

ARTICLE

Market power in California's water market

Françeska Tomori¹ | Erik Ansink² | Harold Houba³ |
Nick Hagerty⁴ | Charles Bos⁵

¹Department of Economics, ECO-SOS, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Reus, Spain

²Department of Spatial Economics, Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

³Department of Economics, Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

⁴Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana, USA

⁵Department of Finance, Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Correspondence

Erik Ansink, Department of Spatial Economics,
Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Email: erik.ansink@vu.nl

Funding information

Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y
Universidades and the European Union, Grant/
Award Numbers: PID2019-105982GB-I00/
AEI/10.13039/501100011033, BES-2017-080192,
ECO2016-75410-P; UniversitatRoviraVirgili and
the Generalitat de Catalunya, Grant/Award
Number: 2019PFR-URV-53

Abstract

We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.

KEYWORDS

California, market power, Nash-Cournot, water markets

JEL CLASSIFICATION

C72, D43, Q25

1 | INTRODUCTION

We study the extent and impact of market power in water markets. Such markets are not abundant globally but their prevalence has been increasing. In countries or river basins where rights to water use are allowed to be sold or leased, water marketing reallocates water from lower to higher value uses (Grafton et al., 2011). Although reallocation is known to substantially increase the efficiency of water use (Browne & Ji, 2023; Bruno & Jessoe, 2021; Jenkins et al., 2004; Rafey, 2023;

This is an open access article under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2023 The Authors. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Agricultural & Applied Economics Association.

Vaux Jr. & Howitt, 1984), most water markets have relatively little trading, suggesting they remain underutilized. Why? Two leading explanations are high transaction costs (Carey et al., 2002; Leonard et al., 2019; Regnacq et al., 2016) and market power (Bruno & Sexton, 2020; Chakravorty et al., 2009; Easter et al., 1999; Holland, 2006; Jacoby et al., 2004; Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994; Wheeler, 2022). Both sources of friction may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing, but they may call for different policy remedies, depending on which is more important.

Our setting is California's statewide surface water market. California is one of the world's largest water markets by quantity and value of water traded. At the same time, water transactions are a small fraction of total water used, suggesting large potential gains from trade. Recent work has made progress in quantifying the role of transaction costs (Hagerty, 2023), but the contribution of market power is less clear. Existing conditions may support market power: Trading of water in California is dominated by large water districts that hold rights on behalf of farmers or households. Some of these districts are enormous; for example, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California serves 19 million people. The belief that large districts, in particular those that are buyers, may have market power is held by many stakeholders, and it is supported by previous literature (Hagerty, 2023; Hansen et al., 2014; Tomkins & Weber, 2010).

Our contribution is twofold. The first contribution is methodological; we propose a novel measure of market power tailored to the setting of water markets. This measure is derived using a Nash-Cournot model of water transactions that is inspired by the model setup of Ansink and Houba (2012). We will motivate this model choice by comparing it with a Nash-in-Nash bargaining model. Under two main assumptions, discussed below, this model allows us to derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We write this solution in terms of willingness to pay and accept. It is sufficiently general to be adapted and applied to other endowment economies, including permit markets. A methodological advantage of our model is that we do not rely on a conjectural variations approach that employs consistent conjectures (Bresnahan, 1989). This approach is not compatible with standard notions of rational behavior since the game theory revolution (Lindh, 1992).¹ Despite of this, our solution allows for an extension to conjectural variations that avoids prior selection of the side of the market that holds market power.

The second contribution is that we empirically test the extent of market power in California's surface water market. We apply our model to a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy by Hagerty (2023) and Hagerty (2022). The data that we use are 1993–2015 panel data on water transactions in California, with detailed information on quantities and prices by water district, combined with detailed spatial data on locations of buying and selling districts as well as geographical factors that may affect market power. The data allow us to control for main water uses of buying and selling districts as well as various types of associated transaction costs. The results of our estimation allow us, ultimately, to estimate measures of market power for California's water market.

The model starts with two main assumptions, both of which are later relaxed. One assumption is that we fix the side of the market on which market power resides. Our starting point is buyer-side market power, as explained above. We then estimate the model in the other direction, allowing for seller-side market power, and find none. To check the relevance of this assumption, we also employ a model specification where we allow for market power on both sides at once; we find compelling empirical support for market power on the buyer side only. The second main assumption is that we use linear demand, originating from a quadratic benefit function of water use. This functional form is commonplace in the water economics literature and allows for a straightforward empirical strategy to derive our results. Constant linear demand across selling districts may not be realistic, however, and therefore we relax this assumption in an alternative specification where, instead, we impose a constant price elasticity. This alternative specification, with constant price elasticity, is presented as

¹In Hagerty (2023), the same dataset is analyzed, but the focus is on the impact of transaction costs in obstructing water markets. As a robustness check, the potential impact of market power as an alternative explanation for market friction is explored, using an approach that employs consistent conjectures. Other papers, including Bruno and Sexton (2020), use this same approach.

part of a larger class of model specifications featuring homogeneous demand, for which we present a closed-form solution as well.

Our main result is that market power in California's water market is limited. Our main specification implies that buyer power yields an average markdown of 6% of the transaction price. This result is obtained for the linear model but continues to hold for the nonlinear specification and is robust to other model modifications. It is surprising in the sense that the thinness of water markets, including California's, is conventionally associated with higher possibilities of exploiting market power. Intuition for this result may be found in the idea that an individual buyer rarely purchases a large fraction of any seller's endowment of water. Each seller not only has many potential buyers but also consumes water directly, leaving residual supply highly elastic to each buyer.

This finding suggests that market power is not a first-order concern for policy reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and flexibility of water allocation in California, and perhaps in other water-scarce contexts as well. Reform efforts can focus on other considerations instead, such as transaction costs and political economy factors. Proposals to, for example, break the control of water districts over water rights may or may not be desirable on other grounds, but market power in the statewide water market does not appear to be one of them.

Our empirical estimates are relevant to the specific context of surface water in California, and similar analyses in other settings may reveal different results. However, a broadly relevant lesson is that market power is less likely to be a major problem in settings in which water rights are the primary allocation mechanism and markets perform only secondary reallocation. The reason is simply that potential buyers or sellers must compete with the outside option of consuming the water one already owns. Although such a configuration would not describe a situation in which, for example, all water rights are initially held by a single entity, it does describe the vast majority of settings in which water markets are active or under consideration.

2 | BACKGROUND AND DATA

Water in California is initially allocated each year on the basis of water rights and contracts. Water rights originate from historical claims and continue to be recognized by the state.² Contracts are long-term agreements held with federal and state agencies under three major water projects: the Central Valley Project, the State Water Project, and the Lower Colorado operations. The main agents that hold these water rights and contracts are mostly local water utilities we refer to as water districts. Water districts divert water from rivers, or receive deliveries from canals, and distribute them among their constituent farmers and/or households.³

Following initial yearly allocations, water districts may transfer water to other parties, typically in return for monetary compensation. Physically, it is feasible to move water between nearly any pair of districts in the state, due to an extensive network of canals, reservoirs, and pumps that constitute one of the world's largest interconnected systems of surface water infrastructure. Legally, transfers are allowed, but they are subject to many different regulatory approval processes depending on the project or type of right the transferred water is based on, where the water originates, the intended destination, and the transfer pathway (California State Water Resources Control Board, 1999). Practically, transfers are completed on a bilateral basis, without a central clearinghouse or auctions; water managers (and sometimes independent brokers) reach out to each other and reach agreements with the help of attorneys (Brewer et al., 2008).

²Most water rights are based in the legal doctrine of prior appropriation; California also recognizes riparian rights, but these constitute a small fraction of total water use.

³By water district, we mean any organization that supplies water to wholesale or retail customers. Most are local government agencies, though some are nonprofit or for profit, and they carry various names, such as irrigation districts, water conservation districts, or mutual water companies. Some individual farms hold their own water rights without a district intermediary, but they constitute a small fraction of total water use in the state.

Although water transactions are possible, they also face transaction costs arising from all of these frictions: the need to pump water uphill and account for evaporation losses (conveyance charges and delivery costs), the need to comply with regulatory requirements and delays (regulatory, verification, and monitoring costs), and the need to find potential counterparties and reach agreement (search, information, negotiation, and contracting costs). Transaction costs in the California water market are more thoroughly detailed by Regnacq et al. (2016), Scheer (2016), and Hagerty (2023). Our treatment of transaction costs is consistent with a frequently cited definition provided by McCann et al. (2005): “the resources used to define, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights.”

Many types of districts and other parties buy and sell water. Transactions may be agricultural to urban (i.e., a district that primarily supplies irrigation water to farms selling to a district that primarily supplies domestic water to residential households), agricultural to agricultural, urban to urban, or (rarely) urban to agricultural. They also may be agricultural or urban to environmental, in which an environmental nonprofit or government agency purchases water from farmers or municipalities for instream use (i.e., to be left in the river). Our analysis encompasses all these types of transactions, which are conducted bilaterally, at arms length, and at freely negotiated prices. We exclude longstanding arrangements between wholesale and retail water districts (e.g., the Metropolitan Water District and the City of Los Angeles), as well as government programs that offer to buy or sell water at fixed prices (e.g., in cases of late-season surplus or deficit) because observed prices are less informative in these situations.

There are a variety of reasons why water districts trade water. The key point is that trading allows water to be reallocated from lower to higher value uses. This reallocation allows selling districts to raise additional revenue streams, whereas buying districts do so to adjust their water allocation strategy, minimizing losses when faced with water shortage. In such circumstances, agricultural districts with a large share of perennial crops like almonds and grapes will value water more than those with predominantly annual crops. Urban districts will want to secure water for household and industrial use, whereas buybacks by the government may be crucial for environmental purposes particularly when water is scarce.

There are two main types of surface water transactions: leases and permanent sales. Leases are short-term transfers of water volumes with a high degree of certainty. Permanent sales are transfers of the underlying right either to divert water from rivers or to receive deliveries from federal or state water projects. Permanent transfers bundle an expected annual water volume with year-to-year variability on the basis of weather conditions and seniority. We focus our analysis on leases because their prices are easier to interpret without strong assumptions about discount rates and risk preferences, and because they allow us to use year-to-year variation to identify parameters in panel data. Leases also constitute a majority of transactions, and their observed prices are much less noisy than for permanent sales.

The timing of water management and agricultural decisions in California follows an annual cycle known as the water year, which runs from October 1 through September 30. Nearly all precipitation in the state falls between October and March, and most water demand aligns with the main growing season, roughly April through September. By the end of winter, the quantity of water available for the upcoming summer is known with high certainty. For example, yearly allocations in the Central Valley Project are initially announced in the third week of February; they are often revised through April or later, but the revisions are small compared with the interannual variation (Hagerty, 2022; Stene, 1995). As we show below, most water leases are completed during April and May for delivery sometime during the rest of the water or calendar year. This timing comes after districts resolve most of their uncertainty over their water endowment for that year and before they consume most of that endowment. Because both water transactions and market activity follow this kind of annual cycle, we aggregate our analysis to yearly observations of water use and transaction choices.

In focusing on surface water, our analysis also excludes transactions of groundwater rights or permits. Groundwater markets also exist in a few basins that have undergone a process called adjudication to clarify property rights (Ayres et al., 2021), though in most of the state, extraction is largely

unregulated and unmonitored. Legally, groundwater is fully distinct from surface water, and trade of groundwater rights is sufficiently different as to require distinct theoretical and empirical models. For example, groundwater transactions typically transfer the right to pump water rather than the water itself, and groundwater pumping also can only be traded within a basin, whereas surface water can be transported across long distances and may be thought of as a statewide market.

Market power in California's water market is not unlikely. In the Cournot-Nash model that we develop in the next section, such power originates from the number of players on either side of the market. If buyers are on the short side, then they can exploit their favorable position with mark-downs on the price. Several aspects have been found to affect this relative position of buyers and sellers in California's water market. Hansen et al. (2014) point to the presence of some "dominant" buying districts. Tomkins and Weber (2010) suggest informational asymmetries with selling districts being less aware of buying districts' options. Bruno and Sexton (2020) mention capacity constraints in conveyance infrastructure as well as an environment that is "conducive to forming cartel-like coalitions." Combined, these aspects may cause buyers to be able to exercise some degree of market power.

We use recently assembled data on California's water economy, first described by Hagerty (2023). We mainly use three datasets. The first is a proprietary dataset compiled by WestWater Research, LLC, listing prices, volumes, and other information related to water transactions in California. These raw transactions are supplemented by data on the geographical and institutional characteristics of water districts, assembled from geospatial files and other sources. This dataset identifies the locations of buying and selling districts, and is used to estimate distances and identify other parameters related to transaction costs. Full details on these two datasets and their cleaning and processing are provided in Hagerty (2023, Section 4 and Appendix G). The third is a dataset on yearly surface water entitlements and deliveries in California, compiled from the archives of the California Department of Water Resources, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and the State Water Resources Control Board. Details of this dataset are provided in Hagerty (2022).

The combined dataset provides panel data on water deliveries and transaction prices in California over the 23 year period 1993–2015. The panel data are unbalanced because districts can be involved in more than one transaction per year. Our unit of observation is the water district. The water district is the lowest possible level where (a) we can unambiguously match transactions to units, and (b) we have sufficient information on the units' entitlements and deliveries. Roughly 75% of all transactions in our transaction dataset can be matched to districts with complete information on entitlements and deliveries.⁴

The WestWater water transactions database includes a total of 6309 transactions over the period 1990–2015. We impose several sample restrictions following the discussion above. First, to focus on the surface water market, we drop transactions of permits for small volumes of groundwater pumping within adjudicated basins in Southern California. Second, to limit our analysis to short-term leases, we drop transactions of permanent water rights. Third, to focus on transactions from which we can infer useful information, we exclude transactions whose price is missing or known to be set administratively (i.e., not at arms length).

Because we will assess transactions both from the sellers' and from the buyers' perspective, we duplicate each transaction and split the dataset into two: one for buyers and one for sellers. A minority of transactions involve more than one district on each side of the transaction. We split up such transactions (i.e., by dividing the transaction volume equally over the number of districts involved), such that each observation contains one selling and one buying district. Finally, we exclude transactions executed before 1993 (because data on water deliveries is only available from 1993 onward). We subsequently lose 28% of our remaining observations (slightly more for buyers than for sellers)

⁴The alternative to districts as units of observation would be to either use planning areas or DAU-county areas (both are hydrogeographical areas defined by the California Department of Water Resources). Doing so would facilitate the matching with entitlements and deliveries. The downside, however, is that it would severely reduce the number of observations in our final dataset because transactions would be lumped into fewer units.

when merging our transactions dataset with our dataset on districts' entitlements and deliveries. Our final dataset contains 1131 observations, 592 for sellers and 539 for buyers.

Summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and number of observations) on transactions for both buyers and sellers are shown in Table 1. In addition to transaction volumes and prices, this table lists statistics on six different factors that were found by Hagerty (2023) to be costly to buyers or sellers and thereby generate transaction costs. The first three are costly to sellers: (S1) transactions that cross the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, (S2) transactions where the buyer is primarily using water for agricultural purposes, and (S3) the total distance if water is conveyed along a river. The next three are costly to buyers: (B1) the virtual distance between buyer and seller if water is transferred against the direction of flow, (B2) transactions that are subject to a State Water Boards review, and (B3) transactions that export water from a federal or state water project. Two factors cause differences in the data between buyers and sellers. One is that, in merging transactions with entitlements, we lose more observations for buyers than for sellers, and this difference is apparently not a random draw. The second factor is that the buyer observations include a substantial share, 24%, where water is acquired for instream use, whereas for sellers this is only 1%. Such transactions tend to have much lower prices, roughly 50% lower than transactions where buyers are purchasing water for consumptive use. We will check whether the inclusion of these transactions affects our results.

Transactions mostly occur in a limited number of hydrologic regions. Sellers are mostly located in the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River regions, whereas buyers are mostly located in the Tulare Lake, San Joaquin River, and South Coast regions. We find only few instances of districts that both sell and buy, suggesting that we can assume fixed roles for districts as sellers or buyers in our model that we present in the next section. Examining transactions for which we have the exact date of transaction, we find that they are largely spread out over months 3–7 with more than 50% of transactions occurring in April and May, the start of the summer growing season. Transactions in our database cover a total of 161 districts, which implies a mean number of $592/161 = 3.7$ transactions per district over our 23-year period from the sellers' perspective and $539/161 = 3.3$ for buyers. This low number suggests that California's water market is thin.⁵

3 | MODEL

Models that are able to quantify market power range from the Cournot-Nash model to the recent Nash-in-Nash bargaining model (Collard-Wexler et al., 2019). The former model provides a succinct framework that centers around competition in quantities and has been adapted to accommodate water markets (Ansink & Houba, 2012). The Nash-in-Nash bargaining model shares certain similarities with the Cournot-Nash model. A major advantage is that it incorporates bilaterally negotiated contracts, which would capture many realistic aspects of our setting.

There are, however, two disadvantages to the use of Nash-in-Nash bargaining. The first is practical. Nash-in-Nash has yet to find effective applications in nonstandard settings such as the one given by water markets. There is no version of Nash-in-Nash available in the literature that accommodates our setting of an endowment economy with endogenous trading networks and transaction costs. The second disadvantage is more conceptual. Nash-in-Nash bargaining recognizes the asymmetry of bargaining power as an additional source of market power and is not able to distinguish the two. Collard-Wexler et al. (2019), for example, maintain a general notion of contracts that leaves the relationship between quantities and prices unspecified, thereby equating market power to bargaining power. More recently, Alvarez et al. (2023) provide a formulation of Nash-in-Nash that employs negotiated bilateral quantities and inverse demand functions to determine prices. In general, the

⁵One could argue that our data suffer from selection bias because we only observe realized transactions and these are typically from pairs of trading districts with low transaction costs. Note, however, that we only observe equilibrium transactions and any nonobserved transaction price would be "out of equilibrium."

TABLE 1 Summary statistics on transactions by sellers/buyers.

	Sellers			Buyers		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Price (2010\$/AF)	237.49	296.79	592	185.50	173.75	539
Volume (AF)	8.74	24.70	583	8.93	26.67	530
S1: Delta crossing (1 = yes)	0.33	0.47	568			0
S2: Agricultural buyer (1 = yes)	0.47	0.50	592			0
S3: River distance (km)	0.09	0.10	568			0
B1: Virtual distance (km)			0	0.08	0.11	534
B2: State water boards review (1 = yes)			0	0.42	0.49	539
B3: Export from project (1 = yes)			0	0.05	0.22	539

application of Nash-in-Nash requires specifying one side of the market operating along either the demand or supply curve. Although this formulation bears similarities to the Cournot-Nash model, it also implies a concept of market power that combines both bargaining power and strategic quantity manipulation.

For these reasons, we resort to the established Nash-Cournot model as the structural model in our investigation of market power in the Californian water market and leave application of the Nash-in-Nash approach for future research. Note, though, that both models share an important commonality. By relying on the Nash equilibrium concept, it is presumed that an invisible hand steers individual expectations toward equilibrium even in the absence of market institutions such as auctions or clearinghouses. In the Californian water market, this makes sense. Water district managers and water brokers have both a good understanding of the market and good information on aspects that may affect market trading such as weather fluctuations, institutional rules, and different types of transaction costs.⁶

3.1 | A model of market power in water markets

We develop a Nash-Cournot model of water transactions in order to derive a novel measure for the extent of market power in a water market setting. Consider a water market with water transactions between sellers at origins $o = 1, 2, \dots, N_o$ and buyers at destinations $d = 1, 2, \dots, N_d$. Water is a homogeneous good and purchases from different sellers are (physically) perfect substitutes. Both sellers and buyers have endowments of water, denoted either $e_o > 0$ or $e_d \geq 0$, depending upon their role. Although variation in rainfall and snow melt may cause endowments to change over time, we suppress time subscripts in this section to keep notation simple. The amount of water sold by seller o to buyer d is denoted $q_{od} \geq 0$. Obviously, sellers cannot sell more water than their endowments, that is $\sum_{d=1}^{N_d} q_{od} \leq e_o$.

Water use by buyers consists of their endowment plus purchased water: $Q_d \equiv e_d + \sum_{o=1}^{N_o} q_{od}$. Buyer d 's benefit from using this total sum of water equals $f_d(Q_d)$, which is increasing in the neighborhood of e_d (buyers are unsatiated at e_d), strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable in Q_d . For later reference, we introduce buyers' willingness to pay, denoted WTP, which is defined as the partial derivative of net benefits with respect to water use. Formally,

⁶The thinness of the market and lack of a central clearinghouse will create additional transaction costs. Such costs are consistent with our model as is shown in the online supplementary appendix where we present a model version that includes transaction costs.

$$\text{WTP}_d(Q_d) = f'_d(Q_d). \quad (1)$$

In any bilateral trade, buyer d does not pay more than their WTP_d through the transaction-specific price $p_{od} \leq f'_d(Q_d)$.

Water use by sellers consists of their endowment minus sold water: $Q_o \equiv e_o - \sum_{d=1}^{N_d} q_{od}$. Seller o 's benefit from using the unsold amount of water equals $f_o(Q_o)$, which is increasing in the neighborhood of e_o (sellers are unsatiated at e_o), strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable in Q_o . Seller o 's net benefits of water use are now given by $f_o(Q_o)$ plus revenues from selling water, introduced below. For later reference, we introduce sellers' willingness to accept, denoted WTA, which is defined as the partial derivative of net benefits with respect to water use. Formally,

$$\text{WTA}_o(Q_o) = f'_o(Q_o). \quad (2)$$

In any bilateral trade, sellers must be financially compensated for these opportunity costs through the transaction-specific price, and this imposes $p_{od} \geq f'_o(Q_o)$.

Recall that we consider the case where buyers hold all market power. In the standard oligopoly model in economics, consumers react to the quantities chosen by the competing producers, and this is modeled by setting the market price equal to the inverse demand or price function. The price function can be interpreted as either the market-clearing price that equates market demand to the chosen market supply or as the willingness to pay for the chosen market supply. In our case, seller's WTA takes over the role of the price function. Then WTAs can be seen as either market-clearing prices that equate market supply to the market demand chosen by the buyers or as the willingness to accept for the chosen market demand. Formally,

$$p_{od} = \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) \quad (3)$$

Buyer d 's expenditure on buying water from seller o is then given by $q_{od} \cdot \text{WTA}_o(Q_o)$. Similar to standard Cournot oligopoly models, our model is static and all buyers take their quantity decisions simultaneously. Therefore, each buyer maximizes over all potential sellers to purchase water. Formally,

$$\max_{q_{1d}, \dots, q_{N_o d}} f_d(Q_d) - \sum_{o=1}^{N_o} q_{od} \cdot \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) \quad (4)$$

Using the positive relation between Q_d and q_{od} as well as the negative relation between Q_o and q_{od} , a buyer's first-order condition with respect to q_{od} for an interior solution is given by⁷

$$f'_d(Q_d) - \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) + q_{od} \cdot \text{WTA}'_o(Q_o) = 0 \quad (5)$$

Substituting Equation (1) into Equation (5) and rewriting yields

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WTP}_d(Q_d) &= \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) - q_{od} \cdot \text{WTA}'_o(Q_o) \\ &\geq \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

⁷For simplicity we omit the first-order condition for pairs of districts that do not trade. To derive this first-order condition for pairs of trading districts we use the chain rule to obtain $\frac{\partial}{\partial q_{od}} f_d(Q_d) = \frac{\partial}{\partial Q_d} f_d(Q_d) \cdot \frac{\partial Q_d}{\partial q_{od}} = f'_d(Q_d)$. Likewise, we

obtain $\frac{\partial}{\partial q_{od}} \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) = \frac{\partial}{\partial Q_o} \text{WTA}_o(Q_o) \cdot \frac{\partial Q_o}{\partial q_{od}} = -\text{WTA}'_o(Q_o)$.

Note that in a partial equilibrium of perfect competition the inequality in Equation (6) would hold with equality for every pair of trading districts, see for example, Hagerty (2023). Under buyers' market power (and $-q_{od} \cdot WTA'_o(Q_o) > 0$), the willingness to pay will be larger than the willingness to accept for every pair of trading districts, whereas such power keeps markets away from equality. The wedge between buyers' WTP and sellers' WTA reflects the possible price range for each transaction.

As the last step we substitute (Equation 3) into Equation (6) and rewrite to obtain the following system of equilibrium conditions that we will use in our estimations below:

$$p_{od} = WTA_o(Q_o), \quad (7a)$$

$$p_{od} = WTP_d(Q_d) + q_{od} \cdot WTA'_o(Q_o) \quad (7b)$$

Recall that $WTA'_o(Q_o) < 0$ such that the last term of Equation (7b) is negative. This markdown makes the market price lower than the buyer's willingness to pay.

In many economic contexts, it is standard to construct measures of market power based on relative markdowns or markups.⁸ We, therefore, rewrite our pair-specific relative markdowns to construct a novel pair-specific measure of heterogeneous market power given by

$$\frac{WTP_d(Q_d) - WTA_o(Q_o)}{WTA_o(Q_o)} = -\frac{q_{od}}{Q_o} \cdot \frac{Q_o WTA'_o(Q_o)}{WTA_o(Q_o)} \quad (8)$$

It consists of the quantity elasticity of the seller's WTA weighted by the ratio of transaction volume to this seller's total water use. This elasticity is the reciprocal of seller o 's individual price elasticity of demand. Our estimate of the system of Equation (7) provides us with an estimate of $WTA'_o(Q_o)$ and $WTA_o(Q_o)$ from which we calculate our measure of market power (Equation 8) to address such power in California's water market.

Our model is illustrated in Figure 1. With two types of districts (buyers and sellers) and one good (water), whose supply is given, our model is an endowment economy, and so we can visualize it in a chart with a secondary mirrored vertical axis, whereas the total available water is on the horizontal axis. Demand for water is displayed using the $WTA_o(Q_o)$ curve for sellers and the $WTP_d(Q_d)$ curve for buyers. Starting from water endowments e_o and e_d in Figure 1, water transactions increase buyers' water consumption and decrease sellers' water consumption, while closing the wedge between buyers' WTP and sellers' WTA. Compared with the competitive equilibrium, buyer power implies a lower transaction volume, which leaves a positive wedge, as discussed in this section and as illustrated in the figure.

The necessary and sufficient condition for a positive bilateral trade in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium of Figure 1 is that $WTP_d(e_d) > WTA_o(e_o)$, or $f'_d(e_d) > f'_o(e_o)$. The interpretation is that the marginal benefit of water use at the initial endowment of each destination exceeds the marginal benefit of water use at the initial endowment of each origin. In other words, trade must be (marginally) beneficial at the initial endowment levels.

A relevant indicator for water authorities is the (relative) damage caused by market power. Similar to the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index used by antitrust authorities, we investigate—as an easy approximation of individual damage—the markdown times the quantity sold: $(WTP_d(Q_d) - WTA_o(Q_o)) \cdot q_{od}$. This damage consists of the rectangle bordered by three red dotted lines and the blue dotted line in Figure 1. Next, we relate this damage to the monetary value of own

⁸Closely related measures are the (markup) Lerner Index used in industrial organization and the markdown of monopsony power used in labor economics. For homogeneous static labor supply ℓ , revenue $R(\ell)$ and endogenous wage $w(\ell)$, the latter states that $\frac{R(\ell) - w(\ell)}{w(\ell)} = \frac{\ell \cdot w'(\ell)}{w(\ell)}$ (see e.g. Ashenfelter et al., 2010). Note the difference with (8) where we add the term $-\frac{q_{od}}{Q_o}$ to adjust for heterogeneity between pairs of trading districts.




FIGURE 1 Stylized visualization of endowments (dashed, blue) and Nash-Cournot equilibrium (dotted, red), where $WTP_d(Q_d) - p_{od}$ equals the markdown, see Equation (7b). The shaded area is an approximation of damage due to market power.

water use by individual sellers by dividing by $p_{od} \cdot Q_o$. Doing so and making use of Equation (3) and the measure of market power (Equation 8) yields as approximated individual relative damage⁹:

$$-\left(\frac{q_{od}}{Q_o}\right)^2 \cdot \frac{Q_o WTA'_o(Q_o)}{WTA_o(Q_o)} \tag{9}$$

Aggregate relative damage follows after summing over all sellers in the market. The latter can be seen as a modified Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for water markets. Further investigation of this index is left for future research.

3.2 | Main specification

The preferred specification of our model uses quadratic benefit functions for both buyers and sellers. This specification allows us to estimate a linear model. Our proposed benefit functions allow for heterogeneity across buyers and sellers as well as over time, which is why we add time subscripts from here on.

For each origin we have $f_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = Q_{ot}(\alpha_{ot} - \frac{1}{2}\delta Q_{ot})$, where $\alpha_{ot} = \phi_o + \beta_t + v_{ot}$ captures heterogeneity in productivity between different sellers and time periods, while parameter δ is kept constant. This benefit function implies that $f'_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = \alpha_{ot} - \delta Q_{ot}$, which is the sellers' WTA in Equation (2). Similarly, for each destination we have $f_{dt}(Q_{dt}) = Q_{dt}(a_{dt} - \frac{1}{2}\gamma Q_{dt})$, with $a_{dt} = \psi_d + \beta_t + u_{dt}$ and therefore $f'_{dt}(Q_{dt}) = a_{dt} - \gamma Q_{dt}$, which is the buyers' WTP in Equation (1). Note that in the online Supplementary Appendix (Data S1) we generalize our main model specification to also allow heterogeneous pair-specific transaction costs. We do so after presenting the solution to our main model specification under homogeneity as well as under heterogeneity in productivity.

Recall that the necessary and sufficient condition for positive quantities in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is that $f'_{dt}(e_{dt}) > f'_{ot}(e_{ot})$, which implies

⁹Our measure resembles the individual contribution to industry's damage relative to industry's revenue in deriving the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for Cournot oligopolies in Hirschman (1945). In this index, individual market shares (in quantities) are squared, divided by the price elasticity of market demand, and then summed over all firms. In the Cournot model, both the elasticity and aggregate production are the same across firms, and then the sum of individual damage can be rewritten as a simple formula. In water markets, heterogeneity in both Q_o s and elasticities rule out a simple formula.

$$a_{dt} - \gamma e_{dt} > \alpha_{ot} - \delta e_{ot} \quad (10)$$

The interpretation is that the marginal benefit of water use at the initial endowment of each destination exceeds the marginal benefit of water use at the initial endowment of each origin. In other words, trade is (marginally) beneficial at the initial endowment levels.

4 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

The objective of our empirical exercise is to measure market power in California's water market. We do so using our measure for market power (Equation 8). Calculation of this index requires an estimate of $WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot})$. For our linear model specification we have $WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = f'_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = -\delta$, which we will estimate using the system of Equation (7). Note that this parameter δ is the only estimate that we need according to our markdown measure of market power (Equation 8). To see this, note that our linear model specification with buyer power allows us to write this index in terms of δ as well as transaction prices and quantities p_{odt} and q_{odt} , which are present in our transaction data:

$$\frac{WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})}{WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})} = -\frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} \cdot \frac{Q_{ot} WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot})}{WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})} = \delta \cdot \frac{q_{odt}}{p_{odt}} \quad (11)$$

Below, we present our empirical strategy to estimate parameter δ .

Given our panel data on transaction prices and quantities, we construct a fixed effects model, which exploits variation in observed transaction prices, WTA, and WTP across trading districts and across time. This approach rests on two requirements. The first is that we have sufficient variation in WTA and WTP over time. In our data, such variation over time is caused by variation in water endowments over time, which imply movements along the benefit function of water use, thereby changing districts' marginal benefits of water use. Water endowments are determined by the interaction of weather fluctuations with historically determined allocation rules, which are markedly different across regions of California. The second requirement is that WTA and WTP are exogenous, conditional on unobserved district characteristics (as captured by the fixed effects). We meet this requirement by assumption since our model dictates that WTA (and, implicitly, WTP) determines transaction prices.

There are two possible sources of endogeneity in our data, one of which is that omitted variables may cause biases. Ideally, we would control for these using both year fixed effects as well as time-invariant district-by-counterparty fixed effects (the counterparty being the other district involved in the transaction). The latter would capture any variation in prices caused by unobserved heterogeneity across pairs of trading districts. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient observations per trading district pair to estimate such fixed effects. We resort to separate seller and buyer fixed effects instead. The second possible source of endogeneity is reverse causality, which we discuss at the end of this section.

We substitute the linear specification of our model into the system of Equation (7):

$$p_{odt} = -\delta Q_{ot} + \phi_o + \beta_t + v_{ot}, \quad (12a)$$

$$p_{odt} = -\gamma Q_{dt} - \delta q_{odt} + \psi_d + \beta_t + u_{dt} \quad (12b)$$

An implicit assumption underlying the regression of *individual* transaction prices on (some function of) *total* water use levels is that districts do not hedge against the risk of water shortage within each year. One example would be that districts buy "too much" water and will try to resell later that same year. We find, however, that only a handful of districts in our dataset have ever been active on

both sides of the market within 1 year. Hence, this assumption of no risk hedging seems warranted. It is also consistent with the situation in many Western US watersheds, where predictions on water availability in early spring provide “reasonably accurate forecasts” of actual availability (Draper, 2001). Although districts face some degree of uncertainty before the start of the growing season as water allocation percentages are being updated, this uncertainty does not appear to affect their trading behavior.

Without risk hedging, price differences across transactions for a particular district and year should not occur, except in the case of transaction costs, or market power. In model variations, we, therefore, control for various types of transaction costs. Transaction costs are pair specific and time invariant, and they apply to either the seller or the buyer in a specific transaction as summarized in Table 1. In the regressions below, transaction costs are included as $T_{odr} = \tau_r C_{odr} + \tau_o + \tau_d + \epsilon_{odr}$, where vector C_{odr} includes seller-, buyer-, and pair-specific transaction costs, with units (mostly dummies) as presented in Table 1, whereas τ_o and τ_d represent district fixed costs. Because each transaction is assessed twice in this system, we add r to indicate whether the transaction is assessed from the seller’s perspective ($r = 0$) or the buyer’s perspective ($r = 1$). We expect $\tau_r \geq 0$ if $r = 0$ and $\tau_r \leq 0$ if $r = 1$. That is, transaction costs enter sellers’ WTA positively, because these have to be compensated for sellers on top of the sellers’ net benefits, whereas transaction costs enter the buyers’ WTP negatively, because these decrease sellers’ net benefits.

We add transaction costs to Equation (12) and re-order and relabel terms:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{odrt} &= -\delta Q_{ot} + (\phi_o + \tau_o) + \tau_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + (v_{ot} + \epsilon_{odr}) \\ &= -\delta Q_{ot} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \epsilon_{odrt}, \end{aligned} \quad (13a)$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_{odrt} &= -\gamma Q_{dt} - \delta q_{odt} + \tau_o + (\psi_d + \tau_d) + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + (u_{dt} + \epsilon_{odr}) \\ &= -\gamma Q_{dt} - \delta q_{odt} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \epsilon_{odrt}. \end{aligned} \quad (13b)$$

Note that coefficient δ appears in both equations. We estimate both equations simultaneously by constructing two variables, R_{odtk}^o and R_{odtk}^d , that combine the coefficients on water use from Equation (13). We also add a counter k , because there can be multiple transactions between one origin o and one destination d within 1 year t :

$$R_{odtk}^o = \begin{cases} Q_{ot} & \text{if } r = 0, \\ q_{odtk} & \text{if } r = 1, \end{cases} \text{ and } R_{odtk}^d = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } r = 0, \\ Q_{dt} & \text{if } r = 1 \end{cases}$$

The combined regression equation, which also suppresses the intercept, is:

$$P_{odrtk} = -\delta R_{odtk}^o - \gamma R_{odtk}^d + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \epsilon_{odrtk} \quad (14)$$

In the next section, we will estimate variations of Equation (14) using linear regression.

Unlike standard models of supply and demand, we are estimating a system with two demand functions (with slopes given by parameters γ and δ), whereas the annual supply of water is determined by rainfall and snow melt. With hydrological variation between years, the total amount of water in the system changes exogenously each year. Summed over all districts, annual supply cannot respond to changes in price.

Despite this exogeneity in supply, individual districts may still respond to price changes by changing the volume of water bought or sold. We therefore also estimate Equation (14) while instrumenting for water use with districts’ water allocations in each year. Water allocations are the product of a time-invariant maximum entitlement for each district and a year-varying allocation

percentage. Allocation percentages are determined bureaucratically on the basis of environmental conditions (i.e., rainfall and snow melt in the mountains during the preceding winter) and do not respond to demand-driven factors. They are determined separately for each of 13 categories of water entitlements (for more details see Hagerty, 2022, 2023). With district and year fixed effects, identifying variation comes from fluctuations in each district's annual water endowment, relative to other districts in the same year. In line with Hagerty (2023), we argue that it is reasonable to assume changes in water allocations reflect pure supply shocks and are uncorrelated with changes in demand.¹⁰

5 | RESULTS

The estimates of regression Equation (14) are shown in Table 2. Recall that the aim of this regression is to estimate the impact of market power on transaction prices via the markdown $WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})$. Applying a model with quadratic benefit functions implies that *Seller water use* (i.e., R_{odtk}^O) is one of the independent variables, whose coefficient gives the slope of the sellers' benefit function, parameter δ . Multiplied by transaction volume, this parameter gives the markdown for each transaction.

In Model (1), estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), we model water use as our only explanatory variable, combined with seller, buyer, role, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on *Seller water use* implies that $\delta = 0.018$, which is more than double the size of $\gamma = 0.008$, implied by the coefficient on *Buyer water use*. The difference indicates that selling districts have steeper demand curves than buying districts. In Model (2) we attempt to improve the efficiency of these estimates. Given the large number of clusters compared to observations, we replace year fixed effects by a time trend. No comparable simplification was found feasible for the other fixed effects. Particularly, there is no obvious possibility to replace seller and buyer fixed effects with a coarser set of dummy variables. As a result of replacing the year fixed effect by the time trend, the number of clusters decreases sharply. Compared to Model (1), the Model (2) estimates for both δ and γ increase significantly.

In Model (3) we instrument water use by districts' water entitlements. The resulting estimates of δ and γ increase sharply, in absolute terms, compared to those of Models (1) and (2). The fact that the IV estimates are so much greater in magnitude than the OLS estimates suggests that the OLS estimates are biased by selection into trading. In the OLS estimates, prices appear to respond minimally to changes in water use—but this water use is observed after water users have already conducted endogenous water transactions. In contrast, the IV estimates isolate variation in water use driven by exogenous changes in water supply, so it more accurately identifies the slope of the benefit function. Finally, in Model (4), we add seller- and buyer-specific transaction costs, which do not appear to improve the model results, decreasing the F-statistic and increasing the standard error of our main coefficient of interest. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics for the first stages of the IV models are both higher than their critical values as reported by Stock and Yogo (2005), suggesting that Models (3) and (4) do not suffer from weak instruments. Variations of Models (3) and (4) featuring year-fixed effects rather than a time trend would yield a large number of clusters compared to observations, similar to Model (1). Such model variations would deteriorate efficiency and would turn the estimates of δ and γ insignificant.

Based on these model results and interpretation, our preferred model is Model (3) and we use the main coefficient of interest from this specification, $\delta = 0.580$, in the remainder of this section.¹¹ The interpretation of δ is that sellers' WTA, which equals the water price in our model, increases by

¹⁰Hagerty (2022) shows that the effect of surface water supplies on crop choice is precisely unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of flexible controls for weather in the same or preceding year.

¹¹Another reason to prefer one of the larger coefficients is that we are less likely to underestimate the impact of market power. Because our main result is that market power is rather limited, this is a conservative choice.

TABLE 2 Estimating WTA and WTP: Linear model.

Price (2010\$/AF)	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) IV	(4) IV
Seller water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\delta$)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.028** (0.013)	-0.580*** (0.208)	-0.932** (0.445)
Buyer water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\gamma$)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.309** (0.132)	-0.311** (0.156)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓			
Quadratic time trend		✓	✓	✓
Transaction costs				✓
# Observations	1034	1034	879	877
# Clusters	543	337	308	307
# FE dummies	212	190	164	163
Cragg-Donald F-statistic			9.94	8.68
First stage (Seller water use)				
Seller entitlements (%)			128.3*** (26.75)	225.6** (75.20)
Buyer entitlements (%)			-76.92 (60.13)	-31.46 (54.81)
First stage (buyer water use)				
Seller entitlements (%)			6.255 (47.77)	-227.4* (97.74)
Buyer entitlements (%)			531.7*** (134.6)	519.7*** (142.8)

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller, buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in Models (2)–(4) where year fixed effects are replaced by a quadratic time trend).

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

\$0.58/AF for each 1000 AF sold.¹² More important for our analysis, however, is that δ is used to calculate the markdown $WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = \delta q_{od}$. Doing so we find that the average markdown, after removing one outlier, equals \$4.60/AF (SD = 8.66). This markdown corresponds to about 6.4% of the transaction price, on average, with markedly higher markdowns (both in absolute and relative terms) for transactions with low prices. We use transaction-specific markdowns to compute our measure of market power (Equation 11) and plot these in Figure 2. This figure shows that our measure is relatively low. It is markedly higher, though, for a small set of transactions with low prices, which also tend to have the highest transaction volumes; a substantial share of these transactions is water transferred from agriculture to environmental use. All in all, we find that market power is relatively low in California's water market.

6 | ROBUSTNESS

In this section, we report on six robustness checks. First, we use a conjectural variations approach. Second, we check robustness when we focus on relevant subsamples of the data. Third, we apply an

¹²AF: acre-foot. One acre-foot equals 1233 m³.




FIGURE 2 Scatter plot of transaction prices and the measure of market power as given by Equation (11) (one outlier removed).

alternative model specification featuring nonlinear benefit functions. Fourth, we alter the calculation of districts' water use to account for the timing of transactions within 1 year. Fifth, we check whether selling and buying districts can be reasonably assumed to have similar benefit functions. Finally, despite the results of our conjectural variations approach, we estimate a model with seller power.

Note that this list of robustness checks is not exhaustive. Importantly, we also checked for differential levels of market power. One such example would be differential market power occurring in wet versus dry years. In wet years, one could imagine that buyers have better opportunities to exercise market power. Using the Sacramento Valley Water Year Hydrological Classification Index to classify years, we fail to find such differences. Another option is differential market power depending on the location of buyers and sellers. The argument would be that buyers that are more central would have more opportunities to switch to another seller and could therefore achieve higher mark-downs. This argument ignores, however, that the Californian water market features an almost complete hydrological network enabling water transfers between nearly any two districts. As a result, although central buyers would probably face lower transaction costs, they do not have increased opportunities to exercise market power compared to buyers at the periphery.

6.1 | A conjectural variations approach

We proceed to compare our results to those obtained using a conjectural variations approach in order to verify whether our assumption of buyer power is warranted. In this approach, the term expressing market power is multiplied by some weight that dampens this term. A recent example that employs this approach and analyzes Californian groundwater is Bruno and Sexton (2020). Accordingly, we introduce conjectural variations using parameter $\theta \in [0, 1]$ that measures the degree of buyer power, whereas $\xi \in [0, 1]$ measures the degree of seller power. Conceptually, at most one of these parameters can be positive and the other is equal to zero. Nevertheless, in order to avoid repetition of arguments, we include both parameters simultaneously in the derivation below. We rewrite (Equation 7a,b) to include these market power weights:

$$P_{odt} = WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot}) - \xi \cdot q_{odt} \cdot WTP'_{dt}(Q_{dt}), \quad (15a)$$

$$P_{odt} = WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) + \theta \cdot q_{odt} \cdot WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot}) \quad (15b)$$

The new terms capture districts' expectations about other districts' reactions to a change in transaction quantities. These expectations may tend to the expected reactions under perfect competition

versus settings with buyer or seller power. As a result, the maximum possible markups or mark-downs are dampened by, respectively, θ or ξ . In our analysis so far we have assumed $(\theta, \xi) = (1, 0)$, that is, only buyer power. Two other special cases of the model are seller power—which would imply $(\theta, \xi) = (0, 1)$ —and perfect competition, which would imply $(\theta, \xi) = (0, 0)$.

We proceed to estimate this system of equations. The resulting values of θ and ξ will verify whether our assumption of buyer power is warranted using this conjectural variations approach. Taking similar steps as before, we first substitute the linear model specification:

$$p_{odrt} = \alpha - \delta Q_{ot} + \gamma q_{odt} - (1 - \xi)\gamma q_{odt} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \varepsilon_{odrt}, \quad (16a)$$

$$p_{odrt} = a - \delta q_{odt} - \gamma Q_{dt} + (1 - \theta)\delta q_{odt} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \varepsilon_{odrt} \quad (16b)$$

The combined regression equation becomes:

$$p_{odrtk} = -\delta R_{odtk}^o - \gamma \tilde{R}_{odtk}^d + (1 - \theta)\delta \hat{R}_{odtk}^o - (1 - \xi)\gamma \hat{R}_{odtk}^d + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \tau_r C_{odr} + \varepsilon_{odrtk} \quad (17)$$

with R_{odtk}^o as defined earlier, whereas \tilde{R}_{odtk}^d , \hat{R}_{odtk}^o , and \hat{R}_{odtk}^d are defined as follows:

$$\tilde{R}_{odtk}^d = \begin{cases} -q_{odtk} & \text{if } r = 0 \\ Q_{dt} & \text{if } r = 1, \end{cases} \quad \hat{R}_{odtk}^o = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } r = 0 \\ q_{odtk} & \text{if } r = 1 \end{cases} \quad \hat{R}_{odtk}^d = \begin{cases} q_{odtk} & \text{if } r = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } r = 1 \end{cases}$$

In order to get a clear view on the parameters of interest, we apply extremum estimation of the IV criterion function, transformed such that we optimize our parameters δ , γ , θ , and ξ . Table 3 reports the results for the case where the zero–one interval restrictions on the parameters in the IV criterion function were dropped in order to obtain precise estimates. We present three models. In Model (1) we allow only buyer power and in Model (2) only seller power. Both models are motivated by standard practice with an ex-ante subjective choice on which side holds market power. Ambiguity would arise if both models were to indicate some degree of market power. For this reason, we also include the novel and mathematically motivated “let the data speak” Model (3) in which both market power parameters are allowed to take a nonzero value. Ideally, the estimation results would suggest which side holds market power by forcing the other side’s parameter to a value indicating no market power. In addition to the coefficients on *Seller water use* and *Buyer water use*, $-\delta$ and $-\gamma$, we report coefficients on both market power weights, θ and ξ , while suppressing the coefficients on the terms \hat{R}_{odtk}^o and \hat{R}_{odtk}^d , because these coefficients are combinations of the four parameters that are already reported.

The results in Table 3 support our assumption of buyer power. Starting with Models (1) and (2), estimates for $-\delta$ and $-\gamma$ are very close to those obtained in our preferred Model (3) of Table 2. The unrestricted estimates for seller and buyer power weight, ξ and θ , are found to lie outside the bounds of $[0, 1]$. We find that the buyer power weight θ is larger than 1 in Model (1), whereas the seller power weight ξ is negative in Model (2). These results are both in a direction that is consistent with buyer market power. Imposing the restrictions that either $[\xi \in [0, 1], \theta = 0]$ or $[\xi = 0, \theta \in [0, 1]]$ leads to the expected result: estimates at the closest boundaries of these intervals. Given that the amount of observations in the dataset is relatively low compared to the number of parameters and fixed effects, and hence both estimates and standard deviations cannot be extracted with too great precision, we do not report these results but take them as an indication that buyer power is the most reasonable assumption.

TABLE 3 Estimating WTA and WTP: Conjectural variations.

	(1) IV Buyer power ($\xi = 0$)	(2) IV Seller power ($\theta = 0$)	(3) IV Both
Seller total water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\delta$)	-0.577*** (0.162)	-0.610*** (0.180)	-0.573*** (0.162)
Buyer total water use (1000 AF) (coefficient $-\gamma$)	-0.242*** (0.070)	-0.282*** (0.082)	-0.241*** (0.070)
Seller power weight (Coefficient ξ)		-8.581** (3.570)	1.251 (2.422)
Buyer power weight (Coefficient θ)	5.664*** (0.658)		6.155*** (1.237)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects			
Quadratic time trend	✓	✓	✓
Transaction costs			
# Observations	879	879	879
# FE dummies	164	164	164

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using extremum estimation. The covariance matrix is computed as a robust sandwich covariance matrix, following the theory of extremum estimation (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, Section 6.3.4). Standard errors in parentheses. Models (1)–(3) correspond to Model (3) of Table 2, but using the conjectural variations approach. First-stage regressions are omitted for brevity.

** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

The estimation results for Model (3), which allows both market power parameters to take a non-zero value, support this result. Estimates for $-\delta$ and $-\gamma$ are, again, very close to those obtained in our preferred Model (3) of Table 2. In addition, whereas the unrestricted estimate for seller power weight ξ is statistically not different from zero, the unrestricted estimate for buyer power weight θ is close to the buyer power estimate of Model (1). All three models combined, we take these results as an indication that buyer power is the most reasonable assumption.

6.2 | Subsample analysis

We repeat our preferred Model (3) of Table 2 for three subsamples of interest. Table 4 shows the results of these additional regressions. For reference, we include the preferred model as Model (1). In Model (2) we drop all observations that involve water for environmental use, for instance, buybacks by the government. Arguably, such transactions are markedly different from transactions between districts that intend to use the water for consumptive purposes. In Model (3) we include only transactions where agricultural districts are selling, which seem to represent the smaller, weaker actors in the market. Unfortunately, our sample size does not allow us to focus only on water sales from agricultural to urban districts (slightly more than 100 transactions), which seem to represent the larger, stronger actors capable of exercising market power (Isaaks & Colby, 2020). By focusing on all sales from agricultural districts, we may still capture the fact that agricultural districts may have less market power than the other types of districts. Note that half of these sales are to other agricultural districts, while the other half is shared roughly equally between buying urban districts and environmental projects. In Model (4) we drop outlier transactions. We exclude the 5% transactions

TABLE 4 Estimating WTA and WTP: Subsamples.

	(1) IV Preferred	(2) IV No env	(3) IV No env	(4) IV No outliers
Seller water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\delta$)	-0.580*** (0.208)	-0.520** (0.201)	-0.570*** (0.179)	-0.442*** (0.142)
Buyer water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\gamma$)	-0.309** (0.132)	-0.278** (0.127)	-0.284*** (0.108)	-0.232** (0.091)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quadratic time trend	✓	✓	✓	✓
# Observations	879	728	778	737
# Clusters	308	248	261	250
# FE dummies	164	149	133	132
Cragg-Donald F-statistic	9.94	7.06	14.01	10.82

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller and buyer. Model (1) corresponds to our preferred Model (3) of Table 2. In Model (2) we drop transactions from or to environmental use. In Model (3) we keep only transactions where agricultural districts are selling. In Model (4) we drop transactions that are outliers in terms of price or volume. First-stage regressions are omitted for brevity.

** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

with lowest and 5% transactions with highest transaction prices and similarly for transaction volumes.

Coefficients of subsample Models (2)–(4) are not statistically different from those of the preferred model. Model (2), which discards 17% of the observations, performs similarly in terms of precision and slightly worse in terms of the F-statistic. Unexpectedly, Model (3) does not show a higher coefficient (in absolute terms). Hence, there is no indication of more buyer power when buying from an agricultural district. Model (4) suggests that some of the market power we find is driven by outlier transactions in terms of price or volume, as one could expect. Combined, these additional regressions show that our main results are robust to including only specific subsamples of interest.

6.3 | Constant price elasticity

In the main specification of our model, we have imposed a constant slope of the benefit functions and a variable price elasticity. In this section, we impose instead that these functions have a constant price elasticity and, consequently, a variable slope. In particular, we consider the class of nonlinear WTA functions that are homogeneous.¹³ Given our earlier assumption of differentiability, we have that Euler's Homogeneous Function Theorem¹⁴ applies to the equilibrium conditions and our measure of market power.

For arbitrary homogeneous $WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})$ of order $-\kappa_o$, we can rewrite the markdown $WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})$ as

$$-q_{odt} \cdot WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = -\frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} \cdot [Q_{ot} \cdot WTA'_{ot}(Q_{ot})] = \frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} \cdot [\kappa_o \cdot WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})] \quad (18)$$

¹³The function $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is homogeneous of order $\kappa \in \mathbb{R}$ if $f(\mu x) = \mu^\kappa f(x)$ for all x and $\mu > 0$.

¹⁴Let the function $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be homogeneous of order $\kappa \in \mathbb{R}$. Euler's Homogeneous Function Theorem states that $x \cdot f'(x) = \kappa f(x)$.

This implies that our measure of market power (Equation 8) can be updated to

$$\frac{WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})}{WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})} = \frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} \cdot \kappa_o \quad (19)$$

The empirical strategy to estimate κ_o has many similarities to the empirical strategy used before, and we refer to Appendix A for details. The resulting regression equation becomes:

$$\ln p_{odrtk} = -\kappa_o \bar{R}_{odtk}^o - \kappa_d \bar{R}_{odrtk}^d + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \ln \tau_r C_{odr} + \varepsilon_{odrtk}, \quad (20)$$

where \bar{R}_{odtk}^o and \bar{R}_{odtk}^d are modifications of R_{odtk}^o , respectively, R_{odtk}^d that are defined in the Appendix A.

We estimate variations of Equation (20) using linear regression, similar to Table 2 for our main model specification. Table 5 shows the estimates of four models that are similar to Models (1)–(4) of Table 2. Despite allowing for nonlinear benefit functions, the models of Table 5 do not perform better than those of our linear model specification in Table 2 in terms of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic nor the precision of our coefficient of interest, the coefficient on *Seller water use*.

Again, we use Model (3) to derive the main coefficient of interest for this model specification, $\kappa_o = 0.370$. Similar as before, we use this coefficient to calculate the markdown $WTP_{dt}(Q_{dt}) - WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot}) = \frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} \cdot [\kappa_o \cdot WTA_{ot}(Q_{ot})]$, which now also depends on the ratio $\frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}}$. We find that the mean value of this ratio is heavily skewed by 15 districts that sell the majority of their endowments at least once. After removing these outlier observations, we have $\frac{q_{odt}}{Q_{ot}} = 0.10$, and the corresponding average markdown equals \$ 6.97/AF (SD = 14.05), which is about 50% larger than the average markdown found for the linear model specification but still small in percentage terms.

Note that we do not attach much weight to the results from this specification, both because of its sensitivity to removing outliers and also because the functional form of regression Equation (20) depends on the specific implementation of a first-order Taylor expansion (see the Appendix A for details), which may not be warranted. With these caveats in mind, the results of a model specification with constant price elasticity are largely consistent with those from the linear model specification.

6.4 | Transaction timing

So far we have ignored information on the timing of transactions. As a result, in case of multiple transactions per district per year, each district's water use—as captured by variables R_{odtk}^i , $i = o, d$, in Equation (14)—is identical for each of these transactions within 1 year. This approach is consistent with the assumption of no hedging against the risk of water shortage, such that districts can foresee how much water they are going to sell or buy within a year. In this section, we take the alternative approach and update Q_{dt} and Q_{ot} after each transaction. This implies that we use counter z to calculate water use (just) after transaction $j = 1, 2, \dots$ as $Q_{otj} = e_{ot} - \sum_{z=1}^j q_{od(j)tz}$ and $Q_{dtj} = e_{dt} + \sum_{z=1}^j q_{o(j)dtz}$, where $d(j)$ is the j^{th} counterparty of o and $o(j)$ is the j^{th} counterparty of d . When multiple transactions happen to occur within the same month, we order them by transaction volume such that smaller transactions go first. In an alternative specification, we reverse this order.

Table 6 shows the results. For reference, we include the preferred model from Table 2 as Model (1). In Models (2) and (3), we repeat this model using our dynamically updating measure of water use. The results show that the effect of transaction timing on prices is negligible and that Model (1) still offers a conservative estimate of market power.

TABLE 5 Estimating WTA and WTP: Constant price elasticity.

Log price (2010\$/AF)	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) IV	(4) IV
Log (seller water use, 1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\kappa_o$)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0007 (0.0007)	-0.370** (0.173)	-0.623* (0.357)
Log (buyer water use, 1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\kappa_d$)	-0.0006 (0.0006)	-0.0019* (0.0011)	-0.402** (0.194)	-0.458 (0.279)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓			
Quadratic time trend		✓	✓	✓
Transaction costs				✓
# Observations	942	942	827	825
# Clusters	465	292	274	273
# FE dummies	188	166	148	147
Cragg-Donald F-statistic			7.81	5.95

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using OLS and IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller and buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in Models (2)–(4) where year fixed effects are replaced by a quadratic time trend). Models (1)–(4) correspond to Models (1)–(4) of Table 2, but now with a nonlinear model specification. First-stage regressions are omitted for brevity.

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$;

6.5 | Sellers and buyers on one demand curve

So far we have estimated buyers' and sellers' demand curves separately rather than estimating a combined curve. We reject this possibility with multiple arguments. First, we test for equivalence of coefficients using our preferred Model (3) of Table 2. Based on a Wald test ($F(1,356) = 4.92$, $p = 0.027$), we reject equality of these coefficients. Second, we use theory and data to argue that selling and buying water districts differ in key characteristics, implying that buying districts cannot be on the same demand curve as selling districts, and hence our approach of modeling two distinct curves is correct.

Table 7 compares selling and buying districts in terms of their main type of water use (urban, agriculture, environment), levels of water entitlements, and water use, as well as whether or not a district trades with more than one counterparty in any given year. Clearly, selling and buying districts differ in their types of water use. Sellers are more likely to use water for agriculture, whereas buyers are more likely to use water for urban or environmental uses. The key variable that underlines our argument that sellers and buyers are on different demand curves for water is *Water endowments*. Table 7 shows that buying districts have higher water entitlements than selling districts, and by purchasing water they end up with even higher levels of water use compared with selling districts. If selling and buying districts would have identical demand curves for water, then districts with higher water use would be selling water rather than buying. In Figure 1 this implies that e_d would be located to the right of the competitive Q_d . This location implies that $WTP_d(Q_d) < WTA_o(Q_o)$, which is inconsistent with the occurrence of observed water transactions. It follows that sellers and buyers cannot be on the same demand curve.

A final difference between selling and buying districts is related to the dummy variable that measures whether a district has *More than one counterparty*. Comparison indicates that buyers have 53% more transactions with multiple counterparties than sellers do. This statistic points to buyer power, with sellers being on the long side of the market.

TABLE 6 Estimating WTA and WTP: Dynamic updating.

Price (2010\$/AF)	(1) IV No outliers	(2) IV Dynamic	(3) IV Dynamic reversed
Seller water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\delta$)	-0.580*** (0.208)	-0.530*** (0.186)	-0.550*** (0.195)
Buyer water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\gamma$)	-0.309** (0.132)	-0.306** (0.127)	-0.304** (0.128)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Quadratic time trend	✓	✓	✓
# Observations	879	879	879
# Clusters	308	308	308
# FE dummies	164	164	164
Cragg-Donald F-statistic	9.94	11.17	10.60

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller and buyer. Model (1) corresponds to our preferred Model (3) of Table 2. In Models (2) and (3), water use is updated dynamically in case of multiple transactions per district per year. In Model (2), multiple transactions in 1 month are ordered from small to large volume; in Model (3) this is reversed. First-stage regressions are omitted for brevity.

** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 7 Key differences between sellers and buyers.

	Sellers		Buyers	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
District: Urban (share)	0.08	0.28	0.29	0.45
District: Agriculture (share)	0.91	0.29	0.47	0.50
District: Environment (share)	0.01	0.09	0.24	0.43
Water entitlements (1000 AF)	193.72	298.63	207.97	570.51
Total water use (1000 AF)	176.22	280.61	251.65	578.29
More than one counterparty (yes = 1)	0.36	0.48	0.55	0.50

6.6 | Seller power

Our main result is that buyer power is relatively low. Going against previous literature, stakeholder beliefs, and the results of our conjectural variations approach, we now reverse our model to estimate seller power. This allows us to check if, rather counterintuitively, a model with seller power would better explain our data than our model with buyer power. We start by adapting Equation 7 as follows:

$$p_{od} = WTA_o(Q_o) - q_{od} \cdot WTP'_d(Q_d), \quad (21a)$$

$$p_{od} = WTP'_d(Q_d) \quad (21b)$$

Taking similar steps as before, the resulting regression equation becomes:

TABLE 8 Estimating WTA and WTP: Seller power.

Price (2010\$/AF)	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) IV	(4) IV
Seller water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\delta$)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.025** (0.013)	-0.576*** (0.212)	-0.867** (0.435)
Buyer water use (1000 AF) (Coefficient $-\gamma$)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.329** (0.147)	-0.324** (0.159)
Seller fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Buyer fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year fixed effects	✓			
Quadratic time trend		✓	✓	✓
Transaction costs				✓
# Observations	1034	1034	879	877
# Clusters	543	337	308	307
# FE dummies	212	190	164	163
Cragg-Donald F-statistic			8.51	8.23

Note: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using OLS and IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller, buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in Models (2)–(4) where year fixed effects are replaced by a quadratic time trend). Models (1)–(4) correspond to Models (1)–(4) of Table 2, but now with seller power. First-stage regressions are omitted for brevity.
 ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

$$p_{odrtk} = -\delta \tilde{R}_{odtk}^o - \gamma \tilde{R}_{odtk}^d + \tau_r C_{odr} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{odrtk}, \tag{22}$$

where \tilde{R}_{odtk}^o and \tilde{R}_{odtk}^d are modifications of R_{odtk}^o , respectively, R_{odtk}^d that are defined as follows:

$$\tilde{R}_{odtk}^o = \begin{cases} Q_{ot} & \text{if } r = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } r = 1, \end{cases} \text{ and } \tilde{R}_{odtk}^d = \begin{cases} -q_{odtk} & \text{if } r = 0 \\ Q_{dt} & \text{if } r = 1 \end{cases}$$

Results of this regression are displayed in Table 8. The resulting coefficients are very similar to those of Models (1)–(4) of our main specification with buyer power in Table 2. Importantly, with seller power our measure of market power is now based on the coefficient on *Buyer water use*, that is, γ rather than δ . Restricting the comparison to our preferred Model (3), we find that Model (3) of Table 7 does not perform better than Model (3) of Table 2 when comparing either the Cragg-Donald F-statistic or the precision of our coefficient of interest. In case one would still assume seller power, we obtain from Model (3) of Table 8, that $\gamma = 0.329$, which is lower than $\delta = 0.580$ from Model (3) of Table 2. This difference would imply measures of market power to be lower under seller power than under buyer power.

7 | CONCLUSION

Using a Nash-Cournot model, we derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting, and we construct related measures for market power. Applying our model to surface water transactions in California over the period 1993–2015, we find only limited market power in California’s water market, despite the thinness of this market. Our main specification implies that buyer power yields an average markdown of 6% of the transaction price. This result is important in the context of current discussions on Californian water market reform

(Maples et al., 2018), which, perhaps, should focus on other distorting factors, most notably transaction costs (Carey et al., 2002; Hagerty, 2023; Leonard et al., 2019; Regnacq et al., 2016).

Our model has three main assets: (1) it features a closed-form solution, (2) it does not rely on conjectural variations, and (3) it is sufficiently flexible that it can be applied to other types of endowment economies, including permit markets. On the downside, our model requires choosing a specific functional form for WTP and WTA that may not be warranted. In addition, although our current application is quite clear in terms of the side of the market where market power resides, this may not be the case in other applications.

One explanation for the limited extent of market power in California is that transaction quantities are, generally, small. These quantities enter our measure of market power linearly such that small quantities imply low markdowns. By the same line of reasoning, high prices also imply low markdowns. This effect was illustrated clearly in Figure 2. Another explanation for the limited extent of market power is that, although California's water market is "thin" in trades, it is "thick" in possibilities to trade. Recall that California features an almost complete hydrological network such that nearly any two districts can trade water. The fact that many do not does not imply that such trades are not feasible. Rather, it implies that such districts have high pair-specific transaction costs, which causes a relatively low WTP or a relatively high WTA. The threat of a counterparty switching to a competing district limits the possibility to exercise market power (Funaki et al., 2020). The extent to which such threats affect equilibrium outcomes is an avenue for future research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank seminar participants at various conferences as well as the anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. We thank Clay Landry and WestWater Research, LLC for sharing the Californian water transaction data used in this paper. Françeska acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades and the European Union under grants (ECO2016-75410-P, BES-2017-080192, and PID2019-105982GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), and from the Universitat Rovira i Virgili and the Generalitat de Catalunya under grant (2019PFR-URV-53).

REFERENCES

- Alvarez, V. I., M. Fioretti, K. Kikkawa, and M. Morlacco. 2023. "Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade." In *Unpublished, NBER Working Paper 31253*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Ansink, E., and H. Houba. 2012. "Market Power in Water Markets." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 64(2): 237–252.
- Ashenfelter, O., H. Farber, and M. Ransom. 2010. "Labor Market Monopsony." *Journal of Labor Economics* 28: 203–210.
- Ayres, A., K. Meng, and A. Plantinga. 2021. "Do Environmental Markets Improve on Open Access? Evidence from California Groundwater Rights." *Journal of Political Economy* 129: 2817–60.
- Bresnahan, T. 1989. "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power." In *Handbook of Industrial Organization*, Vol 2, edited by R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, 1011–57. North-Holland: Elsevier.
- Brewer, J., R. Glennon, A. Ker, and G. Libecap. 2008. "2006 Presidential Address: Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual Forms." *Economic Inquiry* 46: 91–112.
- Browne, O. R., and X. J. Ji. 2023. "The Economic Value of Clarifying Property Rights: Evidence from Water in Idaho's Snake River Basin." *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 119: 102799.
- Bruno, E., and K. Jessoe. 2021. "Using Price Elasticities of Water Demand to Inform Policy." *Annual Review of Resource Economics* 13: 427–441.
- Bruno, E., and R. Sexton. 2020. "The Gains from Agricultural Groundwater Trade and the Potential for Market Power: Theory and Application." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 102: 884–910.
- California State Water Resources Control Board. 1999. "A Guide to Water Transfers." https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_transfers/docs/watertransferguide.pdf.
- Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi. 2005. *Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, J., D. Sunding, and D. Zilberman. 2002. "Transaction Costs and Trading Behavior in an Immature Water Market." *Environment and Development Economics* 7: 733–750.
- Chakravorty, U., E. Hochman, C. Umetsu, and D. Zilberman. 2009. "Water Allocation under Distribution Losses: Comparing Alternative Institutions." *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 33: 463–476.
- Collard-Wexler, A., G. Gowrisankaran, and R. S. Lee. 2019. "Nash-in-Nash' Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work." *Journal of Political Economy* 127: 163–195.

- Draper, A. 2001. *Implicit Stochastic Optimization with Limited Foresight for Reservoir Systems*. PhD dissertation, Davis: University of California.
- Easter, K. W., M. Rosegrant, and A. Dinar. 1999. "Formal and Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints." *World Bank Research Observer* 14: 99–116.
- Funaki, Y., H. Houba, and E. Motchenkova. 2020. "Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Non-Expandable Infrastructures." *International Journal of Game Theory* 49: 525–546.
- Grafton, R. Q., G. Libecap, S. McGlennon, C. Landry, and B. O'Brien. 2011. "An Integrated Assessment of Water Markets: A Cross-Country Comparison." *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy* 5: 219–239.
- Hagerty, N. 2022. "Adaptation to Surface Water Scarcity in Irrigated Agriculture." In *Unpublished, Working Paper*. Bozeman, MT: Montana State University.
- Hagerty, N. 2023. "What Holds back Water Markets? Transaction Costs and the Gains from Trade." In *Unpublished, Working Paper*. Bozeman, MT: Montana State University.
- Hansen, K., J. Kaplan, and S. Kroll. 2014. "Valuing Options in Water Markets: A Laboratory Investigation." *Environmental and Resource Economics* 57: 59–80.
- Hirschman, A. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Holland, S. 2006. "Privatization of Water-Resource Development." *Environmental and Resource Economics* 34: 291–315.
- Isaaks, R., and B. Colby. 2020. "Empirical Application of Rubinstein Bargaining Model in Western U.S. Water Transactions." *Water Economics and Policy* 6: 1950010.
- Jacoby, H., R. Murgai, and S. Rehman. 2004. "Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater." *Review of Economic Studies* 71: 783–808.
- Jenkins, M., J. Lund, R. Howitt, A. Draper, S. Msangi, S. Tanaka, Ritzema, R. and Marques, G. 2004. "Optimization of California's Water Supply System: Results and Insights." *Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management* 130: 271–280.
- Leonard, B., C. Costello, and G. Libecap. 2019. "Expanding Water Markets in the Western United States: Barriers and Lessons from Other Natural Resource Markets." *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy* 13: 43–61.
- Lindh, T. 1992. "The Inconsistency of Consistent Conjectures: Coming Back to Cournot." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 18: 69–90.
- Maples, S., E. Bruno, A. Kraus-Polk, S. Roberts, and L. Foster. 2018. "Leveraging Hydrologic Accounting and Water Markets for Improved Water Management: The Case for a Central Clearinghouse." *Water* 10: 1720.
- McCann, L., B. Colby, K. W. Easter, A. Kasterine, and K. Kuperan. 2005. "Transaction Cost Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Policies." *Ecological Economics* 52: 527–542.
- Rafey, W. 2023. "Droughts, Deluges, and (River) Diversions: Valuing Market-Based Water Reallocation." *American Economic Review* 113: 430–471.
- Regnacq, C., A. Dinar, and E. Hanak. 2016. "The Gravity of Water: Water Trade Frictions in California." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 98: 1273–94.
- Rosegrant, M., and H. Binswanger. 1994. "Markets in Tradable Water Rights: Potential for Efficiency Gains in Developing Country Water Resource Allocation." *World Development* 22: 1613–25.
- Scheer, J. B. 2016. "Participation, Price, and Competition in the Sacramento Valley Water Market." In *Unpublished, MSc Thesis*. Davis: University of California.
- Stene, E. A. 1995. *Central Valley Project Overview*. Bureau of Reclamation: Unpublished.
- Stock, J., and M. Yogo. 2005. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression." In *Identification and Inference for Econometric Models*, edited by D. Andrews and J. Stock, 80–108. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tomkins, C., and T. Weber. 2010. "Option Contracting in the California Water Market." *Journal of Regulatory Economics* 37: 107–141.
- Vaux, H., Jr., and R. Howitt. 1984. "Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of Interregional Transfers." *Water Resources Research* 20: 785–792.
- Wheeler, S. 2022. "Debunking Murray-Darling Basin Water Trade Myths." *Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics* 66: 797–821.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

How to cite this article: Tomori, Frančeska, Erik Ansink, Harold Houba, Nick Hagerty, and Charles Bos. 2024. "Market Power in California's Water Market." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 106(3): 1274–99. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434>

APPENDIX A

In this appendix, we present our empirical strategy for the model version featuring a nonlinear WTA function that is homogenous. Our aim is to estimate κ_o so that we can measure market power for this model specification.

The strategy is largely similar to the one used for the linear model specification. We start with the following system of regression equations, based on Equation (7), and substitute Equation (18) to obtain

$$p_{od} = \text{WTA}(Q_o), \quad (23a)$$

$$p_{od} = \text{WTP}(Q_d) - \kappa_o \cdot \frac{q_{od}}{Q_o} \cdot \text{WTA}(Q_o). \quad (23b)$$

Substituting p_{od} for $\text{WTA}_o(Q_o)$, we solve the last equation for p_{od} , which yields the nonlinear system

$$p_{od} = \text{WTA}(Q_o), \quad (24a)$$

$$p_{od} = \left(1 + \frac{q_{od}}{Q_o} \cdot \kappa_o\right)^{-1} \text{WTP}_d(Q_d). \quad (24b)$$

This system can be written in logarithmic form as

$$\ln p_{od} = \ln \text{WTA}(Q_o), \quad (25a)$$

$$\ln p_{od} = \ln \text{WTP}(Q_d) - \ln \left(1 + \frac{q_{od}}{Q_o} \cdot \kappa_o\right). \quad (25b)$$

To extract parameter κ out of the last term, we approximate it by the first-order Taylor expansion of the logarithmic function around 1, which equals $\ln(1 + x_0) + \frac{1}{1+x_0}(x - x_0) = x$. In our case $x = \frac{q_{od}}{Q_o} \cdot \kappa$. This yields the following nonlinear system:

$$\ln p_{od} = \ln \text{WTA}(Q_o), \quad (26a)$$

$$\ln p_{od} = \ln \text{WTP}(Q_d) - \kappa_o \cdot \frac{q_{od}}{Q_o}. \quad (26b)$$

We proceed to estimate (Equation 26a,b) for the specification $A_i(Q_i)^{-\kappa_i}$, $i = o, d$ and $\kappa_i > 0$, which features constant price elasticity equal to $-1/\kappa_i$. Substitution, rewriting, and including multiplicative transaction costs in the factor A_i , $i = o, d$, as well as seller, buyer, and year fixed effects, yields

$$\ln p_{odrtk} = -\kappa_o \ln Q_{ot} + \ln \tau_r C_{odr} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{odrtk}, \quad (27a)$$

$$\ln p_{odrtk} = -\kappa_o \frac{q_{odtk}}{Q_{ot}} - \kappa_d \ln Q_{dt} + \ln \tau_r C_{odr} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{odrtk}. \quad (27b)$$

Similar to the procedure used in deriving the regression equation for our linear model specification, we combine both equations. This combination requires the construction of two new variables that are defined by

$$\bar{R}_{odtk}^o = \begin{cases} \ln Q_{ot} & \text{if } r = 0 \\ q_{odtk}/Q_{ot} & \text{if } r = 1, \end{cases} \text{ and } \bar{R}_{odtk}^d = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } r = 0 \\ \ln Q_{dt} & \text{if } r = 1 \end{cases}$$

The combined regression equation is:

$$\ln p_{odrtk} = -\kappa_o \bar{R}_{odtk}^o - \kappa_d \bar{R}_{odtk}^d + \ln \tau_r C_{odr} + \phi_o + \psi_d + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{odtk} \quad (28)$$

Results of the estimation of this regression equation are presented in Table 5.