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Airport Management Models
Proposal for Reus Airport

FINAL MASTER PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

The infraestructure of Reus airport is considered a key player for the development of tourism in Costa Daurada. For years, the AENA model of airport management has been questioned by several Catalan public bodies and organizations. In several ocasions we have heard the words privatisation and ownership transfer.

This paper intends to analyse the importance of Reus airport for the region and its connection with the tourism in Costa Daurada as well as to analyse the different airport management models existing around the world and the particular case of AENA.

As result of the analysis, the paper ends with a proposal of airport management for Reus airport.

Key words: Airport management, ownership, individualized, centralized, concession, contracts, public finance, competitive.

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0. INTRODUCTION

0.1. Motivation

As per the study *"Intervistas for ACI Europe (2015). Economic Impact of European Airports. Bath: Intervistas"*, the direct economic impact of an airport infraestructure is 0,95 jobs per every 1.000 passengers for airports between 1 – 10 million pax. This study estimates that European airports generate a total of 1,696M direct jobs + 1,353M indirect jobs + 1,401 induced jobs. The direct, indirect and induced impacts sum up to 4,450,400 jobs, € 146.9 billion in income and € 247.8 billion of GDP which represents 1,5% of total GDP in the continent of Europe (including Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Israel; and excluding Azerbaidjan, Armenia and Kazakhstan) . As the study indicates, an airport infraestructure has also a catalytic impact, which can multiply the economic impact by 3. This catalytic impact is explained by the fact that the connectivity of an airport is postively related to the economic growth as it contributes to trade, investments, productivity and tourism. In this sense, the tourism is a key sector in the region of Costa Daurada (where Reus airport is located) and the connectivity of the airport contributes to the economic development of the region.

Tourism is one of the most important economic sectors in Costa Daurada and although there are no recent studies (input/output table), we can presume that contribution of Tourism to the GDP in Costa Daurada is between 13 – 14%. The reasons to determinate this estimation is based on the following:

1) The study *"Duro, J.A.; Rodríguez, D.; Sardà, J. & Farré, F.X. (November 2010). Estimació del PIB turístic de Catalunya, marques i comarques 2005 – 2008. Grup de Recerca d'Indústria i Territori. Departament d'Economia. Universitat Rovira i Virgil"* estimates that the weight of GDP Tourism in Costa Daurada was 13,3% in 2007 and 12,9% in 2008, and in overall Catalonia was 10,8% and 10,9% respectively.

2) Considering this estimation of GDP Tourism for Catalonia was 10,9% in 2008, we could say that the weight of Tourism in the GDP has increased when comparing to the stament made by the *Departament de la Vicepresidència i d'Economia i Hisenda* when confirms that contribution of Tourism to the GDP of Catalonia was 12% in 2017, so we can see that the share has increased by 1,1 points from 10,9% in 2008 to 12% in 2017

3) As per INE press note "*La Demanda turística en 2008 alcanza el 10,5% del PIB de España, tres décimas menos que en 2007 (21st December 2009). Cuenta Satélite del Turismo de España. Serie 2000 – 2008. INE*" the weight of Tourism to Spanish GDP was 10,5% in 2008 and coinciding with Costa Daurada, this percentage lost 0,3 points compared to 2007 (Costa Daurada lost 0,4 points) which indicates certain match on the evolution. Also, if we take 2017 data from *"Cuenta Satélite del turismo de España. Aportación del turismo a la economía española. Año 2017. INEbase"* indicates that the weight of Tourism in the GDP was already 11,7%. Again, and in line with Catalonia GDP data, the weight of tourism has increased by 1,2 points from 10,5% in 2008 to 11,7% in 2017.

For the above mentioned reasons, we could make an estimation and assume that the weight of tourism in Costa Daurada has increased at least the same as in Catalonia (1,1 points). So, if in 2008 the weight was 12,9%, it is easyly that in 2017 the weight was above 13% and likely to be around 14%. This is only an estimation which takes 2008 data and applies to Costa Daurada the incremental experienced in Catalonia and Spain. We shall wait the study in progress, to be finalised in 2021, being made by *Eurecat* as per petition of FEHT (Tourism Business Federation of Tarragona) which shall estimate what is the weight of Tourism in Tarragona province.

There are other data analysis that confirms the importance of tourism in Costa Daurada, and this is the fact that the region received aproximately 10.578.039 of overnights generated by International tourists as per TOK (Tourism Open Knowledge) tool of *Parc Científic i Tecnològic de Turisme i Oci de Catalunya*. As per the study *Seguiment dels usuaris de l'aeroport de Reus 2018*, made by CERES for Costa Daurada Tourism Board, it is estimated that around 433.000 international tourists arrived to Costa Daurada through Reus airport and that this generated about 3.522.000 overnights, which means a 33,3% of all international overnights in Costa Daurada, which is a relevant figure.

Another fact that shows the weight of tourism activity for Reus airport is when we compare the overnights by markets (*TOK data*) with the number of arrivals at Reus airport from said market (*TOK data & Aena statistics*). We see this symbiosis clearly with the evolution of the British market at Reus airport (the most important at Reus, with 64% share) comparing with the British overnights in Costa Daurada for the same period (2006 – 2018) (*See Annex I, page 1)*. When doing this comparison with other markets it is not so clear as the British but we still see similarities. For Irish market we see the decrease in 2010 and the continued growth from 2015 on both graphics *(See Annex I, page 2)*. For other markets we see some similarities when comparing overnights/pax arrivals but we must notice that Reus pax volumes are small and we find a distorsion until 2012 – 2013 due to the fact of the existance of a Ryanair base between 2008 – 2011. During this period the the incoming tourists represented only between 46 – 63% of traffic (*CERES study*). It is not until 2012 when the number of incoming tourists reaches values of +80% of Reus traffic and it continues on the following years. So we see a coincidence of airport traffic and Costa Daurada overnights on the Belgium and Dutch markets from 2013 onwards *(See Annex I, pages 3 & 5)*. For the German market we can notice a parelalism on the decrease between 2006 – 2012 and the slight recovery in 2013 but we cannot made an analysis from 2014 as there has been only 1 route (Frankfurt Hahn) since then. *(See Annex I, page 4)***.**

For all the said above, it clearly shows that Reus airport is a key infrastructure for tourism and that it should be one of the priorities for the Tourism Destination Management of the region. In fact, local and regional authorities (without any decision power on the Reus airport management) have been promoting flights into Reus since 2003 *(see Annex II)* due to the importance of this infrastructure for the development of tourism and given a centralized commercial policy of AENA. This promotion action has served to counterbalance the nonexistance commercial action in the double sense of 1) approach airlines to increase existing operations or get new ones; and 2) a commercial strategy including incentives and fees/charges discounts for new routes or traffic increase. This commercial policy it is a common action for airports in Europe, (normally for the first 3 years of operation in the case of new routes) while AENA had no sort of incentive or discount until 2014 when an incentive was introduced, but it's the same for all airports and is still far from what other European airports are offering.

Economic and social stakeholders like Chambers of Commerce, City Councils, Regional Government or several political parties like CiU, ERC, PSC and ICV have claimed during years to get the infrastructure transferred to local bodies in order to have a descentralized management of the airport. It is believed by these agents that this new management of the airport with more autonomy would generate competition between airports and as consequence, Reus airport would be more attractive and could increase its passenger traffic. *(See Annex III).*

It seems there is a majority of the social and economic stakeholders and political parties demanding a descentralization, but it is not clear what is the preferred model. The most probable scenario and for what have been announced and claimed in the past (page 3, *Annex III*) is that the Spanish Ministry would transfer the ownership of the airport to the Generalitat, but there are different possible management situations:

1. Would Generaliat transfer the management or empower local authorities in the management of the airport? That is something we haven't seen in Lleida, as for instance.

2. Would the Generalitat or regional authorities share the management with private sector or make some concession?

In this sense, we get to the **target of this work which is to counterpoint other airport managements around Europe with descentralized models and see if this models have given true results in terms of increasing its attractiveness and passenger figures.**

This TFM will try to somehow respond to this questions and to put on the table different airport management models in order to better understand their way of working and analyze which one/s might fit better for Reus.

0.2. Methodology

This document will consist on 4 parts:

1. Evolution analsysis of Reus Airport in terms of traffic traffic evolution and its infrastructure.

2. Description and analysis of different types of airport management models in Europe based in current studies and consultancy of sources.

3. Description of the current AENA model and governance with other authorities.

4. Conclusions of the analysis and determinate if a descentralized model would benefit Reus airport attractiveness and increase its passenger traffic.

1. REUS AIRPORT

1.1. Infrastructure evolution

Reus airport was born in 1935 thanks to the initiative of Reus Aeroclub decided to buy fields to build a runway. Since 1937 and due to the Spanish Civil War, Reus Aeroclub stopped its activity and was taken over by the Army who made upgrades and it became a Military airport since then. It was not until late 1940's when the Aeroclub activity returned to operate but with small presence compared to the Military activity. The airport runway was upgraded in 1953 but it was not until end of 1957 when commercial domestic traffic was authorized to operate from Reus and first commercial flight landed in 1958. In 1965, the Provincial Council of Tarragona together with the councils of Reus, Tarragona and Vila-seca offered to contribute with 50% of the cost for the works of marking the runway, with the purpose that the airport could be used for tourist charter flights. By 1973 the airport already had 168.437 passengers but until 1974 there was no passengers terminal and they were accomodate in a small room in the ground floor of the Control Tower. The following years, the terminal experienced several upgrades and by end of 80's the number of charter flights grew noticeably reaching 392K pax in 1988. In 1992 the Military school closed but it was not until 1998 when the the denomination of Military airport was removed and since then it became exclusively commercial airport. By that time (1998) the airport already had 570K pax.

By 2003, the airport reached 846K pax and between 2003 – 2005 the passenger terminal was upgraded with a total cost of 7,5M € and between 2006 – 2008 new terminals were built with a total cost of 18M €. These upgrades facilitated the establishment of an operating base by Ryanair.

Between 2018 and 2020 airport is being upgraded for a total cost of 12M €. The departure gates will increase from 6 to 12 and the delivery baggage belt will increase from 4 to 6 belts. This upgrade will result on a major capacity for the airport, which will be able to accomodate up to 2.560 passengers per hour compared to previous which was 1.800 pax/h. This means the overall capacity will increase from 3M passengers per year to 4,2M pax/year.

1.2. Traffic Evolution *(See Annex III)*

The first years of commercial flights at Reus airport, between 1958 and 1966, had a testimonial repercussion, even without any passenger in 1962.

Since 1967, the grow in passenger figures was outstanding and the airport grew from the 5.752 passengers in 1966 up to 168.437 passengers in 1973, a total growth accumulated of 2.828%. This phenomenon was probably thanks to the improvement of the markings which permitted to land charter comercial flights and in parallel of the strong growth of tourism in Europe from the 60's and until 1973, coindiding with the petrol crisis which also affected the traffic at Reus airport and suffered an stagnation between 1974 - 1981 with an average of 158K pax per year during this period.

Between 1981 and 1988 passengers grew by 162% from 172K pax to 392K pax (with exception of 1985 with a decrease of -33%). The main increases were 1984 (+46,3%), 1987 (+57,9%) and 1988 (+15,4%). It is noticeable to mention that in 1986 and 1987 a total of 11 new hotels opened in Salou and number of beds offered increased by 5.500 beds (Margalef, 2012 & Clavé 1997)

In 1989, Costa Daurada suffered one of their main crisis in their history, the Tifus crisis, and with special affectation in the UK market. As consequence, traffic at Reus airport suffered a -30% decrease in 1989 and -68% in 1990, leaving the airport to lowest levels over the prior 20 years with 88K passengers. Traffic was not recovered until 1994 with a 210% increase. This recover was thanks to the upgrade and construction of new hotels given the new coming business opportunity expected with the opening of Port Aventura theme park (Margalef, 2012). In 1995 pax volume increased by another 49% and between 1996 and 2003 traffic grew from 459K to 846K breaking historic records year after year.

New era

Up to 2003 the vast majority of passenger traffic at Reus airport was coming from UK in charter flights, with the exception of AirNostrum regular flight (double daily) to Madrid. But the year 2003 marks and inflection point in the history of Reus airport thanks to two facts that appeared in parallel and that were feedback to each other. One is the decision of regional and local public bodies, in collaboration of private sector, to incentivate airlines in order to attact them to Reus airport. And the second one is the appearance of low-cost airlines which diversified the markets with routes to Germany, Netherlands and Romania:

- In April 2003, Hapag Lloyd Express opened new routes from Reus to Cologne and Hannover, although operations ceased in April 2004.
- In November 2003, Ryanair opened new route from London-Stansted to Reus. In January 2004 commenced operations to Frankfurth-Hahn and in April 2004 to Dublin.
- Between December 2004 and January 2006, BlueAir operated a route between Reus and Bucharest.
- In April 2005, Transavia commenced operations to Amsterdam, but ceased in October 2005. Meanwhile in the same year, Ryanair opened new routes to London-Luton and Liverpool.

All these new operations made that Reus airport reached 1.138K passengers in 2004 and although Hapag-Lloyd, BlueAir and Transavia presense was only for about 1 year, the operation of Ryanair was consolidated and mantained the airport traffic between 1.138K – 1.380K between 2004 and 2008.

Great future expectations & great disappointment

In October 2008, Ryanair established an operating base at Reus airport bringing traffic to its historic record in 2009 with 1.706K pax and with several routes to different countries: UK, Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Morocco, France, Poland,...

Ryanair increased its traffic at Reus from 357K in 2004 to 1.182K 2009. But while Ryaniar was increasing, all other operators at Reus airport were disappering or reducing its presence. In 2004, Ryanair share at Reus was 31% and traffic of other operators summed a total of 814K. Between 2009 and 2011 Ryanair’s presence at

Reus reached 70% share but traffic of other operators decreased to half and summed only 410K. We should note here that presence of Ryanair pushed out all other operators but this fact doesn't have immediate effect but on the following years. As an example, in 2008, before Ryanair's base, Ryanair had 625K pax and all others had 655K. In 2009, Ryanair increased by 527K pax (+89%) its traffic at Reus, reaching 1.182K pax, while all others still mantained 529K (only -126K less). The consequences would arrive years later, in 2013 when all other operators brought only 348K pax.

Figure 1.1: Reus traffic evolution Ryanair vs Others (2003 – 2018)



Source: Prepared by author on basis AENA statistics.

Ryanair closed its based in October 2011, many routes ceased and its traffic drooped from 952K in 2011 to 292K in 2015. After the base closure other operators could have seen an opportunity to bring traffic back to Reus but it was something slow and also conditioned to other facts like the situation of competing markets like Turkey or Egypt and traffic of other operators (aside Ryanair) were moving only between 348K – 475K between 2012 to 2015.

Figure 1.2: Reus airport traffic share (Ryanair vs others)



Source: Prepared by author on basis AENA statistics.

In 2017 and 2018 the airport reached again 1M pax after 5 years being below, and that was given at the same time that Ryanair had it's lowest share (36%) and thanks to the arrival of new operators like Transavia, Pobeda, EasyJet,... which brought traffic of other operators up to 664K.

Weight of Reus Airport for Costa Daurada

Reus airport is clearly a key infrastructure for the development of Costa Daurada as a destination as its activity is totally linked and performs in parallel of Costa Daurada activity:

- If we analyze Reus airport activity for 2018's, we see that 70% of its activity is concentrated in the months between June to September while the number of overnights in Costa Daurada for the same period represents 66% of the total. Reus airport only receive 4% of its traffic during the IATA Winter season (November to March) and for the same period Costa Daurada only receives 8% of the total yearly overnights.
- The Costa Daurada Tourism Board have been carrying out studies (CERES) to learn more about Reus airport passenger profile. We have data since 2004 and

by analysing this studies we can can see how airport activity has been more relevant to Costa Daurada tourism.

- Between 2004 and 2011 the outgoing traffic represented between 16 – 25%, with the exception of 2009 where outgoing traffic reached 33%. It is also interesting to note the importance of incoming traffic outside of Costa Daurada which had an important weight, between 16 – 29%. That leave the incoming traffic purely staying in Costa Daurada in a range between 46 – 63%.
- In 2009, Reus airport experienced its record traffic (1,7M), but looking at the passenger profile, 2009 was also a record year in terms of outgoing traffic (33%) and one of the lowest in terms of incoming to Costa Daurada (48%). This phenomenon is explained due to Ryanair's base with several domestic routes (Santander, Santiago, Sevilla, Palma) and the fact that the airport became, together with Girona, the Ryanair's alternatives airports for Barcelona.
- Taking the series since 2012, the surveys show that the share of incoming traffic to Costa Daurada has grown considerably and represents between 85 – 90% with the exceptions of 2013 and 2014 where it was 83 and 86%. This exception could be explain for the existance of some domestic routes like Palma de Mallorca and Santiago de Compostela.

Therefore, we have already mentioned how the irruption of low cost airlines in 2003 made a change on Reus airport and we can see for the figures above that between 2004 and 2011, while Ryanair was not operating in Barcelona, Reus was partially used as alternative to Barcelona. After Ryanair's base closure and since 2012, the airport has evolved to a purely incoming traffic with 93% of incoming traffic of which only 3% is incoming but outside of Costa Daurada.

To conclude, and in order to easly show with figure how the airport has become a key infrastruture for the destination in the recent years, in 2009 the airport had

1,7M passengers of which 819K where incoming traffic, while in 2018 with only 1,03M passengers, the incoming traffic to Costa Daurada was 934K. Comparing 2009 vs 2018, the airport lost 700K passengers but Costa Daurada gained 115K passengers.

2. Airport Management Models

It is a hard work to list the different airport management models, there are several options with multiple combinations. This fact would explain that having read several studies on airport management models, none of them coincide to another, although some are close to each other. This work will make its own classification, mainly based on ACI Europe classification and IATA Guidance Booklet.

As per the studies reviewed, we can consider that there are three ways to classify the Airport Management Models, and this depends on the approach, which can be depending on: **1) Ownership; 2) Type of Management** (public vs private); **3) Operational Configuration** (individualized vs group).

The Airport Management Models has been evolving for the last 40 years due to several reasons. Since the deregulation of Air Transport in the US (1978), the air transport has been gradually suffered a liberalization and consequently has created competence and growth. Airport infrastructures then have moved from being considered a public service infrastructure to a commercial infrastructure with capacity to generate revenues. In this sense, the common model of airport management in the world 40-50 years ago was a model where airport was owned and operated by governments (usually through the Ministry of Transport). This typical model has been gradually abandoned by most of the countries and have been moving to models where airports and navigation services are autonomous entities. The difference is on the level of privatization that each country has permitted with different levels of private participation or where the countries have individualized the management or has kept it as a group of national airports. These two variables of privatisation level and autonomous level is where we can find more variables on the management models.

2.1. Ownership

Ownership of the infraestructure can either be public or private. As explained in document "Airports Council International (2016). The Ownership of Europe's Airports 2016. London: ACI Europe", airport facilities have a national strategic and economic importance to States and consequently the unwillingness of most governments to give up complete control of these. For this reason, the vast majority of airports in the EU are public owned either fully or majority publically owned and this can be the State, the Region, Local, or a mixed of public bodies, but even in mixed ownerships (public + private), the Public bodies (all combined) would keep the majority of shares when talking about ownership.

We barely could find airports privately owned within the EU and we would only see this in the UK. This was thanks to the privatisation of public airports company BAA group in 1987, after other UK airports followed and nowadays the only airport managed by a public company.



The ownership's airport can be classified by:

- PUBLIC
  - 100% public owned by State government (ie: Spain, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Sweeden, Sofia, Bordeaux).
  - 100% public owned by public bodies: Combination of State government, Regional govt. and/or Local public bodies. (ie: Croatia, Lyon, Nice, Berlin).
  - 100% public owned by Regional government and or Local public bodies. (Austria, Czech Republic, Billund, Nantes, Bremen, Dortmund, Bari & Brindisi, Bologna, Manchester).
  - Mixed: where public bodies would keep majority of fees in combination of private investment. (ie: Lille, Paris, Frankfurt, Milan Bergamo, Rome, Amsterdam, Bern, Zürich,).
- PRIVATE: A private company has full control due to 100% or majority of the ownership. (ie: Budapest, Firenze, Heathrow, Stansted, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Bristol, Gatwick, Liverpool).

As per the "Airports Council International (2010). The Ownership of Europe's Airports 2010. London: ACI Europe", we can see that majority of States prefers to keep majority share in the ownership of major airports while for the regional airports, the States has been more opened to allow the participation of regional and public bodies and in many cases Regional and Local bodies keep majority of shares in regional airports. When the airport ownership is kept in public majority, then there are multiple options for its Management:

1. Keep it public:
   a. State Agency (in the case of 100% State owned)
   b. Corporation (in the case of Regional or Local participation).

   c. Consortium with participation of private but keeping public majority.
2. Make it private:
   a. Concession to a private company.

Private ownership airports (or majority) can either be of new construction or thanks to a Initial Public Offering (IPO) with full or majority of shares. Management will consequently be private.

2.2. Type of Management: private vs public

For this categorization, we will take as reference the categorization of "Deloitte. IATA Guidance Booklet. (2018). Airport Ownership and Regulation. Dubai: Deloitte". All models listed below will be related to majority of airports where the ownership remains with the government and is mainly separate in two groups: 1) with no intervention of private sector and 2) with the participation of private sector.

2.2.1. NO PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR

- **Government Department or Ministy**

  As explained in the introduction of this paragraph, this is the historical model that States used to have 40-50 years ago and is currently abandoned or very few countries keep this model. (Couldn't find any example).

- **Government (or Public) Trading Agency**

  The model of State Agency is better than being directly managed by the Government Department as it is a dedicated company for the management of the airports which allows specialization and as consequence, it can make it more efficient. But this model still keeps management in hands of public. The Agencty is subject to decisions of Government Departments so it is still political dependant. The IATA Guidance Booklet 2018, indicates that the lack of separation of regulatory functions from operations and management is not recommended for the airport industry as it does not optimize efficiency outcomes. Dubai is an example of an airport managed by a government trading agency and is given as example due to its capacity to gain a loan of private financing for its expansion.

2.2.2. PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE SECTOR

This would the most common used option for the management of airports. There are several reason why governments are moving to private participation, one of teh most common is to improve financial results of airports and consequently to help public finances. Another motivations though are to improve efficency by transferring management to specialized agents.

There are many options of getting private finance involved, but we can differentiate them in two groups: 1) In one group we will find those options where the government seeks private financing but without losing control of the infrastructure. Some of these options are sometimes used as a test and preceed to another model allowing private control. 2) The other group would be those options where airport's management are handled to private investors, normally under a lease for a certain period of time.

2.2.2.1. PRIVATE PARTICIPATION KEEPING GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL

- **Corporatization or Airport Authority**

Owership remains at government through a Corporation or Airport Authority. This Corporation or Authority is normally responsible for the management of all public airports within the country. Comparing to the two models without private participation, the corporate model can improve on the separation of regularity and operational functions thanks to an independent corporate board. Another advantage is that the corporatation is responsible for its financial results and it may have a better planning in terms of financing and investment. A corporatized airport can gain access to external financing and can be a step to partial or full sale of equity. This would be the example of AENA in Spain, a corporatized model with majority of public equity. But still, even with this model, the management can suffer from political processes as the board and team might change depending on the political party and consequently this can affect to the management and governance of the airport/s.

- **Not-for-Profit**

The Not-For-Profit model is where an airport asset is transferred or leased to a Not-For-Profit corporation. Not-For-Profit corporations are private and it is expected to be financially solvent without being financed by government. The most characteristic feature of this model is the fact that these entities must re-invest all their profits back into the airport. The fact that the financial results are not the core of the business, makes this model focused on their customers and staff and can even make them participate in some decisions.

The Not-For-Profit model have an independent Board selection process which reduces exposure to political dependance and consequently it makes increase its stability.

In some cases, the owner (State) requires a lease payment to the operator (Not-For-Profit) ensuring an income to the governement.

This model has only been implemented in Canada and there are some raising voices that puts in questions the model due to some inconveniences such as the lack of investment in some cases, the fee that the companies must pay to the government or the absence of a profit motivation which can lead to delivering an unefficent service.

- **Alternative Finance**

This option is an alternative to Concessions or Management contracts, they have specific objectives and would keep the government control of the core business of the infrastructure. The options are:

- Municipal bonds, secured by government
- Single purpose bonds, secured against specific airport assets
- PPP and concession models at a sub-airport level, for example terminal-level concessions which would provide the delivery of a new infrastructure.
- Export Credit Agency ("ECA") financing, where a part of the the infrastructure or services like baggage handling services, or passenger boarding bridges are financed by another government's ECA on preferential terms.

We might find examples of this model mainly in the United States, where management of airports are typically kept under governemnts control:

1. In New York LaGuardia airport, Delta airlines has financed the cost of building a new Terminal. The first phase will open in autumn 2019. Delta will benefit of a 33 year lease and offering an added value to its costumers while at the same time the airport is gaining a new infrastructure and the commitment of an airline.
2. Denver airport (managed by City and Council of Denver) is one of the busiest airport and financially solvent on its own, but still in 1995 was financed in different ways (including bonds and grants).

In 2017, a 1,6 billion euros was awarded to an investing group lead by Ferrovial (80%) for which the investors had to redisign and built a new terminal. In exchange, this group would be responsible of operate and mantain the concession areas and would receive 20% of its revenues on a 30 year contract. It has recently been announced (August 2019) that Denver has revoked this contract.

- **Alternative Value Capture**

The difference with Alternative Finance is that instead of seeking for an investment on the airport infrastructure, this option releases value of the infrastructure. Some examples are:

  - Sale shares of assests that will generate revenues in future, such as car parks.
  - Creation and optimization of Real Estate development and ancillary uses, including retail, hotels and parking; and
  - Special Purpose Vehicles ("SPVs") enabling airports to partner with real estate developers.
  - Monetizing technology investments and advanced managements capabilities. This is specialized sector and the investment in human resources or technology can be selled as product or service to other airports outside of their market.

As an example of this model we find Schiphol Airport, a public operated airport which seeks funding retorn on non-aeronautical assets through a range of commercial activities, specially through Real Estate.

- **Minority Equity Sale**

This represents the sale of minority equity shareholding of an airport allows governement to access to private finance which allows to gain on airport investments without losing control of the infrastructure. The most common mechanism used is via IPO (Initial Public Offering)**.**

One of the inconvenients of this model is that private investment won't be wiling to pay a high amount than if it would be a majority equity sale which would allow full control.

We can find many examples of Minority Equity Sale, each with different share of private sale: Copenhagen Airports (7,4%), AENA (49%), Aéroports de Paris (41%).

- **Service Contracts**

This model is where the airport owner or operator, normally the Governement, gives away some of goods or services in order to be provided by third parties. Some examples are technology platforms, security, cleaning services, or customer services. By using this model, the airport operator has more operational flexibility and reduces operational costs, specially for those airport with important seasonality.

Also, this model allows that some of the services are provided with specialized companies. The difference of this model with the two previous is that this one does not raise finance capital but improves the financial and operational performance. This is not an exclusive model, which means that can be used as part of other models in order to achive better financial results but without losing governments control.

The most common service contracts are cleaning and security, but another service that has recently been added is the baggage handler. In this sense we can find the airport of Dubai where in 2015 awarded Siemens with a contract in order to provide service and mantainance of the baggage handling system.

- **Management Contracts**

For this model, the control of the infrastructure remains with the government. Typically this model is applied in airports where it doesn't need a financial investment but needs an expertised partner for the a specific function or to run whole airport without a loss of staff and transfers the knowledgment to the operator and staff.

Same as with the Service Contract, this can be used together with other models and it has a varying complexity. The duration of the contract is short-medium and will depend on the complexity, risk and responsability (normally up to 10 years). The contract might be on a fixed annual fee or can also include performance incentives.

Management Contracts are also an option to be taken as a transition or test to a full private management.

We find this type of model in countries with low experience in airport management and that have experienced important development in the last two decades. Some examples are mainly found in the Middle East, like the airports of Riyadh and Jeddah where in 2008 a 6-year Management contracts were awarded to Fraport for the daily operation of the airport focused on improving quality service and to train the management staff. Also in 2008, a similar contract was awarded to Changi airport to manage Damman airport.

2.2.2.2. PRIVATE PARTICIPATION AND PRIVATE MANAGEMENT

- **PPP or Concession**

PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) and Concession models are the two main models of airport management privatisation. The model is normally applied in airports where important upgrades are required or where the government has finance constrains. This model requires of long concessions or lease (at least 30 years), the period will depend on the investment required, the operating costs and the conditions agreed with government. This model allows full control of the airport to the private investor and consequently is responsible for the airport's activity (financing, investment, development, operations, maintenance,...) for a determinated period of time. This responsability means also financial risk so private sector prefers a long-term concession as it will result on a better planning, cheap operating costs and more revenue to the investor. Once the lease or concession ends, the asset gets back to the governement. Some concessions or PPP might only include landside assets (terminal, car parking,...) while airside assets (runway, taxiway, aprons) remain at government control. This model, like others, provide access to expertised management.

As this model is result of funding need for an investment or due to government finance constrains, it can result on a expensive agreement for the investor and consequently it could brought high fees and airport charges or unsolicited and unique proposals for the airport management.

Due to the nature of this model, governments must implent safeguards for this strategic infrastructure and build a good agreement with clear and transparent transaction process and regulatory framework.

We find many examples of concession. In 2012, Portugal sold the public management airport company ANA (equivalent to Aena, SA) to VINCI Airports for which will manage the Portuguese airports for a duration of 50 years. Another recently example is the award to Aena Internacional (100% subsidary of Aena, SA) the concession of 6 airports in Brasil for a 30 year period (with possible 5-year extension).

- **Majority Equity Sale or Full Divestiture**

A Majority Equity Sale or Full Divestiture provides not only full control of the airport to the private sector but also the ownership from government to the private sector. In this case, all responsabilities are transferred to the private investor. However, government will remain responsible for aviation regulation. After the privatisation of BAA in 1987, the UK Competition Comission, in 2006 forced the investor to sell some airports that were part of the group and stated that the model

> “was driving significant investment, innovation and growth, as these airports compete on cost and quality of service”.

ACI’s ownership report of 2016, refers as ownership to the Concession or PPP while in this work we have referred to ownership to the owner of the land. In this sense, ACI’s report for example is considering Spain as a mixed ownership and in fact it is not the ownership but the airport operator (Aena, SA) which is a mixed company (49% privatised). Anyhow, this report shows a clear trend on the privatisation of airports management, specially within the EU.

Figure 2.1: Comparison of Airports ownership 2010 vs 2016



Source: ACI. The Ownership of Europe’s airports 2016.

We can see how the number of fully public ownership airport has been reduced from 77% in 2010 to 53% in 2016.

Figures are even higher if we look at the passenger traffic. Private participation on airports is higher in larger airports while regional/small airports are usually kept in public body hands. As we can see for the graphic below, the overall Europe’s passenger traffic in fully public airports is reduced from 52% in 2010 to 26% in 2016.

Figure 2.2: Annual Passenger Traffic by Airport Ownership type.



Source: ACI. The Ownership of Europe's airports 2016.

The report also indicates that this shares will continue increasing in favour of private and mixed ownerships (management for our reference) and already indicates some airports that are in the process of conversion like Lithuanian Airports.

2.3. Operational Configuration: Individualized vs Group

Another classification of Airport model is depending on its operational configuration. Regardless of its ownership and the type of management, airports can also be classified depending on grouping:

2.3.1. Airport Network management

The airport is an integrated part of a society that manages more than 1 airport in the same country, forming an Airport group. The airports are part of a system where all airports are managed together, this system implies that all income goes in the same account and from there is distributed. This system has the advanatge that serves to finance the unprofitable airports thanks to those that are profitable. The contra for this model is that there is a lack of competition between airports. We can see this model in Spain with AENA or in Portugal where althought ANA was privatized and airports are managed by a private company (VINCI), all airports remain under one unique operator. We might find also several private airport operators in the same country and each operate as a network like in France where they have Edeis and Vinci managing several airports each or in Greece where Fraport has recently been awarded with the management of 14 airports (all of them highly dependent on tourism).

2.3.2. Individualized Airport Management

The management is isolated in the country and there are 2 possible options:

0. it is a unique company for the management of that airport (like the vast majority of airports in Germany).

1. it belongs to a multi airport opertator where the operatros manages also other airports in other countries, like Fraport that operates Frankfurt but also Ljubljana, Burgas, Varna, Antalya or the mentioned in Greece.

On both cases, airports are financially autonomous and have the capacity to compete with others.

3. Current Airport Management in Spain

As per the Spanish Constitution (1978), Article 149, paragraph 21th, it states that *"The State has exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters: Merchant Marine and flagging of ships; lighting of coasts and maritime signals; ports of general interest;* ***airports of general interest;*** *airspace control, transit and air transport, meteorological service and aircraft registration".* In regard to this article, there are 46 airports in Spain owned by the Spanish State, all of them are listed as *airports of general interest.* All (46) airports are operated by the public company AENA, SME S.A. which 51% of it remains under the ownership of ENAIRE, a 100% public company belonging to the Ministry of Transport.

3.1. AENA model

As we have been explaining in previous paragraphs, generally, airports over the world were owned and directly managed by the State, typically by the Ministry of Transport. This model began to change about 40 years ago. In this line, after the aviation liberation, the Spanish government created in 1991 AENA, thanks to article 82 of Law 4 of 1990 for the State General Budget. Its legal constitution basis gave this body full public and private capacity, which means that for its public functions is governed by public legislation and for its relations for contracting relationships and patrimony is governed by private legal system. AENA was empowered with the skills for the management of the airports network as well as Air Navigation responsability. AENA has its own self-financing system from its own revenues.

We could say that in terms of Management that the creation of AENA didn't make major changes on the Spanish airport system, since it kept 100% government's control in all airports of the network: ownership of the land, management and airport regulator.

In 1998, it was also created Aena Internacional, a subsidary company of AENA from which it participates or has particiapted in the management of liberated airports in Mexico, Jamaica, Brasil, Colombia, Sweden or United Kingdom.

An Oportunity lost

Until 2010, Spain was one of the few countries in Europe where airports where managed as network and by a 100% public company. This motivated a change in the model and the Government approved the Law (Royal Decree) RD13, of 3rd December 2010 which included several actions in terms of fiscal, labor and liberation to promote investment and employment growth. Among the liberation actions it was included in Chapter I, “Modernization of airport system” and under this Chapter there were several articles like Article 7 & 8: Creation of a public business company: AENA Aeropuertos, S.A.; Article 10: Individualized management of airports; Article 11: Service airport concessions. Article 12: Subsidary Management Companies, Article 13: Airport Coordination Comitée.

AENA Aeropuertos, S.A. would keep the management while AENA would keep the Air Traffic Control. During the firs semester of 2011, a dozen of Air Traffic Towers were privatized, menwhile this happened, there were discussions and rumors regarding the airport management model.

In regards to the Decree 3rd December 2010, the governement had some options, which was to keep managing airports through Aena Aeropuertos, S.A.; to create fiscal societies (which means Aena Aeropuertos S.A. would have kept the major part and finally to create concession societies. The government only started the option of concession societies for the airports of Barcelona and Madrid airports through Management Concessions. The bidding conditions included 20 years + 5 extension years of concession for fee of 1.600M € for Barcelona and 3.700M € for Madrid and in both cases a 20% of the incomes with a minimum amount. Also the governement reserved a 9,95% of the concessionary companies that would have managed Madrid and Barcelona. This bidding process was somehow slowed down due to the coming elections in November 2011 and it was finally stopped by the new government. In parallel it was also planned to privatize 49% of AENA and the new government judged that AENA would have more value as a whole instead as a sum of each part and also considering the participation of AENA in the management of airports in other countries. The governement also stated that their objective was not to promote competence between the two airports (Madrid and Barcelona) but to compete with major hub airports in Europe. In additon, it was though that the economic situation of the country at that time it would have give an advantage to biders in terms of price.

This Decree also planned a major participation of the regions and local bodies through the creation of Airport Coordination Comitée.

Another small item that changed in 2011 was the Airport Fees & Charges fee for which until the date was only breakdown into 3 group airports and in 2011 was changed to 6.

Then after in 2012, and in order to obtain financial gains, the governement decided to increase airport taxes giving only 1 month of notice this generated some tension with airlines and in 2013 as a compensation, AENA introduces, for the first time an incentive scheme for growht and new routes (but only for 1st year of operation. This type of incentives is commone and extended in all airports in Europe and the incentives for new routes are normally between two to four years (being 3 years the most common).

Partial privatisation

It was not until 2014 when the governement resumed the privatisation plan and by Decree changed the name back from Aena Aeropuertos, S.A. to AENA, S.A; while AENA (Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea) changed to be ENAIRE who had 100% of shares of Aena, S.A. and coordinated the privatisation of 49% of their shares. The IPO of AENA was 21% sold to reference partners (Financiera Alba 8%, TCI 6,5%, Ferrovial 6,5%) and the 28% would wen finally to the stock market on February 2015 (it was initially planned for November 2014). Currently, the stock market only represents 26,5%. This is the current breakdown of investors:

- 51% ENAIRE (100% public)

- 8,294% Hohn Christopher Anthony (Founder of TCI)
- 3,607% TCI (The Children's Investment Master Fund)
- 4,392% Deutsche Bank
- 3,214% Capital Group (Capital Research and Management Company)
- 3,010% Blackrock Inc.
- 26,483% Stock Market

By being in stocks, Aena, S.A. is also under review of the CMNC (Comission of National Competition Markets) and at the time, the CMNC has criticized the fact that only 49% was put on sale of private sector, and that airport management should be descentralized.

The partial privatisation forced Aena, S.A. to publish data regarding the financial performance of each individual airport of Aena, something that was only published in 2014 and for which we won't be able to analyze in this document because data is not updated.

Figure 3.1: 2014's Finance performance of AENA airports

LOS RESULTADOS DE LOS AEROPUERTOS

En millones de euros

	INGRESOS	EBITDA (Resultado bruto de explotación)	RESULTADO ANTES DE IMPUESTOS
Barcelona-El Prat	721,59	509,59	339,28
Palma de Mallorca	277,35	181,32	158,76
Tenerife Sur	125,12	83,93	73,41
Gran Canaria	129,92	80,46	70,33
Alicante-Elche	142,70	96,41	50,53
Lanzarote	64,92	42,94	35,98
Ibiza	65,47	44,10	32,15
Adolfo Suárez-Madrid-Barajas	933,86	566,66	27,54
Fuerteventura	59,56	39,38	20,66
Málaga-Costa del Sol	199,74	114,29	18,00
Sevilla	47,95	24,60	16,49
Bilbao	50,58	29,63	14,35
Valencia	61,05	33,95	9,22
Girona	24,35	10,28	0,82
Murcia-San Javier	11,99	4,62	-0,70
Algeciras / Helipuerto	0,74	-0,20	-0,83
Son Bonet	0,55	-0,55	-1,35
Badajoz	1,66	0,30	-1,99
Ceuta/Helipuerto	0,14	-1,11	-2,03
Albacete	0,80	-0,47	-2,69
Menorca	29,64	12,40	-2,78
Asturias	11,67	2,03	-3,78
La Gomera	0,73	-1,56	-3,81
El Hierro	0,89	-2,16	-4,68
Huesca-Pirineos	0,12	-1,38	-4,97
Burgos	0,31	-1,60	-4,98
Salamanca	0,43	-2,95	-5,36
San Sebastián	2,48	-2,22	-5,40
Logroño-Agoncillo	1,35	-2,37	-5,77
Tenerife Norte	33,82	10,49	-5,80
Santander	7,52	0,20	-5,85
Córdoba	0,31	-1,41	-5,98
Granada Jaén	7,70	-0,40	-6,10
A Coruña	12,36	3,35	-6,14
Valladolid	2,08	-2,93	-6,61
Madrid-Cuatro Vientos	1,14	-3,35	-6,94
Sabadell	0,84	-3,15	-6,96
León	0,56	-1,23	-7,07
Almería	9,03	0,58	-7,72
Reus	9,09	0,52	-8,15
Jerez	10,12	-0,14	-8,45
Zaragoza	7,71	-0,83	-9,29
Melilla	2,11	-3,58	-9,34
Vitoria	3,99	-1,69	-9,50
Pamplona	1,68	-3,85	-10,50
Vigo	9,14	-0,45	-10,85
Santiago	26,86	5,96	-15,42
La Palma	8,07	-2,72	-18,16

Fuente: elaboración propia EL PAÍS

Source: El País. 2014 results.

The AENA model, operated as a network, makes that airports with more earnings help to mantain those with loses. We shall note that in the case of Reus, the accounting results were -8,15M €. The losing was due to the high level of investments made and we would like to highlight that the EBITDA result for Reus was +0,52M €.

Figure 3.2: AENA's airport network in Spain.

Source: cerodosbe.com

3.2. Promotion of airports made by regional authorities

For the last 25 years, there have been many changes in the airport management models around Europe while the airport management model in Spain has experienced some change in terms of allowing private finance but the truth is that management has remained untouched in terms of being in hands of a public corporation and managed as a whole netowork. During this period, the model has been questioned by politicians, public opinion, media, economic stakeholders and local or regional governments. Some have claimed a full privatization or a descentralization of AENA, allowing airports to be managed individually, like suggested by the CNMC (National Comission of Markets and Competition) in its report of 2014.

Since 2000, the involvement of the local and regional bodies in the promotion Spanish airports has been increasing. Between 2000 to 2002, there were few advertising agreements with airlines to incentivate traffic and the majority of this agreements were with the regional airlines AirNostrum. This analysis is based on research, and no incentive or promotion agreements have been found before 2003, except for Leon between 2000 – 2002. This research has made a double check and found the paper made by Ramos, D.; Gámir, A.; and Escalona, A.I. under the title *"Ayudas Públicas y ofertas de servicios en los aeropuertos españoles (1996 – 2010)*" for which it confirms that until 2002 the only airline benefiting from public funds in Spain was the regional airline Air Nostrum for its operations in 9 airports.

Figure 3.3: Estimation of Public funds received by airlines in Spain (1996 – 2010)



Fuente: Base de datos de ayudas públicas.

Source: Ayudas Públicas y oferta de servicios aéreos en los aeropuertos españoles (1996 – 2010).

We should recall that the terrorist attack of 11th of September 2001 damaged deeply the aviation industry specially during the last quarter of 2001 and for the whole 2002. It was not until 2003 when the industry eperienced a recovery.

Figure 3.4: Graphic of Air Traffic evolution in the Euro area



Source: Prepared by author on basis of data from The World Bank.

In 2003, coinciding with the recovery of the aviation industry, the low cost airline Ryanair commenced its operations in Spain from Girona (december 2002) which followed Reus operations (November 2003) and in 2004 already opened an operating base in Girona. These fact was taking place in a period where other low cost carriers increased its operations in Europe, like Hapag-Lloyd Express, Transavia, Air Berlin, Virgin Express, Sterling, MyTravelLite, Germanwings, EasyJet,...

Figure 3.5: Growth of low cost passengers in Europe (2000 – 2004).



Source: Las líneas aéreas de bajo coste: fundamentos teóricos y estudio empírico sobre su impacto en el transporte aéreo y en la estructura del sector turístico en Europa. Tesis Doctoral. Meissner, M. (2008)

The majority of the low cost carriers during that period were willing to fly in regional airports, although Ryanair was the only concentrating its operations in regional airports (even to the most unknown airports) and with an outstanding capacity for growth growing capacity. By end of March 2002 the airline carried +15,7M pax for a rolling year and by end of March 2005 carried already +27,5M pax for a rolling year.

Figure 3.6: Ryanair's passenger traffic 1995 – 2007.



Source: Ryanair. Corporate. History of Ryanair.

The increase of low cost carriers flying into regional airports, but specially the easy ability of Ryanair to get into regional airports, made that many regional authorities mirrored the cases of Girona and Reus and followed their steps by getting active on the promotion of their regional airports and the incentives offered to airlines through advertising agreements became more popular between regional authorities. This would explain how the apperance of more agreements from 2004 specially and by 2006, these advertising agreements were already extended in Spain (as we can see in *Figure 3.3*).

A report from the CNC (National Comission of Competence) in 2011, indicated that between 2007 – 2011, several regions dedicated a total of 247 million euros to promote flights with airlines.

Figure 3.7: Table of regional distribution of public funds for advertising agreements:

CCAA / Año	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 2007-2011
ANDALUCÍA	0	0	48.000	150.000	0	198.000
ARAGÓN	8.489.977	8.489.977	6.507.029	6.212.230	4.352.120	34.051.333
ASTURIAS	289.000	1.865.000	1.358.000	2.600.000	2.500.000	8.612.000
BALEARES	310.328	687.000	1.199.800	1.352.120	2.437.500	5.986.748
CANARIAS	600.225	1.670.915	485.000	948.900	130.000	3.835.039
CANTABRIA	870.000	6.055.000	5.968.333	3.433.333	4.337.745	20.664.411
CASTILLA LA MANCHA	487.200	580.000	1.195.433	2.753.367	5.334.000	10.350.000
CASTILLA Y LEÓN	9.479.600	19.483.608	26.892.568	14.076.760	14.347.080	84.279.616
CATALUÑA	336.400	0	3.158.333	6.227.911	7.589.678	17.312.322
Ceuta (helipuerto)	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
EXTREMADURA	1.697.875	1.697.875	1.697.875	2.196.874	2.048.317	9.338.816
GALICIA	3.887.720	5.335.900	3.705.000	6.229.400	3.539.428	22.697.448
LA RIOJA	800.000	1.136.000	167.000	754.000	754.000	3.611.000
MADRID	350.000	150.000	27.000	0	0	527.000
Melilla	1.000.000	0	0	0	2.600.000	3.600.000
MURCIA	650.999	400.000	1.704.688	1.704.688	354.000	4.814.376
NAVARRA	550.000	0	0	0	0	550.000
PAÍS VASCO	0	0	425.001	0	0	425.001
VALENCIA	0	4.857.150	7.964.195	2.855.545	750.000	16.426.890
Total por año	29.799.323	52.408.425	62.503.256	51.495.128	51.073.868	247.280.000

Source: Informe de ayudas públicas, CNC.

We should bear in mind that the report from CNC and the paper of Ramos, D. are based on estimated figures as these agreements are usually opaque, but it give us an approach and gets to the point that all regions in Spain have been involved in the promotion of their airports.

Figure 3.8: Distribution of Spain's Public aid for airports (2007 – 2011)



Source: Informe de Ayudas Públicas, CNC.

As per the statement of Ramos, D. in 2015, he estimated that the total funds invested in Spain for airport promotion between 2011 and 2014 was of aproximately 100 million euros.

Furthermore, we have check the attendees list of participants at Routes Europe Conference for the last 5 years. This conference-workshop is the reference of its own in Europe and serves airports to meet airlines to establish or keep relationships. Bye checking editions from 2015 to 2019, we found that over 50% of the destinations attending to this event are from Spain and we can list over 20 destinations from Spain:

1. Aeroports de Catalunya
2. Associació per la Promoció i Desenvolupament de les comarques gironines
3. Basque Country Tourism Board
4. Canary Islands Tourist Board
5. Costa Blanca Tourist Board
6. Costa Daurada Tourism Board
7. Granada Tourist Board
8. Patronato de Turismo de Gran Canaria
9. Region of Valencia Tourism
10. Sevilla Tourist Board
11. Tenerife Tourism Corporation
12. TourSpain, VIA – Vitoria International Airport Promotion Agency
13. Tourism Department of Aragon
14. San Sebastian Airport – Ortzibia
15. Madrid Destino
16. Gibraltar Tourist Board
17. Galicia
18. Cadiz Tourist Board
19. Barcelona Chamber of Commerce
20. Fundación Turismo de Menorca

21. Turismo de Santiago
22. Consell Insular d'Eivissa
23. Cordoba Tourist Board

What we have seen in the recent years is how dozens of Spanish Tourism Boards attend into Aviation conferences in order to promote their airports. This is something you only see for the Spanish airports and none in any other countries.

This situation demonstrates the importance of airport infrastructure for Tourism and specially in a country like in Spain where Tourism is an economic leading sector. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the majority of regional airports in Europe attend to this conferences with at least 2 delegates by airport while AENA (47 airports) attend to this conferences with only 6 delegates. Someone may think that AENA has relied the commercial action on the Tourism Boards, but it has been the other way around: Tourism Boards have get involved to the promotion due to its importance for their economy and because they have seen that perhaps the commercial action of AENA was (and still is) not sufficient due to its centralized system.

3.2.1. State Aid to airlines and airports – European Commission

One of the main handicaps that Spanish regions find for offering incentives to airlines is the EU Guidelines for State aid, which were updated in 2014.

The European Comission has carried some investigations in relation to the incentives offered to airlines and for Spain it is only know the cases of Reus and Girona which are under investigation since 2013 and there is still not an outcome of this.

The Guidelines stablishes a transitional period of 10 years (until 2024) in order to give time to airports to adjust their business models. The Guidelines has 3 criterias: investment aid to airports, operating aid to airports and start-up aid to airlines. The incentives that Spanish regions are offering to airlines would be on the section of start-up aid to airlines and in this sense the EU Guidelines states that this aid is compatible if matches some conditions, of which we will name the most relevant ones:

- If 1) increases mobility of Union citiziens and the connectivity of the regions by opening new routes, or 2) facilitates regional development of remote regions.
- There is no duplication from another airport or high-speed train in the same catchment area.
- The conditions that smaller airports face when developing their services are often less favourable than those faced by the major airports in the Union. Also, airlines are not always prepared to run the risk of opening new routes from unknown and untested airports, and may not have appropriate incentives to do so.
- State aid is for linking an airport with less than 3 million passengers to another airport within the Common European Aviation Area.
- Existance of incentive effect. So that in the absence of aid, a new route would not be launched.
- Start-up aid may cover up to 50% of airport charges for a maximum period of 3 years.
- Make plans of the aid public.
- Cannot be combined with other State aid granted for the operation of a route.

3.3. AENA Governance with regional authorities

As years passed with regional authorities actively promoting airports owned and managed by State agency AENA, some gestures were made by the State government. From a perspective point of time, it seems that these gestures were more in line of creating an image of a State company cooperating with regional governments more than a truth will to have a coordinate strategy on each airport with complicity of regional governments. In this sense, there were two tools used as gestures:

1) Route Development Commitees. The majority of thse commitees were created between 2009 and 2011 for each airport (except for Galicia), although only few of them were created like Alicante, Galicia, Valencia, Ibiza, Mallorca, Menorca,... The most active and productive Commitee has been the one of Barcelona (they even have a website: barcelonalinks.org) which was created in 2005.
2) Airport Coordination Commitees. This Commitees were created after the Route Commitees and were created from 2013 thanks to Article 13 of Decree-law 13/2010, 3rd of December and Royal Decree 697/2013. These Commitees are planned to guarantee the participation of regions, local bodies, business organizations and social stakeholders. Among the functions of these Commitees, it is included the actions of collaborate in terms of strategy and promotion. This Commitees were thought in terms of region, so one Commitee for each autnomous region. The first Commitee was created in 2013 for Madrid region and in 2014 followed Catalonia and the rest of Autnomous regions. This Commmitees seem to be uneffective as in the majority of regions there has been only a couple of meetings made since 2014, except for the case of Galicia that has been 4 and the case of Andalusia which meet the minimum of two annual meetings, as stated in the Royal Decree. This Commitees have been questioned by by the regions of Catalonia, Galicia, Balearics and Canary Islands as they are considered to be uneffective.

4. Conclusions and proposal for Reus Airport

From the analysis made on the previous chapters, it would arise the following motivations/needs to change the current airport management model for Reus airport:

- It is demonstrated that Reus airport is a key infrastructure for the development of tourism and economy of Costa Daurada. So, the local and provincial public bodies and private sector with interests in the region are the stakeholders that knows better the needs and the opportunities to develop the airport.

- The Spanish model (AENA), is a unique case in Europe where a big market (Spain) has a centralized mode. This type of model is no longer in use in other European countries. To simplify this fact we can reference to the table made by Bel & Fageda in 2010.

Figure 4.1: Table of Management models (individual vs network) within the EU.

Cuadro 1
MODELOS DE GESTIÓN (INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CONJUNTA) EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Forma de gestión	Tipo de mercado	Países de la UE
Centralizada y conjunta	Grande Pequeño	España, Estonia, Finlandia, Lituania, Portugal, Rumanía.
Híbridos	Grande Pequeño	Ø Suecia, Grecia
En cambio desde gestión conjunta a individualizada	Grande Pequeño	Ø Polonia
Gestión individualizada	Grande Pequeño	Alemania, Francia, Gran Bretaña, Italia. Austria, Bélgica, Bulgaria, Chipre, Dinamarca, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, Holanda, Hungría, Irlanda, Letonia, Luxemburgo, Malta, República Checa.

[a] Tipo de mercado 'Grande' indica un número de pasajeros alrededor de 100 millones por año, o superior. El país con más viajeros entre los de 'mercado pequeño' es Holanda, con menos de 50 millones por año.
[b] Fuera de la UE, en el caso de Noruega, la gestión es centralizada y conjunta. El resto de países anglosajones (EE.UU., Canadá, Australia y Nueva Zelanda) tienen gestión individual, así como Suiza.
Fuente: para países de la Unión Europea y otros de la OCDE, Bel y Fageda (2006). Páginas web de los aeropuertos para países de Europa Central y del Este.

Source: Bel & Fageda, 2010.

We should note to this table, made in 2010 with data of 2006, that Estonia has practically only 1 airport (Tallinn), that Portugal has privatized the operators (although management is not individualized) and Romanian airports appeared at ACI 2016's report The Ownership of Europe's Airports as a descentralized model with airports owned by County Councils (with the exception of the 2 Bucarest airports and Constanta with majority of the Ministry of Transport).

- AENA commercial policy is centralized. Airport fees, taxes, charges and incentives are decided in Madrid and are not though with the needs of Reus airport. For some of the airport charges, AENA applies the same pricing to the whole airport network and for other charges like passenger fee, AENA divides the airports in in 4 groups (except Madrid and Barcelona). This means that Reus airport charges are the same as other 10 airports, like Girona or Almería which for different reasons are competitors of Reus. This situation does not generate competition in an industry where there are less customers (airlines) every year.
- The fact that all regional governments in Spain are actively involved on the promotion of the airport, demonstrates that there is a need to descentralize the management of airports in Spain. This has also been stated by the Competition Comission in Spain.
- Currently, the State is the owner but also responsible for the investments and to operate the airport. But, the regional and local authorities are investing on the commercial task to catch airlines. The EU guidelines for State aid to airports and airlines are drawed in line to end State aid to airlines by 2024, while State aid to airport investment guidelines are in line to be kept even after 2024.
- The Spanish Minster of Transport has made a wrong planning in terms of investment as it is demonstrated by the fact that in the last 15 years the airport has experineced several upgrades on terminals and many of them has been provisionally as result of a wrong planning. This unefficienty on planning has made increase the investment costs and consequently has affect to the financial results. During these 15 years, the Ministry has invested a total of 40M€ (aprox) with public funds and still it is not the adequate terminal for Reus (Reus airport is the only airport in Spain, and we could almost say that is also one of the few in the world that terminal is not built in parallell to the aircraft

parking and runway). With all these funds invested, it would have been possible to build an appropiate terminal located in the right position.

- AENA has no innovation in terms of financing and has not explored the management options of Alternative Finance or Alternative Value Capture explained in section 2.2.2.1 of this paper.

- The fact that the transfer of Reus airport was announced in 2007, demonstrate that is an historical demand and that it only depends on the will of politicians.

Taking into account the above considerations, the new management for Reus airport should consist on the following principles:

- The airport ownership should not 100% transferred from Spanish State to Catalan regional government, as planned in 2007 and perceived in recent years. This could find Reus airport moving from a centralized system in Madrid (AENA) to another centralized system in Barcelona (Aeroports de Catalunya). We would suggest to follow Germany’s airport ownership model where local and regional bodies have a majority although it is not the same share in every airport. In this sense, we can find airports where 50% is for the city and 50% for the region., others where there is a share for the German state, or where the regional government has majority, and even some cases where ownership belongs 100% to the city, like Bremen. In this sense, ownership of Reus airport should be transferred to the region where province and local bodies should not only be in Board but also have the biggest portion of shares. Portions of the shares it is something that should be negotiated between the different administrations involved.

- As it is an strategic infrastructure, the shares should be keep in public hands in order to guarantee the territorial interest. Privatisation is not an option for Reus as it would fall in the risk of having a short view to obtain financial results. Still, it is recomendable that some to have private investors in the shareholding of the new ownership Corporation in order to reduce possible financing lost and the criteria of private investor principle. It could have 2 type of shareholders, those that would provide the assets and those that would obtain shares for their representation in the Board of Directors. An example of ownership shareholders for Reus could be as follows:

- 30% Generalitat (Catalan Government)
- 30% Diputació (Provincial Government)
- 5% City of Reus
- 5% FEHT (Tourism Business Federation) (private)
- 4% PortAventura World (private)
- 3% Hard Rock (private)
- 3% City of Tarragona
- 2% AEQT (Chemical Business Association) (private)
- 2% City of Salou
- 2% Port of Tarragona
- 1% City of Cambrils
- 1% City of Vila-seca
- 1% Chamber of Commerce Reus (private)
- 1% Chamber of Commerce Tarragona (private)
- 1% Airport employees (private)
- 0,5% Chamber of Commerce Valls (private)
- 8,5% Free Float (private)

➢ As explained in different sections of point 2, the ownership could decide different options of Management:

a. A PPP or Concession would only be in a long term if the airport becomes a true alternative to Barcelona and exceeds 5M pax.

b. The Not-For-Profit, has little experience and given the financial results of Reus, it would not so benefitial as it might seem as it could have the risk that airport has to keep high fares to keep mantainance and necessary investments. In this sense, we would also consider as an option in the medium or long term after the airport has no major investments in a close scope of time.

c. So, followed to the distribution of the ownership shares, it would follow the creation of a operator company (with the same shareholders as the ownership), which could be named “Reus Airport, SA”. This operator would in future make the possible deals for a Concession or Not-For-Profit system.

- “Reus Airport, SA” would have a Board of Management which should be formed by expertised members in airports and infrastructure management.

- As the Board of Directors would be in majority of public hands, the infrastructure could access to State-aid financing for investments in line of EU guidelines, which states that government can fund up to 75% of costs if passenger traffic is under 1M pax, 50% if its 1 – 3M pax and 25% if its 3 – 5M pax. Somehow may think that whith this scenario the regional and local governments which are currently funding the commercial action, should also have to fund the investments, but the truth is that as consequence of this new model of management, the State-aid to airlines would be eliminated.

- Although the ownership is responsible for investment, the Board of Directors, with the help of the private shareholders should:
  a. Do the best endavours to be efficient and avoid unnessary investments.
  b. Search for Alternative Finance or Added Value Finance to reduce investment costs, as for example, develop Real Estate investments or sponsorized assets by private companies.

- It would be also interesting to create a Consultant Council with the participation of the industrial sector, the Aeroclub, aviation companies based at the airport, airlines,... to get their opinion about the project and assure efficiency.

- In line of becoming an efficent cost airport, “Reus Airport, SA” would have to use other tools of management such as Service Contracts for security, cleannig, car park,...

As result of this new Airport Management, the airport could benefit from the following:

- ✓ The airport fees and charges would be designed to reduce seasonality.
- ✓ Airport would have an strategy aligned with the economic interests of Costa Daurada.
- ✓ Commercial team dedicated only to Reus airport that would attract commercial activity at the terminal and new airlines operating.
- ✓ The airport would become part of the Tourism Management of Costa Daurada.

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ANNEX I: Overnights vs Airport Traffic

British market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

Irish market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

Dutch market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

German market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

Belgium market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

Russian market



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre



Source: Tourism Open Knowledge PCT Turise Costa Daurada i Terres de l'Ebre

Annex II

https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/695239/20030521/

VilaWeb

País Món Societat Opinió Cultura Economi

Notícies

Dimecres 21.05.2003 10:14

El "Pacte de la Boella" exigeix un mínim de sis vols diaris a baix cost a Ryanair

Si hi hagués acord, els vols podrien començar a la tardor

Tuit Like 0

Diverses institucions públiques i privades de les comarques tarragonines han signat un acord conegut com "Pacte de la Boella", que autoritza la Cambra de Comerç de Tarragona

https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/695239/20030521/pacte-boella-exigeix-minim-sis-vols-diaris-baix-cost-ryanair.html www.laxarxa.com/altres/noticia/es-posa-en-marxa-una-entitat-que-impu

Es posa en marxa una entitat que impulsarà el desenvolupament de l'aeroport de Reus

19/05/2003 20:05h

0 Imprimir Comparteix

Diferents representants de les institucions del camp de Tarragona han signat aquest matí un conveni per la creació de lAgrupació dInterès Econòmic, un ens que servirà per impulsar el desenvolupament de laeroport de Reus. El primer que sha acordat és invertir per aconseguir que la companyia Ryanair comenci a operar a laeroport reusenc. Segons lacord signat avui, les institucions, encapçalades per la Diputació de Tarragona i els ajuntaments de la zona invertirien fins a 657.000 euros anulament per promocionar els seus vols. De moment però, Ryanair està esperant tancar primer un acord amb la Generalitat, que ja ha anunciat que lacord serà el mateix que a laeroport de Girona, on Ryanair ja opera des de fa un any.

http://www.laxarxa.com/altres/noticia/es-posa-en-marxa-una-entitat-que-impulsara-el-desenvolupament-de-l-aeroport-de-reus

Annex III

XARXA AEROPORTUÀRIA

CiU torna a demanar el traspàs de la gestió dels aeroports catalans a la Generalitat

Convergència i Unió tornarà a demanar avui al Congrés el traspàs de la gestió dels aeroports catalans a la Generalitat. Actualment, la xarxa aeroportuària de Catalunya compta amb instal·lacions al Prat, Girona, Reus i Sabadell, gestionades per AENA, un organisme públic d'àmbit estatal. Segons CiU, aquests aeroports no són tan eficients com podrien ser i tindrien més dinamisme si se'n descentralitzés la gestió i s'ajustessin a les necessitats de desenvolupament dels sectors productius.

23/09/2003 - 00.00 | Actualitzat 09/11/2006 - 10.51

https://www.ccma.cat/324/ciu-torna-a-demanar-el-traspas-de-la-gestio-dels-aeroports-catalans-a-la-generalitat/noticia/46476/

BARCELONA

ERC reclama al Congrés el traspàs de la gestió dels aeroports i el desmantellament d'AENA

Esquerra Republicana està disposada a aconseguir que els aeroports civils de Catalunya siguin gestionats per la Generalitat i pels ajuntaments pròxims a la seva ubicació. Ara no és així; per aquest motiu, avui registrarà al Congrés una proposició de llei per transferir-ne la gestió. I no només això, també vol actuar per desmantellar AENA, l'entitat pública encarregada de gestionar els aeroports espanyols.

27/03/2005 - 00.00 | Actualitzat 28/03/2005 - 00.27

https://www.ccma.cat/324/erc-reclama-al-congrs-el-trasps-de-la-gesti-dels-aeroports-i-el-desmantellament-daena/noticia/87991/

L'Ajuntament de Reus reclama que l'aeroport es gestioni des del territori i deixa la porta oberta a la participació privada

Reus.- L'Ajuntament de Reus ha aprovat una moció de CiU en el ple d'aquest divendres per demanar que la gestió de l'Aeroport de Reus es faci des de les institucions del territori. La moció també ha estat votada afirmativament per l'equip de govern (PSC, ERC i ICV-EA), ja que els nacionalistes han acceptat una esmena socialista que demanava deixar la porta oberta al fet que el sector privat també pugui participar en el nou model de gestió.

30/03/2007 - 20.07

https://www.ccma.cat/324/lajuntament-de-reus-reclama-que-laeroport-es-gestioni-des-del-territori-i-deixa-la-porta-oberta-a-la-participaci-privada/noticia/183218/

32 | Diari Dimarts, 17 d'abril de 2007

ECONOMIA

INFRAESTRUCTURAS ■ ACUERDO DE LA COMISIÓN BILATERAL PARA EL DESPLIEGUE DEL NUEVO ESTATUTO DE AUTONOMÍA

El Gobierno traspasa el aeropuerto de Reus a la Generalitat

El compromiso alcanzado ayer entre Jordi Sevilla y Joan Saura no contempla la cesión del aeropuerto de El Prat y deja para una nueva reunión el traspaso del servicio de Cercanías

AGENCIAS

El Gobierno y la Generalitat acordaron ayer iniciar el proceso para el traspaso de cinco competencias, entre ellas la de los tres aeropuertos secundarios catalanes –Reus, Girona y Sabadell– y la gestión del litoral catalán, y dejaron para la siguiente reunión la transferencia de las Cercanías de Renfe.

Así lo explicaron el ministro de Administraciones Públicas, Jordi Sevilla, y el conseller de Interior i Relacions Institucionals, Joan Saura, tras la segunda reunión de la Comisión Bilateral Estado-Generalitat, que por primera vez se reunió en Barcelona.

El ministro Sevilla destacó la creación de la ponencia para el traspaso de los aeropuertos catalanes secundarios –y su previa «desclasificación de interés general o nacional»– una cuestión que «queremos hacer no sólo para Catalunya, sino para el conjunto de España».

Además de aprobar el reglamento de la Comisión, Gobierno y Generalitat acordaron, tras más de dos horas de reunión en el Palau de la Generalitat, crear cinco nuevas ponencias para el traspaso de cinco áreas: la declaración de utilidad pública de las asociaciones y los beneficios fiscales de las fundaciones, las comunicaciones electrónicas e inspección en las telecomunicaciones, los códigos de identificación de libros y publicaciones periódicas, la ordenación y gestión del litoral, y la desclasificación de los aeropuertos de Reus, Girona y Sabadell.

Ni el Gobierno ni la Generalitat quisieron dar fechas concretas para materializar estos traspasos, pero han subrayado la «importancia histórica» y el «calado» de algunos de ellos, como el de la gestión del litoral, que, como recordó Saura, provocó «enfrentamientos» en el pasado entre las dos administraciones.

Sobre el traspaso de Cercanías, un punto del orden del día que se incorporó de forma específica en la pasada reunión de febrero debido a las deficiencias del servicio en Barcelona, Gobierno y Generalitat se limitaron ayer a encargar «estudios técnicos» al Ministerio de Fomento y a la conselleria de Obres Públiques para abrir la ponencia del traspaso en la próxima reunión de la Comisión bilateral, que será o antes o después del verano, según Saura.

La Generalitat no quiere abrir este proceso sin certificar antes la ejecución del plan de choque sobre esta infraestructuras, una transferencia «compleja» que requiere también determinar el personal y la partida presupuestaria que conlleva, coincidieron Sevilla y Saura.

En la reunión del pasado 3 de abril de la comisión catalana de seguimiento del nuevo Estatut, el conseller de la Vicepresidencia, Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira, reclamó el traspaso, «por la vía rápida» y en un plazo aproximado de seis meses, del servicio de Cercanías, además de los tres aeropuertos secundarios.

El conseller Saura ha recordado hoy que el próximo 27 de abril se reunirá por primera vez la comisión bilateral específica sobre Infraestructuras.

> El Govern no quiere la cesión de Cercanías hasta materializar su plan de choque

Jordi Sevilla (izquierda), ministro de Administraciones Públicas, junto a Joan Saura, conseller de Relacions Institucionals. FOTO ANDREU DALMAU

REACCIONES

Isaac Sanromà, presidente de la Cambra de Comerç de Reus
«Hacemos una valoración muy positiva de este primer paso que esperábamos desde hace tiempo. El aeropuerto de Reus es un activo importante y creemos que su gestión tiene que llevarse a cabo por parte de la Generalitat y el Ayuntamiento de Reus, así como también la Cambra de Comerç de Reus. No es lo mismo gestionar el aeropuerto desde 600 kilómetros que a pie de pista. Tenemos que buscar mejorar la eficiencia del aeropuerto y que sea más competitivo. Es un primer paso que puede permitir un despegue del aeropuerto de Reus».

Josep Joaquim Sendra, presidente de Pimec en Tarragona
«La noticia de hoy se centra en el traspaso de competencias del Gobierno a la Generalitat en el aeropuerto de Reus y, de momento, en eso se queda. Ahora será el momento de ver cómo la Generalitat lleva a cabo esta gestión. El Govern tiene la oportunidad de cambiar el modelo actual o seguir de la misma forma. La apuesta de Pimec es que la gestión del aeropuerto sea de la administración pública y de sectores privados».

Sebastià Cabré, presidente de la Cepta
«Es una noticia positiva, la primera fase de aquello que reclamamos desde el territorio para liderar la gestión del aeropuerto. Pensamos que será mucho mejor que las decisiones se adopten desde el territorio y no a 600 kilómetros de distancia». -P. FRANCESCH

POLÍTICA » ÚLTIMA ACTUALITZACIÓ DIVENDRES, 6 DE JUNY DE 2008 05:00 H

CiU porta al Congrés la demanda de traspassar els aeroports de Girona, Reus i Sabadell

En demana les 'competències exclusives' a la Generalitat de Catalunya

http://directe.larepublica.cat/noticia/7737/ciu-porta-al-congres-la-demanda-de-traspassar-els-aeroports-de-girona-reus-i-sabadell-7737

La Cambra de Tarragona demana el traspàs de l'Aeroport de Reus al Govern per realiztar el més aviat possible les millores del Pla director

Tarragona.- La Cambra de Tarragona ha analitzat el futur de les instal·lacions aeroportuàries del Camp de Tarragona en el marc d'una de les sessions monogràfiques que pretenen conèixer la situació i les expectatives de temes claus per al territori, com recull el Pla Territorial Parcial del Camp de Tarragona. Les conclusions de la jornada s'han centrat en la necessitat de continuar executant les infraestructures incloses al Pla director de l'Aeroport de Reus, les quals permetran operar amb un volum més elevat de passatgers i noves terminals. Per això, segons la Cambra, cal que s'acceleri el traspàs de les competències d'aquesta instal·lació a la Generalitat.

08/10/2008 - 17.31

https://www.ccma.cat/324/la-cambra-de-tarragona-demana-el-traspas-de-laeroport-de-reus-al-govern-per-realiztar-el-mes-aviat-possible-les-millores-del-pla-director/noticia/319815/

Les cambres de Reus, Girona i Sabadell demanen el traspàs dels tres aeroports amb independència del de l Prat

Les tres institucions han signat aquest matí una declaració en què demanen a l'Estat i a la Generalitat que 'agilitzin' les negociacions

Acn/Ddg | 25.05.2009 | 16:28

https://www.diaridegirona.cat/economia/2009/05/25/cambres-reus-girona-sabadell-demanen-traspas-dels-tres-aeroports-independencia-del-l-prat/334365.html

ECONOMIA 17 gener 2010 0.00 h

Montilla reclama més aeroports gestionats per la Generalitat en la inauguració d'Alguaire

- Torna a dir que no es conforma amb el model aeroportuari proposat per Foment

https://www.elpuntavui.cat/economia/article/18-economia/276421--montilla-reclama-mes-aeroports-gestionats-per-la-generalitat-en-la-inauguracio-dalguaire-.html

El govern demana el traspàs dels aeroports de Girona i Reus per poder evitar casos com el de Ryanair

El secretari de Transports de la Generalitat afirma que el contracte signat entre l'executiu anterior i la companyia aèria és un mal preacord i inacceptable en les circumstàncies actuals.

17/02/2011 - 13.18 Imprimir

https://www.ccma.cat/premsa/el-govern-demana-el-traspas-dels-aeroports-de-girona-i-reus-per-poder-evitar-casos-com-el-de-ryanair/nota-de-premsa/2535690/

NEGOCIACIONS PER L'AUTOGOVERN

Escull la desclassificació de Girona, Reus i Sabadell i una posició determinant al Prat

La Generalitat prioritza el traspàs dels aeroports

El Govern ja té enllestida la llista de traspassos que la vicepresidenta Joana Ortega posarà damunt la taula en la reunió que el 10 de març mantindrà amb el seu homòleg Manuel Chaves a Madrid.

3 min. BARCELONA. 02/03/2011 00:00

PERE MARTÍ 1 Comparteix Guarda

https://www.ara.cat/cronica/Generalitat-prioritza-traspas-dels-aeroports_0_436756348.html

CiU i PSC fan el primer pas al Congrés per al traspàs dels aeroports

Acorden una resolució que també insta l'Estat a accelerar el Corredor Mediterrani i la 'participació determinant' al Prat

30 de Juny de 2011, per ACN

0

http://reusdigital.cat/noticies/ciu-i-psc-fan-el-primer-pas-al-congr-s-al-trasp-s-dels-aeroports

Alícia Alegret: 'El PP té el compromís de traspassar la gestió de l'Aeroport de Reus'

11 de Juliol de 2011, per Enrique Canovaca

4

http://reusdigital.cat/noticies/al-cia-alegret-el-pp-t-el-comprom-s-de-traspassar-la-gesti-de-laeroport-de-reus

8 - diarimés **REUS** 14/07/11

INFRAESTRUCTURES

Crit unànime per reclamar la gestió de l'Aeroport de Reus des del territori

Entitats i administracions van alçar la veu per subratllar el seu paper en el futur de la infraestructura

MÒNICA JUST

El món polític, empresarial, social i acadèmic de la demarcació es va unir ahir per reclamar el traspàs de la gestió de l'Aeroport de Reus «en benefici d'una gestió més propera al territori». Durant un acte que va tenir lloc al Palau Bofarull i que va aplegar prop de 150 persones, diferents administracions, entitats i institucions van recordar la importància de mantenir la connexió amb la resta del món des de la infraestructura reusenca i moure's per competir a nivell internacional.

Així, doncs, a través d'un manifest conjunt, els ajuntaments de Reus i de Tarragona, les seves Cambres de Comerç, la Diputació i la Generalitat, donen suport al traspàs al Govern català de les competències aeroportuàries, però també reclamen que se'ls atorgui «la capacitat per prendre des del territori les decisions estratègiques de l'Aeroport».

L'acte va donar el tret de sortida amb la intervenció del gerent del Patronat de Turisme de la Diputació de Tarragona, Octavi Bono, que va fer un repàs de la trajectòria de l'aeròdrom reusenc des de la seva creació a principis del segle XX i fins a l'actualitat. I és que, al llarg del mig segle d'història que duu a les seves espatlles, han passat per l'aeroport més de 19,7 milions de passatgers.

OLÍVIA MOLET

L'acte va tenir lloc al Palau Bofarull i hi van assistir prop de 150 persones.

Robusté posa en relleu la manca de sensibilitat d'Aena en la gestió d'aeroports petits

Pellicer assegura que el territori no vol centralismes i que «és hora de plantar-nos»

El moment central de va ser la intervenció del catedràtic de la Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) i director del Centre d'Innovació del Transport (CENIT), Francesc Robusté, que va parlar sobre la influència del territori en la gestió dels aeroports regionals i es va aturar en el cas concret que ocupa Reus.

Així mateix, Francesc Robusté va manifestar que hi ha dues qüestions principals que provoquen que les companyies optin per operar a la ciutat de Barcelona en comptes de ferho a Reus: la capacitat i les tarifes no diferenciades. I és que, tal com va voler remarcar, «hi ha molta discriminació entre els dos, i per això les aerolínies acaben escollint la instal·lació més propera al centre neuràlgic del nostre país».

D'aquesta manera, el catedràtic considera que calen tres punts clau per a poder rellançar el territori: l'àmbit comercial, l'àmbit de la gestió i l'accessibilitat. També va subratllar la importància de la unitat «per adreçar-nos tots junts a Madrid». També va aprofitar per parlar d'Aena, tot assegurant que «li falta sensibilitat local i màrqueting» per poder gestionar aeroports petits com són el de Reus i Girona.

«És hora de plantar-nos»

L'alcalde de Reus, Carles Pellicer, es va mostrar contundent en assegurar que «ha arribat l'hora de plantar-nos». D'aquesta manera, va mostrar la voluntat de «complementar, però no ser subordinats», tot donant un cop sobre la taula i deixant clar que «no volem centralismes».

Pellicer, a més, també va assenyalar la necessitat de tenir un model diferent a l'actual, sense centralismes i on aeroports petits com el de la capital del Baix Camp no serveixin per pagar el dèficit d'alguns aeroports grans de l'Estat.

L'acte es va organitzar poques setmanes després que Ryanair fes pública la seva decisió d'abandonar el territori el proper octubre, i precisament en aquesta línia es van centrar bona part de les intervencions, que van coincidir a afirmar que l'aerolínia irlandesa va trencar les negociacions «de manera unilateral».

Així mateix, el Grup de Treball de l'Aeroport continuarà treballant per aconseguir captar noves companyies i mantenir viva l'activitat en una infraestructura que s'ha convertit en un dels principals puntals del territori.

Unitat entre les administracions

L'acte es va iniciar poc després de les sis de la tarda, i va comptar amb la presència de diferents personalitats de l'àmbit polític, empresarial i social de la demarcació. Així, no hi va faltar l'alcalde de Reus, Carles Pellicer, ni els presidents de les cambres de comerç de Reus i de Tarragona, Isaac Sanromà i Albert Abelló. També va ser-hi present el president de la Diputació, Josep Poblet; el director del Port de Tarragona, Josep Andreu, i el director de l'Aeroport de Reus, Vicenç Pallarés. Des de la Generalitat hi van assistir el delegat del Govern català a Tarragona, Joaquim Nin, i els directors generals de Transports i de Territori i Sostenibilitat. Pel que fa a l'equip de Govern de Tarragona, va ser representat pel regidor Javier Villamayor. Tampoc hi va faltar l'exalcalde de la capital del Baix Camp, el socialista Lluís Miquel Pérez.

BARRIS

Afectacions al trànsit Carme amb motiu de les seves festes de barri

REDACCIÓ

Amb motiu de les festes de convivència del barri del Carme, es prohibirà l'estacionament de vehicles des de les vuit del matí d'avui dijous fins a les dues del migdia del 18 de juliol, al carrer d'O'Donnell, entre el carrer de Jurats i el carrer Baix del Carme. A més, també es tallarà la circulació fins diumenge, des de les sis de la tarda fins a la finalització dels actes de la festa, al carrer d'O'Donnell, entre Closa de Torroja i el Baix del Carme; al carrer de Sant Benet i també l'accés a aquesta via des del carrer de l'Arquitecte Caselles i el carrer de Freixa; al Baix del Carme i a l'Alt del Carme, segons els actes.

D'altra banda banda, la Processó del Barri del Carme obligarà a tallar el trànsit el 16 de juliol, a partir de les set del vespre, al carrer d'O'donell, des del carrer Jurats; al carrer Baix del Carme, a la placeta de Sant Francesc i al carrer de Sant Francesc, des del carrer de la Misericòrdia, i al carrer de Sant Pancraç.

LLENGUA

El CNL ofereix eines als comerços perquè millorin l'ús del català

REDACCIÓ

Des de mitjan juliol fins a finals d'agost, el Centre de Normalització Lingüística de l'Àrea de Reus Miquel Ventura visitarà diversos establiments comercials propers a la seva seu des de fa un any, el Mas Vilanova. L'objectiu de les visites és informar els comerciants dels serveis que tenen al seu abast, com els cursos perquè el personal que treballa al sector pugui atendre la clientela en català i el servei d'assessorament lingüístic gratuït per revisar textos breus o per informar del recursos en línia existents per ferho de forma autònoma.

A més, en el cas que els establiments visitats ja vetllin per l'ús del català en l'atenció al públic, se'ls oferirà la possibilitat de ser establiments col·laboradors del programa *Voluntariat per la llengua*, amb la qual cosa passaran a formar part d'una xarxa de comerços que es difon entre els membres participants d'aquest programa lingüístic.

https://issuu.com/mestarragona/docs/mtarragona140711/8

El Parlament demana el traspàs dels aeroports de Girona, Reus i Sabadell

La finalitat és «fer possible una gestió individualitzada d'aquestes infraestructures des dels seus territoris»

Efe | Barcelona | 19.12.2014 | 11:17

https://www.diaridegirona.cat/comarques/2014/12/19/parlament-demana-traspas-dels-aeroports/702424.html

INFRAESTRUCTURES I SERVEIS BARCELONA - 28 juliol 2016 18.48 h

INFRAESTRUCTURES

El Parlament insta el govern a reclamar el traspàs de la titularitat dels aeroports

- Tots els grups han votat a favor de presentar el Pla Estratègic d'Aeroports de Catalunya 2017-2030 l'any vinent

Imatge de l'Aeroport del Prat JOSEP LOSADA/ARXIU.

PUBLICITAT

ACN - BARCELONA

JxSí, la CUP i CSQP han votat aquest dijous una moció que demana al Govern català que reclami al govern espanyol el traspàs de la titularitat dels aeroports del Prat, Girona, Reus i Sabadell a la Generalitat. El text, presentat per Junts pel Sí, també reclama que la gestió d'aquestes infraestructures passi a les mans de la Generalitat, els ajuntaments concernits i els agents econòmics i socials més representatius. El PP, C's i el PSC han votat en contra d'aquest punt. En canvi, tots els grups han votat a favor de presentar l'any que ve el Pla Estratègic d'Aeoroports de Catalunya 2017-2030 i de

http://www.elpuntavui.cat/territori/article/991709-el-parlament-insta-al-govern-a-reclamar-el-traspas-de-la-titularitat-dels-aeroports.html

Annex IV



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