

Organizing Violence

Peace and War in Twelfth-Century Catalonia

How can violence lead to the emergence of an ethnically or regionally diverse political community whose elites have avoided emphasizing this diversity? During the twelfth century the rulers of Catalonia used the conflict with neighbouring Muslim states to create a new political community. This community was to be formed by Christians, regardless of their origin, who recognized the leadership of the Catalan rulers. The protection of the inner peace within Christian society under the Catalan counts and the violence required by them towards the 'Others', the Muslims outside of Catalan society, created the possibility of building a single political society, irrespective of the internal territorial and social divisions. In this case, the sense of threat to the Catalan Christians by Muslims was a factor that facilitated integration and blurred the differences of members of the political community. The new political community was formed, whose elites established new forms of domination based on the progressive control of peace and war for increasing the effectiveness of the conquest of al-Andalus. Alongside the building of the new political community, new institutional and cultural discourses were created for advocating violence against Muslims who were seen as enemies given their differentiated ethnic-religious condition. The emphasis within them on ethno-religious differentiation occurred while a relative or theoretical unitary Christian society was claimed and promoted, which aimed for surpassing previous violence and internal divisions.

How Violence Was Valued and Organized in Twelfth-Century Catalonia

This chapter addresses the process of change in the definition of violence in twelfth-century Catalonia. The valorization of peace for specific groups of the community turned into the valorization of violence against a religious-ethnic group, the Muslims, which involved the conquest of their lands, their property, and even of their people. All this


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Map 1.1. The Iberian Peninsula in 1195. Source: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:P%C3%A9ninsule_ib%C3%A9rique_en_1195.png>. Elryck, cc by-sa 4.0.

gave rise to a military and political change of great significance that found in the new concept of peace and war important grounds for this transformation.

Violence was an essential element in defining, justifying, and exercising feudal or political power during the important changes that took place in twelfth-century Catalonia. The rejection of certain violent actions and the promotion of others led to another way of organizing war, which could at times take on a penitential character and be set in the contractual conditions of feudal relationships. The tradition of instituted peace was a notable feature of Catalonia, and the county and royal power cemented its authority through guarantees of peacekeeping.¹ This protective role contributed to its predominance in the control and management of major military events. In fact, the emerging political authority was active in the reorganization of war, at the same time as its agents became stronger or performed new roles. However, violent conflicts, local wars, and conquests were recurrent features in the warfare of those days.²

The needs of the time shaped the kind of war that was appropriate or possible. Foundations were being laid for the exercise of legitimate domination and legitimate

1 Bisson, 'The Organized Peace', and Font i Rius, 'Los inicios de la Paz y Tregua'.

2 Bonet, 'Wars in 12th Century Catalonia', pp. 164–69 and 189.

violence, something that in later periods would be administered by the state. Certain powers were becoming predominant in new power relationships, and war and peace were essential elements in dominant relationships. Cities and military orders, representing new and emerging realities, were involved in the process of defining which forms of violence were legitimate by either containing or promoting its use. In general, the rise of feudal violence has been considered by some to be the result of the decline of political power, although some authors single out the decline of public institutions. Nevertheless, negotiation, agreement, ideology, and other processes related to pacification emerged among the feudal aristocracy and under the leadership of certain political players. Peace emerged from the increasing maturity of the feudal relationship and the reorganization of the political order, although war also had a far-reaching impact. This process involved reinforcing certain political powers and functions exercised by elements of the feudal class. This occurred in a context of geopolitical changes in the feudal West that were marked by alliances and conflicts between regional powers, as well as the rise of the Church as an arbitrating and legitimizing force. Moreover, the choice of a single enemy, based on its religion and ethnicity, to some extent favoured the construction of a collective regional identity, and even an interregional one, that found its clear expression in the new forms of the political power.

The following pages explain how the reorganization of violence came about as a response to socioeconomic changes and the redefinition of political or power relationships. The main political authority, be this the count or the king, was the ultimate expression of the gradual emergence of the idea of legitimate domination that was nurtured in peace and security and justified in and by war. War together with justice, as an alternative to peace, were the axes of the power relationships. The value given to the fight against the Muslims as a sacred and important violent undertaking justified and, to certain extent, favoured the most important military developments in the second half of the twelfth century. The spiritual reward to be gained from subjecting the 'perfidious' Muslims was a metaphor for the material rewards which came with the military turn of events.

'God's Peace and War' and the Rise of Political Leadership

The pacification of the knights and lords took place over more than two centuries and gradually passed from feudal aggression within one's territory to a type of warfare pursued more often in neighbouring lands. Private war, that is, war for its own sake, gave way to war by consensus during the twelfth century. Great expeditions contributed to stabilizing the power relationships within the aristocracy, but a consensus had been reached before this, when the days and spaces in which the lords were allowed to exercise violence were restricted. The new agreement was reached or disseminated through meetings or assemblies of Peace and Truce from the eleventh century onward, and solutions were expanded and revised until the thirteenth century.³ The concepts

³ Barthélemy, *L'an mil*, pp. 569–76.

of peace and truce were gradually assimilated or equated into the terminology used in these meetings. Peace was identified with the idea of security.⁴

The institution of the Peace and Truce of God was a response to the development of feudal society, and above all to the needs caused by economic growth. The increase in agrarian wealth and its growing relationship with the market and commercial expansion could not take place properly in the presence of predatory and destructive practices such as theft, kidnapping, and other forms of brutality that formed part of the way feudal powers acted in the so-called first feudal age. Pacifying solutions stopped the abuses that had existed in agrarian economies with a high degree of autarky, and may be said to have worked insofar as they provided the lords with a certain standard of living in a near-subsistence farming economy. Theft or violent action had made up for shortages, as for example when arbitrary agrarian rents were extracted. In the emerging economy, stocks or accumulated agrarian resources were essential to growth, and therefore measures to protect them had to be introduced. Furthermore, gains from conquests provided new lands or interests in other markets that reinforced economic growth. These conquests were justified by new ideas about war.

The first peace statutes were implemented by the Catalan bishops in the eleventh century and laid down conditions which did not only protect ecclesiastics and their wealth. Over time, protection was extended and included goods, activities, or groups linked to strategic productive sectors. At this time the instituted peace was confined mainly to the diocese, and proceedings against violators of the Truce of God were administered by the bishops.⁵ During the twelfth century, some of these judicial responses involved or were directed by secular political authorities, usually a count or the king. Double jurisdiction and fines administered by the prelate and the count or king were introduced and imposed in the last few decades, although in the county of Urgell the count was the only one to do so.⁶ He was claimed to have the grace to maintain justice in a statement that emphasized that the 'potentes' (powerful) — were in charge of administering justice.⁷ However, if the defendants did not submit to justice, then they were excommunicated and excluded from the Peace and Truce. Justice was defined as a source of power by the Count of Urgell in the preamble of the Peace and Truce provisions of 1187, with justice, backed by biblical references, invoked as the necessary condition for administering the peace.

Pacification protected expressly strategic sectors and elements of the economic renewal during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It was frequently aimed at

4 Power was the protector guaranteeing peace to the protected: Lambert, 'Introduction', p. 2.

5 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 4 (1064), §§ III, XIV, XXIV; no 5 (1064–1066), §§ III and XVII, among others.

6 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 15 (1173), §§ IX, XVI; no. 17 (1188), §§ VII, XIX; and no. 18 (1192), § V. Some earlier examples, such as the Peace and Truce, led the Templars' double jurisdiction, which was at once comital and ecclesiastical, despite the rupture being a sacrilege (*Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 11 (1134)) or in 1155 when it was established that kings could judge whether the peace had been broken on the advice of archbishops and bishops (*Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 12, § XXVII).

7 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 16, § IX.

agricultural production, cattle farmers or peasants, and there were certain references protecting animals for agricultural work and peasants' houses.⁸ In the last part of the twelfth century, certain provisions clearly defended ownership rights. Rural peace was so important that the kings Alfonso the Chaste (1162–1196), also known as Alfonso II of Aragon, and Peter the Catholic (1196–1213), also II of Aragon, collected resources in order to guarantee it, while peasant militias were created to defend it.⁹

The Prince's Leadership in War, Peace, and Law

Some of the peacekeeping solutions of the eleventh century protected markets and merchants, and punished counterfeiters.¹⁰ In addition, from the middle of the twelfth century other provisions protected public roads, thus providing security for commercial activity to take place.¹¹ Sometimes it was specified that the protection was directed at merchants or passers-by circulating on the public roads, and it was explicitly related to fairs and markets by the end of the twelfth century.¹² The *Usatges of Barcelona*, understood to be legislation implemented by Count Ramon Berenguer IV (1131–1162) and inspired by Roman law, claimed that roads on land and 'sea' belonged to the 'potestas' (power), that is, the count, who would punish violators of the Peace and Truce of God on these routes.¹³ Other rules or *usatges* protected commercial spaces and established royalties. They imposed the count's peace and truce on the city of Barcelona, and also on ships travelling along the Catalan coast and on the minting of coins.¹⁴ The specific mention of the principal city in the county relates to the private or feudal notion of territory defined in the Peace and Truce that was set out by the Church and for the Church. Despite this private approach, the comital policy for political authority over peace started to protect commercial activity under its jurisdiction throughout the second half of the twelfth century by establishing peace in key places and among professional groups.

Other solutions of peace and truce were intended to preserve certain groups and individuals involved in important economic activities, as well as other people that could not defend themselves and were vulnerable to seigniorial violence. Unarmed churchmen and peasants were specifically referred to in these aforementioned solutions, as was their property, and sometimes merchants and bourgeois or other

8 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 10 (1131), §§ II–III; no. 14 (1173), §§ VI–VIII; no. 15, §§ VI–VIII; no. 16, § IV; no. 17, § VI.

9 Bisson, 'The Organized Peace', p. 291.

10 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 2, p. 7.

11 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 14 (1173), § XII; no. 15, § XI; no. 16, § II; and no. 17, § XVII.

12 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 16 (1187), § III; no. 18, § III; and no. 19 (1198), § IV. In England roads provided protection and peace to users in the late eleventh century: Lacey, 'Protection and Immunity', p. 83.

13 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 88, no. 62. In relation to the dating of the text, see Bonnassie, *Cataluña mil años atrás*, pp. 340–41.

14 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 88, no. 61; p. 87, no. 60; and p. 89, no. 66 respectively.

unarmed people such as widows or villagers. Those who could not defend themselves enjoyed a 'natural immunity' as did their properties because of their defencelessness.¹⁵ Yvo de Chartres's *Panormia* defined the members of society covered by truce and measures of protection that were almost the same as those embraced by Catalan peace standards, these members being ecclesiastics, peasants, merchants, and pilgrims.¹⁶ Moreover, the peace and protection promoted by French king Louis VII was directed at peasants and merchants in Soissons in 1155.

The peace terms were imposed on new spaces during the twelfth century, going beyond and transforming the preceding protection of ecclesiastical private spaces. In 1108, peace and truce was applied in an area with specific needs, Olèrdola, because it had been attacked by Muslims. Ten years later the pacification was implemented with regard to peasant activity encompassing an entire county, Cerdagne, by Count Ramon Berenguer III (1097–1131). His grandson, Alfonso the Chaste, applied peace measures in the county of Roussillon and in the bishopric of Elna in 1173.¹⁷

Political leaders extended peace measures to more general entities than just the ecclesiastical ones in the twelfth century. When in 1131 Ramon Berenguer III together with several bishops granted security guarantees, he referred to them as 'ac tractandum de comuni utilitate ipsius terre' (treating the common utility of the 'land'), although he kept the focus on goods and ecclesiastical persons.¹⁸ In the last decades of the twelfth century, both Alfonso the Chaste and the Count of Urgell proclaimed peace and truce solutions to the extent that their political authority enabled them to do so.¹⁹ The king stressed the 'common utility or good' in all his land, but now, for the first time, specified the dimensions of Catalonia and enforced peace and truce in all social groups. In so doing, he intended to exterminate kidnappers and thieves. In the first references to the territory, King Alfonso defined it as only referring to certain places on the borders, whereas his son asserted that the peace applied to 'all Catalonia', although Catalonia continued to be defined as 'from Salses to Lleida.'²⁰ The process of transition from the bishopric to the principality has been conceived as the passage from peace derived from the diocesan jurisdiction to territorial peace.²¹ The peace was applied to Catalonia, the area which had traditionally developed peace and truce, and therefore excluded the Kingdom of Aragon.

Other kings enacted the peace for whole kingdoms, sometimes temporarily, as did Henry I of England as early as 1100, or Louis VII of France during his absence on the Crusade, or the general peace given by Frederick I of Germany in 1152 and

15 Contamine, *La guerra*, p. 343; *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 3 (1033), p. 6; no. 4, §§ V–X; no. 5, §§ IV–XII; no. 6, §§ IV–VIII, XV; no. 12, § XVII; no. 13, § XV; no. 14, §§ IV–X; no. 15, §§ IV–IX; no. 16, §§ III–VII; no. 17, §§ II–VII.

16 Graboïs, 'De la trêve de Dieu a la paix du roi', p. 586.

17 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, nos. 8 (1118) and 14.

18 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 10.

19 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, nos. 15, 16, and 17.

20 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 15 (1173) and no. 19 (1198).

21 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, p. xxvi.

amplified in the Diet of Roncaglia in 1158. The progressive control of the peace was an instrument through which the main political power in a territory could assert itself.²²

The *Usatges* of Ramon Berenguer IV had some provisions that were inspired by the ideas of peace and truce, with the novelty that the count, referred to as the prince and understood as the authority, legislated on the administration of peace and truce, which was taken to be a central activity of his government. The occurrence of this tradition in the legal code is reflected in some constitutions of peace and truce that were compiled at the end of this legislation.²³ Besides offering protection in certain situations, the ‘prince’, that is, Ramon Berenguer IV, was said to have to direct security, warfare and peace, and truce relations with foreign enemies, and especially with Muslims. This went beyond the understanding that peace and truce should protect areas and individuals. Furthermore, the legislation specified that he led the process, and all subjects in ‘his land’ had to comply.²⁴ It was also stipulated that all of them should help to maintain the peace and security that the princes conferred on Muslims on land and at sea.²⁵

Another general provision on the prince’s authority indicated that he should command the hosts ‘with which they were to destroy Spain’. At this time, the name Spain referred to the Muslim part. The same legal code forbade the sale of arms to Muslims ‘without the consent of the prince’ (the count), and if anybody eventually did, he had to recover the arms or pay a heavy fine. Moreover, anyone disseminating secrets or information about a lord’s cavalcade to Muslims was also subject to an equivalent fine.²⁶ The famous *usatge princeps namque* required all men under his authority to come to defend ‘the land’ if it was attacked, but also if he besieged enemies in turn.²⁷

It was an early attempt at general mobilization that was invoked during the Middle Ages and later. Also, it should be noted that it was the expression of a new trend in political thought regarding the prince’s leadership at the top of the community in war, peace, and law. In fact, there was some theoretical elaboration or recognition at the time by either his son or grandson. Alfonso the Chaste introduced a general statement about the prince’s commitments in the preamble to an assembly of Peace and Truce: ‘the prince has the power to stop war, establish the peace, and preserve

22 Pascua, *Guerra y pacto*, p. 26; Sabaté, ‘Idees de pau’, p. 17. An approach to the context, Ladero, ‘Paz en la guerra’, pp. 21–26.

23 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 130, no. 172; p. 132, no. 173; p. 136, no. 174.

24 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 88, no. 63, and about the enemies (*inimici*), p. 89, no. 65.

25 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 89, no. 64. Christian kings or leaders of the northern half of the Peninsula received payments or pariahs to guarantee peace to Muslims, which explains this rule.

26 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 108, no. 123.

27 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, pp. 90–91, no. 68. Kagay, ‘The National Defense Clause’, pp. 57–58. According to Kagay, this rule marked the path to ‘Catalonia’s emergent sense of nationhood’ and allowed the Catalan count to seek more power. There was no reference to people or territory, only to the ‘land’ subject to the authority, i.e. the count. His understanding of ‘nation in arms’ seems far from the meaning of the rule, in which the links between vassals and the count are paramount and the count’s dominion over the ‘land’ is referred to.

it'²⁸ In practice, the charisma of the count, Ramon Berenguer IV, was enhanced especially because of his leadership after the conquests, and he had defined himself as 'the glorious conqueror of Spain' in a donation in 1149.²⁹ Nevertheless, when the conquest was over the dominance of the count was transferred to the lords. Once the count established a vassal at a frontier point, 'next to Muslim land', he told the vassal that he was there in the count's place, and in the count's land.³⁰

The articles of law that referred to the military authority claimed by the count contrasted with other articles related to the dynamics of feudal warfare in the same legal text, such as the ones titled 'if someone failed his lord in the hosts and rides' or 'anyone who was obliged to help his master and abandoned in battle'.³¹ This was indeed the military reality; that is, the lords were actually those who used violence or defended the territories, while the count and his son, the king, as lords were able to conquer. *Usatge* 73 stated that the erection of forts, castles, and even churches was subject to authorization by the prince or count and depended on the vassal relationship. This shows how the military leadership of the emerging political power had its roots in feudal hierarchies, at least at the ideological or theoretical level.³² It is known that the castles were the centres of military domination over the territory, and that Catalonia was full of castles at that time.³³

Feudal violence was remedied with monetary compensation: even in the case of murder, the crime could be put right by paying a sum. The sixty ounces of gold asked for in compensation for a killing was also imposed for offences of siege, pulling the hair of a gentleman, or cutting off a limb during an assault. In these crimes, social status and the severity of the injuries modulated or reduced the amount demanded, but vengeance was still referred to as the last solution in some cases.³⁴ Revenge was remedied through fines under feudal law, enacted now by the comital authority, although other *usatges* granted compensation to the family of the victim, or even allowed them to pursue offenders in acts that recalled early avenging practices.³⁵ Justice was also envisioned as a comital activity, but despite how this was planned in the text, feudal formulas were described in the *Usatges*.

Progressive Pacification and 'Legitimate' Violence

Progressive pacification of the violent actions of the feudal class contrasted with provisions that stated that the power or highest court (i.e. the count) must correct

28 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, nos. 15 and 20.

29 *Diplomatari de la catedral de Tortosa*, ed. by Virgili, p. 60.

30 *Els Pergamins*, ed. by Baiges and others, IV, no. 982: 'Et quod sis inde meus estandant de mea terra, de finibus scilicet Barchinone atque Tortuose et Ispanie'.

31 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 82, no. 34; p. 83, no. 37.

32 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 92, no. 73.

33 Ferrer i Mallol, 'La organización militar en Cataluña', pp. 120–23.

34 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, pp. 74–76, nos 5–6; pp. 77–78, nos 13–15, 17–19, 21; p. 79, nos 22–23; p. 86, no. 58 — it refers to revenge.

35 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 101, nos 100–101.

criminals such as thieves, scammers, or adulterers either forcefully or by exhibiting aggressiveness. These criminals could have their feet and hands broken, their eyes removed, be locked up, and even hanged. Women could have their noses, lips, ears, or breasts cut off, and could be burned if necessary.³⁶ However, the power was allowed to forgive them. Violence was also part of justice. The definition of peace conditions involved the development of a system of punishment for offenders, which strengthened political entities as was the case with the bishoprics, and later with the counties and royalty during the twelfth century. In addition to excommunication, the count and his men were authorized to apply violence against those who did not respect the peace or provide compensation. In one ordinance of peace and truce this comital violence was even expressed as revenge.³⁷ The new model tended to surpass and supplant the manorial court.

Another solution warned that if an excommunicated person did not want to make up for any damage done, the bishop and the king's representative or provost should gather an army by recruiting one man from each hide (*mansus*) in the diocese to participate in the revenge.³⁸ This was regarded as so serious that those who did not join the contingent were in turn excommunicated and left room for what has been called legitimate violence, even in a territory subjected to peace and for peaceful aims. The concept of revenge justified this action, but the scope of its implementation was a jurisdictional or territorial one.

Other legal norms of the time contributed to the pacification or limitation of the lords' abuses and uncontrolled violence, and were specifically formulated in the cities through the instrument of the city charter. The towns were clearly in need of peace terms for their development. The two cities taken from the Muslims, Tortosa and Lleida, soon received these charters. They set out the conditions leading to peace that were subject to county authority and upheld by means of justice, which prevented potential retaliation or the spiralling of violence by imposing fines. The model was transferred to other places like Agramunt.³⁹ It was a priority to ensure order among both conquerors and Christians, and thus neutralize violence in order to maintain their unity against the subjugated Muslim population as well as to revive urban activities such as trade. It was stipulated that anyone who made threats with a knife, sword, or spear in Tortosa and Lleida was subject to a burdensome fine from the court — *curia* — and non-payment resulted in their right hand being cut off. At about the same time, the provincial council of Lleida imposed religious penalties on those who brandished weapons or caused death in cities or elsewhere.⁴⁰ In Tortosa it was also stated that fugitive Muslim slaves had to be returned to their owners in an orderly manner and without any abuses, which shows the need to maintain certain conditions in order to control the violence against the ethnic group under

36 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 100, nos 94–95.

37 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 16, §§ XI and XII.

38 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 17, §§ XIV and XV. In most of the dioceses of Occitania, these *militias* were organized: Bisson, 'The Organized Peace', p. 306.

39 Font Rius, *Cartas de población*, pp. 121–26, no. 75 (1149); pp. 129–32, no. 79 (1150); p. 176, no. 79 (1163).

40 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 12 (1155), § XVI.

Christian subjection. Measures to limit private or random violence intertwined with the establishment of a judicial system. Rules were established with a series of procedural safeguards for applying justice. However, failure to compensate for a display of violence by paying a fine was punishable by having the perpetrator's right hand cut off. Violence was used to try to stamp out violence.

Violence against the authority was specifically forbidden in these charters. It was prohibited to 'do battle' against the count. Even if in general the idea of battling referred to private combat, here it was not allowed because the count was the lord or the authority in the conquered towns. In Lleida, the two lords, the counts of Barcelona and Urgell, declared that they would defend all the inhabitants and their property 'everywhere on land or sea where they had power against all men.' The counts' right to defend exceeded the urban jurisdiction and pertained to another territorial concept where they were the main lords. In a letter of confirmation of franchises addressed to the city of Barcelona, the king ensured the safety of the city, and therefore of its people, whom he made 'free' from oppression and 'bad mores' in 1163. In 1198, Count Ermengol VIII confirmed the charter of Agramunt and added some security rules, 'tam quam in pace quam in guerra' (both in peace and in war), and specifically in trading of merchandise.⁴¹ The *paciarii* were established as guarantees of peace in cities in the courts of Lleida in 1214, which meant the culmination of a peace process in Catalan towns, most significantly in those that had been in Muslim hands. Such was the connection between the administration of 'peace' and some city governments that the main posts in the local municipalities of Tortosa and Lleida were called *paers*, that is, *paciarii*.⁴² As the example shows, peacemaking processes and other processes curtailing violence culminated in a new stage in the thirteenth century. In the early thirteenth century, as T. Bisson has explained, the maintenance of peace and the curbing of feudal violence, confirmed through services and payments, moved to regional communities.⁴³

However, in the Catalan case, we want to emphasize the importance of the count, and later the king, as a key player in the provision of law, ideology, and the development of pacification, in contrast to what happened in southern France. This relates not only to the fact that he was the architect of the principal conquests of the Muslim territory, but also due to his close relationship with the city of Barcelona, the seat of the lordly and political power of his lineage. The fight against Muslims, active or latent, contributed to the need to coordinate the defence of certain regions, and thus maintain the balance or condition of peace for the inhabitants, especially of those towns and regions recently occupied. Thus, in 1188 a bull from Pope Clement III addressed to the people of Tarragona stopped some penitents from marching to Rome so that they could fight to repel the Muslim naval attacks suffered by their city, granting them the same amount of penance as if they had fought in Jerusalem.⁴⁴

41 Font Rius, *Cartas de poblaci3n*, pp. 173–74, no. 120, and pp. 286–88, no. 209.

42 Font i Rius, 'Or3genes del r3gimen municipal', pp. 316–25.

43 Bisson, 'The Organized Peace', p. 308.

44 Blanch, *Arxiepiscopologi*, I, pp. 112–13.

From Peace of God to War of God

Peace was guarded by religious condemnation, which materialized in the penalty of excommunication and was one of the common elements of repression for those who broke the terms of the peace process and the truce. The spiritual censures were strengthened and diversified and took the form of earthly punishments such as fines, judgements of God, or exile, which were already in place by the eleventh century. Christians who captured, enslaved, or killed Christians were also excommunicated. In the assembly of Peace and Truce of 1064–1066, it was specified that those who respected the Peace and Truce would be in God's grace and might even achieve forgiveness of sins, thus offering a reward instead of the punishment applied to those who breached the provisions.⁴⁵

The penitential solution was a positive alternative to excommunication in the peace movement, and as such would be highly important in validating or singling out the crusade movement and the military expansions against the Muslim lands of al-Andalus, for instance in Catalonia. C. Erdmann stated that once the peace was protected by the Church and its maintenance was a religious obligation, the war that led to that peace had to be a service to God.⁴⁶ H. E. J. Cowdrey has also established a connection between peace and truce and the Crusade in defining the ideological conditions of the leadership of the papacy and aristocratic peace. He considers, though, that the lasting impact of peace cannot be compared with pilgrimage or holy war.⁴⁷ We understand that there are two key variables in the transition from peace of God to war for God, these being political or military leadership and the overlap of the administration of peace and war in the same person or institution, such as the count or the king. The Church's role was particularly significant, and it provided an element of alterity ideologically speaking, in the confirmation of the political leadership and in offering faithful knights from the military orders. Even so, war was the place where emerging political powers cemented their authority.

Just as conviction and reward became closely linked in the deployment of the peace movement, war and warriors were gradually defined within the new framework, which in turn contained or controlled violence. Defenceless churchmen were protected, as were peasants, but on some occasions clerics who carried weapons or committed unlawful acts were condemned.⁴⁸ Those farmers and their goods who rode in cavalcades with their lords were also outside the protection of peace.⁴⁹ From the 1060s, various provisions shaped the violence in a more precise way. In the assembly

45 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 5, § XXI.

46 Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 64–94.

47 Cowdrey, 'From the Peace of God to the First Crusade', p. 61. Contamine, *La guerra*, p. 348, notes the proximity between the peace movement and the Crusades, especially in pilgrimage vows. Also Flori, *La guerra santa*, pp. 59–98, and Barthélemy, *La chevalerie*, pp. 254–60, explain the relationship between the Truce of God and Crusades. Despite the fact, as Barthélemy points out, that Christian knighthood was not pacified, after all.

48 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 7 (1068), § V.

49 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 15, § VI, and no. 17, § VI.

of 1064, those who rode with their lords with the intention of causing damage were condemned for wreaking 'depredation or devastation' and for breaking the 'peace and truce'. The same thing happened to those who caused damage or committed other forms of misdeeds but did not submit to the authority or judgement of the Church.⁵⁰ Excommunication befell people, their goods, and even companions if they had participated in the cavalcades. Also, the sons of magnates who jeopardized the vassals of their parents were expressly condemned and were not allowed to return to the family castle or enjoy family protection.⁵¹ Those who attacked by surprise ('aguayt') during the truce and caused the capture of the castle or deaths were subject to ecclesiastical justice.⁵² Once again, the imposition of certain compensation after attacking castles by surprise during the truce was updated in the middle of the twelfth century.⁵³ Another provision of the assembly of 1064 offered protection for a certain period of time to those who marched on an expedition (the one called the pre-crusade of Barbastro) and according to the truce of God.⁵⁴ Similar policies were developed in the next century for the Crusaders.

The Crusaders were protected with the security of peace, but also took a qualitative leap when they were rewarded for their contribution to the holy war. This form of positive assessment of military activity against the enemies of the faith inspired a provision of peace and truce aimed at the people defending the Olèrdola castle in 1108. The inhabitants and knights who were in charge of restoring the Olèrdola castle were also protected by the peace and truce in 1108. The site had been devastated by the attacks of the Muslims or 'paganorum inimicis nominis Christi' (enemies of Christ's name), and therefore all who defended the castle and its region would benefit.⁵⁵ The defence was rewarded with a guarantee of peace, which was now granted by Count Ramon Berenguer III and the Bishop of Barcelona.

Can these factors explain the particular definition of peace and truce attributed to the early Templars before their involvement in military activity? In 1134, the Archbishop of Tarragona, a pre-eminent figure in the Church, as well as Ramon Berenguer IV along with other prelates granted safety and security to the Templars, who were under the protection and defence of God and St Peter. This protective link was a key issue, whilst military activity was only referred to in a very general way.⁵⁶ Subsequently, the Templars and the Hospitallers were subject to protection, security, and peace in perpetuity, as were other ecclesiastical people and as was expressed and repeated occasionally.⁵⁷ Later, these orders had specific military obligations

50 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 4, §§ XVIII, XXIII, XXVI, XXVII, and no. 5, § XXIII.

51 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 4, § XIX, and no. 5, § XXIV.

52 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 5, § XIX, and no. 6, § XIII.

53 Valls Taberner, *Los Usatges de Barcelona*, p. 96, no. 83.

54 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 4, § XVI. Flori disputes that the conquest of Barbastro was an anticipated crusade but describes religious aspects that would end up being characteristic of the Crusades; Flori, *La guerra santa*, pp. 272–75.

55 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 8 (1108).

56 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 11 (1134).

57 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 14, § V, no. 15, or no. 19 as examples.

such as those concerning the defence of the frontier; however, around 1145, in the neighbouring region of Narbonne, the Templars started to charge in exchange for protecting the peasants as the Hospitallers did later in Osona.⁵⁸

'Restorative Violence' against Muslims: Discourses and Memories

In Olèrdola there was a direct relationship between the rejection of Muslim violence, which involved destroying churches, arson, and kidnapping, and the progressive definition of another form of violence that was defensive and restorative. This understanding of violence as restorative became further entrenched and is illustrated by the fact that arsonists could exchange excommunication for a penance of one year's fighting in Muslim lands — 'Ierosolimis vel in Ispania in servitio Dei' (in Jerusalem or in Spain in the service of God) — in the second half of the twelfth century.⁵⁹ This reflects an idea of the Crusade or holy war in which the Hispanic lands in Muslim hands were identified with Jerusalem. However, defining peacekeeping or security conditions did not stop feudal war, and even some peace arrangements made certain exceptions in some of these situations. Roads or tracks were protected unless the lords of the territory were clearly involved in war.⁶⁰ The concept of war was being remodelled, and as in the case of peace and truce, the new interpretation gave birth to a new way of managing the military process.

The emergence and development of the concept of holy war dates back to the eleventh century, when aristocratic elites prospered in the areas of Aragon and Catalonia, as C. Laliena has stated. The providential character of war had already appeared in the middle of the eleventh century, as Arnau Mir de Tost put it in 1048. At this time the idea of holy war flourished, as did the idea of a just war for the liberation of Christians. These ideas shared two key components of further military developments: the union of Christians and the definition of the enemy.⁶¹ Ecclesiastical reform provided the ideological ingredients, while the papacy led part of the process of promoting holy war. The pope favoured forming ties with major political powers while promoting other complementary focuses of ecclesiastical power, that is, the bishops, as renewed emerging authorities. Urban II addressed the main counts of Catalonia, Barcelona, Urgell, and Besalú, so they could help the Bishop of Vic in the restoration of Tarragona in 1089.⁶² The spiritual benefits offered to those who participated were the remission of sins, and significantly were offered to those who wanted to go on a pilgrimage to do penance in Jerusalem or other places. A reference in the bull is worth mentioning: divine providence would guide them, and the Christians who occupied Tarragona would rise up like a wall against the Muslim neighbours. The bull is an interesting record because it contains significant items that were proclaimed by the same pope

58 Bisson, 'The Organized Peace', p. 300; Freedman, 'Military Orders in Osona'.

59 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 12, § XXVII; no. 14, § XXV, but less detailed.

60 *Les constitucions*, ed. by Gonzalvo, no. 15, § XI.

61 Laliena, 'Guerra sagrada y poder real', pp. 104–07, and on identity related to holy war ideology in eleventh-century Catalonia, Sabaté, 'Frontera peninsular e identidad', pp. 76–78.

62 Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III*, nos 41–42.

to promote the First Crusade a few years afterwards, but this time it refers instead to the restoration of the Church and the occupation of Tarragona.⁶³

Holy war was not only a discourse disseminated by the papacy, but also served as an argument in the Catalan counts' early projects, as when Count Ramon Berenguer III proposed to conquer the region of Tortosa in 1097. In his concession to the churches of the 'kingdom of Tortosa', the long introduction put forward the idea of a certain Christ-mimesis of himself as Christ-redeemer, 'who with his own blood had redeemed the Church, whose unity was attacked and destroyed by the enemies of the faith in the lands of Hispania (Spain)'. He founded the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, commanding it to be built for the redemption of the recipient, the Abbot of Sant Cugat, of men 'pro delictorum suorum poenitentia', and of himself. The count would be redeemed by his restoration of the Church in the 'taifa kingdom' of Tortosa, with the Holy Sepulchre being a symbolic element in the process. In doing so, Ramon Berenguer III echoed a formula devised by the papacy before the success of the First Crusade.⁶⁴ Another county grant issued to the Count of Pallars during the same campaign to conquer Tortosa contained almost no trace of crusade ideology. Probably the contents of the count's message depended on the interlocutor.⁶⁵ The church was a key element in achieving legitimacy for the aims pursued by the Count of Barcelona. The project to restore Tortosa is interesting because in general the Aragonese Crusaders' vocation is better known, as is Peter I in comparison with his contemporary Ramon Berenguer III.⁶⁶ Moreover, the crusade movement had greater manifestations in Aragon than in Catalonia, at least in the early part of the twelfth century.⁶⁷ Catalan comital power used the crusader discourse to promote a reorganization of the Church based on the count's interests and different from other contemporary restorative guidelines. During the first half of the twelfth century, the need to restore ecclesiastical sites became clearer, but especially those which had been outside the Christian faith for centuries, such as Tarragona, Huesca, Tortosa, and Lleida.

The documents written to restore Tarragona and Huesca emphasized that these sites had been abandoned for years or had been outside the faith for 390 or 460 years because of the 'impetus of the barbarians'. The proposed restoration of Tortosa made clear that the bishopric had been destroyed and oppressed by the pagans and, as with Huesca and Lleida, that it 'had been subject to Muslim perfidy'.⁶⁸ The restoration of the Church and the consolidation of the crusading movement were the shared goals of the count and the popes. In this sense, Ramon Berenguer IV was

63 Crusading was a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon at this period, Cheveddan, 'Pope Urban II', p. 34.

64 Risco, *España Sagrada*, XLII, pp. 279–82.

65 *Els Pergamins*, ed. by Baiges and others, II, no. 296. There are two mentions of the intervention of divine providence in the success of the conquest: 'ex Dei adiutorio in omni regno Tortuose... dante Deo'.

66 Utrilla, 'Conquista, guerra santa y territorialidad en el reino de Aragón'.

67 According to Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality*, p. 125, this Christ-mimesis was evident in the person and actions of Peter I of Aragon, known as 'rex crucifer'.

68 Mansilla, *La documentación pontificia hasta Inocencio III*, no. 50; Laliena, 'Guerra sagrada y poder real', p. 110; *Diplomatari de la catedral de Tortosa*, ed. by Virgili, no. 13 for Tortosa and no. 19 for Lleida.

recognized for having restored three hundred churches after his conquests, as was memorialized in the dynastic written account of the *Gesta comitum Barchinone et regum Aragonie* (*Deeds of the Counts of Barcelona and Kings of Aragon*).⁶⁹ This reveals the connection of the major powers and the coexistence between the two processes of restoration and conquest. It reinforced the reform of the Church, but emerging comital power participated in or even led the process during its early stages.⁷⁰ The union between the Church and the Count of Barcelona suffered vicissitudes, as was common in other feudal power relationships. The Archbishop of Tarragona appointed a prince in 1129 to serve the Church, entrusting him instead of the count 'to exercise war in defence of Christianity' during the restoration and 'repopulation' of Tarragona. He chose a Norman prince, despite the vassal relationship that the archbishop had with the count, who had previously given him the territory of Tarragona. The task for the Norman was not just to occupy an abandoned city, but to defend Christianity.⁷¹

The two emerging powers, the papacy and the Count of Barcelona or leaders of similar status, intersected at the same pace, while the crusader ideals became more refined and stronger. Ramon Berenguer III showed this in his preparations for military action in the conquest of Majorca, when the pope urged him to take up the fight against Muslims.⁷²

The Pisan version *Liber Maiolichinus de gestis pissanorum illustribus* tells of the Pisan-Catalan crusade that conquered Majorca (1113–1115). The pope gave the cross to the Pisans, with the purpose of ending the capture of Christians and curtailing Muslim piracy that plagued the Mediterranean coasts.⁷³ The Pisan source highlighted the leadership of the Count of Barcelona, referred to as the Duke of Catalans ('dux catalanensis'), also 'rector Catalanicus hostes' or hero, a term in turn used to refer to the Count of Ampurias. At the time that Count Ramon Berenguer III was establishing pacts with the Pisans to attack Majorca, he gave an assurance of safety to the Pisan people and their goods in Arles and Saint Gilles in 1113.⁷⁴ In the same way that conditions of peace and security had favoured the consolidation of regional and local trade, the agreements for peace and security granted to some allies benefitted the progressive commercial hegemony of the Christian allies in the western Mediterranean. In turn, peace among Christians was accompanied by the covenants made in the war against Muslims. This shows how peace and security conditions favoured efficient war, or at least were accounted for in this way. A decade later, agreements between Genoa and the Count of Barcelona led to Genoese commercial traffic coming under comital

69 *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, pp. 102–03.

70 The donation by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer II, to Saint Peter and the pope placed the count under pontifical dependence through the possible restoration of the site: Archivo Histórico Archidocesano de Tarragona, *Llibre de la corretja*, no. 1 (1090).

71 Font Rius, *Cartas de población*, pp. 87–89, no. 51.

72 Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest', p. 406.

73 *Liber Maiolichinus*, rev. by Pierazzo.

74 *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, pp. 162–63, and no. 37, pp. 289–92.

protection and the inclusion of Barcelona on the sea routes to Muslim Spain, and they also manifested support for a possible war against Muslims.⁷⁵

In 1092 there was an unsuccessful attempt by the Christians to conquer Tortosa, which has been associated with the failure of Castile to conquer Valencia. Despite the parsimony of the sources, the military enterprise had a Pisan-Genovese fleet, and the Count of Barcelona, Berenguer Ramon II, and King Sancho Ramírez of Aragon collaborated, each aspiring to take the town for himself.⁷⁶

However, the *Liber* tells of a confusing episode in which the Pisans attacked and caused terror 'by mistake' on the Blanes coast, thinking that they had reached the coast of Majorca, eventually realizing that the people were 'Christians and Catalans'.⁷⁷ This is the first known reference to the Catalans, and it is significant because it is evidence of the appearance of the collective identity of Christian groups to counter a common enemy: the Muslims. Not surprisingly, Christians and Catalans are mentioned together in the same way. Interestingly, in another part of the poem, the count accused the Muslims of depopulating the coast of Blanes, due to a fear of attacks. In addition, Ramon Berenguer III stressed the aforementioned argument for the restoration of the Church. He described atrocities, such as killing monks and priests, that Muslims had committed inside churches that were later abandoned.⁷⁸ The story has clearly been reworked in an attempt to hide or justify the pillage committed by the Pisans before they became allies with the 'Catalans', and especially in the interests of the count, who finally joined them.⁷⁹ It seems difficult to believe that the Pisans completely lost their way. It also seems unlikely that churches in an unimportant place north of Barcelona were abandoned due to Muslim attacks as is described by the count. The story has been rewritten with crusaders' arguments that paint the Catalan ally as a hero or a military leader, even if he did not take part in the expansion in Tarragona around the same time. On the other hand, the explanation of the abandonment of the temples and their becoming overgrown with trees and bushes in Blanes is close to that offered by Orderic Vitalis on the abandonment of others in Tarragona before the restoration, and it seems a commonplace in restoration discourses.⁸⁰

Papal bulls preceded and accompanied the processes of conquest. Callixtus II exhorted all bishops, kings, counts, and princes to fight Muslims in 1123, equating those involved in the peninsular conquests with the defenders of the crusader states in terms of prerogatives and spiritual benefits.⁸¹ He explicitly referred to the release

75 *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, no. 41: 'et quod Ianuensis populus quiete habeat transitum [...] per comite [...] terram ad faciendam pacem et guerram cum voluerit sarracenis'.

76 *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, p. 160.

77 *Liber Maiolichinus*, verses 245–50.

78 *Liber Maiolichinus*, verses 285–90.

79 We agree that there was no previous agreement between Pisa and Barcelona for this expedition to conquer Majorca, as M. Teresa Ferrer i Mallol argues: *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, p. 162.

80 *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. and trans. by Chibnall, p. 402.

81 Flórez, *España Sagrada*, xxv, pp. 223–24. Ayala, 'Religiosidad militar y cancillería regia', pp. 48–49.

of the churches from the oppression of the heathen, and he said that ‘the sons of God are dead by the oppression of the pagans.’ He also nominated Oleguer, the archbishop of Tarragona and bishop of Barcelona, as his delegate or ‘legatus’ of holy war in the peninsular lands. The papacy also participated by re-establishing the reformed episcopal sees in the subsequent conquests. However, Oleguer had no role in the expansion process, something contradicted by the stories narrated in the hagiographic tradition, which probably tried to erase the ineffectiveness of the purported contribution of the Church.⁸²

Shortly before the conquest of Tortosa, another bull was published in favour of the military campaign that would be led by Ramon Berenguer IV.⁸³ The pontiff also encouraged the participation of soldiers in these expeditions. In 1152, Eugene III urged the faithful to follow the Count of Barcelona, once again assuring spiritual benefits equal to those enjoyed by fighters in the Holy Land.⁸⁴ A year later, Anastasius IV backed the leadership of the Count of Barcelona, telling the faithful to follow Ramon Berenguer IV and insisting on the need ‘to attack the infidels and enemies of the cross [...] to defend the Christian faith and the whole Church.’ He also identified Eastern and Western Crusades, and specifically referred to the benefits promised by the first Crusade propagator, Urban II.⁸⁵ The pontifical push coincided with ‘the purpose of spreading the faith and defending Christianity’ or even ‘of oppressing or devastating Muslims’ expressed by the leaders of the Catalan conquest. These types of statements were repeated in documents issued before or during military campaigns, such as the conquest of Tortosa and Lerida, and in other contemporary records, clearly in those addressed to the military orders.⁸⁶

The new political forms coincided with the renewal in historical memory, as happened with the *Deeds of the Counts of Barcelona* that was an important piece in the construction of political memory, probably compiled in the 1180s by monks from Ripoll.⁸⁷ Its narrative paid attention to the comital lineage, established dynastic legitimacy, and celebrated Ramon Berenguer IV as the restorer of Count Guifré the Hairy’s county. In this sense, the text stressed a legitimate dynastic descendance from Guifré, who was portrayed as the heroic founder of the anti-Muslim cause.⁸⁸ Besides, the members of the lineage were recognized as successful fighters against Muslims in this dynastic account. This distinguished feature was applied to Ramon Berenguer III, who was described as ‘the one always victorious against Muslims’ and

82 Aurell, ‘Esclavage et croisade.’ Mc Crank, ‘Saint and Hero’, notes that Oleguer was revered as a hero, while acknowledging the lack of military evidence.

83 Bishko, ‘The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest’, p. 410 (22 June 1148).

84 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 128, pp. 314–15.

85 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 133, pp. 320–21: ‘ad expugnationem infidelium et inimicorum crucis Christi viriliter [...] pro defensione Christiane fidei et totius sancte ecclesie’.

86 The count referred to the Hospitallers in 1150, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Saint John’s Order, folder 686, n. 2. Another reference in *Cartulaire general*, ed. by Delaville le Roulx, pp. 621–22, or also in 1157, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 94, pp. 243–45.

87 Cingolani, ‘Seguir les vestigies dels antecessors’. *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, p. 14.

88 *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, pp. 68–69.

also to his son, who ‘attacked bravely twenty thousand Muslims’ with only fifty-two knights, after inspiring King Alfonso VII to conquer Almeria.⁸⁹ This specific military role, highlighted in the chronicle, was in line with the prince’s role as the leader in the fighting against the Muslims that was claimed in the *Usatges*. However, the members of the lineage were presented with a special charisma in the *Deeds*, because they were heroic and brave fighters who opposed the main enemies of the faith, the Muslims. In addition, they were reported as the most committed against the Muslims among the Spanish Christian kings.⁹⁰

Agreements for War against Muslims and for Peace

The comital leadership prospered under the redefinition of peace and war. The agreements of the Catalan counts, especially between the Count of Barcelona and mercantile cities, kings, and other Christian political leaders, were essential in order to carry out military enterprises or establish peace. The pacts between the Catalans and other Christian powers are beyond the scope and purpose of this study, but they were the framework and, in part, the reason for the process of affirming comital power and reinforcing unity against a common enemy, the Muslims. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to highlight the importance of comital influence in Provence and the links between the Count of Barcelona and the Italian states which have been magnificently explained by P. Benito Monclús and M. T. Ferrer Mallol.⁹¹

The approach to crusade ideology by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV, was intentionally set out in the solution he imposed to settle the issue of the rights of the Order of the Temple in the Kingdom of Aragon in 1143 after a series of fruitless negotiations.⁹² The count stated that he would ‘defend the Western Church in Hispanic lands, by attacking, reducing, and oppressing Muslims; he would also exalt faith and the religion of Western Christendom by following the example of the Templars defending the Eastern Church.’ This last point shows how he was taking the baton from the institution that had been the heir of the Kingdom of Aragon thanks to its crusading role, thus remaining close to the main ‘crusader’ King Alfonso I of Aragon. There was also a discourse of ‘Otherness’ or complementarity between the Hispanic lands and the Eastern lands. Furthermore, he specified that the Templars had renounced the constitution of a ‘militie Christi in Ispaniis adversus mauros’ (knighthood of Christ in Spain against the Moors). This argument was linked to his

89 *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, pp. 98–99, 100–102.

90 This also referred to King Alfonso the Chaste, *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, pp. 122–23.

91 Benito Monclús, ‘L’expansió territorial ultrapirenenca’; Ferrer i Mallol, ‘Les relacions del comtat de Barcelona i de la Corona catalonaragonesa.’

92 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 43, pp. 93–99. The explanation of this comital imposition and lack of agreement contrasts with what is generally found in the bibliography, Bonet, ‘Historiografía e investigación’, p. 65. However, Forey, *The Templars in the Corona of Aragon*, p. 23, had already observed that there was no evidence of renunciation of the Templars, but it must have been made in a separate document.

insistence 'ad exercendum officium milicie in regione Ispanie' (to fulfil the obligation to fight in Spain) against the Saracens in a penitential formula. He did this in honour of his father, whom he stated had died as a Templar. This reference claims him to be the heir of somebody who joined the order at the end of his life, and for this reason he was apparently free of any personal interest before the King of Aragon's will was settled. The association of Ramon Berenguer III with the Temple was almost certainly forged by his son.⁹³ The comital discourse reinforced and legitimized his dual heritage as a son of a Templar and a political leader. Furthermore, he established a dynastic and ideological bridge between the Temple and the count, allowing the matter of the will to be settled, bolstering the figure and person of the Count of Barcelona, and also legitimizing him as a prince of Aragon.

In the solution applied to the Templars by Ramon Berenguer IV, they were called on to be involved in the conquests, especially in the military occupation of new lands. Later on, the count and his son the king established military orders to occupy conquered lands, following his resolution of 1143. The count gave a fifth of the lands conquered from the Muslims to the Templars, and later a tenth to the Hospitallers.⁹⁴ This was to promote their assistance in these conquests and in occupying regions. He also wanted the Templars to attack Muslims, and this explains why he gave them a fifth from the expeditions. The count agreed not to make 'peace and truces' with the enemy without asking the Templars' advice. Also, in 1146, Ramon Berenguer IV confirmed the Templars' right to 'obtain' or capture Muslims during their service in al-Andalus, thus boosting his role in capturing Muslims, which was a strategy to harass the enemy.⁹⁵ At that time, this was mostly a statement of intent because the Templars' real military potential was weaker than he expected. In the aforementioned document, the 'Otherness' pursued by the count shows how these knights, specialized in fighting but also members of the Church, were ideal or maybe idealized to contribute to later comital conquests and regal ones.

The process of forging links and loyalties, undertaken by the count and the king together with other emerging powers to obtain military contingents for great military enterprises, was a key element in achieving victories.⁹⁶ It further conditioned the distribution of power after the conquests in the middle of the twelfth century. Taking Tortosa as an example, in 1136 Ramon Berenguer IV established a vassal agreement with William of Montpellier, who obtained Tortosa in fee as well as castles, and in return promised to join the count in peace and war according to his will.⁹⁷ Then, in 1146 Ramon Berenguer IV made an agreement with Genoa, while another agreement

93 Miret i Sans, *Les cases de Templers i Hospitalers*, p. 23, suggested that the document in which Ramon Berenguer III was linked to the Temple was false. The son's responsibility in the probable falsification is explained in Bonet, 'Historiografía e investigación', p. 61.

94 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 94, pp. 243–45, and, *Els Pergamins*, ed. by Baiges and others, IV, no. 1028.

95 *Col·lecció diplomàtica*, ed. by Sarobe, no. 12.

96 Bonet, 'Wars in 12th Century Catalonia', pp. 180–83.

97 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 22.

to conquer Almeria was made with the Castilian king.⁹⁸ The Genoese took the conquest of Tortosa as an episode in a very ambitious programme, which had at its vertices Almeria, Tortosa, and finally the Balearic Islands, but they recognized the leadership of the Count of Barcelona by saying that they would not attack any place, city or castle, without his consent. Commercial accords of great importance for Genoa are referred to in one of two records kept about agreements between the Count of Barcelona and the Genoese to conquer Tortosa and the Balearics. Genoa obtained tax-free trade from the Rhone to the west and access to a third of the cities that the count might conquer, and a neighbourhood district with a corn exchange. The fact that the Genoese wanted to acquire a presence in these cities shows that their main objective was to establish colonial bases in the western Mediterranean. The need for leadership in political and trading matters led to pacts for war and trade. These agreements guaranteed the effectiveness of these prominent leaders, united powerful groups, and also foreshadowed the division of power and political or economic functions in the conquered regions.⁹⁹ The document of the agreement with Genoa was sworn to by important figures like the Counts of Urgell, Ampurias, and Roussillon, as well as the retinue of the Count of Barcelona, and it featured members of the aristocracy. The consensus for conquest and the commitments in favour of Genoa were obtained by Ramon Berenguer IV, just as he had managed with the Templars, and it shows how he exercised clear leadership in the preparation of war and, the most important issue, the status quo after it.

In the same year another agreement was concluded with the seneschal, Guillem Ramon de Moncada, who was given 'lordship of Tortosa in the form of a third of the revenues of the city and territory'.¹⁰⁰ Moncada's rights to the Balearic Islands were settled in the agreement, and it was his grandson and great-grandson who died during James I's expedition, undoing the pact, but at the same time showing how seriously these pacts were taken. Furthermore, by incorporating Moncada, the count established similar conditions to those of the Genoese for someone in his own circle. The fact that both were granted Tortosa and the Balearics as well as a third of the revenues indicates a comital strategy to give equal weight to the principal vassal of his court.

The Count of Barcelona set another vassal agreement with the Count of Urgell for the subsequent conquest of Lleida in May 1148, before embarking on the conquest of Tortosa. Both facts and projects were related. The division of Lleida gave a third part to the Count of Urgell as a vassal, and a fifth of the two remaining thirds retained by the Count of Barcelona went to the Templars. Ramon Berenguer IV gave the castle of Ascó, in Muslim lands, to the Count of Urgell, as a reward for benefits given to

98 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 144, pp. 337–39, and no. 141, pp. 332–34, and updated edition in *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, no. 52, pp. 314–18; no. 51, pp. 309–13.

99 *Tractats i negociacions diplomàtiques*, ed. by Ferrer i Mallol and Riu i Riu, no. 51, pp. 309–13. In the other agreement about the Genoese presence in the conquered lands, it would be a third, including both fortresses and cities.

100 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 51.

the Templars.¹⁰¹ There would be a castellan chosen by the Count of Barcelona. The castellan would have to go on campaigns against Muslims if the Count of Urgell did not fulfil his obligation to do so, and the Count of Barcelona would have the right to stay there. This example shows how vassalage agreements were modelled by the principal leader, Ramon Berenguer IV, who took Ascó as a strategic location and with a formula to ensure the effectiveness of his delegate, be it a prominent vassal or a mere castellan who represented him.

Other donations anticipated conquests, such as when Arnal Berenguer received Siurana in 1146. Bertrà Castellet, among others, participated in this enterprise and was awarded with the castellany for his efforts.¹⁰² The conquest of Siurana, a rural Muslim district, was the last to be directed by the count, and it opened up the possibility of conquering other sites, such as Miravet and Ascó in 1153–1154. All these main strongholds were located in a region between the two Muslim cities conquered before. The comital strategy was to take out the most important places first, starting with the main Muslim town, Tortosa. The donation of Ascó to the Count of Urgell was made on condition that he assisted in the conquest by attacking from inland positions, should the conquest of Lleida occur before that of Tortosa. The Count of Barcelona told him that he should make ‘*pacem et guerram sarracenis et christianis*’ (peace and war for both Christians and Muslims), as a duty to his lord. This phrase went beyond the traditional formulas in documents of vassalage in which the vassal pledged to help defend and go to war on behalf of his master. However, in the case of the Count of Urgell, he was being assigned a responsibility attributed to the Count of Barcelona according to the law. Despite the fact that power was delegated, this reflected his weakness as principal commander. The right of making peace and war was clearly expressed as a key issue in the political system.

The Count of Barcelona financed important aspects of military deployment with pariahs. Ironically, he defined pariahs as the result of the peace established with Muslims, but understood in the frame of a vassal relationship.¹⁰³ For instance, the Count of Barcelona promised the Count of Urgell two thousand morabetinos of pariahs until Lleida was conquered, and granted two thousand morabetinos to the Hospitallers to erect a fortress in a strategic place, Amposta, after conquering the neighbouring town of Tortosa plus one thousand annually from pariahs.

Despite the strengthening of the figure of Count Ramon Berenguer IV in the organization, conquest, and later distribution of the Muslim kingdom of Tortosa, the Genoese version in *De Captione Almerie et Tortuose* offers a different narrative which needs to be taken as a suggestive counterpoint. There was no such comital dominance in the conquest, as comes to light in the situations described therein. The title of Cafaro’s chronicle — Consul of Genoa before 1147 and expeditionary — shows how the Genoese naval actions of 1147 and 1148 were related, and indeed the Count of

101 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 54, pp. 126–29.

102 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 50, pp. 112–13.

103 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 20, pp. 47–48, ‘decimum de ipsius pariiis Ispanie que a modo inde exierint comite nominatim per ipsam pacem ad fevum’.

Barcelona participated in both of them. Cafaro tells us that the count came to Almeria with fifty-three men, while Alfonso VII of Castile, called the emperor, had no more than four hundred knights and an infantry of one thousand.¹⁰⁴ After returning from Almeria, the Genoese spent the winter in Barcelona with their families, where they stocked up for subsequent conquests, in line with previous agreements with the count.

The aforementioned account of the siege of Tortosa referred to three contingents located on three flanks: one was made up of half of the Genoese warriors with 'some warriors from the count', another with the count and William of Montpellier, and the third of Englishmen, Templars, and other foreigners. The story highlights the courage and strength of the Genoese, but also an uncontrolled episode in which they acted 'sine consilio consulum et ceterorum' (without the advice of consuls and others), showing that the Genoese were not under the military command of the count. It is also suggested that the Count of Barcelona was left with twenty knights for lack of resources and the 'Ianuenses namque viri audacissimi [...] iuraverunt quod a Tortosa non recederant' (Genoese, the bravest men, swore not to withdraw from Tortosa).¹⁰⁵ Although the count was really diminished in this account, the prior agreement was upheld: a third of the conquered land for the 'audacious' and two-thirds for the count.

From the middle of the twelfth century and onwards, the King of Castile, also called the 'Emperor of Spain', Alfonso VII and his son Alfonso VIII, drew up various treaties with the Count of Barcelona, and later his son, the King of Aragon, sharing future land gains in Muslim countries. They also divided up the Kingdom of Navarre.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, the imperial idea was related to the submission of al-Andalus in a few records from the chancellery of Alfonso VII.¹⁰⁷ This is not the place to explain the complexity of the balance of power in the Peninsula, although it is worth pointing out that a common strategy defined common enemies, in reference to not only Muslim lands but also Navarre. The agreements resulted in attacks on Navarre by both neighbouring leaders, which were interspersed in time with other attacks on al-Andalus. Already in 1139, Ramon Berenguer IV, acting as Prince of Aragon, and Alfonso VII agreed to share any lands acquired from the King of Pamplona, Sancho, proportionately; one-third for the emperor and two for the count.¹⁰⁸ They also made a pact not to make truces or settlements without consulting each other. The agreement between the two political leaders also led in 1141 to the recognition of Ramon Berenguer IV as vassal of the Castilian king, and in 1151 to the well-known treaty of Tudillén. This was made to achieve peace. The text was headed with the three key expressions of the process:

104 Caffarus, *De Captione*, ed. by Ubieto Arteta, p. 24. The difference between the two armies is striking, but in any case it reflects some precariousness in the comital contribution.

105 Caffarus, *De Captione*, ed. by Ubieto Arteta, p. 34. This account is far from the official image offered by the *Gesta comitum Barchinone*, ed. by Cingolani, pp. 102–03. The chronicle claims the unbelievable presence of two hundred thousand warriors gathered by the count with Genoese support.

106 Cantera Montenegro, 'Los tratados de paz y la delimitación', pp. 401–10; Estepa, 'El reinado de Alfonso VIII', pp. 214–15.

107 Ayala, 'Religiosidad militar y cancillería regia', p. 61.

108 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 28, pp. 64–65.

peace, strong vassal relations, and lasting covenants.¹⁰⁹ The treaty solved to some extent the issue of Navarre, thus leaving the Count of Barcelona subject to vassalage to the Castilian king, again. This bond was mentioned in other pacts on spaces to conquer, but with some interesting specifications. When conquering the city of Valencia and its lands and Denia, the count was linked to the Castilian king based on earlier bonds between Navarre and Castile. However, if Ramon Berenguer IV could conquer the city of Murcia, he would be considered a vassal in just the same way as had happened with Zaragoza. If the Castilian king did not help the Count of Barcelona for justified reasons, the count would gain full domination of Valencia. Degrees of interdependence were drawn up, based largely on past agreements, but also foreshadowing greater degrees of independence from the leader of Barcelona in certain cases.

The papacy had promoted the holy war and spoken in favour of peace among Christian dignitaries. Eugene III encouraged the Count of Barcelona and the 'Duke' of Pamplona to achieve peace, because 'war had caused harm to the Church and hit the poor hard', in accordance with the peace discourse. He asked Ramon Berenguer IV to reform the peace in God's honour and for the tranquillity of the Christian people under the count's government, but he also reminded him to act against the enemies of the cross of Christ.¹¹⁰ The count's mission was to bring peace to the Christians and fight against the Muslims, with the support of the bishops and backed up by the pope. Adrian IV demanded that the Archbishops of Tarragona and Narbonne intervene against those who opposed the count and those who favoured the Muslims.¹¹¹

The military leadership of Ramon Berenguer IV is evident because of the continuity of war under his command. He fought against Navarre, and later he participated with Sancho IV and Alfonso VII in Almeria in 1147; a year later he conquered Tortosa, then Lleida in 1149. Next, in 1150, he attacked resistant nobles in Occitania; he resumed attacks against Navarre in 1151, and won Miravet and Siurana in 1153. However, he did not experience only victories, as his own lands were attacked when Sancho IV of Navarre moved against Zaragoza in 1156. Despite the arrival of the Almohads, the military career of his son also demonstrated a similar continuity. He conquered the Teruel region (1169–1171), launched attacks against Almohads, and even tried to conquer Valencia (1172), as well as participating in the conquest of Cuenca (1177) and the Occitan war. Both father and son participated in attacks led by Castile, but there was no help from the Castilians in the Catalan or Aragonese conquests. It is possible to attribute this unbalanced relationship to the vassalage of the count and his son to the Castilian king, which, on the other hand, is far from the image given in the comital chronicle.

After the conquest, it was necessary to strengthen the frontier because of pressure from the Almohads. Political power achieved this by establishing and expanding the domain of the military orders, among them the Templars and Hospitallers. However, the military orders were also used for political-military purposes by the monarchs

109 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 62, pp. 168–74: 'vera pax et firma conveniencia et perpetua concordia'.

110 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 131, pp. 318–19.

111 *Colección de documentos inéditos*, ed. by de Bofarull, no. 129, pp. 315–16.

of Aragon and Navarre fighting on the western border of Aragon. Therefore, they were given lands in order to mark the kings' positions in the border areas of their kingdoms, these lands being finally set out in a peace treaty in 1149.¹¹² Military orders were mainly the instruments of the emerging political powers who patronized them, and they returned this favour above and beyond their crusader duties.

The military orders became lords of the southern frontier of Catalonia thanks to land granted by the count and the king. The formation of commanderies there mostly took the place of earlier donations to other lords that were involved in the occupation and defence of the region but who had failed.¹¹³ Other military orders were added to strengthen the defences in the gains made in the Teruel region and also the Ebro valley by Alfonso the Chaste, who promoted a model of militarization of extensive border regions with Muslim lands mainly under the orders' domain. This programme was developed by the monarch in the last three decades of the twelfth century, and these institutions were his indisputable agents. It went further than his father's policy had in Catalonia. A parallel process was developing in southern Castilian lands granted to military orders by the monarchy.¹¹⁴ The king outlined a specific military mission for the orders, already established in the frontier lands of the Crown of Aragon. He ordered them to attack the Muslims, round them up and establish truces with them, when he set up the orders of the Alhambra and Alcala, or when he gave Villed and Alcañiz to the Order of Calatrava.¹¹⁵ The characteristic elements of war in this region as defined by the king were the defence and control of the territories and the organization of peace and war, which took place from fortified sites near the border. In so doing he was delocalizing his military responsibility, despite having led the conquest, in accordance with the main formula for conducting military activity in the territories. In other areas, King Alfonso also chose to strengthen his presence at sites through the development of castellanies or the appearance of castle-guards under his authority, as he did in Montblanc and la Riba (1176–1178).¹¹⁶

Military control of the Catalan lands remained in the hands of the lords, as can be clearly seen in the enfeoffments that were given in the territory of Tarragona by the three main lords. They specified the military obligations of vassals, who were often required to fortify the place that they had been granted, and they also affirmed fidelities in a time marked by feudal war. This was the reality of war in the territories.¹¹⁷ The importance and autonomy of the lords explains why the Count of Urgell refused to construct fortifications in an area in 1132, and even promised to remove the one he had built, even though he had been rewarded with a payment.¹¹⁸ This contrasts with the measures of control and intervention in the fortifications by the count specified in the *Usatges*.

112 Forey, *The Templars in the Corona of Aragon*, pp. 7, 37, and 44.

113 Bonet, 'Las dependencias personales y las prestaciones económicas', pp. 460–62.

114 Ruiz Gómez, *Los orígenes de las órdenes militares*, from p. 121.

115 *Alfonso II. Rey de Aragón*, ed. by Sánchez Casabón, pp. 375–76, 599–601.

116 *Alfonso II. Rey de Aragón*, ed. by Sánchez Casabón, pp. 288–90; *Diplomatari de Santa Maria de Poblet*, ed. by Altisent, no. 571, pp. 418–19.

117 Bonet, 'Las dependencias personales y las prestaciones económicas', pp. 444–46.

118 *Diplomatari de Santa Maria de Poblet*, ed. by Altisent, no. 79, p. 81.

Epilogue

Socioeconomic changes demanded and gave rise to new forms of domination. Agricultural, commercial, and urban developments forced conditions of peace, but war was better organized and more effective, therefore contributing to economic growth which in turn strengthened the emerging political powers. The county or royal authority and the main Church authorities defined which violence was legitimate from the eleventh century and during the twelfth century, thus directing the administration of peace and the deployment of large military enterprises. Excommunication and penance legitimized repression and the use of violence. In addition, violence administered in the name of justice and peace remained a tool for new forms of domination. Moreover, restorative violence against a religious-ethnic group, the Muslims, was justified and boosted thanks to new discourses and memories that ended in the conquest of their lands and properties.

Agreements between political dignitaries and military orders or other military leaders created the conditions for Christian progress against the Muslims whereby they conquered and dominated huge frontiers. The count, Ramon Berenguer IV, and his son, King Alfonso, shifted their military responsibilities in the territories to other agents, while feudal war was still the highest expression of the feudal authorities in the Catalan regions. However, the emergence of the county or royal role in peace and war in the twelfth century reached its full expression in the thirteenth century.

Peace among the Christians encouraged agrarian and trade development, and the conquests consolidated this economic growth, bringing about a major qualitative advance. In the end, the protection of the Christians and the violence required towards the 'Others', the Muslims, meant a different valorization and organization of that violence which also gave rise to a qualitative improvement in local economies and a distinctive, new definition of political power.

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