarretxe Plan needed to be accepted by the Basque Parliament and also by the Spanish Parliament to be put into force. As expected, Basque Parliament approved the plan; however, Spanish Parliament rejected it. Hence, the plan did not put into force; however, the discussion on political future of Basques and other people in Spain continued during following years.

During the first decade of 2000, the cooperation between France and Spain continued. ETA operations stopped, ETA leaders were captured. More and more, ETA started to lose its support from the Basque people, and in international area, ETA started to be known as a terrorist organization rather than a liberation

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[360] Giles Tremlett, "Basque Plan is Treason, Say Critics", *The Guardian*, 27 October 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/27/spain.gilestremlett>, site visited on 12 May 2013.

movement. Within time, the government in Spain changed, and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero became Prime Minister of Spain in 2004. As the government changed in Spain, ETA wanted to try to engage in talks with Spanish Government and declared a permanent cease-fire in March 2006.[361] Even though the Government contacted with ETA, the talks did not give any outcome and ETA attacked to the Airport in Madrid, in December 2006.[362] With this attack, ETA declared that so-called permanent cease-fire was over.

During following years, ETA's attacks continued in small scale; however, after the Madrid bombing, both Spanish and French security forces made operations against ETA and many ETA leaders were captured. As a result of heavy operations against ETA, the terrorist organization declared another cease-fire in September 2010. However, political parties and the government of Spain declared that the cease-fire decision was insufficient and demanded that ETA should give up weapons permanently.[363] As a result of public and political pressure, firstly ETA declared that cease-fire as permanent in January 2011, then on 20 October 2011, ETA broadcasted a video message and declared that the cease-fire was definitive and organization finished its armed struggle against Spanish security forces. Also they stated that ETA was ready to engage dialogue with both state of Spain and France.[364] ETA's declaration was as following;

> "With this declaration, Euskadi ta Askatasuna, the Basque socialist revolutionary organisation for national liberation, wishes to give news of its decision:
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> Eta considers that the international conference that has recently taken place in the Basque country is an initiative of enormous significance. The agreed resolution includes all the elements for an integral solution of the conflict, and it has attained

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[361] "ETA Declara un Alto el Fuego Permanente", El País, 22 March 2006, <http://elpais.com/elpais/2006/03/22/actualidad/1143019019_850215.html>, site visited on 10 May 2013.

[362] "ETA Cargó la Bomba de Barajas con Menos 200 Kilos de Explosivo", *El País*, 30 December 2006, <http://elpais.com/elpais/2006/12/30/actualidad/1167470217_850215.html>, site visited on 10 May 2013.

[363] "Gobierno y Partido Ven "Insuficiente" el Anuncio de Alto el Fuego de ETA", El País, 06 September 2010, <http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/09/05/actualidad/1283674620_850215.html>, site visited on 11 May 2013.

[364] Luis R. Aizpeolea, "ETA Pone Fin a 43 Años de Terror", *El País*, 20 October 2011, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/19/actualidad/1319056094_153776.html>, site visited on 12 May 2013.

the support of a wide spectrum of the Basque society and the international community.

A new political time is emerging in the Basque country. We have an historical opportunity to find a just and democratic solution for the centuries old political conflict. Dialogue and agreement should outline the new cycle, over violence and repression. The recognition of the Basque country and the respect for the will of the people should prevail over imposition.

This has not been an easy road. The cruelty of the fight has taken away the lives of many comrades. Many others are still suffering in prison and in exile. Our recognition and deepest tribute goes out to them.

From here on the road will not be easy either. Facing the imposition that still exists, every step, every achievement, will be the result of the effort and fight of Basque citizens. During these years the Basque country has accumulated the necessary experience and strength to address this path and it also has the determination for doing it. It is time to look at the future with hope. It is also time to act with responsibility and courage.

Therefore, Eta has decided the definitive cessation of its armed activity. Eta calls upon the Spanish and French governments to open a process of direct dialogue with the aim of addressing the resolution of the consequences of the conflict and, thus, to overcome the armed confrontation. Thorough this historical declaration, Eta shows its clear, solid and definitive commitment.

Lastly, Eta calls upon the Basque society to commit to this process until freedom and peace are achieved.

Long live the free Euskal Herria! Long live Basque socialism! No rest until independence and socialism!

Basque country, 20 October 2011

Euskadi ta Askatasuna

Eta"[365]

ETA's declaration found place in international media, as well. All over the Europe and United States of America, ETA's decision on finishing armed struggle

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[365] "Basque Ceasefire Statement: Full Text", *The Guardian*, 20 October 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/basque-ceasefire-statement-full-text>, site visited on 12 May 2013.

was welcomed by Governments and authorities. With the declaration of ETA, fear of terror finished in Spain, but not fade away completely. As ETA declared permanent cease-fire but later broke it and returned the terrorist attacks before, public opinion has doubts about ETA's decision on finishing armed struggle. Until ETA declares that the organization diffuses itself and its name, ETA, points out just an *organization in history* not in actuality, the fear will be among the population.

## 4. POLITICAL WINGS OF TERRORISM

### 4.1. Sinn Féin and IRA as a Reference Point

This thesis takes the British case as a reference point for the cases of Spain and Turkey. To understand the relationship between Sinn Féin and IRA, and its relevance to this thesis, brief information about 'North Ireland problem' will be given below, and the Sinn Féin and IRA relationship will be examined to highlight the relation of politics and weapons.

### 4.1.1. General Frame of Northern Ireland Problem

As the British Empire conquered the island of Ireland in 12th century, the history of the problem goes back to that date. The British control of the island lasted until the aftermath of World War I, in 1922, when the Irish Republic was proclaimed. Historically, the British rule and its existence are widely accepted as the base of long lasted dispute in the island. With the British rule, many Protestants immigrated to the island where the population was Catholic, once. As English men and Irish men differentiate themselves on the terms of sects of religion, the Northern Ireland problem has also a religious basis. Irish historians often claims that, a part from religious basis, British rule always treated Protestants with favor, such as giving land on the island. With this unequal treatment of British rule, Catholics struggle to have an equal treatment.

Sinn Féin - means 'Ourselves' in English - was founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith with the goal of creating an independent Irish State by politics. As a result of British rule's suppression policies, the idea of having an independent state backed by the Irish people and Sinn Féin gained the support of the population

from its creation. While the Sinn Féin wanted to pursue its way within politics, high tension continued between Catholics and Protestants regarding great differences in life conditions. As a result of the high tension, the clashes occurred in 1916.[366] The rebellion of 1916 was named as Eastern Rising and by the rebellion, Irish militants wanted to gain independence from the British Empire. The 1916 Eastern Rising was also the scene where the roots of Irish Republican Army; Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizens Army showed themselves. In 1919, Irish Volunteers regrouped and formed Irish Republican Army (IRA, *Óglaigh na hÉireann*).

The clashes between British and Irish forces finished with Anglo-Irish Treaty, in 1921. The Sinn Féin delegates signed the treaty and by the treaty, Northern Ireland, consisted six counties of Ulster, stayed under the rule of the United Kingdom. In 1922, the Irish Republic became self-governing state under the name of Irish Free State. As the new state did not include the Northern Ireland, the conflict occurred among the population and also caused the first split of Sinn Féin. After the conflict, Catholics started to be called as 'Nationalist' as they seek to form a 'United Ireland' and Protestants started be called as 'Unionist' as they were in favor of British rule.

The 1916 Eastern Rising was the starting point of the cooperation between military forces and politicians. The Irish Volunteers, which later became IRA, came under the control of Irish Assembly, and Sinn Féin political organization, which was backed by the Irish people had the legitimacy on the signing of Anglo-Irish Treaty. Two wings of Irish movements worked together for the same goal.

Sinn Féin is in politics of Ireland more than a century; however, the organization faced with many splits but succeeded to preserve itself. For the purpose of this thesis, only the last two splits will be examined to understand today's Sinn Féin and its relation with Provisional IRA.

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[366] Emin Gürses, *Ayrılıkçı Terörün Anatomisi IRA-ETA-PKK*, İstanbul, Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2003, pp. 27-28.

### 4.1.2. Sinn Féin and IRA, After 1970

Sinn Féin maintained its goals and policies since the beginning. The organization preserved its desire of 'United Ireland' by seeking to set Northern Ireland free from British rule. The goal of the creation of 'United Ireland' was common between IRA and Sinn Féin, and IRA faced with the split within itself as well as Sinn Féin.

By 1970, Sinn Féin party members, who demanded the equality between Catholics and Protestants, adopted leftist policies and pursued their goal by non-violent politics. This group started to be called as 'Official Sinn Féin'. Official Sinn Féin later changed its name to 'Sinn Féin the Workers Party' in 1977 and then to 'The Workers' Party' in 1982.[367] By becoming the Workers Party, Official Sinn Féin transformed it self to another organization and the name Sinn Féin stayed with the other wing.

The other wing of Sinn Féin, who preserved the idea of separatism for Northern Ireland, started to be called as 'Provisional Sinn Féin'. By its policies, Provisional Sinn Féin became the representative of Catholics.[368] Sinn Féin defined its goal as to lead all Irish people and form a United Ireland.

As it happened with Sinn Féin, IRA split itself into two groups around the question of usage of violence. Official IRA chose the way to form a new political structure both among North and South Ireland to create a United Ireland by non-violent acts. They recognized the South and North administrations, which was against the original idea of IRA as the IRA did not accept the two-administration structure in island of Ireland. Since the Official IRA gave up the armed struggle ideas of original IRA, this thesis focuses on the other wing of IRA, Provisional IRA.

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[367] "Aspects of the History & Ideology of the Workers' Party", *The Worker's Party of Ireland*, <http://www.workerspartyireland.net/history.html>, site visited on 2 May 2013.
[368] Anniseh van Engeland ve Rachael M. Rudolph, *From Terrorism to Politics*, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2008, p. 58.

The Provisional IRA was formed as a response to the Catholics demands on protection against Protestants. The Provisional IRA conducted the armed struggle in Northern Ireland against British forces and continued to refuse the administrations both in North and South. They also claimed that IRA Army Council was the main organ, which acted as governments in the island of Ireland. The cooperation between Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin continued during 1970s, and the British rule was aware of it; nevertheless, Sinn Féin was never closed down by the British rule.[369] Instead, British Government took other measures to control the acts of Sinn Féin. These measures will be examined in coming lines.

In 1986, another split occurred in Sinn Féin over the policies of the party against the Assembly of the Republic of Ireland. In its congress, majority of Sinn Féin delegates voted in favor to end up abstentionism policy in the Assembly. Until that time, as Sinn Féin did not recognized the Assembly of the Republic of Ireland, elected members did not take their seats in the assembly. The discussion paved the way for another party. The Republican Sinn Féin was formed by the members who were in favor to pursue the abstentionism. They declare that their candidates for elections would not enter the assembly in case of being elected. Republican Sinn Féin did not have major support from the Irish people.

On the other hand, Provisional Sinn Féin under the Garry Adams leadership - he is still the leader of Sinn Féin - continued to be in politics and took its places in the administrative organs of Northern Ireland; however, even though they entered the general elections in the United Kingdom, but never took their seats in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Even they do not take the oath of allegiance.

The connection between provisional wings of IRA and Sinn Féin became clear with Garry Adams' leadership in Sinn Féin. Garry Adams was in the

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[369] Clive Walker, "Political Violence and Democracy in Northern Ireland", *The Modern Law Review*, vol. 51, no. 5, 1998, pp. 605-622.

leadership of IRA between 1977 and 1978.[370] Within time, Garry Adams became the leader of Sinn Féin from the leadership of IRA. One of the evidences of relation between Sinn Féin and IRA took place in 1981 Hunger Strike. Mostly the IRA members participated the Hunger Strike, which lasted 217 days, and Bobby Sands, who was elected for the Parliament of the United Kingdom from the Sinn Féin list, died. Sinn Féin as political organization supported the Hunger Strike.[3] During 1980s, Sinn Féin gained support among the Irish population by supporting to IRA's actions.

With the splits of 1970 and 1986, the core of Sinn Féin was preserved under the leadership of Garry Adams; however, the organization adopted more flexible attitude towards the participation in administration system of Northern Ireland. Additionally, historical connection and cooperation between IRA and Sinn Féin was preserved itself throughout years.

From the split of 1970, the policies of provisional wings of Sinn Féin and IRA formed around the United Ireland desire. IRA was seeking to set Northern Ireland free, and if necessary with an armed struggle. For IRA, the usage of violence was taken into account as a way to the freedom of the Ireland, and as already mentioned, with the splits within Sinn Féin, group had occurred with the similar ideas. Briefly, while IRA was conducting an armed struggle, Sinn Féin was being active in politics; nonetheless, Sinn Féin supported the IRA's way of struggle for the United Ireland. Started in 1969-1970, IRA engaged the armed campaign against the British forces, which lasted thirty years.

### 4.1.3. British Measures Against Political Party-Terrorism Connection

The connection between Sinn Féin and IRA existed for a long time in the history of Ireland. Both of them faced with internal splits within their organizational structure and ideas; however, these internal problems did not

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[370] Bowyer J. Bell, *The Secret Army: The IRA*, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 520.
[371] Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA a History*, Colorado, Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993, pp. 474–475.

become obstacles on their way to preserve themselves. For IRA, it was easy to carry on its actions as it was accepted as illegal organization by the British rule. Sinn Féin existed and is still active as political party, which is recognized by the British rule, it's continuous existence depended on British legal system for political parties. Party ban method is not a used measure in the United Kingdom, which paved the way for the long existence of Sinn Féin.

As the closing political parties was not a way of dealing with them in British politics, measures of British rule generally concentrated on individual levels. At the individual level, British system closed down the way for the politicians who were imprisoned more than one year to become a member of parliaments. With this, the main idea was to keep away convicted politicians who supported the terrorist acts, from becoming the voice of people in the administrative organs of the United Kingdom. As the British system forced politicians not to defend any illegal organization and its attacks, 'Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act of 1989' forced every elected local authority to take the oath not to support the terrorism activities and organizations.[372]

A part from the legal necessities to become the voice of people, active members of political parties were forced not to speak to public by broadcasts about any terrorist actions. The Broadcasting Ban in 1988 was clearly put in force to stop Sinn Féin members to give declarations on TVs. As the IRA and Sinn Féin were accepted as connected, British rule prohibited any declarations of the members of Sinn Féin. However, Sinn Féin members found a way to make public declarations, which noted as an historical act.

When the Broadcasting Ban was introduced, the clashes between IRA and British forces was at high level. IRA was using violence in daily basis, and Sinn Féin often made declarations to defend and support IRA's actions. Within these

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[372] Whole text can be found in: "Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989", *The National Archive of United Kingdom*, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/3/contents>, site visited on 17 April 2012.

conditions, the British Government believed that they should find a way to stop Sinn Féin. Even, the ban did not clearly target Sinn Féin by giving its name, instead every political organizations that supported the acts of IRA and spoke about violence; Sinn Féin was the real target to stop. The law said that direct declarations were prohibited; however did not mention its way of practice. Hence, the broadcaster did not know exactly what to do and not to do. Sinn Féin was totally sure about that the law was put into force to stop their campaign, and they started to ask to television and radio stations to find out what could be done. Main claim of the British Parliament for the ban was that: when people saw Garry Adams and others from the leadership of Sinn Féin were defending IRA and violence, the tension was raising among the population.

Sinn Féin found the solution to broadcasting ban by using actor's voices. Garry Adams and other leaders of Sinn Féin wrote down their declarations by their own words; however, instead of them, actors read these declarations. By the usage of actor's voices, Sinn Féin might not use its own voice; however, as they wrote the words, declarations were broadcasted *indirectly*. With this work-around, the broadcasting ban was never violated. The broadcast ban was lifted in 1994, after the cease-fire declarations of IRA.[373]

*Political terrorism* has the connection of political parties and terrorist organizations in its nature. Two different approaches fight for the same goal in the structure of a certain country. If one takes into account the various definitions of terrorism which were explained in the first part of this thesis, and the common discourses on terrorism that is also popular among social scientists, 'one man's terrorists is another man's freedom fighters or heroes', Sinn Féin's defensive declarations on IRA attacks and Irish people's support to Sinn Féin can be understood in a wider perspective.

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[373] "The 'Broadcast Ban' on Sinn Fein", *BBC*, 5 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ politics/4409447.stm>, site visited on 1 May 2013.

Among Irish people, IRA was accepted as freedom fighters and Sinn Féin was accepted as a legitimate representative in politics. As the British rule also accepted the Sinn Féin as a legitimate political organization and *voice* people, the political party was never closed down, even though their leaders' declarations were restricted or politicians was kept away by laws. One can say that British authorities took into account that closing a political party never could be a solution to any problem and did not prevent the people to form an another one. Therefore, in the British experience, British authorities never tried to *silence* people by closing down political parties; however, as a legitimate actions, British rule tried to eliminate politicians who supported the violence. The British experience shows that punishment for the individuals who supported the violent actions that effected the general population and public safety, is more convenient than closing the political parties.

## 4.2. Kurds in Politics, Effects of PKK

### 4.2.1. During Ottoman Empire

Kurdish existence in politics in the history of Turkey goes back to the Tanzimat Period of the Ottoman Empire. As Tanzimat period gave chance to the creation of political organizations, Kurds created the first political organization in 1908[374]; Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid (*Kürt Terakki ve Teavun Cemiyeti*).[375] This society had members from famous Kurdish families, in other words, tribes. As the activities of Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid increased, Young Turks, which formed a government under Ottoman Sultan's rule, considered the organization as a potential *threat* to their authority and shut it down in 1909. Then, Kurds tried to be an active political player in the Ottoman politics with the creation of a second Kurdish political organization, *Hevi-i Kürt*

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[374] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[375] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

*Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Hope Society) at the beginning of 1912; however, this organization did not last very long and was closed in very short time.[376]

During the aftermath of the World War I, Kurds founded another political organization with the name of Society for the Progress of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti*) based in Istanbul on 17 December 1918.[377] The Society opened branches in other cities and started to promote Kurdish nationalism among people.[378] The Society for the Progress of Kurdistan was effective during already explained Koçgiri rebellion, and the organization closed down in 1921, after the suppression of the Koçgiri Rebellion.

Kurds were also a part of the resistance movement in Anatolia. During the resistance movements, Mustafa Kemal organized congress to gather people and talked about the resistance and its aftermath. As Kurds were important actors on politics, Mustafa Kemal invited them to Erzurum Congress in 23 July-7 August 1919.[379] Maybe they did not formed another political organization during the time of resistance movements; however, by being present in the congress, they participated actively to the political sphere at that time. The first National Assembly of Turkey was officially opened on 23 April 1920, in which Kurdish MPs existed.

### 4.2.2. Kurds in Politics in New Republic

The Republic of Turkey was declared on 23 October 1923. A month before the declaration, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions founded a political party under the name of 'People's Party' on 9 September 1923. The name of the party changed into 'Republican People's Party' (CHP) in 1935 as it is today.[3]

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[376] Ibid.
[377] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
[378] Olson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[379] Ibid., p. 36.
[380] "Party History", *Republican People's Party*, <http://www.chp.org.tr/en/?page_id=67>, site visited on 29 March 2013.

The Republican People's Party was the only political party until 1945, which ruled Turkey until the elections of 1950.

Democrat Party was founded on 7 January 1946, and entered the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1946 as opposition party. Four years later after the first multi party election, Democrat party won the general elections of 1950 and took over the power from Republican People's Party for the first time. The elections of 1950 hold significant importance on the political history of Turkey as it ended the single-party rule period (1923-1950).

DP rule lasted until the military intervention of 1960. After the military intervention,  constitution of 1961 was introduced, which was more liberal than the previous constitution on the subject of the creation of political parties. As Kurds were in politics as members of CHP and DP, other political parties was started to be founded.

DP was closed by the military intervention of 1960. Instead of DP, new political parties were founded. On 11 February 1961, Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP) and on 13 February 1961, New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*, YTP) were established. YTP had the support of local elites in the Kurdish populated areas and received more than 30% of votes in the east during the elections of 1961, and became the partner of the government with six ministries in the CHP-led coalition government.[381]

One of the political parties, which was effective on the creation of Kurdish awareness of ethnic identity, was Turkish Workers' Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP), which was founded in 1961. As stated on previous parts of the thesis, TIP was the first party, which accepted the Kurdish reality in the politics of Turkey. Their proposition for the solution of Kurdish problem was recognition of Kurds as separate nation, and changing the state regime needed to federation.[382]  As

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[381] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[382] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

expected, the Constitutional Court closed the Turkish Workers' Party on 20 July 1971.[383]

Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi,* GP), which was founded on 12 May 1967 by a group of broke away CHP MPs.[384] GP managed to receive votes from Kurdish populated areas.[385] According to Kirişçi and Winrow, in the elections of 1965 and 1969, Kurds also supported independent candidates.[386] One can see that Kurds have been active in elections with supporting political party's candidates, if not independent candidates.

During 1970s, Kurds continued to be active in politics in elections; moreover, young Kurds had been in student organizations in major cities. Student organizations were mainly founded over Marxist-Leninist revolutionist ideas, which was also the idea that PKK was founded over. During late 1970s, leftist and rightist student groups and youth groups of political parties fought with each other, political and social chaos and violence spread fear among population. All of these paved the way for another military intervention on 12 September 1980.[387]

The military intervention of 1980 suspended all political activities of any kind. Political parties and all student organizations were closed. The Turkish Armed Forces ruled the country through the National Security Council for three years. A new constitution was introduced in 1982 and the country returned to the democracy in 1983.

The new constitution *re-set* the rules of political life in Turkey. The constitution of 1982 was accepted by a referendum on 7 November 1982, which is still in use in Turkey. The constitution has 177 articles; some of them describe

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[383] Ibid., p. 168.
[384] Gürcan Bozkır, "Türk Siyasal Hayatında Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol. 6, no. 15, 2007, pp. 275-308.
[385] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
[386] Ibid.
[387] Ömer Aymalı, "12 Eylül Askeri Darbesine Giden Süreçte Neler Yaşandı?", *Dünya Bülteni*, 12 September 2012, <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=204563>, site visited on 16 November 2012.

the main duty of the state and the roles of political parties. Article 5 explains the duties of state as;

> "Article 5: The fundamental aims and duties of the state are; to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the individual's material and spiritual existence."[388]

One can see that the constitution made state responsible from itself. State centric article focused, primarily on the independence and integrity of the nation, indivisibility of the country, then secondly, put population's welfare and happiness as duties. This shows that the fear about the territorial integrity started to show itself from the beginning of the constitution.

As the constitution has articles nearly for every scenario, Article 26 described the freedom of express as;

> "Article 26. (As amended on October 17, 2001): Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities. This provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, and similar means to a system of licensing.
>
> The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and private and

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[388] "The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey", *Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information*, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Content.aspx?s=tcotrot>, site visited on 02 April 2013.

family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary.

The regulating provisions regarding the use of dissemination means of news and thoughts shall not be regarded as restriction of freedom of expression and dissemination of thoughts, provided that such provisions do not hinder publications thereof.

The formalities, conditions and procedures to be applied in exercising the right to expression and dissemination of thought shall be prescribed by law."

The article guaranteed the freedom of expression; however, made it possible to interpret any idea as 'against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation'. Basically, any expression about the Kurdish existence can be considered as a threat to the integrity and may be restricted. This article gives fear to the individuals and political parties to talk about Kurdish existence and the Kurdish problem.

Section tree of the constitution described how to form a political party and principles to be observed by the political parties by two articles;

"**III. Provisions Relating to Political Parties**

**A. Forming Parties, Membership and Withdrawal From Membership in a Party**

ARTICLE 68. (As amended on July 23, 1995: 4121/6 Article)

Citizens have the right to form political parties and in accordance with the established procedure to join and withdraw from them. One must be over 18 years of age to become a member of a party.

Political parties are indispensable elements of democratic political life.

Political parties can be formed without prior permission and shall pursue their activities in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Constitution and law.

The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they

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shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.

Judges and prosecutors, members of higher judicial organs including those of the Court of Accounts, civil servants in public institutions and organizations, other public servants who are not considered to be labourers by virtue of the services they perform, members of the armed forces and students who are not yet in higher education institutions, shall not become members of political parties.

The membership of the teaching staff at higher education institutions in political parties is regulated by law. This law cannot allow those members to assume responsibilities outside the central organs of the political parties. It also sets forth the regulations which the teaching staff at higher education institutions shall observe as members of political parties.

The principles concerning the membership of students at higher education institutions to political parties are regulated by law.

The state shall provide the political parties with adequate financial means in an equitable manner. The financial assistance to be extended to political parties, as well as procedures related to collection of membership dues and donations are regulated by law.

**B. Principles to be Observed by Political Parties**

ARTICLE 69. (As amended on July 23, 1995 and October 17, 2001)

The decision to dissolve a political party permanently owing to activities violating the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68 may be rendered only when the Constitutional Court determines that the party in question has become a centre for the execution of such activities.

The activities, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line with democratic principles. The application of these principles is regulated by law.

Political parties shall not engage in commercial activities.

The income and expenditure of political parties shall be consistent with their objectives. The application of this rule is regulated by law. The auditing of the income, expenditure and acquisitions of political parties by the Constitutional Court as well as the establishment of the conformity to law of their revenue and expenses, methods of auditing and sanctions to be applied in the event of unconformity shall also be regulated by law. The Constitutional Court shall be assisted in performing its task of auditing by the Court of Accounts. The judgments rendered by the Constitutional Court as a result of the auditing shall be final.

The dissolution of political parties shall be decided finally by the Constitutional Court after the filing of a suit by the office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic.

The permanent dissolution of a political party shall be decided when it is established that the statute and programme of the political party violate the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68.

The decision to dissolve a political party permanently owing to activities violating the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68 may be rendered only when the Constitutional Court determines that the party in question has become a centre for the execution of such activities. A political party shall be deemed to become the centre of such actions only when such actions are carried out intensively by the members of that party or the situation is shared implicitly or explicitly by the grand congress, general chairmanship or the central decision-making or administrative organs of that party or by the group's general meeting or group executive board at the Turkish Grand National Assembly or when these activities are carried out in determination by the above-mentioned party organs directly.

Instead of dissolving them permanently in accordance with the above-mentioned paragraphs, the Constitutional Court may rule the concerned party to be deprived of State aid wholly or in part with respect to intensity of the actions brought before the court.

A party which has been dissolved permanently cannot be founded under another name.

The members, including the founders of a political party whose acts or statements have caused the party to be dissolved permanently cannot be founders, members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a period of five years from the date of publication in the official gazette of the Constitutional Court's final decision and its justification for permanently dissolving the party.

Political parties which accept financial assistance from foreign states, international institutions and persons and corporate bodies shall be dissolved permanently.

The foundation and activities of political parties, their supervision and dissolution, or their deprival of State aid wholly or in part as well as the election expenditures and procedures of the political parties and candidates, are regulated by law in accordance with the above-mentioned principles."

These articles and others regarding political life in Turkey restrict the political parties on their ideas and policies. The 1982 Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to close any anti-system political party. This arrangement

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aims to prevent any kind of act carried out by any political party, which spoils the foundational principles of the regime and the state. These principles inevitably cover the indivisible integrity of the state, with its nation and territory. Within perspective of democracy, it is possible to see that by the constitution, state created a limited space, which is restricted and always kept under the heavy control of central authorities. Consequently, not just Kurdish parties but various parties have been closed over the years with accusation of being an 'anti-system' parties.

The National Security Council put a new rule to the election system of Turkey. 10% election threshold has been introduced and it was undermined the chance of representation of the small political parties.[389] Mostly, Kurdish political parties suffered from this high threshold percentage.

After the military intervention and the introduction of the constitution of 1982, Turkey returned to the democracy with the elections of 1983. As National Security Council observed the creation of political parties, and had the right to veto of any party, only three political parties entered the elections. Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), People's Party (*Halkçı Parti*, HP), Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*, MDP) participated in the election of 1983 and ANAP won the majority of votes under the leadership of Turgut Özal who later became the President of the Republic of Turkey.[390]

With the return to democracy, other political parties were also formed. Political parties and politicians tried to avoid the Kurdish problem in political discourses. As PKK started its armed attacks against Turkish forces in 1984, Kurdish question lost its importance and terrorism problem took the first place in state's agenda. After the creation of PKK, Kurds also started to form their political parties; however, every Kurdish parties stayed under the shadow of PKK.

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[389] Burak Cop, "Yüzde 10 Barajının Öyküsü", *NTVMSNBC*, 30 March 2011, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25197844/>, site visited on 27 March 2013.
[390] "1983 Yılı Genel Seçimleri".

### 4.2.3. Kurdish Parties, PKK's Domination

As the military intervention closed CHP, the founder party of the republic, a new party was formed under the name of Social Democracy Party (*Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi,* SODEP) to take on CHP's role. The party later merged with the People's Party and gained the name Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*, SHP) in 1985. During the elections of 1987, Kurdish candidates entered the elections under SHP flag and then took seat in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.[391] In 1989, a group of Kurdish MPs from SHP attended to Kurdish national identity conference in Paris. Attendance to the conference in Paris resulted with their expulsion from SHP.[392]

In 1990, expelled Kurdish MPs formed the first Kurdish political party, People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi,* HEP).[393] Abdullah Öcalan, founder of PKK, was mainly against the creation of HEP, as he considered an organization outside his control could divide the Kurds. Nevertheless, PKK engaged with HEP and tried to control it. For the elections of 1991, HEP and SHP formed a political pact to act together. As a result of this pact, twenty-two HEP representatives were elected and entered to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey from the list of SHP. Abdullah Öcalan declared that he supported the idea of the electoral pact between SHP and HEP.[394]

On 6 November 1991, during the ceremony of the oath of allegiance in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Leyla Zana, Kurdish MP, came into the hall wearing a headband, which had colors of PKK flag and tried to take to oath in Kurdish and changed the text.[395] This caused high-tensioned debates not only in

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[391] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
[392] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[393] Henri J. Barkey, and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1998, p. 84.
[394] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
[395] Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2000, p. 129.

the Assembly, but also among the Turkish society. Mass media put these efforts on headlines on the next day.[396]

In March 1992, fourteen HEP MPs that entered the parliament under SHP flag, resigned from SHP and rejoined HEP.[397] During its congress, HEP hung PKK flags, which used as an evidence of their relations with PKK.[398] HEP was banned by the Constitutional Court's decision on 14 July 1993. HEP's activities were against the 'indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation'.[399]

In October 1992, before the closure of HEP, some members of HEP formed another political party under the name of Freedom and Democracy Party (*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi*, ÖZDEP).[400] However, with similar reasons of the closure of HEP, ÖZDEP was banned by Constitutional Court's decision on 23 November 1993.[401]

As Kurds were already aware of a possibility of closure for ÖZDEP, they had formed another political party with the name of Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*, DEP) on 7 May 1993.[402] According to Dündar, PKK was effective on formation of DEP, and even Abdullah Öcalan stated that DEP should be under the PKK's control; otherwise, they could not get any support from Kurds.[403] In January 1994, during DEP congress, PKK flag was hung and participants gave discourses in which the State of Turkey was described as an occupying power in Kurdish populated areas.[404] In February 1994, PKK attacked and killed young

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[396] For the cover of Newspaper Cumhuriyet, please see Appendix IV.
[397] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
[398] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
[399] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2154&content=>, site visited on 02 April 2013.
[400] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
[401] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2155&content=>, site visited on 02 April 2013.
[402] "HEP, DEP ve HADEP de Kapatılmıştı", *NTVMSNBC*, 11 December 2009, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25029246/>, site visited on 28 March 2013.
[403] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
[404] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

military school students in a railway station, and a DEP MP denied the terrorist characteristic of the attack and said "During war, these things happen, everyone in uniforms is a target".[405]   In March 1994, the immunities of thirteen DEP MPs' were lifted as a consequence of their discourses and actions, and prosecution process started which resulted with the imprisonment of seven DEP MPs and one independent.[406] The Constitutional Court banned DEP on 16 June 1994 for similar reasons to HEP and ÖZDEP.[407]

During the trail of closure for DEP, another Kurdish political party was formed. People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, HADEP) was founded in 1993, and always described itself as not a Kurdish party but a party for everyone. HADEP tried to maintain its distance with PKK in order not to be banned. In 1999, during his interrogation, Abdullah Öcalan said that PKK provided economic aid on the creation of HADEP.[408]

Until its congress in 1996, the idea, which used to assume that HADEP was different from its predecessors was common among the political sphere. During its congress, participants took down the flag of Turkey and hung PKK banner. As a result, all party members were arrested.[409]   Later, in 1999, the Supreme Court chief prosecutor applied to Constitutional Court with the demand of ban for HADEP. The prosecutors argued that HADEP had become legal wing for illegal PKK activities. The party offices and other capabilities were consequently serving as tools of terrorist propaganda. Moreover, as mentioned before, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan said that PKK provided economic aid on the creation of HADEP.[410] The trail process took four years and on 13 March

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[405] Erdal Şafak, "1994 Yanlışını Tekrarlamak", *Sabah*, 15 November 2007, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/safak/2007/11/15/1994_yanlisini_tekrarlamak>, site visited on 08 September 2012.

[406] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[407] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2158&content=>, site visited on 02 April 2013.

[408] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

[409] Ibid., p. 215.

[410] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

2003, the party met the same fate as its predecessors, and was banned by the Constitutional Court for having separatist goals and connections with PKK.[411]

As it happened before, Kurds formed another political party before the closure of HADEP. However, as the lifetime of HADEP lasted longer than expected, time frame between HADEP and the new party was different than the previous examples. Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, DEHAP) was founded in 1997; however, it was not highly active before the closure of HADEP. After the closure of HADEP in 2003, DEHAP took its place in the political area. As DEHAP was the *continuation* of HADEP, HADEP delegates joined DEHAP immediately. For instance, 35 mayors of municipalities joined to DEHAP.[412]

DEHAP was not different from previous political parties regarding its ties with PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan. In September 2005, DEHAP organized a meeting near the İmralı Island where the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan is in prison. The main goal of the meeting was to carry out a demonstration for the release of the prisoned leader of the PKK.[413] In every meeting of DEHAP, it was possible to see photos of Abdullah Öcalan and PKK flags. Among the Turkish population, protests started to rise against DEHAP, and party merged with another Kurdish organization, the Democratic Society Movement (*Democratik Toplum Hareketi*, DTH) initiated in 2005 by Leyla Zana, who tried to take the oath in Kurdish in 1991. DTH members discourses on certain incidents supported their claim on being a mass movement in Turkey. For instance, in 2005 during the Nowruz celebration, flag of Turkey was set on fire. Right after this event, DTH members made declarations to condemn the flag burning incident. Leyla Zana

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[411] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2168&content=>, site visited on 02 April 2013.
[412] "35 Belediye Başkanı DEHAP'ta", *Radikal*, 26 March 2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=70196,> site visited on 27 November 2012.
[413] İbrahim Büyükfuran, Erdoğan Paçin, and Nail Kahraman, "Gemlik'te 'Apo' Gerginliği", *Hürriyet*, 04 May 2009, <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=347384>, site visited on 27 November 2012.

said, "Flag is our common value".[414] On 9 November 2005, this movement formed another political party; Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP).

As DTH transformed itself to DTP, the party described itself as a mass party for everyone in Turkey.[415] However, party members were charged with supporting PKK. For instance, on 2 September 2006, 12 DTP members were arrested after police search of the offices of the Party, as the authorities discovered PKK documents and posters.[416] As happened in previous cases of Kurdish political parties, discourses and declarations of DTP members were watched closely by the Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor. Even though DTP was an existing political party, due to the ten percent election threshold, Kurds entered the elections of 2007 with independent candidates. 19 MPs entered the parliament, then another independent candidate joined DTP and party reached 20 MPs in the assembly, which is necessary to form Party group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.[417] And in 2007, prosecutor applied to Constitutional Court with the demand of ban for DTP by claiming that it became the wing of PKK; and the members were making propaganda of the its actions, the discourses and actions of the DTP were against the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation.[418] The trail process took two years and on 11 December 2009, DTP was banned by the Constitutional Court.[419]

As the closure trail started in 2007, an alternate Kurdish political party was formed on 2 May 2008 in case of the ban of DTP. Peace and Democracy

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[414] Ahmet Hakan, "Zana: Bayrak Ortak Değerimizdir", *Hürriyet*, 22 March 2005, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=305702>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
[415] "Demokratik Toplum Partisi Kuruldu", *Bianet*, 10 November 2005, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/70037-demokratik-toplum-partisi-kuruldu>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
[416] "12 DTP'li Tutuklandı", *Milliyet*, 2 September 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/09/02/siyaset/siy08.html>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
[417] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
[418] "Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı DTP Hakkında Kapatma Davası Açtı", *Milliyet*, 16 November 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/11/16/son/sonsiy14.asp>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
[419] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2756&content=>, site visited on 28 November 2012.

Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, BDP) took over the political space of DTP after its closure. Like the elections of 2007, BDP did not enter the elections of 2011 as a party, but supported independent candidates. 36 independent candidates entered the parliament, 29 of them later formed party group in the Assembly.[420] At time of writing this thesis, allocation of seats according to following parties is;

| Parties | Seats |
|---|---|
| Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 327 |
| Republican People's Party (CHP) | 134 |
| Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 52 |
| Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) | 29 |
| Independent | 6 |
| **Total** | 548 |

Table III:[421] Seats per Political Parties

BDP is not the only party who has Kurdish originated MPs. Other parties also have MPs who are elected from Kurdish populated areas. Consequently, BDP is not the only representative of Kurds in the Assembly; however, Kurds are mostly pointing out BDP as their political representative; even they voted for other parties also.

At the time of writing this thesis, BDP stands as a Kurdish political party in Turkey. A part from BDP, Kurds have also Democratic Society Congress (*Demokratik Toplum Kongresi*, DTK) as a political organization. The co-leaders of DTP are Aysel Tuğluk and Ahmet Türk who were the leaders of banned DTP. As Constitutional Court also banned Aysel Tuğluk and Ahmet Türk from forming any political parties, being member of political parties for five years in

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[420] Hazal Ateş, "36 Bağımsız Mecliste", *Sabah*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/06/13/36-bagimsiz-mecliste>, site visited on 28 November 2012.
[421] Source: The Grand National of Assembly's website, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.dagilim.>, site visited 03 December 2012.

2009,[422] DTK become a tool for their political activities. In 2011, DTK declared so-called 'democratic autonomy' in Kurdish populated areas, which caused a negative reaction among the population.[423]

With respect to all aforementioned information about political activities of Kurds, it is possible to say that until creation of first the Kurdish political party, HEP in 1990, Kurds had not been completely engaged with politics with Kurdish identity. With formation of HEP, Kurdish political parties trend started; however, every Kurdish party was accused of being the wing of PKK, and was banned by Constitutional Court.

HEP, ÖZDEP, DEP, HADEP, and DTP were Kurdish political parties, which were banned by the Constitutional Court. On each cases, the Constitutional Court pointed out certain articles of the Constitution of Turkey and the Law of Political Parties.

In each closure case, the Supreme Court Prosecutor described the activities of parties and members as against to independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation by pointing out of the Preamble[424] of the Constitution and Articles 68 and 69, which were quoted in previous pages. A part from articles from the Constitution, articles from the Law of Political Parties were given as reasons for the ban as well. Articles 78, 80, 81, 82, 90 explain the limit of political parties in terms of party programs, materials, etc. These articles underline that political parties cannot claim existence of minorities in terms of *race, religion, and language difference,* and cannot form party policies against the national security, territorial integrity, national independence, and so on.

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[422] Whole text of decision can be found in (Turkish): "Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı", *Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey*, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2756&content=>, site visited on 28 November 2012.

[423] "DTK Demokratik Özerklik İlan Etti", *Milliyet*, 14 July 2011, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/dtk-demokratik-ozerklik-ilan-etti/siyaset/siyasetdetay/14.07.2011/1414430/default.htm>, site visited on 28 November 2012.

[424] For the Preamble of Constitution of 1982 of Turkey, please see Appendix V.

If aforementioned articles examined in details, one can see that political sphere in Turkey is very limited and restricted. Political parties' actions, and politicians' discourses are under state's full-time observation. The Constitution of 1982 and laws regarding this constitution set very strict rules for politics, and demand total obedience to this rules.  As these articles and laws regarding political parties and political life can be interpreted in very large scale, any party slogan or poster, any public discourse from a politician can be considered as against the law. This situation is a problem not just for Kurds, but for all political parties and party members. Even as a citizen, no one can express his/her ideas if they are against State's policy on certain subjects like, territorial integrity or unity of the nation and so on. However, in case of Kurdish political parties and PKK connection, PKK's actions bring only problems to the Kurdish political movement. As PKK has interfered the candidate selection process, party congress, party leaders etc., party members felt obliged not to condemn any PKK actions and support them by their discourses and propaganda meetings in eastern Turkey. Closure decisions for Kurdish political parties came from party members talks in public, parties' slogans and posters. Their 'unclear' statements about PKK actions were interpreted as against the law by the State and as a consequence, parties were closed and party members were banned from political activities.

During 1990s, the situation of Turkish political sphere was heavily disorganized. As the coalition governments were in power, there were no political stability in the country. Therefore, there were no economic stability either. Within context, Kurdish problem could not be solved, and terrorism problem grew. There were previous attempts to solve the Kurdish problem; however, none of them reached the solution. With the election of 2002, the political life has changed in Turkey. Under the AKP Governments, certain regulations have been changed on Kurdish issue, and at the end of 2012 a new solution process has started. All attempts to solve Kurdish problem and terrorism problem will be examined in the next part of this thesis.

## 4.3. The Basque Political Life, Effect of ETA

### 4.3.1. Arana's Legacy

As stated in previous part, Basque political life was formed around nationalist ideas of Sabino Arana. Arana described Basque people as historical people and often made references to history of *fueros* for the rights of Basque people. Sabino Arana transformed his nationalist ideas to political movement with the creation of Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). From its creation, PNV formed its policies around Arana's ideas. The main goal was to gain all historical rights for Basque people and, if possible, the independence for Basque regions.

The PNV, which was formed in 1895, stands as the second old political party of Spain. With respect to party's name in Basque language (*Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea,* which means literally 'Basque Party of Supporters of God and Old Laws'), it is possible to say that references to the history of Basque people are evident. Basque name of PNV shows Arana's idea of nationalism was based on *fueros*. As the idea of nationalism requires certain elements to find place in people's mind, giving references throughout history is a common tool.

Arana described the Basque people as following: they lived in the foral system with their own traditions and culture; and PNV made its organization among Basques people with giving adequate references to the history. As stated earlier, PNV had a 'closed' organization system, consequently, José Luis de la Granja Sainz described its organization as *"partido-comunidad"*, community party.

PNV always adopted itself to the political structure of Spain, and as a result, it managed to be active all the time. For instance; it transformed itself to Basque Nationalist Communion (CNV) in 1916. With this transformation it tried to avoid to political discussions inside the party.

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The party, as PNV and for a while as CNV, was closed in 1920s as a result of military intervention of General Miguel Primo de Rivera; however, it continued its actions and propagandas in secret. With declaration of the Second Republic, the CNV regained its original name PNV and continued as the major political party for Basques.

Under General Franco's rule, once again political activities and parties were banned, and PNV operated secretly among the Basque people. During General Franco's rule, as the PNV and other political parties were closed, young Basque students formed EKIN, which later became the ETA.

With the creation of ETA, a part from PNV, a new political actor entered the Basque political scene. ETA's terrorist actions with political goals, such as the total independence of Basque Country, make them political terrorist organization.

After the death of General Franco, political life in Spain started to be restored and many political movements hit the surface. As a result, a new political movement was formed as an umbrella organization under the name *Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista* (KAS). However, PNV did not become the part of this organization. With the formation of KAS, ETA started to make demands not for themselves but for KAS, as well.

The ETA had split into two fractions in 1976 and ETA (pm) formed a new political party under the name of Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA). The party later became the partner of Basque coalition organization, Basque Left (EE).

### 4.3.2. Herri Batasuna and Aftermath

In April 1978, a new nationalist Basque political party, Herri Batasuna, HB (Popular Unity). The HB was formed as a coalition of several leftist groups and parties. At the beginning, HB did not have any direct relations with ETA; however, both of them were promoting the same ideas to gain support of the

people. Within time, ETA had more influence over HB, and HB became the public appearance of ETA.

The new constitution after General Franco's death formed the new social and political order in Spain. For the political parties, the Article 6 of the Constitution said the following;

> "Political parties are the expression of political pluralism; they contribute to the formation and expression of the will of the people and are a fundamental instrument for political participation.Their creation and the exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution and the law.Their internal structure and operation must be democratic."[425]

The Article 22 also explained the right of association as following;

> "1. The right of association is recognized.
>
> 2. Associations which pursue ends or use means classified as criminal offenses are illegal.
>
> 3. Associations set up on the basis of this article must be recorded in a register for the sole purpose of public knowledge.
>
> 4. Associations may only be dissolved or have their activities suspended by virtue of a justified court order.
>
> 5. Secret and paramilitary associations are prohibited."[426]
>
> 6.

One can see that participation to the political life and forming political parties were under the protection of the Spanish Constitution: The secret and paramilitary associations were prohibited; so, ETA was labeled as an illegal organization - as a natural result of the democracy, armed groups could not be integrated directly to the system - during the transformation to democracy in Spain.

A part from the constitution article about political parties, law for political parties, which was in force until 2002, was introduced on 4 December 1978. The

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[425] "The Spanish Constitution", *Agencia Estatal Boletín del Estado / Gobierno de Espana,* <http://www.boe.es/legislacion/enlaces/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf>, site visited on 26 November 2012.

[426] Ibid.

law of political parties explained the formation process of political parties in detail and stated that all Spaniards were free to form political parties.[427]

The aforementioned constitution and law of political parties were given to explain the  political sphere of Spain after General Franco's dictatorship period.

After  approval of the new constitution, the first election of Basque Parliament took place in 1980. According to the results, PNV had the highest support with 38.1%, HB became the second party after PNV with 16.55%, and PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol,* Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) became the third one with 14.21% total votes.[428] A part from these three parties, four more parties took seats in Basque Parliament. One can see that the majority of Basque people gave their support to nationalist Basque political parties, PNV and HB. The support for both PNV and HB showed diverse thinking among Basque population. While nationalist PNV, which defended the idea of autonomy as a part of Spanish State, has the highest percentage of valid votes; HB, the party supported the idea of revolution even with the method of ETA and defended the total independent of Basque Country, also has significant support from the Basque population.

Even PNV and HB had different ideas and policies to follow for the Basque problem in Spanish political sphere, two parties managed to stand next to each other on one occasion. PNV, HB and PSE (*Partido Socialista de Euskadi*, Socialist Party of the Basque Country) formed the *mesa para la paz* (peace table) for possible negotiations between ETA and Spanish authorities in 1983.[429]  The *mesa para la paz* was started as an initiative to reach the peace in Basque region;

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[427] "Partidos Políticos (Ley 54/1978, de 4 de diciembre, Articulo 1)", *Ministerio de la Presidencia / Gobierno de Espana*, <http://www.mpr.gob.es/servicios/publicaciones/vol35/pag_12.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013.
[428] "1980 Basque Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.
[429] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

however, as parties had different points of view for the solution of the problem, the initiative did not give any outcome.

HB's engagement with ETA was often seen after ETA attacks. For instance, in beginning of 1980s, after ETA's attack in Madrid, HB leaders held a press conference and stated that Spanish Government should negotiate with ETA (m) directly and gave three demands from Spanish State: Navarra should be included into the Basque Autonomous Community, the constitution should give the right of self-determination to the Basque people, total amnesty for all ETA members including prisoners and exiles should be applied.[430] One can see that, the demands listed by HB were the demands of ETA. As a political party, HB could call for a direct negotiation; however, same demands as ETA's, made party the public voice of the terrorist organization. HB saw itself on the same basis of ETA and in political structure, both of them had the same ideas to defend, and same goals to reach.

PNV continued its success in elections of 1984. PNV had 42,01% and became the first party, PSOE had 23,07% and HB had 14,65% of valid votes.[431] One can see that while PNV increased its votes, HB lost a small percentage its support from the Basque population. The result of 1984 Elections shows that Basque people increased their support to the idea of wide-range autonomy, PNV policies.

PNV faced with a split in 1986 right before the elections. A group of PNV members left the party and formed a new political party under the name of *Eusko Alkartasuna,* (EA). This split reflected the results of 1986 Elections, eventually PNV had 23.71% of votes and gained 17 seats, while PSOE gained 19 seats with 22.05% of votes. HB had 17,47% and gained 13 seats and new party EA had

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[430] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
[431] "1984 Basque Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/ eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

15,84% and gained 13 seats.[432] One can see that political split among PNV paved the way for the domination of Spanish party, PSOE. Even though political splits caused a decrease of PNV's votes and made more room for PSOE, Basque people continued to support regional nationalist parties, PNV, HB and EA.

First three Basque parliamentary elections were given in order to show the political diversity in Basque political life. Even the parties had the same or similar ideas and policies for the Basque people; they did not choose to be together and acted by themselves.

In 1986, Spain's admission to the European Union (EU) as full member was not supported by HB. HB claimed that the European economic policies would effect negatively the economy of Basque Region. While HB was against the EU, PNV supported the admission to the EU.

In the Basque Parliament, PNV had 28,49%, PSOE had 19,94%, HB had 18,33% and EA had 11,38% of valid votes in the elections of 1990.[433] The political structure and the distribution of votes was similar to previous years.

In the elections of 1994 for Basque Parliament, PNV had 29,84%, PSOE had 17,13%, HB had 16,29% and EA had 10,31.[434] While PNV increased its percentage of valid votes, PSOE's and HB's percentages decreased. Even though the difference between 1990 and 1994 was not significant, one can say that HB lost around 20.000 votes.

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[432] "1986 Basque Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.
[433] "1990 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.
[434] "1994 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

One of the obvious evidences for the relation between HB and ETA had took place in 1996. Before general elections of 1996, HB used one of ETA's videos during its propaganda period. As a result of usage of ETA's video, the National Court (*Audiencia Nacional*) started a trail against HB leaders with the accusation of "collaboration with ETA" in 1997. The trail process ended with the approval of sentence decision for HB leaders by Spanish Supreme Court, 23 HB leaders were imprisoned[435] and stayed in prison for 20 months. The trail for HB leaders was considered as a sign of possible closure trail for the party, and HB decided to enter the elections of 1998 under another organization; *Euskal Herritarrok* (EH, Basque Citizens). All HB party members continued to do politics under EH. 1996 was also the year that José María Aznar became Prime Minister of Spain, and heavy security measures started to be applied against ETA.

The Basque parliament elections of 1998 was the first elections that former HB entered as EH. PNV had 28,01%, PP had 20,13%, EH had 17,91%, PSOE had 17,6% and EA had 8,86%.[436] One can see that the main difference on the results of 1998 local elections was the position of PP as it became the second party after PNV. At that year, PP was in power in central government of Spain. PP success in general election for Spanish governments, accumulated in the local elections of Basque Country.

In the Basque parliament elections of 2001, EA made coalition with PNV. As a result of this coalition, PNV-EA had 42,72%, PP had 23,12%, PSOE had 17,9% and EH had 10,12% of valid votes.[437] While the PNV-EA coalition managed to have high percentage of votes, EH lost around 7% votes from the previous election.

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[435] "Siete Años de Carcel para los 23 Dirigentes de HB por Colaborar con ETA", *El País*, 2 December 1997, <http://elpais.com/diario/1997/12/02/portada/881017202_850215.html>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

[436] "1998 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/ q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

[437] "2001 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/ q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

### 4.3.3. Banning Political Parties

First HB, then EH both wanted to be a player in Basque politics just in Spain. However, in 2001, HB formed a new political platform to be active both in Spain and France, in their saying; in *Euskal Herria*. The new organization took the name Batasuna (Unity). Batasuna took the place of HB in Spain and opened branches in France, as well. Even the name changed from Herri Batasuna to Batasuna, party members and leaders did not leave the political scene of Basque politics. Batasuna continued to defend ETA's actions. Hence, the ban process of Batasuna started in 2002.

As aforementioned earlier, Law on Political Parties was changed in 2002, which paved the way for the suspension of Batasuna. With the new law for political parties, Spanish government had chance to put pressure over Batasuna. The Article 9.2 of Law for Political Parties explained the reasons to ban a political party as;

> "Article 9.2 A political party will be declared as illegal if; violates democratic principles in a repeated and grave form, or aimes to undermine or destroy liberties, or injure or eliminate the democratic system by;
>
> *promoting, justifying or excusing of attacks on people's life or integrity, or exclusion or persecution of people because of their ideology, religion or beliefs, nationality, race, sex or sexual orientation
>
> *Encouraging, promoting or legitimizing violence as a means to achieve political goals, or destroying conditions necessary for democracy, pluralism and political liberties
>
> *Complementing or supporting politically, the activities of terrorist organizations which aim to subvert the constitutional order, gravely alter public peace, create a climate of fear, or enhance the effects of fear and intimidation generated by terrorist violence."[438]

In August 2002, the National Court suspended Batasuna's political activities for three years for further investigation to look into ETA-Batasuna relation. Then, on 17 March 2003, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that

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[438] Author's translation from Spanish.
"Ley Orgánica 6/2002, de 27 de junio, de Partidos Políticos", *Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado / Gobierno de Espana*, <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2002-12756>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

Batasuna was illegal by saying that Party's actions were against the Law on Political Parties Article 9 and Batasuna had financial relationship with ETA. With Batasuna, the Court also banned two previous party, Herri Batasuna and Euskal Herritarrok.[439] In May 2003, the United States of America added Batasuna, HB and EH to its list of terrorist groups just before Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar's meeting with the U.S President George W.Bush.[440]

HB and following parties were active in Basque politics and participated the elections for Basque parliament; however, as they did not believe the legitimacy of this regional institutions, elected candidates did not occupy their seats in the Basque parliament. Hence, with not occupying the seats, they tried to block the legitimate system in Basque region and force people to think that the regional Basque Government could not be effective.

The ban of Batasuna, HB and EH created a space in the Basque leftist political movement. As none of the aforementioned organizations could not participated the Basque parliament elections of 2005, a new organization, *Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas* (PCTV, The Communist Party of the Basque Homelands or in Basque language, Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista, EHAK) tried to fulfill the empty place. PCTV was formed in 2002; however, became active after the ban of Batasuna, HB and EH. As a result of the election s of 2005, PNV-EA had 38,67%, PSOE had 22,68%, PP had 17,4%, PCTV had 12,44%.[441] If one takes a glance at previous Basque Parliament Elections' results, it is possible to say that PCTV had more or less the same percentage of votes. This shows that the PCTV fulfilled the place of Batasuna and its fractions. However, PCTV was also banned in 2008 by the Spanish Supreme Court with the accusation of having relation with ETA. The Court stated that Batasuna used

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[439] "El Supremo Ilegaliza Batasuna por Unanimidad", *El País*, 17 March 2003, <http://elpais.com/elpais/2003/03/17/actualidad/1047892620_850215.html>, site visited on 17 March 2013.
[440] "Basque Groups on US Terror List", *BBC*, 7 May 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3008509.stm>, site visited on 25 May 2013.
[441] "2005 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

PCTV to have financial aid, and former ETA members and Batasuna members became members of PCTV.[442]

The ban of PCTV reflected the Basque parliament elections of 2009. There was no political party to fulfill the space of PCTV/Batasuna movement this time. As a result of elections; PNV had 38,56%, PSOE had 30,7%, PP had 14,1% of votes.[443] According to the results, one can say that there were no representatives of Batasuna fraction.

Another coalition was formed under the name of *Sortu* (in English; Create) in 2011, in order to fill the empty place in Basque leftist movement. The creation of Sortu was considered as another Basque leftist party in the line of Batasuna; however, since its creation, Sortu has claimed that the party is not the continuation of anything. Also the leaders of Sortu stated that Sortu rejects the violence of ETA.[444] However, the Spanish Government believed that Sortu was the continuation of Batasuna; hence, Government made appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court with the demand of closure for Sortu. In March 2011, the Spanish Supreme Court decided that Sortu could not be registered as political party by saying that Sortu did not present enough evidence about not having relations with ETA.[445] Sortu had a change to give evidence and become a legal party; however in any case, with this decision, Sortu did not participate the elections of 2011. The

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[442] "Batasuna Usó al PCTV Como Cobertura Economica para Seguir Delinquiendo", *ABC*, <http://www.abc.es/20090718/nacional-terrorismo/batasuna-pctv-como-cobertura-20090718.html>, site visited on 15 May 2013;
  "Procesados Cinco Cargos del PCTV por Pertenecer a ETA", *El País*, 18 July 2009, <http://elpais.com/diario/2009/07/18/espana/1247868012_850215.html>, site visited on 15 May 2013.
[443] "2009 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.
[444] Al Goodman, "New Basque Party Tries to Run in Spain", *CNN*, 10 February 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/02/09/spain.basque.politics/index.html?>, site visited on 16 May 2013.
[445] Maria Peral, "El Supremo Impide que Sortu se Presente el 22-M al Ver Vínculos con ETA", *El Mundo*, 24 March 2011, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/03/23/espana/1300908345.html>, site visited on 16 May 2013.

decision about Sortu raised the tension in Basque Country and many Basques hit the streets to protest the decision.[446]

Right after the decision about Sortu, another coalition was formed under the name of *Bildu* (in English; Gather). Nevertheless, like in the case of Sortu, Spanish Government made appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court with the demand of closure for Bildu. The court banned entrance of Bildu to the elections of 2011.[447] The decision was protested by Basques in Basque Country, and PNV declared that they would no longer support the central Government of Spain.[448] Consequently, the Spanish Supreme Court lifted the ban decision and Bildu entered the municipality elections of 2011. As a result of the election PNV had 30,74%, Bildu had 26,03%, PSOE had 16,71%, PP had 13,83% of valid votes.[449]

For the general elections of 2011, leftist Basque political parties formed another coalition under the name of Amaiur and entered the elections as a single party. As a result of this coalition, Amaniur became the second party after PNV.[450] The new coalition rejected the violence of ETA and as a result of Spanish general elections of 2011 gained six seats on the Spanish Congress of Deputies. After many years, Basque pro-independence leftist movement represented itself in the Spanish Congress of Deputies.

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[446] "Thousands March for Basque Party in Spain", *Fox News*, 2 April 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/02/thousands-march-basque-party-spain/>, site visited on 16 May 2013.

[447] Maria Peral, "Bildu Fue 'Auspiciada por la Misma ETA,' dice el Supremo", *El Mundo*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/05/02/espana/1304313695.html>, site visited on 16 May 2013.

[448] "Spanish Government Loses Basque Nationalists' Support", *Thomson Reuters Foundation*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/item/?map=spanish-govt-loses-basque-nationalists-support>, site visited on 16 May 2013.

[449] "2011 Basque Municipality Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

[450] "Basque Results of 2011 Spanish General Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

Sortu, the left wing party that was banned to enter the elections of 2011, was legalized by the Constitutional Court's decision in June 2012.

In the Basque parliament elections of 2012, another coalition was formed under the name of *Euskal Herria Bildu* (EH Bildu), which contained the left wing parties such as Sortu, Eusko Alkartasuna, Alternatiba and Aralar. The new coalition became the second party after PNV. According to the results, PNV had 34,61%, EH Bildu had 25%, PSOE had 19,14%, PP had %11,75 of valid votes.[451] As seen before, PNV had the majority support of Basque electorates.

Basque political parties were effective both in regional politics and Spanish politics from the formation of PNV. After PNV, Basque political parties were majorly formed as left wing parties. The leftist Basque parties are named as *Ezker Abertzalea* ('Patriotic left' in English) in Basque language. Basque nationalism and Basque political life was formed by Sabino Arana himself with PNV that took Arana's ideas as party acts. Even the Basque political life started with PNV, following parties made contributions for its evolution. Starting with Herri Batasuna, leftist parties relation with ETA paved the way to talk about 'political terrorism'. ETA, which is labeled as a separatist terrorist organization, pursued political goals with armed struggle. While ETA was attacking the Spanish security forces in order to create an independent Basque Country, HB and following parties tried to accumulate ETA's actions into political acts. With the closure decision of Batasuna, following leftist parties declared total denial of armed struggle for any political cause, which paved the way to act legally in political life both in regional and general atmosphere. Maybe ETA and Batasuna relation gave a limited pace to Basque politics in short term; however, in long term, it is possible to say that Basque politics were damaged because of it.

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[451] "2012 Basque Parliament Elections", *Departamento de Seguridad*, <http://www.euskadi.net/ q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?menu=li_2_1_1&opcion=a&idioma=c>, site visited on 13 May 2013.

While ETA's actions and Batasuna's position and support in political sphere call attention to terrorism problem of Spain both in national and international level, it also caused the closure of Batasuna. Ban of political parties in a functioning democracy harms the system and decreases the support of public to the elections process. With every closure or ban of a political party, electorates started to question the system whether they have chance to be represented or not. It is possible to say that, creating more space to political parties in a functioning democracy and searching for an appropriate solution to certain problem in democratic frame will captivate more and more percentage of population in every election. Consequently, the system will reflect people's will more accurately.

## 5. SOLVING THE PROBLEM

### 5.1. The United Kingdom Example

As the splits happened within IRA and Sinn Féin in 1970s, British political scene changed. A solution to the Northern Ireland Problem was in search among official circles. The British rule was in favor of solving the problem with creating a mechanism, which represents both parties in Ireland: Nationalists and Unionists.

### 5.1.1. Attempts Without Sinn Féin

In 1973, a new assembly was elected and a new government was formed which contained six Unionists and four Nationalists and one neutral from the Alliance Party.**[452]** The new system did not include Sinn Féin by saying that the organization was related with terrorism. After the elections and formation of government, British rule signed an agreement with Irish Government over the decision making process in Northern Ireland. The idea of having a co-control over Ireland with relation between Irish and British governments was failed because of the Nationalists worker strike in 1974. As a result of the strike, Irish government removed and Northern Ireland returned to the direct British rule.[453]

During 1980s, Northern Ireland Assembly became active again, but with little power. British Government's intention was to increase the power of Northern Ireland Assembly over years. Sinn Féin was not in the Assembly and they boycotted the newly formed Assembly. In 1985, another treaty was signed

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[452] Jonathan Tonge, *The Logic of the Peace Process", Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change*, Hertfordshire, Prentice Hall Europe Pb., 1998, pp. 99-100.
[453] Gordon Gillespie, *Historical Dictionary of the Northern Ireland Conflict*, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, 2007, p. 250.

between governments, which made the Northern Ireland problem as joint problem for two governments. The negotiation about the responsibilities of joint governments was started; however, all efforts to form a joint system failed in 1986.[454]

In 1989, Irish Government started to meet with all political parties for a possible solution. As it happened before, Sinn Féin was not among the political parties that Irish Government had meet. The efforts of Irish authorities did not reach to any solution. The situation continued with the talks between parties except Sinn Féin until 1993.

### 5.1.2. Road to Solution

In 1993, Sinn Féin leader, Garry Adams and leader of the Social Democrat and Labour Party, John Hume, started to talk with every party for a political solution for the conflict.[455] The ultimate goal was to find a proper solution and finish the violence. The talks continued for a while then the Downing Street Declaration was announced. According to the Declaration, British Government described itself as 'neutral' between Nationalist and Loyalists and gave guarantee that every political party, even parties linked with terrorism, would be a part of the talks as long as they renounced the violence.[456]

Sinn Féin actively participated the talks and became the mediatory between IRA and the British authorities. As a result of talks, IRA declared a cease-fire in 1994. At this point, President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton, appointed Senator George Mitchell as a neutral representative for the talks between parties.[457] In 1995, British and Irish governments declared a joint document for their cooperation on Island. The document suggested a creation of a

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[454] Brian Feeney, *Sinn Féin Un Siglo de Historia Irlandesa*, (trans.) Ignacio Alonso Blanco, Barcelona, Edhasa, 2005, pp. 402-404.
[455] Ibid. pp. 455-561.
[456] Philip Lynch, *Politics of Nationhood: Sovereignty, Britishness and Conservative Politics*, New York, Palgrave Pub., 1999, p. 120.
[457] McNaughton, p.138. For the detailed effect of the Clinton government on the peace process, see: Boyce, pp.162-65.

new authority, which contained representatives from Irish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly. By the involvement of George Mitchell, an International Body on Arms Decommissioning was formed. In January 1996, the International Body on Arms Decommissioning published its report on Northern Ireland problem and indicated six principles for a healthy solution. According to the commission, parties should show commitments to following principles;

"a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues;

b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations;

c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;

e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and,

f. To urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions."[458]

As the International Body on Arms Decommissioning was formed by the U.S Senator George Mitchell, aforementioned principles were also knows as 'Mitchell Principles'. However, while the talks were continuing, British Government declared that terrorist organizations should give up their weapons for further political talks. IRA was against this idea as they thought cease-fire should be enough to talk for political solution. At this point, Sinn Féin leader Garry Adams put his effort to explain the talks to IRA in details with many meetings.[459] However, Garry Adams' efforts were not enough to convince IRA and in February 1996, IRA declared that the cease-fire was over with accusing the British Government by saying they were just wasting their time.

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[458] Whole Report can be found in: "Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996", *Conflict and Politics in Northern Island / University of Ulster*, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/gm24196.htm>, site visited on 2 May 2013.

[459] Brian Rowan, *Behind the Lines: The story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires*, Belfast, The Blackstaf Press, 1995, p. 90.

British Government under Tony Blair's leadership kept talking with Sinn Féin and gave every guarantee on political reforms for the solution of problems in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin's efforts to force IRA to announce another cease-fire continued and on 19 July 1997, IRA declared another cease-fire. With cease-fire of IRA, all parties of the problem, including IRA, joined to talks and negotiations On 9 September 1997, Sinn Féin declared that they accepted the Mitchell Principles. In April 1998, Belfast Agreement was accepted by parties after 48 hours of non-stop talks.

As Belfast Agreement was signed on Friday, agreement also known as 'The Good Friday Agreement' in international scene. The Good Friday Agreement covers political issues not on the Northern Island but on all-island. According to the Agreement, parties should renounce the use of violence together. The Agreement demanded that historical goal for United Ireland should be abandoned and parties should work together for the island of Ireland. With the Agreement, a new political structure was created for the island; a North/South Ministerial council was formed for the cooperation and the development of island of Ireland. British-Irish Council was formed for the mutual beneficial relationship between British and Irish authorities. A part from administrative issue, other issues were covered by the agreement, such as development of social and economic policies, and so on.[460]

The Good Friday Agreement was voted with the referendum in the island of Ireland and passed with 71% of votes in Northern Ireland and %94 in the Republic of Ireland.[461] The agreement started a new era in island of Ireland and in the British history. 15 years after the Agreement, Tony Blair who was Prime Minister at the time of the Agreement, said that it was an historic day and

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[460] For more information: "Examen Environnemental de l'Irlande", OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/fr/env/examens-pays/43997280.pdf>, site visited on 2 May 2013;
"The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement", *United Nations*, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20Agreement.pdf>, site visited on 2 May 2013.
[461] "Good Friday Agreement: Cameron Hails 15th Anniversary", *BBC*, 10 April 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22086248>, site visited on 2 May 2013.

achievement for the Ireland and United Kingdom, and Garry Adams said that with the Agreement the necessary checks and balances were ensured to prevent the political abuses and discrimination of the past.[462]

In the solution of Northern Ireland Problem, one can see that parties, both Irish and British, did not pursue their daily politics but the common good. A part from dedication of every party,, the involvement of International Body on Arms Decommissioning and George Mitchell's mediatory role, especially Tony Blair and Garry Adams, established the trust between parties. Both parties' devotion on political goals made the agreement possible.

### 5.1.3. IRA After the Good Friday Agreement

At the sign of the Agreement, IRA was in cease-fire period and as the Agreement required the total decommissioning of every paramilitary organizations, IRA started its decommissioning process. With the Agreement, Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was set up to review to process. However, in August 1998, a bomb exploded in Northern Ireland and killed 29 people.[463] Both IRA and Sinn Féin condemned the attacks and a new group which was formed by extremist IRA sympathizers, Real IRA, took the responsibility. The Irish community condemned the attacks, which was accepted as the total desire of the community for an end of violence.

In October 2001, Sinn Féin made a public call to IRA to start decommissioning its weapons. IRA's decommissioning process lasted until 2005 under the surveillance of Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. On 28 July 2005, IRA announced that its armed campaign ended and they ordered their militants to drop weapons.[464] The final decommissioning was confirmed by Independent International Commission on

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[462] "Good Friday Agreement: Cameron Hails 15th Anniversary".
[463] "Omagh Bomb: Colm Murphy and Seamus Daly founda Liable at Retrial", *BBC*, 20 March 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-21858904>, site visited on 1 March 2013.
[464] "IRA Says Armed Campaign is Over", *BBC*, 28 July 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4720863.stm>, site visited on 1 May 2013.

Decommissioning on 26 September 2005.[465] The era of violence ended for Northern Ireland and the political progress continued on following years.

The Real IRA hit the surface after the split in 1997 within IRA. However, their only major attack was in 1998 and after then Real IRA split to small groups. Their existence was always accepted as a threat to peace on Ireland. Recently, BBC published a piece about the threat of armed groups. According to BBC, former members of Real IRA, and Provisional IRA were formed the 'New IRA' in 2012.[466] According to authorities in Northern Ireland armed threat still existed in Northern Ireland against the British presence in Ireland.

It is possible to expect that terrorist organizations split after the major decisions of its leadership. Many of the members and sympathizers of the certain organization often do not accept any other decision than the original goal. For the case of IRA, with the Good Friday Agreement, IRA abandoned its original goal of 'United Ireland' and accepted the new political structure. This major decision was a policy change for IRA and unsatisfied members formed the Real IRA, and even after 15 years of the Agreement, the New IRA take place in Ireland for the original goal of IRA.

## 5.2. Turkey: Previous Attempts, The Future of Process

Kurdish problem of Turkey is an history related and complicated problem. Kurds have had problems on cultural and identity bases since the Ottoman Empire. As the Kurds have been living in the Mesopotamia, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds started to live under four different state flags; Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria where they have had different problems. However,

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[465] "IRA Arms Decommissioned", *The Guardian*, 26 September 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/26/northernireland.northernireland1>, site visited on 1 May 2013.
[466] Peter Taylor, "Analysing the Threat from Irish Republican Dissidents", *BBC*, 6 May 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22404582>, site visited on 6 May 2013.

the case of Turkey is more important than others as majority of the Kurds live in Turkey.

Central authorities have always wanted to control the Kurds in the region of today's Turkey. During the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish political parties were closed, and rebellions were suppressed with heavy military operations. With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, a new 'nation' was born, and all citizens accepted as equals, first the founders described the new nation as 'Nation of were Turkey', but then the term changed with 'Turkish Nation'. Adopting 'Turk' as the name of nation was accepted as the reference to the Turkish *race.* After the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, state policies centralized around the Turkish language as well, and that was considered as denial of other languages. With every constitution, the identity problem of Kurds has become more complicated.

During 1980s and 1990s, PKK's actions increased and terrorism problem took place in the agenda of Turkey, next to Kurdish problem. Eventually, these two different but related problems were started to be accepted as one. Since 1990s, Turkey has had chance to solve the Kurdish problem and terrorism problem; however, each time, obstacles occurred and problems continued.

### 5.2.1. Previous Attempts to Solve the Kurdish Problem/Terrorism Problem

PKK was founded in 1978 and started its terrorist attacks against Turkish security forces in 1984. Within this time frame, Turkey faced with a military intervention which put democracy away and brought violation of human rights to the country, in 1980. Under the National Security Council rule, martial law was applied, political parties were closed, freedom was restricted, and many people were arrested with accusation of being a leftist or rightist party supporters. For Kurds, military intervention brought pain and suffer, and official denial of their existence.

As Hasan Cemal cited in his book with details,[467] in Kurdish populated areas, many people were taken into the custody with accusations of supporting 'the secessionists'. At the time of the military intervention, the name PKK was not well known among the official circles and the state officials referred PKK as 'secessionists, rebels, bandits'. Especially the prison of Diyarbakir was the place where many Kurds faced torture and humiliating treatment. Prison of Diyarbakir was not only place where torture had happened, but the prison of Diyarbakir was the main place where the *hatred* of Kurds against the *S*tate of Turkey had born.

On 12 September 1980, Military took over the rule of the country, and put martial law in action. Following days of the military intervention, the National Security Council denied the existence of Kurds in Turkey. As already mentioned, Head of the National Security Council, General Kenan Evren, publicly said;

> "There are no Kurds in Turkey, these people who describe themselves as Kurds are just Turks living in mountain, and make cracking sounds, *Kart Kurt*, when they walk over snow".[468]

With this statement from Kenan Evren, Kurds were shocked. They were citizens of Turkey; however, the State did not recognize their ethnic origin, or their language. The denial from the State push Kurds away from the state to the arms of PKK.

As PKK leadership fled away from Turkey before the military intervention and focused its actions on recruitment, state's position against Kurds during military intervention made them a favor. Many Kurds run away in order to join PKK, especially who was released from prisons. Young Kurdish population started to see PKK as 'heroes', 'army of salvation'. Either the State's denial or torture did not give legitimacy to any terrorist action; however, the reality stands still that Kurds felt disappointment and run through the PKK.

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[467] Hasan Cemal's book 'Kürtler' have many statements from detained Kurds during the Military Intervention, an example can be read between pages 15-34.
[468] "Tansu Çiller: Ya Bitecek, Ya Bitecek".

PKK's armed terrorist attacks started in 1984, and since then Kurdish problem of Turkey was forgotten and terrorism problem took over it. For many years, Kurds in the region of eastern Turkey stuck between the state's military measures and PKK's pressure over them. PKK sought support, such as food, water, money, from Kurds who lived in villages, and military officials demanded from villagers to abandon their villages and migrate to big cities. As PKK threatened villagers to gain support, military burned down houses in villages of who did not abandon their places. For many years, Kurds in the region suffered because of PKK's attacks and heavy security measures.[469]

After the military intervention, Kurdish existence started to be talked again in late 1980s. First in 1988, a MP from SHP stated that there were Kurds in Turkey. He said that Kurdish population was a national minority, who could not speak their language. After the statement, discussions started in Turkey and many journalists and politicians and even citizens started to criticize the denial of Kurdish existence.[470] Under Erdal İnönü's leadership, SHP formed a group of party members to investigate the problems in eastern Turkey, then published a report under the name of 'SHP's overview and solution proposal on East and Southeast Problem'.[471] In June 1989, Turgut Özal, president at that time, declared that he had Kurdish blood.[472] As the declaration came from President of Turkey, this was considered as a policy change of the State and a hope appeared among Kurds for the solution to their problem. Kurds believed that Turgut Özal wanted to solve the problem by providing their cultural rights.

Turgut Özal put significant attention to the Kurdish problem of Turkey in order to solve it, he believed that Kurds needed to feel as 'equal citizens' and to achieve that point, the State policies should be changed.[473] With his efforts, ban of

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[469] Abdullah Öcalan also admitted situation during his trail, Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

[470] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[471] Güneri Civaoğlu, "Erdal İnönü'ye Kürt Soruşturması", *Milliyet*, 16 October 2009, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdal-inonu-ye--kurt-sorusturmasi-/guneri-civaoglu/siyaset/ siyasetyazardetay/16.10.2009/1150874/default.htm>, site visited on 4 April 2013.

[472] Cemal *op. cit.*, p. 101; Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[473] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

using Kurdish language in daily life, which was put into force with the military intervention of 1982, was lifted in 1991.[474] This accepted as the premier step for the process of solving the Kurdish problem.

In 1991, numerous calls to recognize the Kurdish identity started to come from politicians and other public actors. In December 1991, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü declared that the cultural identity of Turkey's Kurdish citizens should be recognized.[475]   In 1992, this time Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel announced that he recognized 'the Kurdish reality'.[476] The calls from high rank state officials were significantly important on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. After a long time, the State accepted the Kurdish existence and declared that there were regulations that needed to be changed.

In 1992, one MP from ANAP made a visit to Diyarbakir, then wrote a special rapport about the Kurdish Problem in Turkey for President Turgut Özal. Then, Özal made his own additions to the report and as a consequence, this report started be known as 'Özal report'. The said report made description of the problem in the region and gave  proposals for a solution. Briefly, the report stated that while the operations continued against PKK, other measures were needed to be implemented. President Özal proposed that villages, where PKK sought support, should be evacuated. More military vehicles and weapons should be provided to the military, and lastly Özal cited that every idea should be discussed freely and openly.[477] According to Hasan Cemal, President Özal even proposed the idea of TV channel, which would broadcast in Kurdish, to the National Security Council, and indicated that even federation should be discussed as a possible solution.[478]   However, while President Özal was proposing ideas on

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[474] Ayşegül Savaşta, "Devlete Kürtçe TV Serbest Kürt'e Kürkçe Yasak!", *BirGün*, 4 April 2009, <http://www.birgun.net/sunday_index.php?news_code=1231078925&year=2009&month=01&day=04>, site visited on 4 January 2013; Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[475] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[476] Fikret Bila, "Demirel'in Kürt Realitesi ile Erdoğan'ın Kürt Sorunu", *Milliyet*, 17 August 2005, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/08/17/yazar/bila.html>, site visited on 4 January 2013.
[477] Cemal, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-128.
[478] Ibid., p. 128.

Kurdish TV channel, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was opposed to this idea, and he stated to Hasan Cemal that as the official language of the Turkish Republic was Turkish, there were no way to broadcast in another language.[479] For these years, state's official policy was known as following; first the terrorism problem has to be solved prior to any cultural rights for Kurds. The attitude difference between Özal and Demirel made Özal popular among the Kurds.

While these declarations, statements and proposals were coming from official circle of the state, PKK's actions against Turkish security forces did not stop in year of 1992. As a consequence, state's counter-actions continued as well. Between PKK's attacks and state's counter-attacks, talking about Kurdish problem was not easy. As soldiers died in the field, the public opinion gathered around the 'nationalist' ideas as a normal reaction.

PKK attacks and military operations against PKK militants continued until the March of 1993. On 17 March 1993, Abdullah Öcalan held a press conference in Lebanon and declared an unilateral cease-fire until 15 April 1993.[480] At the same day Abdullah Öcalan gave an interview to *El-Hayat*, London based newspaper, and listed his demands from the state as; PKK should be accepted as a legal party, he should return to Turkey unharmed and be able to do politics in the country.[481]

With the cease-fire decision, Abdullah Öcalan also abandoned his idea for independence and started to talk about 'autonomy'.[482] President Özal was in contact with Iraqi Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, who was acting as the *messenger* between PKK and the State of Turkey.[483] During the unilateral cease-fire time, possible amnesty rumors for PKK militants started to be circulated in official

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[479] Ibid., p. 153.
[480] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 217;
    Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[481] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[482] O'Ballance, *op.cit.*, p. 218.
[483] Dündar, *op. cit.*, p. 187;
    Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

circles in Ankara. President Özal was the main driven force about the possibility of amnesty and believed that this might be a start for the solving process of terrorism problem. [484]

On 16 April 1993, Abdullah Öcalan announced that he extended the cease-fire for two months.[485] While PKK was waiting a *gesture* about a possible amnesty for its militants, President Turgut Özal suddenly died because of a heart attack on 17 April 1993.[486] After Turgut Özal's death, officials did not know how to deal with the situation. As another unsuccessful assassination attempt had happened in 1988, when Prime Minister Turgut Özal was giving a speech in his Party congress,[487] the rumors about Turgut Özal's death never stopped circulating that President Özal did not die by a natural cause but was poisoned. Long after his dead, in 2012, an investigation started with the assumption of Özal was murdered with poison. His corpse was taken out from his grave on 3 November 2012 for forensic technical analysis.[488] On 16 April 2013, a lawsuit was opened against former Brigadier General, Levent Ersöz, with the accusation of assassination of Turgut Özal.[489]

As stated in previous parts, after Özal's death, the National Security Council made suggestion to the government for a partial amnesty for PKK militants; however, in following days PKK broke cease-fire by killing 33 unarmed soldiers.[490] Consequently, PKK's attack raised the tension among society, and military officials started to call for heavy measures against PKK. On 8 June 1993, Abdullah Öcalan held another press conference in Bekaa Valley and announced that the cease-fire was over. He also cited that the cease-fire was a response to

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[484] Tayyar, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[485] "Geçmişten Bugüne PKK Ateşkesleri".
[486] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
[487] "Özal'a Suikast Neden Araştırılmıyor?", *AktifHaber*, 9 January 2013, <http://www.aktifhaber.com/ozala-suikast-neden-arastirilmiyor-716982h.htm>, site visited on 12 February 2013.
[488] Fatih Yağmur, "Mezar Açıldı Naaş İncelemeye Uygun", *Radikal*, 3 October 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1102574&categoryid=78>, site visited on 12 February 2013.
[489] "Levent Ersöz'e Özal'a Suikast Davası, *NTVMSNBC*, 16 April 2013, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25436166>, site visited on 20 April 2013.
[490] O'Ballance, *op. cit.,* pp. 219-220.

Özal's attitude on Kurdish problem, and PKK accepted Özal as *interlocutor,* and after his death state did not continue its efforts to solve the problem.[491]

After Turgut Özal, with new president and new Government, State's policies changed. In late 1993, while Prime Minister Tansu Çiller considered the possibility of allowance of education and broadcasting in Kurdish and referred to the relevance of the *Basque model* and its provisions for wide-ranging autonomy,[492] the new President Süleymand Demirel opposed the idea by saying, "Unless terrorism is solved, cultural issues cannot be debated".[493] This showed the new understanding of the problem in official circles: terrorism problem and Kurdish problem had started to be considered as one *single* problem.

In 1994, Prime Minister Çiller indirectly declared her changed position about Kurdish problem by introducing a new slogan on fight against PKK, 'either end or end' ('*ya bitecek ya bitecek*').[494]

Even after the death of Turgut Özal, call for solution kept coming from public actors. For instance, in 1995, a renowned businessman, Sakıp Sabancı, made a visit to Diyarbakir, then he declared "Kurdish Problem is more-over than an economic problem, the solution needs to come from politicians. Spanish and English examples should be examined".[495] However, Sakıp Sabancı's statement made its scene on mass media as he was suggesting the 'Basque Model', or even more 'separatism'.[496] Response to Sakıp Sabancı's statement came from chairman of Nationalist Movement Party, Alparslan Türkeş; "Sakıp Agha, you are crossing the line! You think politics is a piece of cake!"[497] A couple of month later,

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[491] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[492] O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 224;
    "Tansu Çiller: Ya Bitecek, Ya Bitecek".
[493] Kirişçi, and Winrow, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
[494] Ibid., p. 132.
[495] "Sakıp Sabancı ile İlgili Korkunç İddialar", *Haber365*, 22 December 2010,
<http://www.haber365.com/Haber/Sakip_Sabanci_Ile_Ilgili_Korkunc_Iddialar/>, site visited on 4 January 2013.
[496] Can Dündar, "Sabancı Cinayeti Örgüte Sipariş Edilmiş Olabilir", *Milliyet*, 22 January 2011,
<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-sabanci-cinayeti-orgute-siparis-edilmis-olabilir-/can-dundar/guncel/
yazardetay/23.01.2011/1342885/default.htm>, site visited on 3 January 2013.
[497] Ibid.

Sabancı's brother, Özdemir Sabancı was murdered on 9 January 1996.[498] Even though there were no concrete evidence, public opinion always believed that this murder was connected with Sakıp Sabancı's statement on Kurdish problem and even more, Sakıp Sabancı was the real target.

With the murder of Özdemir Sabancı, the fear spread among the population and no more call for solution for Kurdish problem was heard. The hope, which started with Özal's statement, faded away totally with the assassination of Özdemir Sabancı.

In 1999, Turkish political life started to spin around Kurdish problem and terrorism problem one more time. Abdullah Öcalan's capture raised the expectation on finishing the terrorism problem. When Abdullah Öcalan captured on 16 February 1999, Kurdish problem was forgotten suddenly, and public opinion started to think that as the leader of PKK was captured, PKK would not continue its terrorist attacks. During his trail, Abdullah Öcalan said "I wanted to serve for the Republic of Turkey".[499] During his trial and aftermath, Abdullah Öcalan continued to control the PKK via his lawyers. With his capture, Abdullah Öcalan's attitude changed and he started to talk about withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkey. He believed that PKK did not need to wait actions from the State on the Kurdish problem, they could withdraw from Turkey and the State would see their 'positive' attitude and act afterwards.[500]

In August 1999, Abdullah Öcalan made a call for PKK militants to stop attacks and to leave Turkey.[501] In September 1999, PKK declared another unilateral cease-fire and announced that PKK would not attack, and leave Turkey.

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[498] Hamdi Özen, et al., "Sabancılar'a Esrarengiz Suikast", *Zaman*, 10 January 1996, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_sabancilara-esrarengiz-suikast_432646.html>, site visited on 3 January 2013.

[499] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[500] Ezgi Başaran, "Çekilmenin PKK'daki Karşılığını Bilelim", *Radikal*, 7 April 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikalyazar&articleid=1128429&yazar=ezgi-basaran&categoryid=77>, site visited on 15 April 2013.

[501] Cemal, *op. cit.*, p. 493;
"Ocalan Proposes Weapons Handover", *BCC*, 13 August 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/419653.stm>, site visited on 15 February 2013.

However, while PKK militants were leaving country, they were panicked and withdrawal process gone out of PKK's control. As Turkish military forces saw the situation as an opportunity for debilitation of the PKK, they started operations against them and consequently, many PKK militants were killed or captured.[502]

In late 1999, Turkish agenda was occupied with Turkey's relation with the European Union. At the Helsinki Summit of 10-11 December 1999, the European Union declared that Turkey, as candidate country destined to join the European Union, should have at certain level of democracy on its political life. According to European Union's criteria, a candidate country should have stable institutions guaranteeing the democracy, the rule of law, the human rights and the protection of minorities. On the Kurdish problem, the EU asked from Turkish Government to reform its legal system and to solve the Kurdish problem on legal basis, with peaceful measures. The demand of EU reflected the speeches of politicians and Mesut Yılmaz, chairman of ANAP, Prime Minister at that time, said: "The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir.[503] Nevertheless, the government at that time was a coalition government and did not carry out all necessary changes, and the fulfillment of EU's demand waited until the AKP Government.

The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the premature withdrawal of PKK militants, the EU perspective and EU's demand on Kurdish problem brought out another chance to solve problems for Turkey. However, the coalition government failed to do necessary political reforms on cultural right basis, and focused on fighting against terrorism problem, which did not paved the way for the dissolution of PKK.

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[502] Birand, "PKK da Kuşku İçinde".
[503] Nevzat Çiçek, "AB Yolu Diyarbakır'dan Geçer", *Sabah*, 10 August 2009, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Siyaset/2009/08/10/ab_yolu_diyarbakirdan_gecer>, site visited on 24 February 2013.

### 5.2.2. Attempts Under AKP Governments

Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, entered the general elections of 2002, and won the elections with the majority of the valid votes. AKP had 34.28% of valid votes.[504] With AKP's winning, Turkey rescued itself from coalition governments and after a long time, a rule of a single party government started. As in 2001 economic recession and political instability were effective in Turkey, population needed a change, and a *new* party seemed as the best option. Even though AKP founders were coming from conservatism, Islamist party tradition, known as *Milli Görüş* (National View), starting with the leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, founders always claimed that they *changed* and abandoned the National View.

Under the success of AKP, party name is also important. As the country had a long history with tortures and violation of human rights 'Justice' was a message for everyone, and as the country was in recession at that time, 'Development' made sense for the population and especially for capital holders. Putting Justice and Development together, gave a *hope* to the people of Turkey. A new party with new faces and voices paved AKP's way for the rule of the country. As a consequence, the high percentage of the Turkish society saw AKP as a solution for all problems, including Kurdish Problem.

AKP' s dedicated section for Kurdish problem in its party program under the label of 'The East and Southeast' was already mentioned; however, it is necessary to point out once again for this part of the thesis. In this section, AKP founders explained Party's aim to guard cultural diversity in the region. A part of the mentioned section explained AKP's policy regarding to language and territorial unity and integrity of Turkey as;

> "The event, which some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the
> Terror problem, is unfortunately a reality in Turkey. In cognizance of the negative

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[504] "2002 Yılı Genel Seçimleri".

issues caused by this problem in our social life, our Party shall follow a policy guarding the happiness, welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional population, in a manner not to create a weakness in a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality the prevention of the terror threatening the region, the integrity of Turkey, as well as the unitary State structure; a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality respectful to the sensitivities of the entire society, efficient and aimed at solving problems at the root. The cultural diversity in this region is considered richness by our Party. On condition that the Turkish remains the official and instruction language, our Party regards the cultural activities in languages other than Turkish, including broadcasting, as an asset, which reinforces and supports the unity and integrity of our country, rather than weaken it. The elimination of certain troubles originating from the under -development of the region, are intended to be solved within the scope of the general democratization project, rather than special arrangements aimed at the region...." [505]

AKP also highlighted the importance of *citizenship* rather than ethnicity by these sentences;

"...Cultural diversities do not require that what we have in common with the region's population should be pushed to the background. On the contrary, being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is the cement of our society..."

On the relation between Kurdish problem and terror problem, AKP's view is;

"[...Despite the terror which has lasted for long years and was maintained with an intense outside support, the fact that the region's population is attached to the unitary State structure, and the fact that the problem did not turn into an ethnic conflict with the common sense of our people, is proof that the issue can be solved as an internal affair...]

[...In the period after the intense terror, no significant steps have been taken in our Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions to eliminate the differences in development between the regions, even to minimize them. Our Party shall provide the needed rehabilitation by starting serious economic projects to increase employment aimed at the region, and implementations to reduce the suffering of our citizens who have been hurt from the terror environment.

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[505] "Party Programme".

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Lack of public services, unemployment, poverty and oppression are situations where terror can flourish most conveniently. Terror and oppression respectively feed one another. Any approach, which ignores that terror is a consequence, turns to producing solutions with only oppression. Consequently, this only promotes terror. Therefore, the way to end terror requires an approach by the State, respectful of basic rights and freedoms, and a way of thinking, which sees economic development and security as pieces of the same whole…"]

These AKP views could give an idea of their manner of thinking. Briefly, AKP sees that an approach on political level, which contains elimination of certain problems in the Kurdish populated areas, eventually would end the terror itself. As PKK's main arguments as a reason for its terrorist actions were the incorrect state policies and applications in the region, lack of cultural rights for Kurds, and so on, AKP's point of view could make sense. Even though PKK's aim was not and never has been to force state for cultural rights for Kurdish origin people. PKK's aforementioned arguments were its excuses for terrorist actions and PKK's goal was the creation of an independent Kurdish State at the beginning, which later changed into regional autonomy, and at the time of writing this thesis, to 'democratic Republic for everyone'. However, their understanding of democratic republic also contains sort of regional autonomy in itself which is commonly understood by the society as 'division' of the country.

As AKP Government came into power in 2002, PKK's unilateral cease-fire of 1999, which lasted until 2004, was continuing. AKP started its reforms with the European Union perceptive. As a result, eight legislative reform packages were adopted by the Turkish Parliament in 2002-2004 period. With these reforms, Turkey declared its commitment to human rights in international convention. The packages also helped to solve numerous problems regarding the social and political life. Nearly every single of them, one way or another, were welcomed by the Kurds. As a result of reforms packages, following improvements happened; on government-military relations, European standards were adopted; State Security Courts were abolished, more freedom of expression was provided; law which led easy punishment for criticizing military and state system was changed; more

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freedom was provided on gathering and demonstration; necessary changes were made for television broadcasting other than Turkish; usage of languages other than Turkish become possible for private language courses, and so on.[506] Many other regulations have been adopted regarding to EU laws. With these packages dead penalty was also abolished, which paved the way for Abdullah Öcalan to lifetime imprisonment instead of death penalty. The European Union welcomed reform efforts of Turkish Government.[507] As a consequence of reform packages, in 2004, the EU confirmed that Turkey had made all necessary changes in its legal system and was ready for the negotiations for full admission to the European Union. The negotiations started on 3 October 2005.[508]

In accordance with reform packages, the first private Kurdish language course was opened in Şanlıurfa in 2003.[509] Later on, other private courses were opened in other Kurdish populated cities, and in 2004, a Kurdish language course opened in Istanbul.[510] However, in May 2004, PKK declared that they did not see these reforms *enough* and finished its unilateral cease-fire; hence, PKK militants would continue its attacks inside Turkey. That year, PKK started its attacks with saying that the Government did not take necessary actions to solve the Kurdish problem and demanding improvements on Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions. With PKK's return to terrorist actions, positive atmosphere on Kurdish problem faded away and another chance to solve the problem missed.

Even though PKK's attacks continued, AKP followed its ideas on Kurdish problem. In 2005, the chairman of AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave a public speech in Diyarbakir. He indicated that the Kurdish Problem exists and ethnical identities such as Turk, Kurd, Arab, were needed to

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[506] "Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri", *Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs*, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/abuyp.pdf>, site visited on 14 April 2013.
[507] "Europe Welcomes Turkish Reforms", *BBC*, 3 August 2002,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2170331.stm>, site visited on 04 April 2013.
[508] "Accession Negotiations", *Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs*,
<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37&l=2>, site visited on 4 April 2013.
[509] "İlk Kürtçe Kurs Urfa'da", *Radikal*, 8 December 2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=98175>, site visited on 4 April 2013.
[510] "İstanbul'da Kürtçe Dil Kursu Açıldı", *Milliyet*, 27 September 2004,
<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/09/27/guncel/gun04.html>, site visited on 4 April 2013.

be considered as *sub-identities,* and the Turkish citizenship need to be considered as *upper identity.*[511] However, the Article 66 of the 1982 Constitution defines Turkish Citizenship as following;

> "Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.
> The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship of a
> child of a foreign father and a Turkish mother shall be defined by law."[512]

The common understanding of the aforementioned article is that every single citizen of Turkey is *Turk,* which refers to an ethnic origin in a way. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statement on citizenship and identity was significantly important for Kurds, as he listed Turk and Kurd together as sub-identities and called the citizenship as upper-identity. This brought another discussion to Turkish political life; the possibility to modify the Article 66 for a more general description of citizenship.

In 2009, Turkey faced with a lot of changes on Kurdish issue. On 1 January 2009, TRT 6, a dedicated TV channel started to broadcast in Kurdish, was opened by Turkey Radio and Television Corporation (TRT, *Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*), which is an official institution of the state.[513] With the TV broadcasting, Kurdish language was accepted at state level. Even though Kurds generally live in eastern Turkey, TRT 6 broadcasts as a national channel, which gives opportunity to Kurds to watch TV in their mother tongue. AKP's efforts on Kurdish issue brought another unilateral cease-fire of PKK in April 2009.[514] In July 2009, AKP Government declared a new initiative on Kurdish problem. AKP Government believed that reforms on Kurdish issue eventually paved the way for the end of terrorism problem. If the Kurdish problem start to fade away, terrorism problem could finish within a process.

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[511] Özkan Tezel, and Sadık Güleç, "Kimlikte Tartışma", *Sabah*, 22 August 2005, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/08/22/siy107.html>, site visited on 4 April 2013.
[512] "The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey".
[513] "Tarihçe", *TRT*, <http://www.trt.net.tr/Kurumsal/Tarihce.aspx>, site visited on 5 April 2013.
[514] "7. Ateşkes de Sona Erdi".

The name of the initiative, which was 'Kurdish opening', was changed to 'democratic opening, national unity and solidarity project'.[515] With this democratic opening, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that whatever the name of the project was, Government was seeking a way to solve the problems of Turkey. In 2009, in a time between August and September, Abdullah Öcalan sent a message to PKK militants via his lawyers that a group could come to Turkey from Northern Iraq as a signal of PKK's *goodwill*.[516] The opposition parties did not support Government's project by saying that Government was in negotiation with PKK.[517] On 19 October 2009, 34 PKK militants entered Turkey from Iraq-Turkey border. They stood trail at the border then released at the scene.[518] PKK militants' enter to Turkey was promoted as a 'victory' by Kurds, militants were welcomed with celebrations and made a tour in the region over DTP's party bus.[519] DTP's show with PKK militants raised tension on the political atmosphere in Turkey, public opinion did not accept these images, opposition parties accused the Government by saying that they lost control of the 'democratic opening' process.

With Abdullah Öcalan's call, another group of PKK militants were supposed to return Turkey from Europe; however, as 34 PKK militants' return scened as a *show,* the Government stopped other militants' return process.[5] Kurdish political party, DTP, was banned in December 2009 as mentioned. However, AKP Government's reforms on Kurdish issue continued with the arrangement about usage of Kurdish language on elections' propaganda process in

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[515] Complete guide book of AKP's Democratic Opening can be found in (Turkish): "Soruları ve Cevaplarıyla Demokratik Açılım Süreci", *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/acilim220110.pdf>, site visited on 2 May 2013.
[516] Rifat Başaran, "Açılımın İlk Meyvesi: 34 Kişi Döndü", *Radikal*, 20 October 2009, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=960094&categoryid=97>, site visited on 5 April 2013.
[517] "Baykal Hükümetin Açılımına Kapıyı Kapattı", *Bianet*, 10 September 2009, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/116966-baykal-hukumetin-acilim-ina-kapiyi-kapatti>, site visited on 22 March 2013.
[518] "Habur'dan Giriş Yapan PKK'lıların Serbest Bırakılması Ankara'yı Hareketlendirdi", *Radikal*, 21 September 2009, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=960336&categoryid=98>, site visited on 23 March 2013.
[519] For the image of the tour, please see Appendix VI.
[520] "Atalay: Habur Yol Kazası", *Bianet*, 12 July 2010, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/azinliklar/123356-atalay-habur-yol-kazasi>, site visited on 17 March 2013.

March 2010.[521] Later on, in June 2010, lawsuit was opened against returned PKK militants, and ten of them were arrested. With this arrest of ten militants, the rest of PKK militants went back to PKK's camp in Iraq.[522] In June 2010, PKK broke the cease-fire and returned its terrorist attacks. The most brutal one was on 14 July 2011 during which PKK killed 13 soldiers.[523] Therefore, AKP's efforts on democratic opening process stopped.

Since the beginning of the democratic opening process, the opposition parties accused the Government of negotiating with PKK, and in September 2011, a voice record was published in one of the news agency's website. According to the record, the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey's representatives had been in contact with PKK representatives in Oslo/Norway under the supervision of an unknown foreign country representative.[524] There were no mentions to the date of the meeting, however; according to the record, that meeting was not the first one. Therefore, except the sides, nobody knows the exact date of the beginning of Oslo meeting. For the start date of the Oslo meetings, Murat Karayılan, PKK's leader in the field, pointed out 2008.[525] Therefore, common belief on the subject was that the State officials had been talking to the PKK representatives for a while.

PKK's attack which resulted with the death of 13 soldiers, and the voice recording practically finished the democratic opening process, and another unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem was noted on the history of Turkey.

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[521] Nuray Babacan, "Kürtçe Propaganda Seçim Yasasında", *Hürriyet*, 25 March 2010, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/14209059.asp>, site visited on 19 March 2013.
[522] Ibid.
[523] Tolga Şardan, and Meriç Tafolar, "Yürekleri Yakan Pusu", *Milliyet*, 15 July 2011, <http:// gundem.milliyet.com.tr/yurekleri-yakan-pusu/gundem/gundemdetay/15.07.2011/1414541/ default.htm>, site visited on 25 March 2013.
[524] "PKK ile MIT'in Oslo Görüşmesi Sızdı İddiası", *Hürriyet*, 14 September 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/18726260.asp>, site visited on 19 March 2013.
[525] Hasan Cemal, "Murat Karayılan ile Kandil'de 5,5 Saat", *T24*, 24 March 2013, <http://t24.com.tr/yazi/karayilan-geri-cekilme-sonbahara-sarkar-kalici-baris-aponun-ozgurlugunden-gecer/6390>, site visited on 26 March 2013.

In summer 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Kurdish language would become an *optional course* in middle schools.[526] Necessary regulations were made and Kurdish language became an optional course for the educational year of 2012-2013. According to Hürrtiyet Daily News' article on the subject, by 6 February 2013 total numbers of students who chose the optional language course was 18.847.[527]

In 2012, PKK's attacks increased in Turkey. A part from PKK attacks, another action was started on 12 September 2012; 63 Kurdish inmates began hunger strike. They demand that the *cruelty* against Kurds should stop immediately; Abdullah Öcalan's prison conditions should be improved, and he should be accepted as the interlocutor for the Kurdish problem; Kurds should defend themselves in Kurdish in trails. On 60th day of hunger strike some BDP MP's also joint the strike.[528] On 17 November 2012, Abdullah Öcalan's brother visited him in prison, then made a statement that Abdullah Öcalan made a call to stop the hunger strike. As his brother indicated that Abdullah Öcalan considered the hunger strike as in important act, and said that the act fulfilled its duty, they could stop.[529] The hunger strike was a civil-disobedience action of imprisoned Kurds and MP's to force the state to talk with Abdullah Öcalan. With Abdullah Öcalan's call, hunger strike finished on 18 November 2012. It was kind of a *show* to put Abdullah Öcalan at the center of both Kurdish and terrorism problems and, as Andrew Finkel states in his piece for International Herald Tribune, Abdullah Öcalan did play his part well and finished the hunger strikes by a demonstration

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[526] Birkan Yıldız, "Kürtçe Seçmeli Ders Olacak", *Milliyet*, 12 June 2012, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/kurtce-secmeli-ders-olacak/siyaset/siyasetdetay/12.06.2012/1552705/default.htm>, site visited on 25 March 2013.
[527] Esra Kaya, "İşte 'Seçmeli Kürtçe'nin Türkiye Haritası", *Hürriyet*, 6 February 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22534618.asp>, site visited on 26 March 2013.
[528] "BDP'lilerden Açlık Grevi Açıklaması", *Radikal*, 18 November 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1108321&categoryid=78>, site visited on 18 November 2012.
[529] "Öcalan: Açlık Grevleri Bitirilsin", *Hürriyet*, 17 November 2012, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21952885.asp>, site visited on 26 March 2013.

of power.[530] Öcalan showed public that he was still in power not just over the PKK militants but over the Kurds as well.

During the last days of 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the National Intelligence Organization officials have been in talk with Abdullah Öcalan with the intention of finishing terrorism problem. He also noted that the State of Turkey had done these talks before and in necessity would do again.[531] After Prime Minister's statement, three Kurdish politicians visited Abdullah Öcalan in prison on 3 January 2013. In this visit, Abdullah Öcalan stated that he was in contact with state officials since 4-5 months.[532] First meeting was the beginning point of a new initiative and series of visits to Abdullah Öcalan. Until 21 April 2013, Kurdish politicians visited Abdullah Öcalan five times, and each time Öcalan wrote letters both for the PKK's wing in Europe and its leadership in Kandil, Iraq. This time, the initiative was named as 'resolution process' by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

One week after the Kurdish politicians' meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, three PKK militants were found death in PKK's office in Paris.[533] For the assassination of three militants, PKK accused Turkish Intelligence services,[534] and Turkish Government stated that groups in PKK, which were against the

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[530] Andrew Finkel, "The Second Career of Abdullah Öcalan", *International Herald Tribune*, 22 November 2012, <http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/the-second-career-of-abdullah-ocalan/>, site visited on 26 March 2013.
[531] "İmralı'yla Görüşüyoruz", *Habertürk*, 29 December 2002, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/807198-imraliyla-gorusuyoruz>, site visited on 26 March 2013.
[532] Rengin Arslan, "Kışanak: Görüşme Talebi Öcalan'dan Geldi, AKP'den Değil", *BBC Türkçe*, 18 April 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/ 2013/04/130418_kisanak_surec_ocalan.shtml>, site visited on 18 April 2013.
[533] Christophe Cornevin, and Jean-Marc Leclerc, "Mystérieux Assasinat de Militantes Kurdes", *Le Figaro*, 10 January 2013, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/ 2013/01/10/01016-20130110ARTFIG00714-mysterieux-assassinat-de-militantes-kurdes.php>, site visited on 10 January 2013;
  Dan Bilefsky, and Alan Cowell, "3 Kurds are Killed in Paris, in Locked-Door Mystrey", *The New York Times*, 10 January 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/europe/three-kurdish-activists-killed-in-central-paris.html?_r=0>, site visited on 10 January 2013.
[534] "Karayılan'dan Paris Açıklaması", *Bianet*, 22 January 2013, <http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/143774-karayilan-dan-paris-aciklamasi>, site visited on 22 January 2013.

'resolution process' might be responsible of these killings.[535] The assassinations created a small scale crisis in the resolution process; however, meeting and talks with Abdullah Öcalan continued. In the month of January, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said "I do not know 'Kurdish Problem', I know that my Kurdish brothers and sisters have problems."[536] With this, AKP put all its efforts to solve the problems of Kurds in Turkey. In other words, AKP tried to demonstrate that the Government did not do reforms because the State was in talk with Abdullah Öcalan; however, public opinion in Turkey often accepted the reforms as compromises against PKK. Later in January, AKP Government did necessary changes for the usage of Kurdish language in trials.[537] This was the first positive outcome of resolution process. Following days, the atmosphere in Turkey changed and everyone started to talk about the resolution and *peace.* The talks with Öcalan stopped PKK's attack, and Governments statements made the room for talks on Öcalan's role, ideas and so on. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said "to solve the problems, we consider every way. Even if I need to poison myself to solve the problem, I would do it" to demonstrate how dedicated he was for the resolution process.[538]

The positive atmosphere raised the expectation of another unilateral cease-fire announcement from the PKK. Even PKK's attacks have stopped, PKK's leadership in Kandil, Iraq waited to see and to understand Abdullah Öcalan's position first. At the end of February 2013, second committee, which was formed by BDP MPs, visited Abdullah Öcalan, and in their return they stated that Öcalan said that PKK should treat well its *captives,* he was also expecting to see them to

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[535] "Hüseyin Çelik'ten PKK Paris Suikasti Açıklaması", *Sabah*, 10 January 2013, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/01/10/huseyin-celikten-pkk-paris-suikasti-aciklamasi>, site visited on 10 January 2013.

[536] Yahya Bostan, "Ben Kürt Sorunu Diye Bir Şey Tanımıyorum", *Sabah*, 21 January 2013, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/01/21/ben-kurt-sorunu-diye-bir-sey-tanimiyorum>, site visited on 09 February 2013.

[537] Ferit Aslan, "Yasa Geçti, İlk Kürtçe Savunma Yapıldı", *Hürriyet*, 25 January 2013, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/22442566.asp>, site visited 02 February 2013.

[538] "Gerekirse Baldıran Zehri İçerim", *Sabah*, 26 February 2013, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2013/02/26/gerekirse-baldiran-zehri-icerim>, site visited on 26 February 2013.

return their families soon.[539] After Öcalan's call about *captives*, on 13 March 2013, PKK released 8 public servants who had been kidnapped and held by PKK for two years.[540] BDP party co-chairmen considered this as PKK's *gesture* for resolution process, and government officials stated that this was the outcome of the resolution process. Abdulah Öcalan's call for a cease-fire was expected to be heard on the celebrations of Nowruz in Diyarbakir.

On 21 March 2013, during the celebration of Nowruz in Diyarbakir, Abdullah Öcalan's message was read both in Kurdish and Turkish. In his message Öcalan made references to the history of Turkey, the foundation of Turkey and called the day of 21 March 2013, as the starting date of a new period. Full text of his message was as followings;

"Greetings to all peoples of Middle East and Central Asia who celebrate Nowruz, the day of revival and rejoice, with the greatest participation in the world...

Greetings to all other peoples of the world who celebrate Nowruz, the landmark of a new era and sunshine, with enthusiasm and a democratic tolerance.

Greetings to all who take democratic right, freedom and equality as their guides...

Greetings to all Kurdish people, a folk that mothered one of the most ancient rural and urban civilizations at the lands of Mesopotamia and Anatolia from Zagros and Taurus Mountains to Tigris and Euphrates Rivers...

For Kurdish people, who coexisted peacefully and co-created this civilization with other peoples from different racial, religious, ethnic backgrounds; Tigris and Euphrates are siblings with Sakarya and Maritsa rivers. Mount Ararat and Cudi Mountain are friends of Kachkar and Erciyes Mountains. Haley and Delido dances are relatives with Horon and Zeybek dances.

This great civilization, these sister entities have been separated from each other by political oppressions, external interventions and group dynamics; they have been compelled to build entities ignoring justice, equality and freedom.

For the past 200 years, conquest wars, western imperialists interventions and oppressive mentalities have urged Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Kurdish entities to form

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[539] Serpil Çevikcan, "İlk Adım Örgütten", *Milliyet*, 24 February 2013, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/ilk-adim-orgutten/siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/24.02.2013/1672815/default.htm>, site visited on 05 March 2013.

[540] "PKK'nın Elindeki Kamu Görevlileri Serbest", *CNN Türk*, 13 March 2013, <http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/03/13/pkknin.elindeki.kamu.gorevlileri.serbest/699969.0/index.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013.

Şebnem Arsu, and Tim Arango, "Kurdish Rebels Free 8 Turks, Fueling Peace Talks", *The New York Times*, 13 March 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/world/europe/kurdish-rebels-release-turkish-captives-fueling-peace-talks.html?ref=europe>, site visited on 13 March 2013.

artificial states, borderlines, problems.

The era of exploiting, oppressive ignoring mentalities is over. The peoples of Middle East and Central Asia are waking up. They are returning to their own. They are saying 'no' to the clashes that aim to provoke and harm each other.

Millions of people who are enthusiastically crowding for Nowruz today speak of peace and fraternity, and demand a resolution.

The struggle I initiated against our collective desperation, ignorance and slavery was aiming to form a consciousness, mentality and spirit albeit all challenges.

Today, I see that this scream came to a certain point.

Our fight was never against a particular race, religion, sect or group, and it can never be.

Our fight was always against oppression, ignorance, injustice, lack of development and all sorts of pressures.

Today though, we are waking up to a new Turkey, Middle East and future.

To all youngsters who bless my call, to all women who add my message to their hearts, to all friends who consider my sayings, to all people who pay attention to what I am saying;

We have a new era starting upon us.

A door is opening from a process of armed resistance to a process of democratic politics.

A new process emphasizing on political, social and economic aspect is starting, a new mentality on democratic rights, freedoms and equality is developing.

We have sacrificed decades for this people, we have suffered great consequences. But all the sacrifice and struggle did not go unwasted. Kurdish people regained their true self-identity.

We have come to a point where we say "let the arms silence, opinions and politics speak". The ignorant modernist paradigm has been deconstructed. The blood is dripping from this geography, regardless of Turkish, Kurdish, Laz, Circassian origin.

I, myself, am declaring in the witnessing of millions of people that a new era is beginning, arms are silencing, politics are gaining momentum. It is time for our [PKK] armed entities to withdraw from the [Turkish] border.

I strongly believe that whoever opens their heart to me, whoever believes in our struggle, will certainly consider the sensitivity of the ongoing process.

This is not an end, this is a beginning. It is not the end of our struggle, it is the start of a new sort of struggle.

Forming geographies based on a single ethnicity and nation is an inhuman invention that the modernity created to alienate us from our true selves.

Everybody is responsible for the creation of a free, democratic and egalitarian country that suits well with the history of Kurdistan and Anatolia. On the occasion of this Nowruz, I am calling all people with Armenian, Turkic, Assyrian, Arabic and other backgrounds to see the light of freedom and equality as much as Kurdish people do.

To people of Turkey;

Turkish people who know ancient Anatolia as Turkey should know that their

coexistence with Kurdish people dates back to a historical agreement of fraternity and solidarity under the flag of Islam.

In the real sense, this spirit of solidarity does not and must not contain conquest, denial, forced assimilation and annihilation. The politics of oppression, annihilation and assimilation represent the effort of an isolated elitist government that deny the existing history and fraternity agreement.

I am inviting everyone to build the democratic modernity together, as two prominent strategic powers of Middle East, departing from our culture and civilization to emancipate ourselves from the vicious cycle of cruelty which looks obvious to contradict our history and fraternity agreement.

It is time not for opposition, conflict or contempt towards each other, it is time for cooperation, unity, embracing and mutual blessing.

During World War I, Turkish and Kurdish soldiers have fallen martyrs together in Çananakkale [Dardanelles], they have fought together in Turkey's Independence War, and opened together the 1920 National Assembly.

What our mutual past points out is our mutual necessity of forming our future together. The spirit of 1920 National Assembly era also enlightens the upcoming era of now.

I am inviting all representatives from oppressed peoples, classes and cultures; women who have been the most exploited class of all times, oppressed religious groups, cults and other cultural entities, worker class representatives, and other individuals who are excluded by the [capitalist] system to take part, understand and acquire the democratic modernity system.

Middle East and Central Asia is currently seeking a contemporary modernity and democratic order that would address its historical context. The search for a new model where everyone could live freely and in fraternity has become one of basic human needs - like bread and water. It is inevitable that Anatolian and Mesopotamian geography, and the cultural momentum in there will build this model.

We are currently experiencing a much more complex, contemporary and profound moment than Turkish and Kurdish people experienced almost hundred years ago during the foundation of modern Turkey with the National Pact (Misak-i Milli).

This time, we are building a model on the lesson of what we learned from the mistakes of our predecessors - embracing all devastated peoples, classes and cultures. I am calling all these people to realize an organization through a more egalitarian, independent and democratic method.

I am also calling all the Kurdish, Turkmen, Assyrian and Arabic people in today's Syria and Iraq who have been left wrongly out from the borders of the National Pact to discuss, become aware and decide on their realities on the platform of a "National Solidarity and Peace Conference".

The broadness and inclusivity of saying "we", an important pillar in the historical context of this geography, has been narrowed to a "singularity" under the arms of elitist administrations. It is time to give "us" its old sense spirit and practicality.

We will unite against whom are trying to divide and conquer us. We will unite against

who are trying to tear us apart.

The ones who are unable to read the spirit of time will inevitable end up at the junk of history. The peoples of the region are witnessing a new dawn. War-tired peoples of the Middle East want to be reborn and get up on their feet. This Nowruz is a precursor to all of us.

The prophecies uttered by Moses, Jesus and Mohammed are becoming true now, the humanity is regaining its dignity again.

We are not in a position to reject all the values of Western civilization. We are taking the values of enlightenment, freedom, equality and democracy, and synthesizing them with our own norms. The basis of our new struggle is ideas, ideology and democratic politics, and to launch a democratic movement.

Greetings to all who give life to this process and support democratic peace!

Greetings to all who take responsibility for the fraternity, equality and democratic freedom of people!

Long live Nowruz, long live the fraternity of peoples![541]

With his message, Abdullah Öcalan made more than a cease-fire call. He ordered PKK's militants to leave Turkey and, for the future of the Kurds, he indicated that politics would take place of weapons. Öcalan's message made its scene on international media also.[542] The President of Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Jean-Claude Mignon, stated that Öcalan's message was an important step on the resolution process between PKK and the Turkish authorities.[543] The next day all Turkish mass media was talking about Abdullah Öcalan's message. Turkish Daily newspaper, Radikal, printed its front cover with a photo of the Nowruz area in Diyarbakir, and a Kurdish slogan over it: 'Biji Türkiye' (Long Live Turkey).[544] Putting a Kurdish slogan in the front page of a national newspaper was not even thinkable ten years ago. Radikal's act was not an evidence of courage, but an evidence of how far Turkey have evolved on Kurdish problem.

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[541] Translation of the full text is taken from: "Öcalan: Our Armed Forces Should Withdraw Beyond Border", *Bianet*, 21 March 2013, <http://www.bianet.org/english/politics/145278-ocalan-calls-for-ceasefire-promotes-politics>, site visited on 21 March 2013.

[542] Pieces about the subject:

"El Líder Kurdo Abdulá Ocalan Pide un Alto el Fuego a Turquía", La Vanguardia, 21 March 2013, <http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20130321/54370501789/lider-kurdo-abdula-ocalan-pide-alto-el-fuego-turquia.html>, site visited on 21 March 2013;

James Reynolds, "Turkey Kurds: PKK Chief Ocalan Calls for Ceasefire", *BBC*, 21 March 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21874427>, site visited on 21 March 2013.

[543] Kayhan Karaca, "Öcalan'ın Çağrısına Avrupa'dan İlk Tepki", *NTVMSNBC*, 21 March 2013, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25430398/>, site visited on 21 March 2013.

[544] For the frontpage of Radikal, please see page Appendix VII.

For many years, PKK tried to demonstrate that they were the representatives of Kurds, they had no goals for themselves but a goal for all Kurds. PKK's intention was to merge the Kurdish problem and terrorism problem together, and as Öcalan's aforementioned message had references to common history of Kurds and Turks, he made the call to Kurds but not just the PKK militants; the Kurdish problem and terrorism problem literally become one.

On 23 March 2013, Hasan Cemal did an interview with Murat Karayılan.[545] As Hasan Cemal cited, Murat Karayılan gave his support to Öcalan's message and said that this time was different from previous ones. Following hours to that interview, Murat Karayılan announced that PKK declared unilateral cease-fire. As Abdullah Öcalan's message's first part was put in action by PKK, the discussions in Turkey focused on the second part; the withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkey. For the withdrawal process, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that the militants should give-up their weapons and leave as unarmed. The counter statement to Prime Minister's demand came next day, on 30 March 2013 from PKK, they indicated that in PKK militants would not give up their weapons and the Government should construct the legal base for withdrawal.[546]

For the withdrawal process, Abdullah Öcalan proposed that two commissions, 'wise men commission' and 'investigation commission' among the MPs should be organized and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey should involve to the process as *supervisor*. During the first week of April 2013, AKP Government formed the 'wise men commission' but not from the MPs, instead 63 well known people were selected to work for two months time. Among them, there were academics, columnists, movie stars and singers who found place.[5]

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[545] Cemal, "Murat Karayılan ile".

[546] "PKK: Silahsız Çekilme Gündemimizde Yok", *Radikal*, 30 March 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1127377&categoryid=78>, site visited on 30 March 2013.

[547] "Akil İnsanlar, Toplantı Sonrası Konuştu", *Radikal*, 5 April 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1128202&categoryid=77>, site visited on 5 April 2013.

The 'wise men commission' made their first meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then started to work. As Turkey has seven geographical areas, these 63 'wise men commission' were divided into seven groups of nine people. They did not become designated State servants; however, the Government stated that the 'wise men commission' was a public initiative, which was formed by the Government, to report to Prime Minister. Same week, AKP MPs gave motion to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for the formation of an investigation commission among MPs.[548]

*"El Pais"*, Spanish newspaper, published an interview with Murat Karayılan in Kandil about the resolution process.[549] According to the interview, Murat Karayılan repeated that PKK militants would not give up their weapons during the withdrawal process, and stated that giving up weapons should be talked as final step of the process. Murat Karayılan also claimed that 90% of PKK's activities were political, while only 10% were military and there were no terrorist activities among them. However, PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States of America and the European Union. As journalist José Miguel Calatayud said in his piece and also as explained in previous parts of this thesis, PKK is known for its attacks against Turkish security forces, civilians, professors, public servants, and even tourists in Turkey. As already cited in the first part of this thesis, if an armed attack kills soldiers of a State, affects civilians and frighten to population, it is commonly considered as terrorist action. Therefore, Murat Karayılan's statement to El Pais is just the usage of international media to project PKK as a *just* organization, which serves for favor of Kurds.

As the resolution process put PKK under the spotlights, Murat Karayılan gave another statement to New York Times, US newspaper, a week after El Pais

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[548] "Meclis 'Sürece' Araştırma Komisyonuyla Dahil Olacak", *Radikal*, 3 April 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?atype=radikaldetayv3&articleid=1127998&categoryid=78>, site visited on 3 April 2013.

[549] José Miguel Calatayud, "Es Imposible Que Dejemos Las Armas Antes Retirarnos de Turquía", *El País*, 6 April 2013, <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/04/06/actualidad/1365281966_130538.html>, site visited on 6 April 2013.

interview.[550] In addition to what he said to El Pais, he stated, "if this [resolution process] does not happen, there will be a great war". He also mentioned his desire for the aftermath of the process as he would like to play a political role in Turkey.

Murat Karayılan's two statements to different countries' newspapers show how hard he was trying to project the PKK as a political organization. Turkish journalists and columnists made interviews with him before; however, he did not state his desire of political role for the aftermath of the problem before. In this sense, Murat Karayılan tried to conduct an international pressure over the State of Turkey for a possible demand for amnesty not just for militants of PKK, but also for the leadership.

On 18 April 2013, *TIME's list of 100 most influential people in the world* was published and Abdullah Öcalan found a place in the list.[551] Abdullah Öcalan's message on Nowruz, following statements, and his role in general paved the way for him to the TIME's list. As in the list of TIME, every personality was described by another famous person in the World; Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, wrote down the following for Öcalan;

> "The Irish peace accord known as the Good Friday Agreement is 15 years old this month. For almost all that time, Abdullah Ocalan, a founder of the Kurdistan Worker's Party, has been in prison in Turkey.
>
> Despite this, he has become a voice for peace, a leader willing to offer the hand of friendship to those he has fought against for most of his life.
>
> Persuading enemies that there are alternative ways to resolve long-standing differences takes patience and a willingness to engage in dialogue, but most important, it requires leadership.
>
> Ocalan has demonstrated that leadership. Despite incarceration, he has forged a road map to peace that commits the Kurdish people to democracy and freedom and tolerance. He argues that it is time to "silence the weapons and let the ideas and politics speak."

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[550] Tim Arango, "Rebel Keeps Kurds' Guns Close at Hand in Peace Talks With Turkey", *The New York Times*, 11 April 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/middleeast/rebel-kurd-karayilan-defiant-in-turkish-talks.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&ref=europe>, site visited on 11 April 2013.

[551] Full list can be found in: "The 2013 Time 100", *Time*, 18 April 2013, <http://time100.time.com/2013/04/18/time-100/slide/all/>, site visited on 18 April 2013.

> Ocalan wants a "new beginning" that will bring the Kurdish people's struggle into a new phase — a political phase in which they seek through negotiation to create an equal, free and democratic country for "all peoples and cultures."
>
> I commend him for his leadership and vision and urge the Turkish government to release him." [552]

As this thesis took the British Experience as a reference point, putting Gerry Adams' comments on Abdullah Öcalan was important in order to demonstrate how Gerry Adams and the Sinn Fein saw Abdullah Öcalan.

On 25 April 2013, Murat Karayılan held a press conference in Kandil, in which international media and Turkish media representatives participated. During the press conference, Murat Karayılan declared that the withdrawal process of PKK militans from Turkey to Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) would begin on 8 May 2013 and will be finalized as soon as possible. For a possible encounter with Turkish Security Forces, Murat Karayılan said the following;

> "It is a must for Turkish military forces to display the same sensitivity and seriousness during the withdrawal which will be stopped in the event of any kind of attack, operation and bombing to which guerrillas will respond on the basis of necessary defence. The forces of the Turkish state should also avoid provocative and opportunist attitudes that may lead to any kind of military activity and clashes in Kurdistan. Apart from that, a healthy and accomplished progress in the process could be ensured by paying attention to the points we have highlighted in the letters we sent to Öcalan and are known to the state as well."[553]

According to Murat Karayılan's statement, the process would take three steps, and with the withdrawal of PKK militants, first step would be completed. On the second step, Karayılan demanded that the State of Turkey and the Government should do necessary changes on regulations on the constitution and state should abolish village guard system, special forces, etc. And for the third

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[552] For related page: Gerry Adams, "Abdullah Ocalan", *Time*, 18 April 2013, <http://time100.time.com/2013/04/18/time-100/slide/abdullah-ocalan/>, site visited on 18 April 2013.
[553] Complete text of the press conference can be found in (English): "KCK: Withdrawal to Begin on 8 May", *Firat News*, 25 April 2013, <http://en.firatajans.com/news/news/kck-withdrawal-to-begin-on-8-may-update.htm>, site visited on 25 April 2013.

step, Murat Karayılan named the step as 'normalization' and  establishment of freedom for everyone, including Abdullah Öcalan.

According to Kurdish politicians and newspapers, the withdrawal process of PKK militants started on 8 May 2013 as planned. Following days, various photos of PKK militants on rural areas were published on newspapers, and they were considered as evidences of PKK`s withdrawal from Turkey. During the month of May, the resolution process and the PKK militants` withdrawal were at the center of the agenda of Turkey. However, on the day of 31 of May 2013, street protests started in Turkey, which consequently pushed down the resolution process in the agenda.

During the second half of May 2013 in Istanbul, a group of people was protesting against the Government's plan to destroy the Gezi Park in Taksim and to build a replica of Ottoman Barrack (name of the barrack was Topçu Kışlası). PM Erdoğan promoted the plan of the Ottoman Barrack as re-establishing the history where it belongs. Ecological protests to protect the Gezi Park from destruction evolved after the police intervention towards protesters early in the morning of 31 May 2013. After that moment, thousands of people gathered in the Taksim Square against police brutality. However, police forces tried to disrupt the crowd with tear gas and water cannons. The harsh attitude of police sparked multiple demonstrations in multiple cities all over Turkey. The protests started with Gezi Park, then turned into anti-government protests. BDP supported the protests by taking its place in the Taksim Square with pennons. BDP MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder was the first man who stood up against municipality vehicles and stopped the destruction of the trees in the park. Many Kurdish people also participated individually. Many columnists stated that Gezi Park protests were organized against the resolution process. Even PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that the protests targeted the resolution process and the development of Turkey in

general.[554] With the Gezi Park protests, the agenda of Turkey shifted from the resolution process.

On 13 June 2013, Mehmet Öcalan, Abdullah Öcalan`s brother, visited Abdullah Öcalan in İmrali Island. After the visit, Mehmet Öcalan said that Abdullah Öcalan stated that the first step of the resolution process was nearly over.[555] The statement of Mehmet Öcalan about the withdrawal of PKK militants was considered as a message to the Government to start the second step of the process. In the meantime, Kurdish politicians started to organize multiple conferences in Turkey and in Europe in order to inform people about the process. During the conference in Diyarbakir between 15-17 June 2013, many demands were listed by participants including release of Abdullah Öcalan, self-determination right for Kurds, release of all convicts on political crimes, remove of PKK from list of terrorist organizations etc.[556] Some of these demands were listed publicly for the first time, and considered as Kurdish demands from the Government in the second step of the process. However, one can see that extreme demands, like release of Abdullah Öcalan, could not be fulfilled in the conditions of Turkish society. Kurdish politicians were aware of this reality; however, they put demands at very high point in order to gain more and more in the negotiations with state officials.

On 26 June 2013, Selahattin Demirtaş, co-chairman of BDP, stated that resolution process was affected by the Gezi Park protests. He said that for ten, fifteen days the process was in hold and Abdullah Öcalan and leaders of BDP made statements to continue the process and tried to create the atmosphere for the

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[554] "Erdoğan: Çözüm sürecini aksatanlar bunun vebalinden kurtulamaz", *Cihan Haber Ajansı*, 12 July 2013, <http://www.cihan.com.tr/caption/Erdogan-Cozum-surecini-aksatanlar-bunun-vebalinden-kurtulamaz-CHMTA3NjY5Ny8xMDA1>, site visited on 12 July 2013.

[555] "Öcalan: Süreçte birinci aşama sona erdi", *Radikal*, 13 June 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/ turkiye/ocalan_surecte_birinci_asama_sona_erdi-1137451>, site visited on 13 June 2013.

[556] "PKK terör örgütleri listesinden çıkarılsın", *Radikal*, 17 June 2013, <http:// www.radikal.com.tr/politika/pkk_teror_orgutleri_listesinden_cikarilsin-1137980>, site visited on 17 June 2013.

start of second step of the process.[557] One can see that as the resolution process needed the dedication of all efforts from both sides, a change in Turkish agenda affected the dialogue between sides and jeopardized the resolution process. On the other hand, it is possible to say that with the aforementioned statement, Selahattin Demirtas tried to use the Gezi Park protests in their favor and promoted the role of Abdullah Öcalan again as `peacekeeper` in the process. As the resolution process is very fragile, each side tries to empower his position by daily statements. Same day PM Erdoğan hold a meeting with members of `wise men commission` as the commission finished its two months of fieldwork around Turkey. According to wise men commission's reports a high percentage of Turkish population supported the resolution process. Members of the commission stated the demands of the society to PM Erdoğan and Erdoğan stated that the Government of Turkey will examine each report on the issue and will conduct a map for the future of process. PM Erdogan also stated that despite the statements coming from BDP leaders that PKK militants withdrawal was nearly completed, only 15% of PKK militants left the territory of Turkey. Some members of the commission tried to make connections between Gezi Park protest and the resolution process; however, PM Erdoğan stated that they were different subjects.[558] Even the PM Erdoğan tried to distinguish Gezi Park protests from resolution process, one can say that they were related in multiple ways, as one easily could affect the other.

On 28 June 2013, a protests took place in Lice against the construction of a military station. Turkish Gendarme Forces intervened the protesters by tear gas and opened fire in the air, which caused the death of one person and seven injured.[559] As this incident happened during the Gezi Protests, people took streets

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[557] "Demirtaş: Çözüm süreci Gezi'de gitti geldi", *Radikal*, 26 June 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/demirtas_cozum_sureci_gezide_gitti_geldi-1139202>, site visited on 26 June 2013.

[558] "Erdoğan`dan akil insanlara: Lütfen Gezi Parki olayını buraya taşımayın", *Radikal*, 26 June 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogandan_akil_insanlara_lutfen_gezi_parki_olayini_buraya_tasimayin-1139299>, site visited on 26 June 2013.

[559] "Lice'de protestocu köylülere müdahale: 1 ölü 7 yaralı", *Radikal*, 28 June 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/licede_protestocu_koylulere_mudahale_cok_sayida_yarali-1139575>, site visited on 28 June 2013.

to show their support to people of Lice in major cities like Istanbul. It is possible to say that one of the results of Gezi Protests was the rising awareness of people in Western part concerning the issues of Kurdish problem and what was happening in the eastern part of the country.

On 3 July 2013, Abdullah Öcalan's brother visited him in prison once again and declared that Abdullah Öcalan stated that as 1 June 2013, first phase of the resolution process was over and the sides were preparing themselves for the second phase.[560] Despite the inconsistent statements from the sides of the talks, public opinion believed that the resolution process was on track.

During the months of June and July, in official circles of Ankara, there was statements about a 'democratization package', which contained several juridical chances that would provide certain rights to Kurds, and in general more democracy in Turkey. More democratic rights were also demands of PKK/KCK for the second phase of the resolution process. Many rumors suggested that this 'democratization package' could be announced by PM Erdoğan during July; however; all protests caused s delay. On 19 June 2013, PKK/KCK made a public statement that they were expecting concrete acts from the Government on the issue of democratization as soon as possible, otherwise the resolution process would not proceed.[561] One can see that while Governments are negotiating and conducting talks with terrorist organizations, organizations make public threats via media channels in order to force the Government to act.

On the 31 July 2013, Cemil Bayık, who was elected as co-leader of KCK/ PKK during their last congress in July, declared 1 September 2013 as a deadline to Government. Bayık, publicly stated that if the Government would not act

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[560] "Gidişat parlak bir gidişat değil", *Milliyet,* 03 July 2013, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-gidisat-parlak-bir-gidisat-degil-/siyaset/detay/1731250/default.htm>, site visited on 03 July 2013.
[561] "KCK: Somut adım atılmazsa süreç ilerlemeyecek", *Radikal,* 19 July 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/kck_somut_adim_atilmazsa_surec_ilerlemeyecek-1142479>, site visited on 19 July 2013.

concretely until the 1 September, KCK/PKK would start to *defend* itself.[562] While PKK was threatening the Government publicly, it would not be easy to brake-out the talks on the resolution process. Hence, the long-talked 'democratization package' was declared on 30 September 2013. Once can see that, PKK was making threats in order to empower their position publicly and they did not brake the talks as the Government delayed the declaration of democratization package after 1 September 2013, which was the decline indicated by PKK.

On 30 September 2013, PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the democratization package by a press conference. The package brought many new implementations and chances. Public opinion expected that the package would be Kurdish issue centric; however, its contained many regulations about religious minorities, etc. With the democratization package, mother-tangues other than Turkish could be used as language of instruction in private schools, the usage of letters Q, W, X were allowed in public services and education, names of villages and towns, which were changed after the military coup of 1980, could be changed to old names, political parties law would change and the threshold for receiving financial aid from Treasury funds would be decreased to %3, (was %7 before) which pave the way for more parties to receive financial aid. In addition to these, the package expand the usage of languages other than Turkish in political scene. In 2010, the Government made necessary changes and let the usage of other languages during election period; with the democratization package, political parties could use other languages in any of their activities regardless of election period.[563] With the democratization package, PM Erdoğan also started the discussion on electoral system in Turkey. Erdoğan proposed three options; preserving the actual one, which has %10 threshold for political parties, lowering the threshold to %5 and implementing a narrowed constituency system in groups of five deputies for each constituency, and lastly, removing the threshold and

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[562] "Cemil Bayık: Devletin adım atması için 1 Eylül son tarih", *Radikal,* 31 July 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/
cemil_bayik_devletin_adim_atmasi_icin_1_eylul_son_tarih-1144294>, site visited on 31 July 2013.

[563] "İşte demokratikleşme paketi", *Milliyet,* 30 September 2013, <http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/
tarihi-paket-aciklaniyor/siyaset/detay/1770501/default.htm>, site visited on 30 September 2013.

implementing the single-member district system, which is to say, creating 550 elections districts all over Turkey.[564] At the writing time of this thesis, no change took place regarding the electoral system; however, other announced changes started to be implemented in Turkey. Right after the announcement of the democratization package, Government officials stated that it was just a beginning of series of packages.

Even-though the package brought many chances regarding the Kurdish issue, the members of BDP criticized the package and considered the acts of the Government as non-sincere. According to them, the Government was trying to present itself as if they cared about the problems of Kurds; however, allowing the usage of Kurdish as instruction language only in private schools was an example that the Government's act was for show. On 7 October 2013, Cemil Bayık made statement to Firat News Agency and considered the package as *empty.* He stated that this empty democratization package did not help the resolution process.[5] Ten days later, Cemil Bayık made another statement and said that as PKK/KCK did not consider the efforts of Government sufficient, they stopped the withdrawal process of PKK militant from Turkish territories; however, this would not change PKK's cease-fire decision.[566]

After the announcement of the package, public opinion believed that the package was below the expectations. As before the announcement, PM Erdoğan oftenly said that the package would change life of *every single ciziten* in Turkey, people were expecting *more.* Especially, Kurds, PKK/KCK and BDP were expecting to see more concrete acts regarding the resolution process, like amnesty for the members of PKK/KCK. Kurds expected much more, and eventually got

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[564] Hayatsever, Hüseyin. "Government takes steps on headscarf, Kurds, electoral system", *Hurriyet Daily News,* 30 September 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/government-takes-steps-on-headscarf-kurds-electoral-system.aspx?PageID=238&NID=55393&NewsCatID=338>, site visited on 30 September 2013.
[565] "Bayık: Empty Package does not help Process", *Firatnews,* 07 October 2013, <http://en.firatajans.com/news/news/bayik-empty-package-does-not-help-process.htm#.UlJyhd_l3Vk.twitter>, site visited on 07 October 2013.
[566] "PKK'lı Cemil Bayık: Çekilme durdu, ateşkes devam", Bugün, 17 October 2013, <http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/cekilme-durdu-ateskes--haberi/829452>, site visited on 17 October 2013.

disappointment. However, it is clear that the package opened the way for future acts on democratization regarding the Kurdish issue and also the political presence of Kurdish parties in electoral system. If one takes into account that the resolution process is very sensitive, expecting deep changes regarding the Kurdish issue like amnesty might not be logical. As the sides are still in talks of negotiations, public opinion should be prepared for any deep chances in order to avoid the rise tension among Kurds and Turks.

As this thesis observed the resolution process until 1 November 2013, at the writing time of this thesis, statements were still coming from both sides regarding resolution process. Even all militants of PKK did not leave Turkey, one can say that the second phase of the process was started with the announcement of the democratization package.

### 5.2.3. What Can Be Done More?

Kurdish problem in Turkey has its roots throughout history of the region of Turkish Republic. From the early days of the Republic, the founders tried to build a *nation* state, which required somehow a definition of the new nation under the Republic's flag. First the term 'People of Turkey' was used to define the new nation, but then it replaced by 'Turkish Nation'. The idea was to call everyone as 'Turk', consequently, create a new nation under the name 'Turk'. Even though the term Turk used as a common name of the all people, it was understood as an ethnic reference by *others,* especially by Kurds.

After years, the Republic of Turkey's policies was formed around the Turkish language, and the term 'Turk' was started to be accepted as ethnic origin more and more. As the state structure of Turkey did not give any space for other ethnic backgrounds to live, the problem evolved from the definition problem to political crisis. With military interventions, the State's *solid* position on the identity question was strengthened; as a consequence with the Constitution of

1982, the State started to deny the existence of *others* in Turkey. The feeling of denial made Kurds more conscious about their ethnical background.

The State's wrong policies over Kurds, especially during1980 military intervention and its aftermath, gave opportunity to PKK to make propaganda against the State. PKK's brutal terrorist attacks were not legitimate in any meaning; however, they put the Kurdish problem on the State's agenda.

In Turkish politics, the main problem was the *duality* on the governance of Turkey. The military held equal power as the elected government, - even some times more than government -, and that caused political instability, powerless Governments before military and even military interventions. The most obvious example of this duality problem occurred in 1990s regarding terrorism problem; while high level government officials accepted the Kurdish reality, the existence of the Kurdish problem, and its relevance to the terrorism problem, the military officials did not accepted political side of the terrorism problem, and saw the problem as *whole,* which required only military measures to solve.

On the merger of two problems, terrorism and Kurdish problems, the State's policies played important role. PKK was founded in late 1970s as a small organization and State of Turkey did not consider them as a threat back then. Over the years, PKK strengthened its organization and eliminated rivals on the way to become the representative of Kurds. The Constitution of 1982 put the 10% national threshold rule in action, basically to keep Kurds away from the parliament. Kurds were forced to be in politics in other ways, which gave space to PKK to involve the political actions of Kurds. All of these caused the sentiment of *hatred* among Kurds against the State.

When AKP Government came into power in 2002, it was to late to solve one without touching the other. First, AKP Government passed reform packages which contained certain positive regulations for Kurds; however, PKK's attacks

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did not stop. After 2004, PKK showed that they were not going to accept any solution in which they were not involved. During the democratic opening process in 2009, the Kurdish politicians and PKK acted irrationally on the return of PKK militants from Kandil to Turkey. The democratic opening process started as premature, without any concrete action plan. The public opinion of Turkey was not ready to see such scenes and could not accept it. As the public support was missing, the process could not go far.

The resolution process; however, was different from previous ones. Recent public surveys show that over %60 percent of the population supports to process already. This time, AKP projected itself more ready and more in control than the previous one. Direct talks with Abdullah Öcalan put pressure over PKK militants in the field; although Öcalan's position was not welcomed. While the resolution process still goes on, 'what to do more?' question is on the table. It is evident that a solution to the problem is more than a necessity for Turkey.

The resolution process continues with talks between sides. The National Intelligence Organization of Turkey representatives are in direct contact with Abdullah Öcalan, and Abdullah Öcalan communicates with PKK leadership via letters. Within this chain of communication, nobody knows anything except high rank state officials. Certain secrecy is essential on these kinds of talks; however, public opinion should also be informed about the process step by step. The main critics coming from people and opposition parties are regarding this situation. Main opposition party, Republican People's Party, do not openly support the talks by claiming that they do not know what PKK wants from the Government. Also, considerable amount of people among population of Turkey criticize the talks with same arguments. Government officials claim that nearly 60% of the population supports the talks; however, this percentage should be rised more and more by convincing the rest of the population. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership is a key element on the support of the population. As he knows that, he often says, "Trust Me!" against any questions related the process.

As already said before, secrecy is essential; however, Government officials should give information about the process for a sustainable support from population of Turkey.

The main goal of the resolution process was to find a democratic solution for the problems of Kurds and to complete the dissolution of PKK. By April 2013, PKK has prepared itself for the withdrawal which was expected to be over before winter of 2013. After PKK militants' withdrawal, certain reforms were expected to put in power by the Government regarding Kurdish problem. On the changing regulations and laws, Turkey has an opportunity, as a new constitution project came into country's agenda after the elections of 2011. With a new constitution, many problems could be solved with a maximum backing from population. For instance, the Article 66 of the Constitution of 1982 claims that 'Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.'. As referring everyone as 'Turk' considered as an imposition of a single ethnic identity by Kurds, this article should change with a common reference. Eventually, there is no need to give a special name to the constitutional citizenship.

As the last two constitutions of Turkey had been written after military interventions, the idea of writing a new *civil* constitution created an excitement among society. However, the political parties on the Grand National Assembly of Turkey are not in collaboration in writing the constitution. On this subject, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan often says that if the Assembly could not agree on articles of the new constitution, AKP would introduce its own draft to the Assembly. On going talks with PKK, and Prime Minister's statement create question marks in people's mind. Day by day, people start to think that the new constitution might be a joint outcome of AKP and BDP/PKK. AKP wants to change the political system of Turkey, from the parliamentary to presidential. On the other side, BDP, as well as PKK leadership, talk about the regional autonomy or even federation. These two suggestions regarding to political structure of Turkey, reduce the resolution process to the state's *regime* problem. This situation

causes fear among the population that AKP as a party in power, and BDP, as a Kurdish party, propose to form a 'new' State, which would exclude some of the population and would create new 'other' notion. As AKP has Islamic background, and Abdullah Öcalan gave a reference to Islam by saying that Kurds and Turks have been living together for 1000 years under the flag of Islam, even BDP MP Altan Tan declared that Kurds are against the nation-state, and the state structure formed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's ideas should be changed with people's desire, and he believes that the Sheria law should be adopted.[567] At this point, reducing the new constitution process to regime discussion will harm the resolution process, and reduce the support of the laic population. The new constitution should be a *social contract* for everyone and should provide the freedom for every ethnic background as well as every religion. The Government should find a way to work with other political parties to create a consensus on writing the new constitution, which would provide democratic rights to every citizen of Turkey.

Another main obstacle is Abdullah Öcalan's position. Even the last surveys show a high percent of support of the population, people are not content to see that Abdullah Öcalan keep making statements from prison, and putting himself at the center of the problem. Within this context, Abdullah Öcalan started to become the main person who carries out the resolution process by himself. It is true that direct talks with Abdullah Öcalan put pressure over PKK militants in the field; although, Öcalan's role and position in the process was not welcomed by significant part of society. Even Abdullah Öcalan himself and Kurdish politicians try to project him as 'peace-maker', public opinion will not be able to accept that in near future. Hence, the Government should show that they are in control of process.

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[567] "BDP'li Tan: Eyaletler Birliği gibi Bir Ortadoğu Lazım", *Radikal*, 22 April 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/bdpli_tan_eyaletler_birligi_gibi_bir_ortadogu_lazim-1130709>, site visited on 23 April 2013.

Territory of Turkey is larger than most of European countries. Up until now, it has been ruled from the capital, Ankara. The governance is centralized, and central government decides everything. In this system, decision-making process takes time, and slows down the development in areas, the investments, infrastructural constructions etc. Kurds propose regional autonomy, which is commonly interpreted as 'division' of the country by people, is not the only solution; however; is true that the power should be decentralized. At this point, central authority should provide more rights and responsibilities to the local municipalities. Eventually, the State of Turkey already signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government; however, it declared nine reservations. If Turkey lifts reservations from the said charter, local municipalities will have more powers to decide on certain subjects, like infrastructure and investments. Lifting the reservations will not divide the country; however, this fact should be explained to the public in details. The State of Turkey could do necessary implementations of the charter to the new constitution, which will be easy to adopt other laws.

Another *post-process* problem will be the village guard system. If at the end of the process, PKK will dissolve itself, there will be no need for the village guard system. However, the dissolution of village guard system will bring another question to the political agenda. Right now, many Kurds are public servants who have weapons provided by the State, and serve as *village guards* on Kurdish populated areas against the threat of PKK. For many years, these Kurds have been considered as 'traitors' by other Kurds. Therefore, with the dissolution of village guard system, there is a possibility that hatred of Kurds would turn toward to these village guards. At this point, the State of Turkey should integrate these village guards to the *normal* life with proper measures and somehow should provide their *safety*.

The usage of Kurdish language as instruction language in education is another topic to solve. Kurds demand that Kurdish language should be accepted

as instruction language in every level of education. Although, Kurdish language is an optional course in middle schools and language of instruction in private schools, the idea of having Kurdish as language of education in public schools has been highly debated by opposition parties. Main argument is that as the State of Turkey's official language is Turkish, another language cannot be accepted as instruction language in public schools. At this point, Spanish system can be the solution for the language issue. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 explains the language by following;

> "Article 3
>
> 1. Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it.
>
> 2. The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Autonomous Communities in accordance with their Statutes.
>
> 3. The wealth of the different language modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage which shall be the object of special respect and protection."

As one can see that, the Spanish Constitution indicates the official language and in the meantime recognizes other languages, such as Catalan, Basque, and Galician, and that paves the way for the education in these languages. Education in other than the official language is not a threat to the unity of Spain or the language of Castilian, as the Article 3 already obliged all Spaniard to know Castilian. In the case of Turkey, Spanish case may be an example to explain to public opinion that education in other languages will not be a threat.

Briefly, the State of Turkey has evolved during last ten years regarding Kurdish problem. Turkey reached the resolution process from the denial policies of 1980s and 1990s. It is evident that a solution to the problems is more than a necessity for Turkey. The Republic of Turkey has to solve this problem to strengthen its position in the region. As the Middle East is already in crisis, Turkey's role on many issues will be vital in near future. To act more affectively, Turkey needs to solve its own problems first. By the writing time of this thesis,

high level of *hope* is visible among the society. Forming more democratic system and providing more democratic rights will be beneficial not just for Kurds but everyone in Turkey.

## 5.3. Spanish History on Solving the Terrorism Problem

Political position and problem of Basque people have deep roots in the history of Spain. However, the creation of ETA put the problem in other perspective as ETA launched an armed campaign against the central authority of Spain. ETA's way of intervening the problem changed the frame of the Basque problem from rights of Basque people to terrorism problem. After ETA's terrorist attacks, Basque political parties which supported these attacks became player of the Basque politics. As ETA had and still has, at some level, goal of creating an independent Basque Country, and leftist Basque political parties fight in political sphere for the same goal, 'political terrorism' found its place in the Spanish political discourses and problems. From its creation to up to today, a search for the solution to the ETA problem has been in process. Since its first years, Spanish central power applied military measures to finish the terrorist organization; however, with the transformation of Spain to democracy, talks were also carried out between parties.

### 5.3.1. Unsuccessful Attempts

As already mentioned, ETA was founded in 1959 against the suppression of Dictator General Franco regime. With its attacks, ETA wanted to have public support. Against ETA's attacks, Franco Government applied heavy security measures to control the Basque Region and to find the source of ETA's attacks and leadership. Following the Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos I acted against ETA by sending his representative to the Basque Region of France in order to establish an atmosphere to talk. The representative visited a bookshop in Biarritz, which run by two Basque refugees and bookshop was known as a place

to reach-out ETA leadership. According to Robert P.Clark, the representative explained King's plan regarding the liberalization of the regime, with which ETA would benefit if they could declare a 'political truce' in order to give space to King for planned changes. However, ETA did not respond positively to the plan and next day, carried out an attack to the mayor of a Basque City by saying that he was working as a spy for Franco regime. After the attack, ETA published an announcement, which is already explained in previous parts, to declare that ETA would continue its armed campaign against King Juan Carlos's regime as well.[568] With the announcement headlined as 'ETA against Juancarlismo', King's initiative to talk with ETA finished even without actually started.

P.Clark notes that after the unsuccessful attempt to talk with ETA in 1975, other talks were carried out in 1976 and 1977 between ETA and Spanish representatives. ETA (m) refused the idea of giving up armed struggle and pointed the Basque socialist political parties as a counter-part for further talks.[569] However,  ETA(pm) declared a cease-fire in 1977 for the elections. Meanwhile, the transition from the late-Franco regime to democracy started with regulations on political parties and social organizations. Even the talks were carried-out between 1976 and 1977, the death of journalist Jose Maria Portell in 1978 stopped the talks. Meanwhile, ETA had its own struggle with internal problems between two fractions ETA (m) and ETA (pm). However, in 1978, ETA (m) declared its desire for possible cease-fire talks by publishing its five point demands, which were also known as 'KAS Alternative'. ETA (m) demanded; total amnesty, legalization of all political parties, Spanish police forces retrieval from Basque Region, improvements on living and working conditions for masses, autonomy statue for Basque Country, which would recognize the national sovereignty of Basque people and would make the Basque language as principal language.[570] Meantime in 1978, Spain's transition process was continuing and

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[568] Florencio Domínguez Iribarren. "El Enfrentamiento de ETA con la Democracia", *La Historia de la ETA*, Antonio Elorza, et al., (eds.), Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2006,  pp. 273-275.
[569] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
[570] Dominguez Iribarren, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

special courts that established under the Franco's regime for the trails of terrorists were being abolished.

As ETA had internal problems within two fractions, Spanish central authority faced with different demands from different parts of ETA, and that ultimately made the further talks impossible to pursue. There were rumors that sides continued on talks over KAS Alternative, while ETA (pm) attacked in Madrid in order to force the Spanish Government for the return of prisoned members to the prisons in Basque Country.[571] As a consequence of these attacks carried by ETA (pm), Spanish Government agreed to discuss the return of some prisoners, and bombings attacks stopped.

After their success on forcing the Government for the return of prisoners in 1979, ETA (pm) listed four demands for a possible cease-fire decision in 1980. The demands were; Basque autonomy; referendum to be hold in Navarra for its integration to Basque Autonomous Community, ETA prisoners' return to Basque region, withdrawal of Spanish security forces from Basque Region.[572] The demands were similar to the demands of ETA (m) in 1978. Nevertheless, these demands and any negotiations about them were rejected by the Spanish authorities. Spanish Government was expecting the cease-fire decision of ETA unconditionally.

In 1981, ETA (pm) declared a cease-fire; however, ETA (m) continued its attacks. ETA (pm) kept its position on observing the situation in Spain, they did not attack the Spanish forces; however, they continued robberies and other actions in order to maintain their economic condition.[573] As already mentioned in previous parts, the cease-fire decision of ETA (pm) caused an internal splits of the group as *septimos*  (ETA pm-VII) and *octavos* (ETA pm-VIII). Later in 1982, *septimos* made contacts with Spanish authorities, which led to dissolution of the

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[571] "ETA Político-Militar Puso las Bombas de Madrid", *El País*, 31 July 1979, <http://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/31/espana/302220008_850215.html>, site visited on 1 June 2013.
[572] Clark, *op. cit*., p. 91.
[573] Ibid., p. 98.

group and return to the society in 1983.[574] With the dissolution of a wing of ETA (pm), one actor of the terrorism problem exited the equation; however, ETA (m)'s terror attacks continued. Already explained HB's intention to become intermediary between sides for the negotiations did not give any outcome as the Spanish Government refused to negotiate with ETA (m) in 1982. Another attempt for the negotiation, *mesa de la paz*, which was also explained in previous part, did not gave any outcome in 1983, either.

In August 1984, a representative from Ministry of the Interior gave an interview to El Pais and stated that Spanish Government was ready to negotiate with ETA in condition that ETA would stop its attacks and give-up all weapons at once. According to the interview, as a counterpart, Spanish Government would facilitate the integration of ETA members into society. However, this declaration raised the tension in the Government and many members from the Government denounced the announcement by saying that Spanish Government could not negotiate with ETA in political frame. Also the representatives from HB declared that the offer was unacceptable and stated that ETA would only talk about true political negotiations. Meanwhile, ETA (m) declared that they were not in position of any negotiation unless the five point demands, KAS Alternative, were the basis of talks.[575] Another chance for the end of terrorism was missed.

The year 1985, witnessed the change of ETA discourse on their goal of creating an independent Basque Country. One of the ETA leaders, Antxon Etxebeste, who was living in Dominican Republic in exile, gave an interview to a French magazine and stated that ETA would give up their weapons if central authority of Spain "recognize Basque sovereignty and grant a real autonomy to Euskadi, that is a state within a state". Right after his interview, HB leader also stated that Basque Country could be independent within the Spanish State.[576] These two statements were considered as ETA's change of discourse as

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[574] Ibid., p. 106.
[575] Clark, *op. cit*., pp. 140-143.
[576] Ibid. p. 148.

they shifted from a total independence to real autonomy for Basque Country. As a response to these statements from ETA and HB, Spanish Government declared to public that they were not in position to negotiate and ETA should lay down weapons. However, even the Spanish Government made the aforementioned announcement to the public, they were trying to approach ETA secretly.

Another attempt to talk with ETA occurred with another ETA leader in exile. In 1986, one of the ETA leaders, Txomin Iturbe, started to live in Algeria in exile. With his arrival, Algerian Government contacted with both parties to become intermediary between them. Starting in 1986, Algeria became the place where the talks between ETA and Spanish authorities took place until 1989.[577] The talks lasted three years; however, it did not give any positive outcome. While the talks were taking place in Algeria, HB continued to promote idea of negotiations based on KAS Alternative. According to press reports of 1987, the talks between sides were in good conditions. As the rumors were spread out about negotiations, during a press conference Spokesperson of Spanish Government, Javier Solana, confirmed the talks between ETA and Spanish Government by saying "there have been, there are and there will be" contacts with ETA in order to finish the terrorism problem of Spain.[578] It was the first time that a government official of Spain spoke openly about talks between ETA and Spanish Government. First in 1988, then in January 1989,[579] ETA declared a cease-fire periods during Algerian talks. However, in April 1989, ETA went back to the terrorist attacks against Spanish security forces and Algeria started to expel ETA members who were living in the country in exile.[580]

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[577] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
[578] "Solana Admite que "ha habido, hay y habrá" Diálogo del Gobierno con ETA para Poner fin al Terrorismo", *El País*, 29 August 1987, <http://elpais.com/diario/1987/08/29/espana/ 557186401_850215.html>, site visited on 21 May 2013.
[579] "Basque Separatists Extend Cease-Fire", *Associated Press*, 23 January 1989, <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Basque-Separatists-Extend-Cease-fire/id-ed74efd65e7da00d3e73863d8970a9ff>, site visited on 21 May 2013.
[580] Kledja Mulaj, *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 85.

As exiled ETA leaders were still in control over ETA, Spanish governments tried to talk with them in *neutral* territories. However, as one can see above the secret talks with intermediaries take long time and lack of public support make talks delicate.

Another cease-fire period was declared by ETA in 1992 for the Olympic Games, which were held in Barcelona.[581] With the cease-fire declaration, ETA stated its desire to talk with Spanish Government. However, Spanish Government considered ETA's position weaker than before and did not accepted ETA's talk proposition. The cease-fire period lasted until August and the Olympic Games ended without any major events or casualties.

In 1996, after the general elections, a new government was formed by the José María Aznar. After Aznar took the office of Prime Minister, ETA declared cease-fire for a week with a hope to engage to talks with the new Government. However, as explained in related part of the thesis, during Aznar's period, Spanish Government shelved all talks with ETA and applied military measures in order to fight against ETA's terrorist actions. ETA resumed its attacks, including the Reus Airport bombing. 33 people, mostly tourists, were wounded by the Reus Airport attack.[582] As ETA did not get any answer for its call for negotiations from the Spanish Government, another chance to solve the terrorism problem was missed. Consequently, the clashes between sides continued.

In 1998, ETA declared indefinite cease-fire, and also stated that they decided to be in political scene of Spain by giving-up their weapons. However, as they broke up the cease-fire period in 1999, ETA's so-called indefinite cease-fire did not produce any positive outcome to solve the terrorism problem, either.

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[581] Alan Riding, "Olympics; Keeping Terrorism at Bay in Barcelona", *The New York Times*, 11 July 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/11/sports/olympics-keeping-terrorism-at-bay-in-barcelona.html, 11.07.1992>, site visited on 21 May 2013.

[582] "Una Bomba Colocada por ETA Hiere a 33 Personas en el Aeropuerto de Reus", *El País*, 21 July 1996, <http://elpais.com/diario/1996/07/21/espana/837900019_850215.html>, site visited on 21 May 2013.

After a long time, ETA declared another so-called permanent cease-fire in March 2006, again with the hope to negotiate with Spanish Government.[583] There months after the cease-fire decision announcement, Spanish Government declared that they were in contacts with the organization. However, nine months after the declaration of permanent cease-fire, ETA attacked Barajas Airport in Madrid, which broke up the cease-fire decision and the positive atmosphere over Spain.[5] It is still a secrecy why the talks ended negatively. With so-called indefinite and permanent cease-fire decisions and broke up, ETA lost its credibility both in the eyes of Spanish authorities and public opinion.

As attack in Madrid raised questions about ETA's credibility, security measures re-entered Spanish Government's agenda. ETA's attacks continued in small scale; consequently, both Spanish and French security forces made operations against ETA and many ETA leaders captured. As a result of heavy operations against ETA, the terrorist organization declared cease-fire in September 2010. Nevertheless, political parties and the government of Spain declared that the cease-fire decision was insufficient and demanded that ETA should give up weapons permanently.[585] ETA declared that cease-fire as permanent in January 2011. Then in October 2011, Peace Conference, which was organized by international and local actors - including former United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan; leader of Sinn Fein, Garry Adams; former Irish Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern; former French Minister of Interior and Defense, Pierre Joxe; former Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland - gathered in San Sebastian in Spain to talk about a possible solution for terrorism problem. After the Peace Conference, a final declaration of the gathering was announced to public by Bertie Ahern and the Peace Conference demanded to announce the definitive end of its armed activities from ETA.[586] As a result of

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[583] Giles Tremlett, "ETA Declares Permanent Ceasefire", *The Guardian*, 23 March 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/23/spain.topstories3>, site visited on 21 May 2013.
[584] "ETA Cargó la Bomba de Barajas con al Menos 200 Kilos de Explosivo".
[585] "Gobierno y Partido Ven "Insuficiente" el Anuncio de Alto el Fuego de ETA".
[586] "La Conferencia de Paz Reclama el fin Definitivo de ETA y la Apertura de Una Mesa de Diálogo Político", *La Vanguardia*, 17 October 2011, <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20111017/54232913460/la-conferencia-de-paz-reclama-el-fin-definitivo-de-eta-y-la-apertura-de-una-mesa-de-dialogo-politico.html>, site visited on 21 May 2013.

public and political pressure, three days after the Peace Conference, 20 October 2011, ETA broadcasted a video message and declared that the cease-fire was definitive and organization finished its armed struggle against Spanish security forces. They also stated that ETA was ready to engage dialogue with both state of Spain and France.[587] ETA's last decision on declaring permanent cease-fire and finishing armed attacks were welcomed in Spain and also international media. With the video message of 20 October 2011, a new era started on Spain's terrorism problem.

After ETA' declaration to end the armed struggle, ETA leadership started to live in Norway under the protection of the State of Norway and The International Verification Commission took place on the disarmament process of ETA and hope to become intermediary between ETA and Spanish Government. However, the idea of The International Verification Commission was rejected by Spanish Government. Spanish Government wanted an unconditional dissolution of the organization. According to multiple press reports, the International Verification Commission members met with ETA leaders in Oslo / Norway and other cities to talk about the disarmament process of ETA.

In November 2012, ETA proposed an 'agenda of dialogue' for the talks in Oslo with Spanish and French governments. ETA listed topics as; prisoners, refugees, disarmament of the organization.[588] Spain rejected ETA's call for talks with their agenda publicly as Minister of Interior Jorge Fernandez Diaz stated "They know we have not negotiated and won't negotiate at all with a terrorist organization"[589]. However, supposedly the talks continued trough the beginning of 2013 in secrecy. By March 2013, Norwegian Government expelled three ETA

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[587] "ETA Pone Fin a 43 Años de Terror", *El País*, 20 October 2011, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/19/actualidad/1319056094_153776.html>, site visited on 12 May 2013.
[588] "ETA Responde a la Involución en el Proceso Proponiendo Una Agenda de Diálogo", *Naiz*, 25 November 2012, <http://www.naiz.info/actualidad/noticia/20121125/eta-responde-a-la-involucion-en-el-proceso-con-una-agenda-de-dialogo>, site visited on 12 December 2012.
[589] "Spain Rejects ETA Call for Negotiations", *Aljazeera*, 26 November 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/11/2012112602149679348.html>, site visited on 27 November 2012.

members, and started to warn others to move forward on peace process.[590] In mid-March 2013, The International Verification Commission issued a statement about the process and declared that ETA had six months to disarm totally, if not remaining ETA members in Norway would lose their political protection.[591] In late March 2013, ETA published a press release about talks in Oslo. The organization criticized Spanish and French Governments and stated that Spanish Government' attitude might cause a delay and make the resolution of the conflict more complicated.[592] As an answer to ETA's press release, Spanish Prime Minister Mariona Rajoy declared that he would like not to think about ETA's critiques about Spanish Government, and the Minister of Interior stated that only acceptable solution for Spanish Government was the unconditional dissolution of ETA.[593]

As sides in talks in Norway could not move forward, and ETA made unclear announcement to blame Spanish Government, EUROPOL (European Police Office) issued a statement that if Spanish and French Governments could not manage to continue the talks, the extremists ETA members might re-activate the organization to return the armed attacks to force both governments.[594] The warning of EUROPOL showed grave doubts about the talks and the attitude of ETA. As mentioned earlier, in the history of the struggle with ETA, the organization declared cease-fire multiple times, even the permanent and indefinite ones, but returned to armed attacks when their demands were not fulfilled by the Spanish or/and French governments. Both Spanish and French governments

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[590] "Norway Expels Three ETA Members After Seeing no Moves Toward a Peace Process", *El País*, 5 March 2013, <http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/03/05/inenglish/1362513396_349394.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013.

[591] Luis R. Aizpeolea, "Los Verificadores Dan un Ultimátum de Seis Meses a ETA para su Desarme", *El País*, 10 March 2013, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/03/09/actualidad/1362851158_524237.html>, site visited on 13 March 2013.

[592] "Comunicado de ETA", *El Mundo*, 26 March 2013, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/26/espana/1364323392.html>, site visited on 2 April 2013.

[593] Mónica Ceberio Belaza, "ETA Anuncia "Consecuencias Negativas" al Rechazar el Gobierno Negociar en Oslo", *El País*, 27 March 2013, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/03/26/actualidad/1364318917_372632.html>, site visited on 2 April 2013.

[594] Isabel Ferrer, "Europol Teme que Sectores Radicales de ETA Vuelvan a la Violencia Armada", *El País*, 26 April 2013, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/04/25/actualidad/1366909188_432192.html>, site visited on 26 April 2013.

shared the doubts about ETA's possible return to the terrorist attacks, which made the situation critical at the state security level.

While press reports and public discourses were coming from sides about the unstable conditions of talks, Spanish and French police forces continued their operations against ETA members. In May 2013, six ETA members were captured in France by a joint operation of Spain and France.[595] The operation was considered as a message to ETA to indicate that ETA was still under the radar of governments and their declaration of ending the armed campaign did not have any meaning without actual acts on disarmament.

As the disarmament was important for a definitive end of ETA, public opinion and political leaders were expecting a concrete act from ETA. Basque politicians tried to assure the public opinion via public statements that ETA would move forward on the disarmament topic. On 5 August 2013, the leader of Sortu stated that the process was underway and more concrete acts were expected in coming months.[596]

While the Spanish Government was in talks with ETA and expected more acts from the terrorist organization about disarmament, the discussion about ETA's future was shifted with the release of one of ETA members. Ines Del Rio, was sentenced for 40 years of imprisonment in 1987 after the bombing of 1980. While she was in prison, she earned sentence reduction through prison work for early release in July 2008. However, Spanish High Court applied the Parot Doctrine to prevent her release. The Parot Doctrine ensures that remission for work done in prison is deducted from the total sentence rather than the 30-year limit under Spanish law. For the case of Ines Del Rio, this meant that her release was postponed until 2017 at that time. However, in October 2013, the European

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[595] Fernando J. Pérez, "'La ETA que Padecimos ya no Volverá', Afirma el Ministro del Interior", *El País*, 7 May 2013, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/07/actualidad/ 1367906495_526184.html>, site visited on 7 May 2013.
[596] "Hasier Arraiz dice que habrá 'más pasos' de ETA en próximos meses", *El Pais,* 05 August 2013, <http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/08/05/paisvasco/1375698233_527531.html>, site visited on 5 August 2013.

Court of Human Rights decided that Parot Doctrine was against the human rights and demanded an immediate release of Ines Del Rio, which started a new discussion and caused disappointment among the families of victims of ETA.[597]

As this thesis reflects the actuality of the process for ETA's definitive ends until 1 November 2013, it is possible to say that there were no concrete advancement on the process. The early release of ETA's member Ines Del Rio, rose the tension among public opinion that ETA could feel more comfortable and force government to accept their terms. Yet, one can see that even with the declaration of ETA to finish its armed campaign in 2011, the solution did not come with talks in Oslo via intermediaries. A declaration about giving-up armed campaign for certain terrorist organization does not mean that the struggle against terrorism has ended as the ultimate solution can be established in certain conditions. This is not a case just for ETA, but also other terrorist organizations. It is possible to say that, ETA's decision to finish armed campaign created positive atmosphere among population and Spanish political area. However, as ETA's credibility is not high enough to take their 'words' as evidence of their real agenda, the doubts about ETA's 'real' plan is still at the center of the discussion to solve the terrorism problem.

### 5.3.2. Background as an obstacle: Unpredictable Future of ETA's Dissolution

ETA as a terrorist organization is effective Spanish both political scene and daily life since 1959. According to the Ministry of Interior of Spain, ETA killed 829 people between 1968 and 2010.[598]

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[597] Tom Burridge, "Spain releases ETA convict after European court ruling", *BBC,* 22 October 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24624913>, site visited on 22 October 2013.
[598] Ami Sedghi, "Eta and Basque Separatism: Data Over the Years", *The Guardian*, 10 January 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/10/eta-basque-sepratists-ceasefire-victims-over-time>, site visited on 7 May 2013.

The Guardian published following tables to give detailed informations about victims of ETA;

| ETA victims by year | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Victims | 1988 | 21 |
| 1968 | 2 | 1989 | 19 |
| 1969 | 1 | 1990 | 25 |
| 1970 | 0 | 1991 | 46 |
| 1971 | 0 | 1992 | 26 |
| 1972 | 1 | 1993 | 14 |
| 1973 | 6 | 1994 | 12 |
| 1974 | 19 | 1995 | 15 |
| 1975 | 16 | 1996 | 5 |
| 1976 | 17 | 1997 | 13 |
| 1977 | 10 | 1998 | 6 |
| 1978 | 66 | 2000 | 23 |
| 1979 | 76 | 2001 | 15 |
| 1980 | 92 | 2002 | 5 |
| 1981 | 30 | 2003 | 3 |
| 1982 | 37 | 2004 | 0 |
| 1983 | 32 | 2005 | 0 |
| 1984 | 32 | 2006 | 2 |
| 1985 | 37 | 2007 | 2 |
| 1986 | 43 | 2008 | 4 |
| 1987 | 52 | 2009 | 3 |
| | | 2010 | 1 |
| | | TOTAL | 829 |

Table IV:[599] ETA Victims by Year

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**ETA victims by location**

| Location | Victims |
|---|---|
| **Basque country** | 551 |
| **Madrid** | 123 |
| **Catalonia** | 55 |
| **Navarra** | 40 |
| Other | 57 |
| France | 3 |
| TOTAL | 829 |

Table V:[600] ETA Victims by Location

**ETA victims by type**

| Force | Victims |
|---|---|
| **Civil Guard** | 203 |
| **National Police** | 146 |
| **Armed Forces** | 98 |
| **Local Police** | 24 |
| **Public Guard** | 13 |
| **Autonomous police** | 1 |
| **Foriegn Security Forces** | 1 |
| TOTAL | 486 |
| Civilian | 343 |
| **Member of the Armed Forces and Police Forces** | 486 |
| TOTAL | 829 |

Table VI:[601] ETA Victims by Type

Apart from deaths, many people were wounded and millions have lived under the fear of terrorism. As a general behavior of terrorist attacks, ETA succeeded to frighten millions with shadow of weapons, and use the fear to force Spanish Government to accept their demands. However, as explained in different parts of this thesis, throughout the years, ETA used terrorism to reach its political goal, the creation of an independent and united Basque Country; however, their *dreams* to create an independent state by weapons has faded away within the time. Historically, ETA adapted itself to every political change of Spain and tried to

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[600] Ibid.
[601] Ibid.

keep its place in Spanish politics sometimes with attacks and sometimes via political parties.

ETA's original demands and the demands of Oslo talks were slightly different. As the organization was founded in Dictator Franco's regime, their goals and ideas for the Basque people might be seen as legitimate at that time. For instance, during Franco regime, usage of Basque language was restricted like other languages in Spain and the regime only accepted the Castilian language as unique language. The historical rights of Basque, *fueros,* were not even a topic to talk under Franco Government. Freedom of expression, democracy, political parties and many other freedoms were taken away and Spanish nation lived under heavy dictatorship conditions. One can say that, within this atmosphere, ETA's call for *freedom, Basque language, human rights* could make sense in Basque people's minds. Consequently, as Franco's regime did not give any freedom and permission to act in politics of Spain, armed campaign might be considered as a way to struggle for a limited period of time.

With the death of Franco, King Juan Carlos I took the crown and become the new leader of Spain. As the king wanted to lead the nation for the transition from dictatorship to democracy, one of his first acts try to reach ETA. ETA had a chance to become an actor of Spain's transition towards democracy; however, the organization chose to pursue its original goals, with their 'way', in other words; with continuous armed campaign. With their announcement "ETA against Juancarlismo", which was already explained in previous parts, ETA declared their position as against Spanish State actor. This attitude of ETA made the Spanish transition to democracy more complicated, but in the meantime more necessary.

Under the King Juan Carlos I's rule, Spain started series of reform and writing process of the new constitution. By 1978, an autonomy was granted for Basque Country and Navarre. As the new government of Spain cleared the way for political acts and parties, Basque people had chance to be an actor in both

Basque and Spanish politics. Consequently, the separation within ETA, which started in 1972, grew up and ETA was divided into fractions. Some of ETA members who defended the idea of engaging in politics chose different part. Therefore, ETA's position changed and different fractions started to act by themselves.

With the autonomous statue of Basque Country and rights for historical peoples like Basques, Catalans and Galicians, Basque language was recognized by the Spanish central authority. With every reform done by Spanish Government, ETA needed to modify its demands. For instance, while back in the foundation time ETA was demanding independence or greater autonomy for Basque Region, after the approval of autonomous statue of Basque Country and Navarra, ETA started to demand the unification of these two. As one can see, ETA reconsidered its demands in order to be accepted as a player - an *illegal* one-, and to have support of the people. With the foundation of Herri Batasuna, ETA had a legal partner in Spanish political game, which gave them a chance to effect the political system of Spain with both terrorist attacks and elections.

The adhesion of Spain to the European Union in 1986 affected the terrorism problem of Spain as well. While Spanish Government continued to do reforms on the European Union perspective, ETA continued its attacks in order not to lose public support. ETA's main power was the support of Basque people who shared the ideas of ETA. Losing the public support could driven ETA out of the *game.*

As mentioned earlier, from time to time in multiple occasions, Spanish authorities contacted with ETA and, even further, they sat down for talks. However, talks occurred via intermediaries in countries other than Spain and France. The difficulty of such talks was political change of Spanish government and also the change of ETA's leadership. Even the state policy of Spain might be conducting the necessary contacts and talks for the solution, every government

had different perspectives on dealing with ETA problem. For instance, as explained earlier, during Aznar's Government instead of conducting talks, military measures were applied to finish ETA. It is possible to say that with every government, the relation of authorities of ETA had shifted.

Throughout the history of the problem, one can see that ETA declared multiple times cease-fires. However, after a while of each, the organization returned back to its armed terrorist attacks. It would not be wrong to claim that, sometimes ETA broke-up its cease-fire decision in order to empower its position in ongoing talks with Spanish authorities.

Back in 2010, ETA declared another cease-fire, and after 2011 the organization announced that its armed campaign was over permanently. However, as already mentioned, ETA's history with cease-fire paved the way to reasonable doubts over organization's declarations. ETA declared the permanent end of its terrorist attacks, although the organization did not lay down weapons, which rose the question of their sincerity on ending the armed struggle.

A part from ETA's demands for disarmament, the complexity of reaching a permanent solution was also coming from ETA's desire to talk both with state of France and Spain at the same time. It is true that the ETA problem is not just an internal issue of Spain or France. However, conducting talks with multiple sides at once would make the process of reaching a solution longer and harder.

### 5.3.3. What Can Be Done More?

At time of writing this thesis, ETA's situation was same as back in 2011. The organization does not embark armed terrorist attacks anymore. However, the disarmament process of ETA was on the agenda with its complications. The International Verification Commission tried to persuade and to facilitate the disarmament of ETA; however, they did not reach any solution up until June 2013. For the future of the process, both sides should reconsider their position. If

ETA returns to armed terrorist attack, the public reaction will be bigger then ever. ETA should realize that, the public support that they had, is over now. The relatively freedom of Basque people on execution of their rights, such as usage of language, Basque local elections and governments etc., decreased the importance of ETA's ideas of independent and united Basque Country. Like other autonomous regions of Spain, people in Basque Country can govern themselves via local elections, can use Basque language in daily life, can rise their flag next to the Spanish one. It would not be wrong to assert that democracy can be evolved towards the local governments in Spain.

On the other hand, Spanish Government should give up demand about unconditional dissolution of ETA. One can say that a movement, even the one that is using terrorism, would not give up their position without fulfilling some of their demands and having certain guarantees for the leadership of the organization or the members.

As the Spanish political system has rooms for legal political parties for local elections and provides freedom of having relatively radical ideas within the unity of the country, terrorism is no more an option for the demands of rights, democracy, or freedom. Even some pro-separatist parties were closed back in the first decade of 2000s, today Basque parties like, Sortu and Bildu - which had or have similar ideas like banned Batasuna -, are legitimate political parties that can be active players in Spanish politics. As the Spain has 2% threshold for elections, more parties and people can be represented both in local and general parliaments of Spain. However, for a clear pluralist democracy, election threshold should be removed from the system. In any case, Spanish political system of today gives change to political parties to have public support and take seats on parliament; consequently, it is possible to speak-out demands legally within the perspective of democracy.

It would not be wrong to argue that the end of terrorism problem would provide more resources for other problems of Spain. In a condition that the terrorism is not an issue, Spanish Government should focus on other issues and could direct its sources for the prosperity of Spanish nation. ETA and Basque people should internalize the conditions of 2013, and divert their strength more and more in legal ways, in other words; within democracy. The democracy of Spain could be criticized in many ways; however, democracy is a game, in which only legal player could achieve their goals and demands.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The cases of Spain and Turkey are different from each other in terms of socio-economical conditions with their own historical backgrounds. While the State of Spain was built over the historical Spanish Empire and still has the King on its political system, which makes her a constitutional-monarchy, State of Turkey was built over the Ottoman Empire`s heritage with an independence war against the Allies of World War I. The Republic of Turkey was formed around westernized policies and abolished both Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate. With respect to democracy, both countries have implemented it in their distinctive ways with different historical rhythms. As a common point, it is possible to say that both countries tried to have a common or upper identity for their diverse population; this is to say, *nation state* building process was taken place in both countries. However, while Spain took the Spanish citizenship as a tool to create a *nation,* Turkey shifted in between the terms of People of Turkey and Turkish People. By the hands of state, the term *Turk* was implemented as a common name of the *nation*; however, *Turk* also refers to the ethnic background of a certain group. On this point, being a Spaniard in Spain and being a Turk in Turkey do not have the same meaning. It is to say, the ethnicity, which is absent on Spanish case, is an issue on Turkish case.

Within the history of Spain, Basque people's history goes back to fueros. According to the fueros, Basque people had historical rights in the Spanish Empire; in other words, they had some privileges, even, relatively autonomy during the history. On the other hand, Kurds had not have any clear rights like fueros within the history of the Ottoman Empire; however, they had some tribal rights and privileges. It would not be wrong to say that with the rights in historical

perception, Basques and Kurds have a similarity. Nevertheless, the historical transformation of both peoples and emergence of nationalisms have occurred in different ways.

The Basque nationalism was created by Sabino Arana and Arana`s followers pursued his ideas after him. On the other side, it is not possible to name a single person for the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. It would not be wrong the say the Kurdish nationalism has been formed by multiple people with multiple events, which started by the first rebellion, and it is possible to say that it continues even today. It is also true that the nationalism of both people have historical roots in their region. Briefly, the idea of nationalism affected Basques and Kurds around the same time. If one takes into account that Sabino Arana`s magazine *Bizkatarria,* in which he explained his nationalist ideas, was first published in 1893, and first newspaper in Kurdish was published in 1898, it is evident that the idea of nationalism reached different territories around same time. Of course the effect of the nationalism was more than cited cases of this thesis.

The idea of nationalism, which started to spread to Europe after the French Revolution, reached territories where empires were in control of different nations and ethnic groups. On this sense, the idea of self determination took the attention of people over Europe and many nationalist movements carried out the slogan of French Revolution; "liberty, equality and brotherhood". After more than two centuries, it is possible to say that the idea of having liberty, equality and brotherhood is still effective on recent social movements. For instance, during the Gezi Park Protests in Istanbul, these three terms were written on the walls, and many protesters declared their support to the cause of protests by shouting the slogan of French Revolution. Among the public opinion in Turkey, majority believe that Turks and Kurds are *brothers and sisters,* and the true *equality*, which would be provided by the State, might solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Briefly, one can see that the strong ideas, like the French Revolution and

nationalism, do not lose their importance within time and still alive during clashes between people and the state.

As a result of nationalism, Sabino Arana created the first Basque political party, PNV, in 1895. As the party is still active in Spain, it is possible to say that common consciousness has been carried out by the party throughout history. On the other side, the first Kurdish party was formed during the Ottoman Empire in 1908. The creation of Sinn Fein was also in 1905. The foundation dates of political parties also verify the argument that nationalism reached different territories around same time. As Sinn Fein is also active like PNV, the continuous political consciousness is valid for Irish people. However, the first nationalist Kurdish political party was closed in a short period and a lot of others have been formed up until today. Because of this reason, it is not possible to talk about a continuous political consciousness for Kurds. However, it is true that Kurds have political knowledge, even it had many names under different conditions throughout history. Obviously, political knowledge of people goes back to the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in all cases, and these characteristics make them historical players on politics of their region.

For the politics, it is possible to say that both Kurds and Basques have been suffered under severe policies of state. For instance, PNV was shut down with other political parties during the Franco Regime, and similarly, multiple Kurdish parties have been closed in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, Basque`s ethnic identity was denied and usage of Basque language in public and official spaces and even in schools was prohibited under General Franco Regime. The prohibition of the usage of language in official manners was not a case only for Basques, other historical peoples of Spain, like Catalans, who lived under the same conditions. Kurds faced with similar denial policies for their ethnic identity and prohibition of usage of Kurdish language starting with military intervention of 1980 and afterwards, in other words under the General Kenan Evren`s rule. In cases of Spain and Turkey, official denial of other languages

forced people to use their languages in private spaces in order to preserve it. One can see that, the ban of a certain language by the hand of state in official manners does not mean that people would give up their own language and accept the official language as *sole* one.

The aforementioned conditions under military rules in both countries paved the way for creation of terrorist organizations. ETA and PKK were formed in different times but under similar circumstances. ETA started its armed struggle against the Dictator Franco`s Regime in 1968; and when PKK launched its first severe attack against security forces in 1984, Turkey was just left the military governance. In other words, in both countries, when freedom was suppressed with harsh state policies, terrorist groups had appropriate conditions for their armed terrorist attacks. Additionally, both ETA and PKK were formed around the Marxist ideas and had goals for the creation of independent states for Basques and Kurds. In any case, the usage of terrorism cannot be justified by any reason or action; however, the reality stands still that both ETA and PKK became active under states' fascist discourses and implementations. Both of the organizations had the idea of gaining support of the people by armed attacks in order to create a "revolution" against the central authorities. ETA and PKK, took the Cuban Revolution case as a reference to their goals. As Cuba Movement led by Fidel Castro against the dictator Fulgencio Batista created the 'revolution'; had the support of people; and had created 'heroes' as Che Guevara; PKK and ETA tried to create similar impact in Turkey and in Spain with the hope of reaching revolution and becoming the 'heroes' of their movements. Within this sense, it is possible to say that PKK and ETA were formed as organizations of *armed nationalism*; however, both became the last examples of armed terrorism within time. Neither of them reached their goal on creating a revolution backed by people; instead, they only brought death and fear to the territories where they have operated.

The cases of Spain and Turkey are different also in terms of territories, where the problems have occurred. Like IRA, ETA was formed in Europe and was sought to create an independent European State with western values. As the historical Basque Region has territories under the control of Spain and France, terrorism problem occurred and stayed limited in Europe. However, PKK based on mountains in Iraq and majorly operated in the southeastern Turkey, and according to the description of PKK, the historical Kurdistan has parts under the control of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. PKK tried to be operational in Europe via its branches in European countries; nevertheless, the geographical information that provided above makes PKK problem originated in the Middle East that does not have any direct connection with Europe. Although, it would not be wrong that the PKK and issue of Kurdish rights have become a major problem for Turkey in her quest for the admission process to the European Union.

While the organizations were conducting terrorist attacks against states' security forces, their main objectives were to have public support and to force states to accept their terms. In terms of gaining public support, both of them tried to force the states to act against civilians. In other words, they attacked the target on areas populated by Basques and Kurds with the hope that state security forces would act against civilians. One can say that, both PKK and ETA believed that with states security measures against civilians, local population would support their cause and organizations could create "public insurrections". However, organizations` methods were slightly different from each other. While PKK based on mountains and attacked Turkish security forces by guerrilla tactics, in other words: hit-and-run tactics, ETA based itself inside the society and attacked the Spanish security forces clandestinely with high level of secrecy. On the other side, both of them often kidnapped state officials; however, while ETA was conducting kidnaps of state officials, military personal, leaders of civil society generally for ransom or release of imprisoned members,  PKK had the objective of using them as leverage against the Turkish State.

On the economical assets of the organizations, both of them forced renowned businessmen to pay them for the protection. Additionally, both ETA and PKK applied taxes on the frontiers of their areas. For instance, PKK forced people, who wanted to cross over to Iraq or Syria, to pay taxes. However, their organizational structure was different. PKK formed organizations and opened branches in European countries like Greece, Germany and collected so-called donations for their cause. On the other hand, ETA`s organization was limited in Spain and France where the organization had goals of creating an independent and united Basque State. Additionally, while PKK was controlled by a single man, - Abdullah Öcalan was, and still is, in charge of PKK even he is in prison - ETA was controlled by multiple leaders of multiple cells, it is to say by a leadership. The biggest difference between ETA and PKK is about the casualties during terrorist attacks. From 1968 to 2010, 2400 people wounded and 829 people died because of ETA`s terrorist attacks. On the other hand, from 1984 to 2011, more than 40000 people died because of PKK`s terrorist attacks.

On propaganda methods, both of them paid significant attention on promoting their ideas via media tools. While ETA published the magazine *"Ekin"*, PKK published the magazine *"Sexwebun"* and later had, and still has, multiple TV channels under its control. One can see that both organizations used the same method in their early stages; however, PKK differentiate itself by having TV channels.

ETA and PKK have their own organizational structure, which differentiates them in terms of fractions inside the organizations. While ETA had splits within time among members around the ideas of continuing armed struggle or engaging into politics, which led the organization to create different fractions like ETA (m) and ETA (pm), PKK kept its unique strategy in clashes against the State of Turkey. The members, who had ideas different from armed struggle, were suppressed by the leader in order to keep the organization in one piece. One can see that IRA also faced with splits similar to ETA. On that point, it would not be

wrong to argue that while ETA and IRA have relatively democratic organizational structure, which gave chance to choose their own way to their members, PKK was controlled with strict rules, which did not even provided a chance to think differently.

As PKK and ETA, which are listed as terrorist organizations by their local authorities, international organizations and foreign states, dreamed to reach their political goals, they associated with political parties. While both of them were trying to affect the political structure of their countries by illegal methods, such as kidnapping, terrorist attacks, ambushes, bombings, they also used political parties in order to have an influence by legal organizations.

Political diversity of Kurds and Basques have also differences and similarities among them. In the case of Basques, the PNV was created with nationalist ideas and kept its position both in politics of Spain and Basques. In addition to PNV, various Basque political parties were formed, and provided chance to the Basque people to choose. Starting with Batasuna, Bildu and Sortu were formed also with nationalist idea; however, their perception of nationalism embraced the use of terror. As these parties accepted the usage of terror, they became the political parties of radical or extremist nationalism, which made them separatist political parties. In the case of Turkey, all Kurdish political parties those were formed after the formation of PKK went under the control of terrorist organization. Consequently, Kurdish people in Turkey had only one reliable option in terms of political party. It is true that the political sphere in Turkey has been under strict control of Turkish State. However, if one considers the strict control of PKK in addition to the Turkish State`s, its possible to say that Kurds have had no political freedom in terms of forming nationalist political parties and working for them.

The connection between political parties and terrorist organizations caused the bans of political parties in both counties. In the case of Spain, ETA`s relation

with Batasuna and others paved the way for the ban of political parties; however, Bildu and Sortu were legalized within time, even they were banned by legal institutions, as well. In the case of Turkey, PKK`s control and direct relation in terms of selection of candidates and economic aids paved the way for the ban of pro-Kurdish parties, and none of them were legalized ever, and took their places in the graveyard of banned parties in Turkey. It would not be wrong to argue that banning political parties finished the pro-separatist political movements neither in Spain nor in Turkey. Right after closure of one party, or even some cases before the decisions of closure, a new party was established over the same ideological base. The British experience, connection between Sinn Fein and IRA, shows that banning individual extremist politicians might be more useful and respectful to the democracy.

On the perspective of democracy, it is evident that Spanish system is more representative both with regional governmental institutions and with 2% threshold in election system, while Turkey has 10% election threshold, which decreases the representative feature of democracy. In the British experience, Sinn Fein became more effective then IRA, especially during the peace talks. In other words, after a while, Sinn Fein started to control IRA. However, in Spanish and Turkish cases, PKK and ETA always kept political parties under their control and tried to talk directly with state officials if it is possible. It would not be wrong to argue that, talks with political party for a solution is more reliable in terms of rule of law. As a similarity between cases, it is possible to say that Kurdish and Basque pro-separatist political parties stayed under the shadow of terrorist organizations, which made them less effective players in the process.

On fight against the terrorism, neither of the countries managed to finish terrorist organizations by military measures. Both ETA and PKK knew that they could not beat their states with terrorist attacks; although, they had a strong belief on having public support with terrorist attacks and forcing states to talk with them under the shadow of weapons and with public pressure. Applied security measures

and tools on fight against terrorism show certain similarities between the cases of ETA and PKK. At the beginning, states considered terrorist groups as small groups of people, who were not capable of affecting the state heavily. Military measures often applied against them; and for many years, authorities kept their position at "no negotiation with terrorists" point. Both in Spain and Turkey, military forces had limitless power in politics, as they tried to do military interventions and even in some of their attempts they succeeded. Military officials considered themselves as "protectors of the state, unity of country and political structure". Consequently, while central authorities did not pay enough attention to the socio-economic and human rights problems, which often cherish terrorist organizations, militaries considered the terrorism problem as a problem to be crushed by military applications. In the fights against terrorist organizations, Spain and Turkey have sometimes used illegal tools and secret organizations, which were supported by states. In Spain, secret organization GAL was created and supported by state funds to assassinate the members of ETA in Spain and more often in France. In Turkey, illegal and secret JITEM was created and supported by state with similar intentions to Spain. Hence, it would not be wrong to argue that the states, where the rule of law supposed to be fundamental, used tactics and organizations outside the law. In the Spanish case, the rule of law reacted to usage of secret organizations, members of GAL and responsible political leaders, even the Minister of Interior of that time, were sentenced for their actions.

When the states decided to contact with terrorist organizations, they often chose to use intermediaries and met in territories, where the problem had not any effects. Hence, meetings in Oslo / Norway could be pointed out as a similarity between talks of ETA-Spain and PKK-Turkey. Spain and Turkey had series of talks in Oslo. It is possible to see that Oslo was and still is a common place for states to talk with terrorist organizations. If one takes the British experience into account in terms of talks between terrorist organizations and States, it would not be wrong to say that direct talks become more effective than the ones with

intermediaries. For a permanent solution to the terrorism problem, British example also shows that it takes many rounds of talks in long period of time. Hence, neither Spain nor Turkey should expect a solution in a day or two. Talks with terrorist organizations are not easy to manage and public support for the process is essential. For instance, in British experience, Tony Blair showed strong belief in talks and put his efforts to convince the public opinion. In Spain, José Luis Rodríquez Zapatero was the one, who publicly declared that Spanish Government could meet and talk with ETA; however, all his efforts gone down the drain when ETA broke up the cease-fire and returned to armed attacks. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan`s position was to deny any talks with PKK during the talks in Oslo, but later he changed his position and stated that the State of Turkey could contact with PKK, but the government cannot. With the last resolution process, he re-changed his position and declared that there had been contacts with PKK and there would be in order to solve the problem. This was the exact time when the public opinion in Turkey started to believe the possibility of a solution. After these three leaders' examples, it would not be wrong to say that, when a leader backs the talks and contacts with terrorist organizations, public support starts to increase.

On the perspective of any permanent solution to PKK and ETA problems, governments of Turkey and Spain should transform their governmental policies to state policies. Nevertheless, within all these years, governments have been changed and as each and every government has applied different policies, the terrorism problem kept its importance on countries` agenda. Talks conducted under one government has ended with another one, which did not give any outcome at all.

It is true that negotiating with terrorist organizations is not easy to explain to public. For many years, people have suffered, died and wounded. Hence, governments should find an appropriate way to explain why they are negotiating with terrorists in order to answer the question of "why have we fought and died

for?", which often comes to the minds of people. There is no unique solution for every terrorism problem. However, as terrorism problem has been cherished by socio-economical problem, lack of freedom, state policies against human rights; governments should solve these problems along with the terrorism problem in order to prevent the reappearance of separatist terrorist movements. Hence, governments should solve the socio-economic problems and provide more freedom within democracy for the common and greater good of their nation, not only in order to solve the terrorism problem.

In terms of a probable solution, one can say that Spain has more chance than Turkey. As Spain has its *upper-identity,* being Spaniard, Turkey requires to form a new *upper-identity* based on common citizenship. Today's common identity, *being Turk,* is obviously understood differently by different communities among the nation. On this point, while Spain has its territorial based common identity as "Spaniard; being from Spain", Turkish common identity was built over the majority`s ethnic background as "being Turk". It is true that some portion of Turkish society does not accept this "being Turk" notion as ethnical reference to any group and translate it as "being Turk *equals to* being from Turkey"; however, this understanding does not give any space to any identities to declare themselves. For instance, according to the Turkish Constitution of 1982, a Turk is a Turk in terms of citizenship, and a Kurd is also a Turk in terms of citizenship, as well. This is to say, taking one`s name as common name for a nation could harm the feelings of others. However, as one can see that in Spain, while one can be a Catalan, Castilian, Basque and Galician in terms of ethnic background, (s)he can also be a Spaniard in terms of citizenship, which is the name of the nation in Spain, and does not refer any ethnic background. Within its own complexity, even thought ethnicity is not the issue in Spain, Catalans and Basques are claiming sovereignty of their own.

The terrorist organizations PKK and ETA were both formed in the conditions of military rules and around the ideas of revolution backed by people.

Their hope was to be supported by the people when they attacked security forces of central authorities. One can say that, although it is clear that using terrorism could not be justifiable in any case, at the beginning, their way of using terrorism against military rules and forces might be considered as only option at that time. However, both of them refused to become a legal player when the countries returned to democracy. After the Franco Period, during the transition, ETA chose to stay as an illegal organization and Batasuna took the place on political scene. Similar to the example of ETA, PKK operated as an illegal organization when Turkey returned to democracy in 1983. Until 1990s Kurds did not have any political party. Briefly, it is possible to say that both organizations' leadership thought that the support of people under the military rule would last long within the democracy as well. However, as political system of countries become more and more democratic, terrorist organizations have radicalized themselves and lost their position in the mind of people. It is true that extremist members of ETA and PKK and even some portion of Basque and Kurdish people still want more than democracy for their desires, today. From 1977 and 1980s to today, Spain and Turkey have come a long way on democracy. Basques have an autonomous statue within the State of Spain; however, still the desire for an independent and free Basque country exists among the Basque people. In the case of Turkey, during the last decade, democratic rights of Kurdish people have started to be evolved in positive sense, although often extremist Kurdish politicians have stated their desires for independent and unified Kurdistan, which will have territories from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. While the globalization takes place on World political system and unions like the European Union removes the borders within states, peoples like Basques and Kurds still have the desire of having a nation-state of their own, which was the trend of the 20th century. On this manner, it will not be wrong to suggest that Kurds and Basques should catch the ideas of this century and try to be more effective players in the game of democracy.

One can see that the idea of nationalism is re-emerging in recent years, and it will shape the future of countries in the Middle East, the United Kingdom,

Spain and Turkey. While this *new* nationalism takes the historical origins of the French Revolution and French understanding of nationalism, it is slightly closer to the idea of conservatism, in other words conservative nationalism. Conservative nationalism tries to avoid interactions with other states, in order to preserve their traditional institutions and traditions of daily life and considered themselves entirely different from others. For instance, in Iraq, Kurds already have their own authority on the Northern part of the country, while different communities, like Sunnis and Shias, trying to live together, a more conservative idea emerged among them. Because of this reason, Sunnis and Shias often talk about having their own state. Another example can be given from Europe regarding the new nationalism. In Spain, a portion of Catalan people have recently declared their desire for an independent state, in other words separation from Spanish State, and they are promoting the idea of having a referendum in 2014 within the perspective of self-determination. Like Catalans, people of Scotland are also preparing for the upcoming referendum in 2014, with which they will decide to stay within the United Kingdom or have an entirely independent state. If one takes the nationalism as a concept of 19th and 20th centuries, and considers that those groups, which rely on ethnic, religious or territorial differences, do not seek to create a *nation state* but a *state* for their *nation*, the term *micro-nationalism* might be more useful in the field of social sciences as a concept of 21th century´s nationalism. At this point, it would not be wrong to distinguish the idea of nationalism as creator and shaper. While the creator nationalism aims to create new states, shaper nationalism aims to create supranational organisations like the European Union. The idea of integration of different states under Unions does not mean the end of the idea of creating new states. Hence, one can say that Kurdish and Basque nationalism have also a conservative and creator approach to the idea of having an independent state. Even Kurdish politicians often declares that Kurdish people do not seek an independent state anymore, but their desire to self-govern themselves stands still, it might evolve the idea of creating an independent state in the future. For the Basques, it is possible to say that, after the definitive end of ETA, the idea of nationalism might live among the Basque people and if

the Catalans separate themselves from Spain, Basques may try to do same thing also.

For the future of progresses to solve terrorism problem in both countries, it is possible to say that, both of them will face challenges from nationalist part of their population. The fear of disintegration is wide spread among the societies of Turkey and Spain. Because of this reason, significant portion of the population have doubts about the on-going talks with PKK. And for the Spanish case, it seems there is no ongoing talks at all. As Turkey will have three elections between 2014 and 2015, one can say that AKP Government will face with challenges on the way to elections about resolution process. Opposition parties may try to criticize AKP heavily. On the other hand, PKK still threatens the Government, and that attitude complicates both the process and government position before the public opinion. For Spain, under the economic crisis, dealing with ETA is harder than before. As ETA as already declared that they gave up armed actions forever, and public pressure over them is very intense, Spanish Government has more spaces before the public opinion to conduct direct talks with ETA. However, for both cases, it is possible to say that the end of their solution processes might not be reached in the near future. While the governments in both countries are dealing with real politics of daily life, they can only devote a portion of their efforts to their terrorism problem.

As a final word, it is true that Basques and Kurds are coming from different pages of same history. The cases have aforelisted similarities in terms of nationalist ideas, terrorism problem, armed political movements, political history and so on; however, as one sees that there are differences, which can be seen in details, as well. This thesis shows that the arguments, which is Spanish political system and the autonomous statue of Basque Region could be applied for the solution both for Kurdish and terrorism problems, are worthy to analyze. With the acceptance of the similarities and differences between cases, it would not be wrong to say that the Spanish experience can be taken as an example rather than a

model to apply directly. No model solution for terrorism can be found to apply to all. This thesis also shows that usage of local language other than official one, having a flag along with the general one, having local parliament along with the central one within the democracy and so on, are not always against the unity of a country and nation. Therefore, the model of Spanish autonomous communities system might be applied to Turkey with some modifications in accordance to Turkish history and political structure. However, the question of whether Turkey, Turkish political system and even further Turkish society are ready or not, should be answered first.

## 6. CONCLUSIÓN

Los casos de España y Turquía son diferentes entre sí, tanto en cuanto a las condiciones socio-económicas como en los antecedentes históricos. Mientras el Estado Español fue construido durante la época del Imperio y conserva todavía el rey en su sistema político, si bien desde el siglo XIX tal monarquía se ha convertido en constitucional, el Estado de Turquía se ha construido sobre la herencia del Imperio Otomano, con una guerra de independencia contra los aliados de la Primera Guerra Mundial. La República de Turquía se formó en torno a las políticas occidentales y abolió tanto Sultanato Otomano y Califato. En lo que respecta a la democracia, los dos países la han puesto en práctica en sus respectivas formas con diferentes ritmos históricos. Como punto en común, es posible decir que ambos países trataron de tener una identidad común o una identidad superior a la diversidad de su población y territorios, tratando de construir un *Estado nación*. Sin embargo, mientras que España tomó la nacionalidad española como herramienta para crear *una nación*, con éxito bastante desigual, Turquía se pasó entre los términos del Pueblo de Turquía y del Pueblo Turco. En manos del Estado, el término *Turco* fue implementado como un nombre común de la nación, sin embargo, el *Turco* también se refiere al origen étnico de un grupo determinado. Es decir, incluye un concepto de etnicidad que está ausente en el caso español.

Para nuestro objeto de estudio en el caso español y para el caso vasco debemos remontarnos a los fueros. Según éstos, los vascos tienen derechos históricos que se remontan a la época del Imperio, o, mejor dicho, de la conformación de la monarquía unificada y ello conlleva el mantenimiento de ciertos privilegios, y cierta autonomía a lo largo de la historia. En cambio, los

kurdos no poseían derechos claros como los fueros dentro de la historia del Imperio Otomano, si bien mantenían algunos derechos tribales y privilegios. No sería erróneo afirmar que desde el punto de vista de los derechos, históricamente los vascos y los kurdos tienen ese punto en común. Sin embargo, la transformación histórica de ambos pueblos y la aparición del nacionalismo se han producido en diferentes maneras.

El nacionalismo vasco fue creado por Sabino Arana y sus seguidores de Arana siguieron sus ideas posteriormente. Por el contrario, no es posible nombrar una sola persona en el origen del nacionalismo kurdo. Más bien éste se ha formado a partir de las aportaciones doctrinales y políticas de diferentes personas y múltiples eventos, comenzando por la llamada primera rebelión, y ha continuado desde entonces. Por supuesto que, como hemos dicho, los nacionalismos de ambos pueblos tienen raíces históricas en su región. Y los une el hecho de que el nacionalismo afectó a vascos y kurdos en la misma época. Si tenemos en cuenta que la revista de Sabino Arana, *Bizkatarria*, donde explicó sus ideas nacionalistas, fue publicada por primera vez en 1893, y el primer periódico en lengua kurda fue publicado en 1898, es evidente que la idea del nacionalismo alcanzó diferentes territorios en torno a misma época, y por supuesto en un espectro de países y regiones mucho mas amplio que los casos citados. La idea del nacionalismo, que comenzó a extenderse en Europa después de la Revolución Francesa, llegó a los territorios en los que los imperios estaban en control de diferentes naciones y grupos étnicos. En este sentido, la idea de la autodeterminación llamó la atención de los pueblos de Europa y muchos movimientos nacionalistas inscribieron en sus banderas el lema de la Revolución Francesa de "libertad, igualdad y fraternidad", iniciando trayectorias que culminaron, o no, con la consecución de estados propios. Después de más de dos siglos, es posible decir que el lema revolucionario de libertad, la igualdad y la fraternidad sigue estando vivo y en movimientos prodemocratización muy recientes en la propia Turquia -las protestas del Parque Gezi en Estambul- estos tres términos se escribieron en las paredes, y muchos manifestantes declararon su

apoyo a la causa de la protesta gritando el lema de la Revolución Francesa. Entre la opinión pública de Turquía, la mayoría cree que los turcos y los kurdos son hermanos y hermanas, y la igualdad verdadera, que sería proporcionada por el Estado, podría resolver el problema kurdo en Turquía. En resumen, se puede ver como ideas fuertes, como la Revolución Francesa y el nacionalismo, no pierden su importancia con el paso del tiempo, sino que siguen vivas en la medida que los problemas de inserción o relación entre estados y comunidades interiores. Y si Sabino Arana creó el primer partido político vasco, el PNV, en 1895, como expresión e instrumento para conseguir las reivindicaciones nacionalistas, este partido sigue activo en el país vasco y España. Es decir, que ha sido un instrumento creador de conciencia política nacionalitaria llevada a cabo por el partido a través de la historia. Por su parte, el primer partido nacionalista kurdo se formó durante el Imperio Otomano en 1908.Y el referente irlandés que utilizaremos también en nuestro análisis, el Sinn Fein, lo fue en 1905. Las fechas de fundación de estos partidos políticos son muestras que el nacionalismos ha llegado a diferentes territorios en mismo tiempo. Y el hecho es que tanto el Sinn Fein como el PNV siguen todavía activos, por lo tanto, la conciencia política continua también es válida para los irlandeses. En cambio el primer partido nacionalista kurdo fue cerrado tras un corto período de tiempo y aunque otros muchos se han formado hasta hoy. En el caso curdo, así pues, no es posible hablar de una continuidad en cuanto la permanencia de instrumentos politicos. Sin embargo, sí ha existido continuidad en la conciencia política, aunque con altibajos a traves de la historia, y diferentes expresiones. Obviamente, el conocimiento político de los pueblos se remonta a finales del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, en todos los casos, y estas características los convierten en actores históricos en la política de su región.

En cuanto a la respuesta política recibida desde los estados en los que se dan, se puede decir que tanto los kurdos como los vascos han sufrido con las políticas severas, si bien, al menos en el caso vasco, no de manera constante sino variable. Por ejemplo, el PNV se cerró junto con otros partidos políticos durante

el régimen de Franco, mientras que, de manera mas permanente, varios partidos kurdos se han cerrado en la historia de la República de Turquía. Además, la identidad étnica vasca se negó bajo el régimen franquista y el uso de la lengua vasca a nivel oficial, escolar y publico fue prohibido. La prohibición del uso de la lengua de maneras oficial no afectó sólo a los vascos, sino también a otros pueblos históricos de España, como los catalanes, quienes vivieron en las mismas condiciones. Por su parte, los Kurdos sufrieron políticas similares de negación de su identidad étnica y de prohibición del uso oficial de la lengua kurda a partir de la intervención militar del año 1980, es decir, bajo el gobierno del General Kenan Evren. En ambos casos, la negación oficial de otras lenguas obligó a la gente a utilizar sus lenguas en los espacios privados para preservarla, espacios en los que siempre habían tenido presencia aunque retrocediendo ante las políticas estatales. Los casos vasco y kurdo muestran como la prohibición del uso oficial de un idioma determinado por parte del Estado de manera oficial no significa que las personas renuncien a su propio idioma y acepten el idioma oficial como *único*.

Las condiciones represivas que acabamos de mencionar y mas en general, las negaciones de la autonomía por los regímenes autoritarios militares crearon las condiciones para la creación de organizaciones terroristas. ETA y el PKK se formaron en diferentes momentos pero en circunstancias similares. ETA comenzó su lucha armada contra el régimen del dictador Franco en el año 1968 y cuando el PKK lanzó su primer ataque grave contra las fuerzas de seguridad en el año 1984, Turquía estaba fuero del bajo el control del gobierno militar. En otras palabras, en ambos países cuando las libertades no existían y estaban en el poder regímenes politicos represivos, los grupos terroristas encontraron el cauce adecuado para su formación actividades armadas terroristas. Además, tanto ETA y como el PKK se formaron incorporando ideas marxistas, ideas que hacían compatibles con la luchas por las independencias respectivas. Por supuesto que el uso del terrorismo no puede justificarse de ninguna manera pero tanto ETA como el PKK comenzaron su actividad en regímenes autoritarios derechistas altamente represivos. Ambas organizaciones pretendían ganarse el apoyo del pueblo con sus

ataques armados con el fin de crear una "revolución" en contra de las autoridades centrales. ETA y el PKK, tomaron el caso de la Revolución Cubana como referencia a sus objetivos. Como el movimiento de Cuba encabezado por Fidel Castro contra el dictador Fulgencio Batista creó la "revolución" con el apoyo de la gente, y creó "héroes" como Che Guevara; el PKK y ETA trataron de tener un impacto similar en Turquía y en España con la esperanza de llegar a la revolución y convertirse en los "héroes" de sus movimientos. En este sentido, es posible afirmar que el PKK y ETA se formaron como organizaciones del nacionalismo armado. La realidad, fue, sin embargo, que ambos se convirtieron, junto a otros, en los últimos ejemplos del terrorismo armado en el tiempo. Ninguno de los dos alcanzó su objetivo, no crearon una revolución apoyada por la gente, y en cambio trajeron muerte y miedo a los territorios donde han operado.

Los casos de España y Turquía son diferentes también en términos en cuanto al y la ubicación. Como el IRA, ETA se formó en Europa y se buscó crear un estado europeo independiente. El País Vasco histórico tiene territorios bajo el control de España y Francia, problema de terrorismo ocurrido y quedándose limitado en Europa. Por su parte y de manera diferente el PKK tiene su base en las montañas de Irak y opera mayormente en el sureste de Turquía. El territorio que reivindica, el Kurdistán histórico tiene partes bajo el control de Turquía, Siria, Irak e Irán. El PKK trató de ser operativo en Europa a través de sus sucursales en los países europeos pero, la información geográfica que se ha expuesto en líneas anteriores evidencia el problema del PKK, puesto que se originó en el Oriente Medio y no tiene ninguna conexión directa con Europa. Ello contrasta, con que la realidad, el PKK y el tema de los derechos de los kurdos se han convertido en un problema importante para Turquía cuando se ha planteado la búsqueda del proceso de admisión en la Unión Europea.

En cuanto a los objetivos de ambas organizaciones uno de ellos era generar apoyo entre sus poblaciones respectivas. Mientras llevaban a cabo ataques terroristas contra las fuerzas de seguridad del estado, pretendían fundamentalmente obtener el apoyo del público para obligar al estado a aceptar

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sus términos. Para ganarse el apoyo del público, trataron de obligar al estado a actuar en contra de la población civil. En otras palabras, realizaron sus ataques con la esperanza de que las fuerzas de seguridad del estado actuarían contra los civiles. Se puede decir que, tanto el PKK como ETA creyeron que con medidas de seguridad del estado contra la población civil, esta apoyaría su causa y las organizaciones podrían crear "insurrecciones públicas". También existieron diferencias: los métodos de las organizaciones fueron ligeramente diferentes unos de otros. Mientras que el PKK se basó en las montañas y atacó a las fuerzas de seguridad turcas en tácticas de guerrilla, en otras palabras, en tácticas de golpear y correr, ETA se basó en una táctica mucho mas urbana y desde el interior de la sociedad, atacando a las fuerzas de seguridad españolas clandestinamente, con un alto nivel de secreto. Por otro lado, ambos organizaciones han utilizado técnicas como el secuestro y otras. En el caso de ETA de funcionarios del Estado, especialmente altos cargos, militares, funcionarios de prisiones y también personajes de la sociedad civil, incluyendo por ejemplo deportistas conocidos. A cambio se exigían tanto sumas de dinero como reivindicaciones políticas o de liberación de presos. En el caso del PKK utilizándolos para presionar al Estado turco.

En concreto en cuanto activos económicos de ambas organizaciones, las dos han obligado a hombres de negocios a pagarles a cambio de protección o en el caso de ETA simplemente como modo de financiación. El PKK aplicó impuestos en las fronteras de sus territorios. Por ejemplo, obligando a la gente que quería cruzar a Irak o a Siria a pagar impuestos. Sin embargo, sus estructuras organizacionales eran diferentes.

Las estructuras internas, por su parte, eran diferentes. El PKK formó organizaciones interiores y exteriores y se extendió en países europeos como Grecia y Alemania, recogiendo donaciones para su causa. Por otro lado, la organización de ETA se limitó a España y Francia, donde la organización tenía el objetivo de crear un estado vasco independiente y unido. Además, mientras que el PKK fue controlado por un solo hombre, - Abdullah Öcalan, quien sigue a cargo

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del PKK aún estando en prisión - ETA fue controlada por varios líderes de varias células, es decir, tuvo un liderazgo conjunto. La mayor diferencia entre ETA y el PKK fue el número de víctimas que hubo durante sus ataques terroristas. De 1968 a 2010, 2.400 personas resultaron heridas y 829 personas murieron a causa de los ataques terroristas de ETA. Por su parte las acciones terroristas del PKK entre 1984 y 2011 provocaron más de 40.000 muertos.

En lo que se refiere a los métodos de propaganda, ambas organizaciones pusieron una atención significativa en la promoción de sus ideas a través de herramientas de comunicación. Mientras que ETA publicó la revista "*Ekin*", el PKK publicó la revista "*Sexwebun*" y más tarde tuvo, y sigue teniendo, varios canales de televisión bajo su control. Se puede ver como ambas organizaciones utilizaron el mismo método en sus primeras etapas, sin embargo, el PKK se ha diferenciado por tener canales de TV.

ETA y el PKK han tenido una diferente evolución en cuanto a sus estructura interna. Mientras que ETA sufrió divisiones internas, traumáticas, fruto de discusiones sobre continuación de la lucha armada o a la participación en la política, lo que llevó a escisiones y a la aparición de varias ETAs ETA (m) y ETA (pm), el PKK mantuvo su estrategia única de enfrentamientos contra el Estado de Turquía y no sufrió fracturas organizativas internas. Los miembros del PKK que mantenían ideas diferentes a la lucha armada fueron eliminados por el líder para mantener a la organización unida. Por su parte, el IRA también se enfrentó a divisiones similares a las de ETA. A este respecto, no sería erróneo afirmar que mientras ETA y el IRA tienen una estructura organizativa relativamente democrática, lo que les dio la oportunidad de decidir internamente -al menos durante una etapa de su funcionamiento- el PKK fue controlado con reglas estrictas que ni siquiera proporcionan una oportunidad para pensar de forma diferente.

El PKK y ETA, que están en la lista de organizaciones terroristas en sus respectivos países, otros más y organizaciones internacionales se plantearon además alcanzar sus objetivos políticos, asociándose para ello con partidos políticos. Mientras ambos estaban tratando de afectar a la estructura política de sus países mediante métodos ilegales -secuestros, ataques terroristas, emboscadas, colocación de bombas, etc.- utilizaron también los partidos políticos con el fin de influir en las organizaciones legales.

Diversidad política de los kurdos y los vascos también tiene diferencias y similitudes entre ellos. En el caso de los vascos, el PNV se creó con ideas nacionalistas y mantuvo su posición tanto en la política de España y la política vasca durante los años en que hubo libertades. Pero además de este precedente, se formaron otros partidos políticos vascos, proporcionando variedad nacionalista en las elecciones de los vascos. En esta variedad de encuentran también los partidos o organizaciones del entorno de ETA, Batasuna, Bildu y Sortu aunque en el caso de los dos últimas ya plantearon una línea propia, en parte independiente de ETA. Estas organizaciones aceptaban el uso del terrorismo y de hecho como decimos fueron expresiones de ETA. A medida que estos partidos aceptaron el uso del terror, se convirtieron en los partidos políticos del nacionalismo radical o extremista, convirtiéndolos en separatistas. De manera parecida, en cambio, en el caso de Turquía, todos los partidos políticos kurdos que se formaron después de la formación del PKK lo hicieron bajo el control de esta organización terrorista. En consecuencia, los kurdos en Turquía tuvieron sólo una opción confiable en términos de partido político. Es cierto que la esfera política en Turquía ha estado bajo el control estricto del Estado pero si se tiene en cuenta el estricto control del PKK, además del control del Estado turco, se puede decir que los kurdos no han tenido libertad política para formar partidos políticos nacionalistas y trabajar por ellos.

La conexión entre los partidos políticos y las organizaciones terroristas tuvo como consecuencia la prohibición de los partidos políticos que amparasen o

no condenasen el terrorismo explícitamente en ambos países. En el caso de España, la relación de ETA con Batasuna y otros allanó el camino para la prohibición de los partidos políticos de este signo, sin embargo, Bildu y Sortu se legalizaron con el tiempo, habiendo sido anteriormente prohibidos por las instituciones jurídicas también, lo que fue muestra de una progresiva aceptación y adaptación al marco democrático que no se ha producido en Turquía. En ésta, el control del PKK y la relación directa en cuanto a la selección de candidatos y las ayudas económicas, allanó el camino para la prohibición de los partidos pro-kurdos, y ninguno de ellos fue legalizado nunca, ocupando una plaza el cementerio de los partidos políticos prohibidos de Turquía. No sería erróneo afirmar que la prohibición de los partidos políticos no ha terminado con los movimientos políticos pro-separatistas ni en España ni en Turquía. Inmediatamente después del cierre de una parte, o incluso en algunos casos antes de las decisiones de cierre, se establece un nuevo partido político sobre la misma base ideológica, aunque en el caso español se ha observado una evolución. En la experiencia británica, la conexión entre el Sinn Fein y el IRA, muestra que la prohibición de los políticos extremistas individuales puede ser más útil y respetuoso con la democracia.

Desde la perspectiva democrática, es evidente que el sistema español es más representativo, tanto con las instituciones gubernamentales regionales como con el umbral del 2% en el sistema de elección, mientras que Turquía tiene el umbral electoral del 10%, lo que disminuye la función de la representación democrática. En la experiencia británica, el Sinn Fein se hizo más eficaz especialmente durante las conversaciones de paz. En otras palabras, en el caso británico también se produjo una evolución y el Sinn Fein acabó controlando del IRA.

En los casos español y turco, el PKK y ETA siempre mantuvieron los partidos políticos bajo su control y trataron de hablar directamente con las autoridades estatales si es posible. No sería erróneo afirmar que las

conversaciones con los partidos políticos para hallar una solución son más fiables en términos de estado de derecho. Como una similitud entre los casos, es posible decir que los partidos políticos pro-separatistas vascos y kurdos quedaron bajo la sombra de las organizaciones terroristas, que hizo que los jugadores fueran menos eficaces en el proceso.

En la lucha estricta contra el terrorismo, ninguno de los países logró acabar con las organizaciones terroristas con medidas militares. Tanto ETA y el PKK sabían que no podían vencer a sus Estados con los ataques, creían que al tener el apoyo del público, o de una parte de la población, obligarían al Estado a dialogar con ellos bajo la sombra de las armas y bajo la presión de ese mismo público. Las medidas y acciones aplicadas por los Estados en la lucha contra el terrorismo muestran ciertas similitudes entre los casos de ETA y del PKK. Al principio, ambos grupos terroristas fueron considerados como pequeños grupos de personas que no eran capaces de afectar el estado fuertemente. Los estados aplicaron medidas policiales o militares contra ellos, y durante muchos años, las autoridades mantuvieron su posición en el punto de "ninguna negociación con los terroristas". Tanto en España como en Turquía, las fuerzas de orden público y el ejército tenían influencia política, el el caso español especialmente en el Franquismo y durante una parte de la etapa democrática y aspiraron a, o en el caso turco realizaron intervenciones militare. Los ejércitos se consideraban a sí mismos como "protectores del estado, la unidad de los países y la estructura política". En consecuencia, mientras que los marcos constitucionales vigentes, sectores de los ejércitos no prestan suficiente atención a la situación socio-económica y ven el problema terrorista como una cuestión a ser resuelta mediante métodos expeditivos.

De hecho, en la lucha contra las organizaciones terroristas, España y Turquía han utilizado a veces las herramientas ilegales y secretas, apoyadas por los propios estados o por sectores de sus aparatos. En España, la organización secreta los GAL se creó con el apoyo de fondos del estado para asesinar a los

miembros de ETA en España y con más frecuencia en Francia. En Turquía, la JITEM, organización ilegal y secreta, fue creada y apoyada por el estado con intenciones similares a las de España. Por lo tanto, no sería erróneo afirmar que los estados, donde el estado de derecho se supone que es fundamental, han usado en momentos determinados tácticas y organizaciones fuera de la ley, si bien hay que decir que, en el caso español, el propio Estado de derecho ha reaccionado y ha juzgado y condenado a los GAL y sus responsables politicos conocidos, incluyendo a un ministro del interior.

Por otra parte, cuando se intentó por el Estado la via de la negociación por los dos Estados, y se pusieron en contacto con las organizaciones terroristas, a menudo optaron por utilizar intermediarios y se reunieron en territorios donde la problemática no tuviera ningún efecto. Por lo tanto, las reuniones en Oslo / Noruega podrían ser señaladas como una similitud entre las conversaciones de ETA-España y Turquía-PKK. Tanto España como Turquía mantuvieron una serie de conversaciones en Oslo. Es posible ver que Oslo era y sigue siendo un lugar neutral común. Pero si se toma en cuenta la experiencia británica en términos de las conversaciones entre las organizaciones terroristas y los estados, no sería incorrecto decir que las conversaciones directas son más eficaces que las que tienen intermediarios. Para una solución permanente del problema del terrorismo, el ejemplo británico también muestra que se necesitan muchas rondas de conversaciones durante un período de tiempo prolongado. Por lo tanto, ni España, ni Turquía deberían esperar una solución en un día o dos. Las conversaciones con las organizaciones terroristas no son fáciles de manejar y el apoyo público para el proceso es esencial. Por ejemplo, en la experiencia del Reino Unido, Tony Blair puso su convicción en las conversaciones y puso todo su empeño para convencer a la opinión pública. En España, el Presidente José  Luis Rodríguez Zapatero declaró públicamente que el gobierno español iba a sentarse a hablar con ETA, pero sus esfuerzos acabaron fracasando cuando ETA rompió el alto al fuego y volvió a los ataques armados. En Turquía, la posición de Primer Ministro Recep Tayyip Erdoğan fue negar que hubiera mantenido conversación alguna con el

PKK durante las conversaciones en Oslo, pero luego cambió de posición y afirmó que el Estado de Turquía podría ponerse en contacto con el PKK, pero el gobierno no puede. En el último proceso de resolución, volvió a cambiar su posición y declaró que había habido contactos con el PKK para resolver el problema del terrorismo. Este fue el momento exacto en que la opinión pública en Turquía comenzó a creer en la posibilidad de una solución política. A través de tres ejemplos de líderes, podemos afirmar que cuando un líder apoya las conversaciones y contactos con organizaciones terroristas, el apoyo público comienza a aumentar.

En la perspectiva de una solución permanente a los problemas del PKK y de ETA, los gobiernos de Turquía y España deberían transformar sus políticas de gubernamentales en estatales. Sin embargo, en todos estos años esto no ha sido así y cuando los gobiernos han cambiado también lo han hecho sus políticas, lo que no ha contribuido al fin del terrorismo. Las conversaciones iniciadas bajo un gobierno han terminado con otro, lo que no da ningún resultado en absoluto.

Por supuesto que la negociación con las organizaciones terroristas no es fácil de explicar al público. Durante muchos años, la gente ha sufrido y han habido muchos muertos y heridos. Por lo tanto, los gobiernos deben encontrar una forma adecuada para explicar por qué se está negociando con los terroristas para dar así respuesta a la pregunta de "¿por qué hemos luchado y muerto?", que a menudo viene a la mente del pueblo. No existe una solución única para todos los problemas del terrorismo. Sin embargo, como en algunos casos el problema del terrorismo ha sido apreciado por problemas socio-económicos, falta de libertades y de políticas estatales contra los derechos humanos, los gobiernos deben resolver los problemas socio-económicas junto con el problema del terrorismo para prevenir la reaparición de movimientos terroristas separatistas. Por lo tanto, los gobiernos deben resolver los problemas socio-económicos y proporcionar más libertad dentro de la democracia para su nación, no sólo para resolver el problema del terrorismo.

En términos de una solución definitiva, se puede decir que España está más avanzada que Turquía. Como España tiene su *identidad superior*, siendo español, Turquía requiere formar una nueva *identidad superior* basada en la ciudadanía común. La identidad común de hoy, siendo turco, es, obviamente, entendida de manera diferente por diferentes comunidades dentro de la misma nación. En este punto, mientras que España tiene su identidad territorial común basada en "el español, siendo de España", la identidad común de Turquía, está construida sobre antecedentes étnicos de la mayoría como "ser turco". Es cierto que una parte de la sociedad turca no acepta este "ser turco" noción de referencia a cualquier grupo étnico y lo traduce como "ser turco *es igual* a ser de Turquía". Sin embargo, este conocimiento no da ningún espacio para cualquier identidad de declarar a sí mismos. Por ejemplo, según la constitución turca de 1982, un turco es turco en términos de ciudadanía, y un kurdo también es un turco en términos de ciudadanía. Es decir, tomar el nombre de uno como nombre común para una nación podría perjudicar a los sentimientos de los demás. Sin embargo, como se puede ver en España, mientras que se puede ser catalán, castellano, euskera y gallego en términos de origen territorial, se puede ser también un español en términos de ciudadanía, que se refiere al nombre de la nación en España, y no a un grupo étnico en particular. De todas maneras, si bien en España no existe una cuestión de etnicidad, hay que tener en cuenta su complejidad, con sectores de la población vasca y catalana que reclaman una soberanía diferente de la española.

Las organizaciones terroristas del PKK y ETA se formaron en las condiciones de regímenes militares y alrededor de las ideas de la revolución apoyados por la gente. Sus esperanzas eran que la gente les apoyara cuando ellos atacaran a las fuerzas de seguridad o que las acciones represivas de las fuerzas policiales o militares creasen rechazo e incrementasen el apoyo a los grupos terroristas. Se puede decir que, aunque es evidente que el uso del terrorismo no puede ser justificado en ningún caso, al principio, su forma de utilizar el terrorismo contra las imposiciones militares y fuerzas puede ser considerada como mas justificada en condiciones de dictadura o falta de libertades extremas que en

una etapa democrática. Sin embargo, las propias dinámicas terroristas les llevaron a no convertirse en organizaciones democráticas y participantes en el juego politico constitucional cuando tanto España como Turquía volvieron a ser estados constitucionales. Después del período de Franco, durante el período de la transición, ETA decidió quedarse como una organización ilegal y Batasuna tomó su lugar en la escena política. De igual manera, en Turquía, el PKK también optó por permanecer como una organización ilegal cuando Turquía volvió a la democracia en 1983. Hasta los años noventa, los kurdos no tuvieron ningún partido político. De hecho el liderazgo de ambas organizaciones pensaba que el apoyo de la gente bajo el régimen militar permanecería también en la democracia. Sin embargo, a medida que el sistema político de los países se tornó democrático, las organizaciones terroristas radicalizaron perdiendo buena parte de su apoyo entre el pueblo. A día de hoy, es cierto que los miembros extremistas de ETA y el PKK e incluso una parte de los pueblos vascos y kurdos todavía quieren mucho más que lo que la democracia les ha dado. Desde 1977 y 1980 respectivamente hasta hoy, España y Turquía han recorrido un largo camino de democracia. Los vascos tienen un estatuto de autonomía dentro del Estado de España, pero persiste el deseo de una Euskadi independiente y libre entre el pueblo vasco. En el caso de Turquía, durante la última década, los derechos democráticos del pueblo kurdo han comenzado a evolucionar en sentido positivo, aunque a menudo los políticos extremistas kurdos han reiterado sus deseos de independencia y unificación del Kurdistán, que contaría con los territorios de Turquía, Siria, Iraq e Irán. Mientras que la globalización se desarrolla así como uniones como la Unión Europea, que eliminan las fronteras interiores de los Estados, parte de las poblaciones vasca y kurda mantienen el deseo de tener un Estado nacional propio, que era la tendencia del siglo XX. De esta forma se podría sugerir que los kurdos y los vascos deberían adaptarse a las ideas de este siglo y tratar de ser los jugadores más efectivos en el juego de la democracia.

De hecho es factible observar que la idea del nacionalismo está resurgiendo en los últimos años, y en el futuro podrían aun aparecer más. Hoy es

una realidad en los países de Oriente Medio, el Reino Unido, España y Turquía. Mientras tanto, el nacionalismo lleva a los orígenes históricos de la Revolución Francesa y la comprensión del nacionalismo francés, acercándose un poco más a la idea del conservadurismo, en otras palabras, el nacionalismo conservador. El nacionalismo conservador trata de evitar las interacciones con otros estados, para preservar sus instituciones y tradiciones de la vida cotidiana tradicional y considerándose enteramente diferente a los demás. Por ejemplo, en Irak, los kurdos ya tienen su propia autoridad en la parte norte del país, mientras que las distintas comunidades, así como los sunitas y los chiítas, que tratan de vivir juntos, tienen una idea más conservadora. Por esta razón, los sunitas y los chiítas a menudo hablan acerca de tener su propio estado. Otro ejemplo se puede dar desde Europa sobre el nuevo nacionalismo. En España, una parte de la población Catalana muestra deseos de un Estado independiente, en otras palabras, la separación del Estado español, y están promoviendo la idea de tener un referéndum en 2014 con la perspectiva de la libre autodeterminación. Al igual que los catalanes, la gente de Escocia también está preparando para el próximo referéndum en 2014, con la que va a decidir quedarse en el Reino Unido o formar un estado totalmente independiente. Si se toma el nacionalismo como un concepto de los siglos XIX y XX, y considera que esos grupos, que se basan en las diferencias étnicas o religiosas o territoriales no buscan crear un *Estado-nación*, sino *un estado* para *su nación*, el término *micro-nacionalismo* podría ser utilizado en el campo de las ciencias sociales como concepto de nacionalismo del siglo XXI. En todo caso habría que distinguirlo del nacionalismo creador y confirmador de estados. Mientras que el nacionalismo creador pretende crear nuevos estados, el nacionalismo confirmador tiene como objetivo crear organismos supranacionales como la Unión Europea. La idea de la integración de los diferentes estados bajo Uniónes no significa el fin de la idea de la creación de nuevos estados. En este punto, se puede decir que el nacionalismo kurdo y el euskera de buscar la independencia, se parece bastante conservador y creador o no conectado con tendencias actuales. Incluso los políticos kurdos a menudo declaran que los kurdos no buscan estado independiente, pero su deseo de auto-gobernarse

sigue estando y podría evolucionar en la idea de crear un estado independiente en el futuro. Para los vascos, es posible decir que, después del fin definitivo de ETA, la idea del nacionalismo resurgir entre el pueblo vasco y que si los catalanes se separan de España, los vascos seguirían probablemente el mismo camino.

En el camino de resolver el problema del terrorismo en ambos países, es posible decir que ambos se enfrentarán a desafíos nuevos. El miedo a la desintegración está muy arraigado en las sociedades de Turquía y España. Por esta razón, parte importante de la población turca tiene dudas acerca de las conversaciones en curso con el PKK, y por el caso español se parece que no existen en absoluto conversaciones ni parece que las vaya a haber. Como Turquía tendrá tres elecciones entre 2014 y 2015, se puede decir que el Gobierno de AKP se enfrentará a retos en el camino a las elecciones sobre el proceso de resolución. Los partidos políticos de la oposición pueden intentar criticar a AKP ferozmente. Por otro lado, el PKK sigue amenazando al gobierno, y esa actitud complica el proceso y la posición del gobierno ante la opinión pública. En España, bajo la crisis económica, todo lo que se refiere a ETA resulta es más difícil que antes. Como ETA ya declaró que renuncia a las acciones armadas para siempre, y la presión pública sobre ello es muy intensa, el gobierno español tendría más espacios ante la opinión pública para llevar a cabo conversaciones directas con ETA. Sin embargo, para ambos casos, es posible decir que el final de sus procesos de solución no podrá ser alcanzado en un futuro próximo. Mientras que los gobiernos de ambos países se enfrentan a la política real de la vida cotidiana, sólo pueden dedicar una parte de sus esfuerzos a sus problemas del terrorismo.

Como conclusión final, es cierto que los vascos y los kurdos vienen de diferentes páginas de la misma historia. Los casos mencionados anteriormente tienen similitudes en términos de ideas nacionalistas, movimientos políticos armados, historia política y así sucesivamente, sin embargo, también tienen marcadas diferencias. En esta tesis se ha tratado de demostrar que los argumentos, que son el sistema político español y el estatuto de la región autónoma vasca, o

posibles cambios constitucionales podrían aplicarse para la solución de la problemática de los kurdos y así como del problema del terrorismo, y son por ello cuanto menos, dignos de analizar. Con la aceptación de las similitudes y diferencias entre los casos, no sería erróneo decir que la experiencia española puede ser tomada como un ejemplo en lugar de un modelo para aplicar directamente. No existe una único modelo de solución para el terrorismo que se pueda aplicar a todos los casos. Esta tesis también muestra que el uso de la lengua oficial en el territorio, la aceptación de una bandera propia junto a la estatal, la existencia de un parlamento territorial compatible con el central, y así sucesivamente, no siempre están en contra de la unidad de un país y la nación. el modelo de sistema de las comunidades autonómicas españolas podría aplicarse a Turquía, con algunas modificaciones de acuerdo a la historia y la estructura política de Turquía. Sin embargo, la cuestión de si Turquía, el actual sistema político turco y la sociedad turca están preparados o no, debe ser respondida primero.

**APPENDIX I**

**President Wilson's Statement on 8 January 1918**

"Gentlemen of the Congress:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russsian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents have been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.

The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied -- every province, every city, every point of vantage -- as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military

leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significances. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war?

The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the Liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again

and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain.

There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but hopeless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe.

They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow nor or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

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I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own

interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace- loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the

world, -- the new world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test."

**Source:** Brigham Young University The World War I Document Archive - <http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points>

**APPENDIX II**

**Treaty of Lausanne**

**Part I**

**Section III.**

**Protection of Minorities**

"Article 37

Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulation's, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

Article 38

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

Article 39

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment's, functions and honours, or the exarchate of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

Article 40

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Article 41

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured

an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

Article 42

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other private institutions of that nature.

Article 43

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religions observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

Article 44

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, he referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Article 45

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The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory."

**Source:** Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website on Treaty of Lausanne, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-political-clauses.en.mfa>

**APPENDIX III**

**Hürriyet Daily Newspaper's cover on 17 February 1999**



**Source:** Ankara Ticaret Odası Website - <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/_files/UNUTULAN_MANSETLER/1997-1999.pdf>

**APPENDIX IV**

**Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper's Cover on 7 November 1991**



Source: Ankara Ticaret Odası Website <http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/files/_files/
UNUTULAN_MANSETLER/1989-1993.pdf>

**APPENDIX V**

**The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey**

**Preamble**

In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies;

The determination to safeguard the everlasting existence, prosperity and material and spiritual well-being of the Republic of Turkey, and to attain the standards of contemporary civilization as an honourable member with equal rights of the family of world nations;

The understanding of the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation and of the fact that sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish nation and that no individual or body empowered to exercise this sovereignty in the name of the nation shall deviate from liberal democracy and the legal system instituted according to its requirements;

The principle of the separation of powers, which does not imply an order of precedence among the organs of state, but refers solely to the exercising of certain state powers and discharging of duties which are limited to cooperation and division of functions, and which accepts the supremacy of the Constitution and the law;

The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the

nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics; the acknowledgment that it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an honourable life and to develop his or her material and spiritual assets under the aegis of national culture, civilization and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms set forth in this Constitution in conformity with the requirements of equality and social justice;

The recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence, in blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life, and that they have the right to demand a peaceful life based on absolute respect for one another's rights and freedoms, mutual love and fellowship and the desire for and belief in "Peace at home, peace in the world".

This Constitution, which is to be embraced with the ideas, beliefs, and resolutions it embodies below should be interpreted and implemented accordingly, thus commanding respect for, and absolute loyalty to, its letter and spirit.

Is entrusted by the Turkish nation to the patriotism and nationalism of its democracy-loving sons and daughters.

**Source:** Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf>

## APPENDIX VI

## PKK Militants' tour



**Source:** Haberaktüel, <http://www.haberaktuel.com/pkklilar-kahramanlar-gibiydiler-video-haberi-230931.html>

**APPENDIX VII**

**Front page of Radikal Daily Newspaper on 22 March 2013**



**Source:** Radikal, <http://i.radikal.com.tr/480x325/2013/03/22/ fft64_mf1382577.Jpeg>

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