

Sociopolitical Aspects of Interpreting at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946-1948)

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Abstract

This study is based on the premise that interpreting is a social activity, which therefore needs to be described and explained with reference to the social, political and cultural context of the setting in which the interpreter operates. Sociopolitical aspects of interpreting at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1948) are studied through historical and archival research of the interpreting arrangements and a case study on the behavior of linguists (language specialists) who worked in the interpreting process during the testimonies of Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses. Three sets of concepts are applied to analyze three salient features of interpreting at the IMTFE. Based on the notions of “trust, power and control”, the historical and political context of the IMTFE and the social and cultural backgrounds of each linguist group are examined to explore why the tribunal devised the interpreting arrangements in which three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists engaged in three different functions: interpreter, monitor and language arbiter. The concept of “negotiated norms” is applied to discuss the interactional aspect of how the interpreting procedures developed over the initial stage of the trial, with the interpreters’ cognitive constraints as a factor in that process. Cronin’s notion (2002) of “autonomous and heteronomous interpreters” is drawn on to discuss the complex position of the Japanese American linguists who worked as monitors. The nature of interjections by the monitors and interpreters and the interactions between the court and each linguist group during the interpreted testimonies of Japanese witnesses are examined. Findings of this analysis support the hypothesis which links interpreters’ choices, strategies and behavior to their awareness of where they stand in the power constellation of the interpreted event.

Keywords

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), interpreting, sociopolitical, power, control, negotiated norms, autonomous and heteronomous interpreters, interpreters’ behavior, monitor, language arbiter

Definitions and notes on Japanese texts

Interpreting: In this study, interpreting or interpretation refers to oral renditions of spoken messages across different languages, and it does not encompass interpreting that involves signed languages.

Linguist: The term “linguists” is used in this study to refer to the interpreters, monitors and language arbiters as a whole, as personnel who engaged in language-related functions at the IMTFE were called “linguists” in relevant archival documents. Therefore, a “linguist” in this study refers to a person who speaks more than one language and engages in a language-related function, and not to a person who studies linguistics.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE): More commonly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal or the Tokyo Trial, the IMTFE was convened in Tokyo on May 3, 1946, and adjourned on November 12, 1948. Its objective was to try 28 “Class A” defendants, mostly military and political leaders of wartime Japan. This study does not discuss “Class B/C” trials, which took place from 1945 to 1951 in the places the pertinent war crimes were committed.

Nuremberg Trial: In this study, the Nuremberg Trial refers to the Trial of the Major War Criminals which was held in Nuremberg, Germany, from November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946, and does not include the subsequent war crimes trials.

Nisei: Second-generation Japanese Americans

Kibei: Japanese Americans born in the United States who returned to America after receiving education in Japan

Heritage language: The term “heritage language” generally refers to indigenous, colonial and immigrant languages. In this study, it is used in the U.S. context as the language other than English spoken in homes.

When citations are derived from texts written in Japanese or interviews conducted in Japanese, English translations are provided by the author of this study unless otherwise indicated.

In the examination of the interpreted testimonies by Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses, the utterances in Japanese are presented in romanized text in italic and their English translations are provided in parentheses by the author of this study.

A Japanese name consists of a surname, followed by the given name. This study adopts the Western order of given name before surname to present transliterated Japanese names for the sake of consistency with the order of Japanese Americans' names.

Citations from *the Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East* are indicated by "TP", followed by the page number(s).

Introduction

Over the past two decades, the scope and focus of Interpreting Studies has expanded to encompass more diverse interpreting settings and theoretical approaches. In earlier times, interpreting researchers focused mainly on conference interpreting, especially the cognitive processing aspect of interpreting, by drawing on such disciplines as psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics. There was also research that was influenced by theories and concepts originated in Translation Studies, mainly involving the notion of translational norms and the functionalist approach. These approaches continue to be part of the research paradigms found in contemporary works in the field of Interpreting Studies.

In the meantime, as changing intra-societal demography and legislative directives have given increased visibility to court and community (social service) interpreting, research on dialogue interpreting has proliferated since the 1990s. While there are a number of studies conducted by practitioner-researchers, mainly concerning their professional issues, there is increasing interest in focusing on interactional aspects of interpreted communicative activity and the functions of interpreters as communication mediators. Such studies are often interdisciplinary, with influence from sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics. Non-practitioner academics in the fields of applied linguistics have become frequent contributors to the body of works on interpreting in a variety of non-conference settings such as courtrooms, hospitals and asylum hearings.

Furthermore, there is also a growing awareness of interpreting as a social activity. Consideration is now given to the social, political, historical and cultural contexts in which interpreters operate. Cronin, for example, calls for a new “cultural turn” in Interpreting Studies to pay more attention to “questions of power and issues such as class, gender, race in interpreting situations” (2002: 46). The emergence of sociological or cultural perspectives in Interpreting Studies may well be closely linked to the fact that researchers are giving increasing attention to court and community interpreting. Since the political, social or cultural factors affecting interpreting can be more observable in institutionalized settings such as courtroom and social service settings, it may be argued

that academic inquiries into interpreting in such settings would naturally arrive at the need to look at those factors. Pöchhacker (2006) describes this overall evolution as Interpreting Studies “going social”, embracing diverse forms of interpreting and broader contextualization.

The present study also views interpreting as a social practice. It goes beyond the analysis of linguistic features of interpreting and pays close attention to various factors, such as politics, race and class, to describe and explain interpreting phenomena. The venue of interpreting activity to be examined is the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1948). Because of its political nature as a trial guided by the overall U.S strategy for the occupation of Japan and its lasting impact on Japan’s postwar politics and foreign relations, the validity of the IMTFE never ceases to be a topic of discussions for nationalists and revisionists in Japan, even sixty years after the conclusion of the trial. Although the legality or legitimacy of the trial is outside the scope of this study, great attention is paid to the historical and political background of the trial as a crucial factor in the examination of the interpreting arrangements and the behavior of the people who were involved in the interpreting process.

The most salient feature of interpreting at the IMTFE was the hierarchical structure of the three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists performing three separate functions: interpreter, monitor and language arbiter. Notwithstanding this distinct feature of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, and the historical significance of the trial itself as the Japanese counterpart of the Nuremberg Trial, there has been very little research done on the interpreters who worked during the IMTFE. The first aim of the present study, therefore, is to shed light on this all but forgotten chapter in the history of interpreting. An overview of the interpreter arrangements at the IMTFE is provided, with special attention to its political and historical context and the social and cultural backgrounds of the linguists.

The second objective is to examine the hypothesis that links interpreters’ choices, strategy and behavior to their awareness of where they stand in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate. This examination is conducted through a case study on the interpreted testimonies of wartime Japanese Prime Minister and War Minister General Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses. Special focus is placed on the nature

of interjections by the monitors and the interpreters and on their interactions with the other court participants.

In light of the first objective of the present study, literature covering interpreting in historical events is reviewed in Chapter 1. After an overview of studies on the general history of interpreting and focused studies on specific eras, regions and settings, there is a discussion of the key findings in research on interpreting at international war crimes trials. There is also a review of literature dealing with interpreters' behavior in courtroom settings. Special attention is paid to various approaches and theoretical frameworks applied in these studies, such as microlinguistic analysis and norm-based approach.

Following the literature review, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the present study. Its overall approach is to view interpreting as a social practice, with a focus on the interpreters, and not the interpreted texts, and to contextualize the interpreting arrangements and linguists' behavior by looking at the political, historical, social and cultural factors. With this sociocultural approach as the overall framework, three sets of notions are introduced for the examination of three distinct features of interpreting at the IMTFE: "trust, power and control" for the examination of why the tribunal devised the three-tier interpreting arrangements to address its language needs; "negotiated norms" for the analysis of how the interpreting procedures developed over the first year of the court proceedings; and "autonomous and heteronomous interpreters" (Cronin *ibid.* 54-59) in the discussion of the complex standing of *Nisei* linguists.

The two research methods used in this study are explained in Chapter 3. The first part of the study is defined as historical and archival research, which draws on the examination of historical records and other archival information. Reference is made to a wide variety of materials, including transcripts in both English and Japanese and other trial documents, government documents and films, and interviews with some linguists and their families. The second part of the study is presented as a case study. The limitations of using transcripts to analyze the linguists' behavior are discussed. The qualitative nature of this research and the strategies for data analysis are explained as well. In addition, the rationale for selecting the testimonies of Tojo and other Japanese witnesses is laid out.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE. It deals with the languages used, the recruitment of the interpreters, the equipment and the interpreters' booth, the mode of interpreting, the functions of three groups of linguists, translation disputes and the effect of interpreting on the proceedings. It also includes the profiles of some linguists.

In Chapter 5, three important features of interpreting at the IMTFE are analyzed in detail. The topics of this focused examination are: the issues of trust, power and control manifested in the interpreting arrangements in which three different ethno-social groups of linguists engaged in three different functions; the interactional aspect of norm-building and interpreters' cognitive limitations as a factor in that process observed in how the interpreting procedures developed during the initial stage of the trial; and the ambivalent nature of the standing of the *Nisei* linguists as "in-between" in the power relations at the IMTFE.

The behavior of the linguists is examined in Chapter 6. Bearing in mind the different positions of the respective linguist groups in the hierarchy of the interpreting arrangements, the nature of the interjections by the linguists and interactions between the court, interpreter, monitor and language arbiter during the trial is analyzed. The focus of the analysis is the interpreted testimonies of Hideki Tojo and other Japanese defendants. Findings of this examination are discussed to see whether they support the hypothesis of the present study.

Chapter 7 is a brief reflection on the relevance of findings of this study to issues of today's world. Two important aspects of interpreting at the IMTFE are referred to in the discussion of interpreter-related issues at the present time. One concerns heritage language used in war and the U.S. government's interpreter procurement methods during times of conflict. An attempt is made to draw parallels and comparisons between the complex position of the *Nisei* linguists during the IMTFE and the situation of linguists currently involved in the "global war on terror". The other is the norm-building process in the context of courtroom interpreting. The negotiation process between court interpreters and users of their services in today's context is discussed by referring to the development of interpreting procedures during the initial stage of the IMTFE.

In Conclusion, the research design and objectives of this study are restated, and the key findings are summarized. They point to the overall argument of the present study that interpreting is a social practice that is conditioned by various factors of the setting in which interpreting takes place; and that, in the case of the IMTFE, attention to political and social factors is essential to achieving a fuller understanding of the interpreting arrangements and the behavior of the linguists. Lastly, this final chapter presents implications of the present research for the state of Interpreting Studies and directions for future research.

1. Literature review

This chapter reviews prior studies in the fields relevant to the two aims of the present study: a historical examination of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, and a case-study analysis of the behavior of the linguists during the interpreted testimonies of Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses. Firstly, previous studies on interpreters through history are reviewed, covering the general history of interpreting and the history of interpreting in particular eras, regions and settings. Focus is placed on literature about interpreting at war crimes trials. Secondly, prior publications on the behavior of interpreters in courtroom settings are reviewed, paying particular attention to different approaches and theoretical frameworks applied in these studies.

1.1. Interpreters in historical events

Interpreting has been used to facilitate communication across different cultures and languages throughout the history of humanity. Undoubtedly, the history of interpreting is much longer than that of translation since interpreting activities must have taken place before the invention of written language. The ephemerality inherent in interpreting, however, and the confidentiality and invisibility generally self- or otherwise imposed on interpreters make it difficult to locate reliable records that can be used to describe interpreting activities of the past. While texts translated in ancient times may be available to scholars, transcripts, audio or video records of interpreting prior to modern times are almost non-existent. Researchers of interpreting history have to search through archival documents, letters, diaries, etc. for references to interpreters and interpreting activities. This may be a reason why, at least judging from available sources in English, there have not been many studies on the history of interpreting compared to those on translators and translating activities. In this section, for the purposes of the first aim of this study, some of the works by researchers in the area of interpreting history are reviewed. First, a general overview of the studies on the history of interpreting is provided, followed by a critical review of literature about interpreters and interpreting arrangements in war crimes trials to identify key findings and any gaps to be filled by future research.

1.1.1. Interpreters throughout history

The most comprehensive of all the English texts of academic inquiry into the history of interpreting in terms of the coverage of different times and settings is Bowen's overview (1995) of how interpreting as a profession has emerged and evolved from Ancient Egypt to post-World War II. It discusses the difficulty of finding reliable records and accounting for past interpreting activities; the evolution of interpreting modes, equipment and training; and the history of interpreters in religious and missionary activities, exploration and colonial contexts, military conflicts, and diplomatic settings. Although this study constitutes only one chapter in a nine-chapter book dedicated to translators in history and contains no in-depth analysis of any particular aspect of past interpreting activities, it does provide a survey of topics in the field of interpreting history worthy of further investigation.

Similarly, the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* (Baker 1998) can be used as an introductory source for research on the history of interpreting. It contains a collection of brief summaries on the history of interpreters in various geographical and language categories, ranging from African to Turkish traditions. Although these summaries are fragmented encyclopedic accounts, they may be the only sources in English documenting the history of interpreting in certain little-studied regions and languages.

As for more focused research on interpreters in specific eras and geographies, there is a pioneering work by Hermann (1956/2002), a former German army interpreter-turned-Egyptologist, on interpreters in Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome. In the same context of Ancient Egypt, Kurz (1985) discusses the princes of Elephantine as "overseers of dragomans" by drawing on the earliest reference to interpretation found on their tombs. Focusing on the Middle Eastern region, Lewis (2004), a historian of the Middle East, provides an insightful account of interpreters from ancient through modern times, fully addressing its overall political, social and religious contexts. The reference to the changes in the interpreter procurement methods of the Ottomans and European countries during the Ottoman era is of special interest to the present study as it entails the issues of trust, power and control in interpreting. Karttunen (1994) examines the lives of interpreter-

guides who worked, willingly or unwillingly, for conquerors, missionaries, explorers, soldiers and anthropologists in the Americas. Although this work addresses issues of imperialism, gender and ethnicity, its main aim is to provide detailed biographical data of these interpreter-guides, who included Malinche, an interpreter for Cortés during the Spanish conquest of Mexico, and Sacajawea, who worked as a guide for Lewis and Clark's expedition in North America. Focusing specifically on the German language, Wilss (1999) discusses both translation and interpreting in his extensive survey of the profession through the 20th century. He provides a comprehensive picture of the evolution of translation and interpreting as a profession and the development of training programs in this context.

In addition, there have been several articles on the history of interpreting from the perspectives of interpreting methods, settings and training. Herbert (1978) describes the history of conference interpreting from the World War I era, including the development of simultaneous interpreting, by largely drawing on his own experience as a pioneer conference interpreter. The contributions to the special issue of *Interpreting* (4:1, 1999) dedicated to the history of interpreting in the 20th century cover various topics, such as the history of simultaneous interpreting in Russia (Chernov 1999), the teaching of conference interpreting (Seleskovitch 1999), and the historical aspects of court (Morris 1999a) and community (Pöchhacker 1999) interpreting. In the area of training, Moser-Mercer (2005) provides a concise review of simultaneous interpreting programs mainly in Europe from 1929 to 1989.

More extensive research in the form of monographs on the history of interpreting in particular settings includes the work by Roland (1999) on interpreters in diplomatic and political settings and the study by Baigorri (2004) on the interpreters at the United Nations. Roland provides a general overview of interpreters who worked in diplomatic and political arenas, from ancient times to the Cold War era, and from Europe, the Middle East and the Americas to China, Japan and India. By compiling snippets of references to interpreters in historical records and anecdotes, Roland aims to shed light on the interpreters buried in diplomatic history. Written for the general reader by a political scientist, this book does not pay much attention to some aspects of interpreting typically discussed in *Interpreting Studies*, such as interpreting modes and methods, the evolution

of interpreting as a profession and interpreter training. One chapter dedicated to Asia, however, is a valuable source of information on this less-commonly-studied area in Interpreting Studies.

In contrast, the interpreter's perspective cannot be missed in Baigorri's work, which includes discussions of the sociological and cultural profiles of U.N. interpreters, the clash among interpreters at the dawn of simultaneous interpreting, interpreter training and technological changes. With a great deal of information drawn from documents and interviews, Baigorri presents a careful, thorough examination of the establishment and evolution of interpreting at the U.N. – an important milestone in the history of conference interpreting as a profession. Of particular interest to the present study is the analysis of the personal backgrounds of the interpreters, which pays due attention to the social, political and cultural contexts in which the first generation of U.N. interpreters developed their multilingual skills and arrived at the profession “by chance”.

There are also studies that focus on particular interpreters and interpreted events. The most extensive work in English includes the study by Gaiba (1998) on the interpreters and interpreting arrangements at the Nuremberg Trial. Drawing on various archival materials and interviews with several interpreters who worked during the trial, Gaiba presents one of the most thorough examinations of an interpreted event in history.

With the introduction of general history of interpreting in Japan and *Oranda tsuji* (Dutch interpreters in 17th-19th century Japan), Semizu (2001) explores the roles of interpreters as intercultural mediators and first learners of foreign knowledge by focusing on the 1708 incident in which a captured Italian missionary was interrogated by *Oranda tsuji*. McNaughton (2006) documents the history of *Nisei* linguists who worked in military intelligence during World War II. As a U.S. Army historian, McNaughton draws on a vast amount of archival documents and testimonials of *Nisei* linguists to chronicle the time from the recruitment of *Nisei* prior to Pearl Harbor to their training in the Army's Japanese language schools and activities as interpreters, translators and interrogators during the war. This 514-page book published by the U.S. Department of the Army provides a wealth of detailed information on the military operations in which these *Nisei* linguists engaged and addresses the difficult subjects of racial discrimination and prejudice within the U.S. military. This is, however, essentially a military record, so

it circumvents any in-depth analysis of the complex issues military linguists face, such as the task of using their language skills to confront their native or heritage culture as enemies. Also, McNaughton does not undertake a comparative analysis with U.S. military linguists in the context of the current “global war on terror”.

As for more recent events, there are some studies on interpreting at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, 1996-1998) in South Africa. A report by du Plessis and Wiegand (1998) describes the interpreting arrangements and operations at the hearings of the TRC and presents a view that draws parallels between interpreting at the TRC and interpreting at the Nuremberg Trial. Wallmach (2002) reflects on the role of interpreters at the TRC by referring to the gaps between the prescribed role of interpreters as “a neutral intermediary” or “a conduit” and the reality of interpreters who experienced difficulties and trauma while interpreting about atrocities at the TRC. As the proceedings of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague are scheduled to complete by 2010, studies on interpreting at the ICTY from a historical perspective may be added in the future to the contemporary research on linguistic features and other issues of interpreting at the ICTY (e.g. Stern 2004).

1.1.2. The Nuremberg Trial (Gaiba 1998)

Of the above-mentioned literature, the most comparable to the first part of the present study is *The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial* by Gaiba (1998). Both the Nuremberg Trial and the IMTFE were held for war crimes committed during World War II and took place around the same time (Nuremberg: November 1945 to August 1946; Tokyo: May 1946 to November 1948). Most of the interpreters at both trials were untrained “chance interpreters” who went through a “trial and error” stage in working under unprecedented interpreting arrangements at large-scale international events. Just like the present study, Gaiba undertakes extensive research into one of the most important, but little-researched, events in the history of interpreting.

As Gaiba herself rightfully points out (ibid.: 20), the strength of her book lies in the amount of information on interpreting at this historical venue, which until then had not been discussed extensively. Based on an examination of a wide range of materials including the transcripts, archival documents, microfilms and interviews with several

interpreters, Gaiba describes the preparation stage, the interpreting system, the impact of interpreting on the proceedings, the interpreters' lives outside the courtroom and the profiles of some interpreters.

In the discussion of the pretrial arrangements in the first chapter of her book, Gaiba touches on the historical background of the development of conference interpreting in order to establish her view of the Nuremberg Trial as the origin of simultaneous interpreting. Gaiba's claim that "[t]he Nuremberg Trial was the first official international gathering in which simultaneous interpreting was used (ibid.: 19)" and her conclusion that the attempts at simultaneous interpreting prior to Nuremberg were actually "simultaneous successive interpretation" and "simultaneous reading of pretranslated texts" (ibid.: 31-32), however, may be challenged by researchers who discuss simultaneous interpreting at the 1928 International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference and the 1928 Comintern. Simultaneous interpreting on those occasions has been studied, with the inclusion of corroborating sources. For instance, Baigorri (1999a: 31-34) cites multiple sources from archival records to point out that the attempts to use simultaneous interpreting started in the mid-1920s and "real" simultaneous interpreting was used throughout the meetings of the ILO conference in 1928. Shveitser (1999) discusses the use of simultaneous interpreting in the 1928 Comintern, without interpreter booths, and in the 1933 Comintern, with booths and headsets supplied for the interpreters. Therefore, contrary to the title of Gaiba's book, *The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation*, interpreting at the Nuremberg Trial should be considered "the coming of age" (Baigorri ibid.: 34) of simultaneous interpreting, or "the first time that simultaneous interpretation was used consistently and for extended periods of time" (Moser-Mercer 2005: 208).

The second chapter provides a detailed description of the interpreting system at the Nuremberg Trial. With the help of figures illustrating the language directions used in interpreting, Gaiba's explanation on the makeup of the interpreter teams is very clear and the intricacy of the electrical transmission system is easily understood. This chapter also offers useful information for the present study to highlight the differences in the interpreting arrangements between the Nuremberg Trial and the IMTFE. The greatest difference is the use of simultaneous interpreting at Nuremberg as opposed to the use of consecutive interpreting at the IMTFE. In addition, of particular relevance to the

discussion of trust issues in the present study is the description of the monitor system used at Nuremberg. There, the role of the monitor was to supervise the smooth operation of the interpreting system at Nuremberg, making sure especially that the equipment was functioning, the incoming and outgoing volume via the interpreter booths was appropriate, and the speaker spoke at the proper speed for the interpreters. The monitor also checked the accuracy of interpretation, as well as the fatigue and stress levels of the interpreters, so that he could replace them as needed. There is no information in Gaiba's book to suggest that the monitoring system was established partly out of the suspicion that the interpreters might behave in bad faith.

The reliability of the interpreting system and the impact of interpreting on the proceedings are examined in the third chapter. First, Gaiba explains the recording system used to ensure the accuracy of interpretation. This system consisted of electrical recording, stenographic recording, and reviewing and printing of the transcripts. Here, the reference to the fact that the interpreters themselves were involved in reviewing the transcripts and correcting misinterpretations they found is an important piece of information for the discussion of the trust issues in the case of the IMTFE. Next, by drawing on documented comments of various court participants, Gaiba discusses the effect of interpreting on the way lawyers examined witnesses, as well as the impact of the peculiar features of the German language and a given interpreter's personality and voice on the court proceedings. She also provides an interesting observation that Hermann Göring, who understood English, tried to exploit the use of interpreting by pointing out alleged interpreting errors and ridiculing the vulnerability of a trial supported by a complex four-language interpreting system. These are all interesting aspects of the discourse of courtroom interpreting that can be objects of in-depth analyses from linguistic and sociological perspectives in future investigations.

In the subsequent two chapters, Gaiba discusses the interpreters' pay and social life, and the profiles of several interpreters. Although Gaiba provides information that reveals the general atmosphere of the setting during the trial, as Baigorri (1999b: 514) suggests, she could have engaged in more sociological reflection on who these interpreters were. For instance, Baigorri (*ibid.*) points to the link between why these interpreters developed their interpreting skills and the political contexts, such as Nazi

Germany's dominance prior to the end of the war and the Russian Revolution. This type of analysis could have provided some contextualization to her examination of the interpreter profiles.

In conclusion, Gaiba introduces some interpreters' views of the Nuremberg trial and their experience, and their life and career after the trial. She also discusses post-Nuremberg developments in the fields of conference interpreting, interpreter training and simultaneous interpreting in courtroom settings. Lists of court participants in various groups, and a summary of the counts, verdicts and sentences of the defendants are provided as well in an appendix.

As mentioned above, the greatest contribution of Gaiba's book to the field of Interpreting Studies is the amount of information it offers on this important achievement in the history of interpreters. Gaiba's detailed, but clear presentation of the interpreting system at Nuremberg provides valuable information for academic inquiries into the evolution of conference interpreting. To the present study, Gaiba's work is the best source for identifying the differences in the interpreting arrangements between the Nuremberg Trial and the IMTFE and for highlighting the unique features of interpreting at the IMTFE. Because of the general nature of this book, however, while the "who, what, when, where and how" part of interpreting at Nuremberg is well presented, it does not contain any in-depth, theory-based analysis of the "why" part or specific aspects of interpreting at Nuremberg. As Baigorri (ibid.: 513-514) suggests, more narrowly-focused studies could follow up on topics such as the validity of the interpreter selection criteria, the on-the-job learning process of "chance" interpreters, and the sociopolitical context that necessitated these particular interpreting arrangements. In addition, some attention to the IMTFE which was taking place around the same time as the Nuremberg trial could have led Gaiba to the fact that, although the same type of IBM equipment was also used at the IMTFE, Tokyo had totally different interpreting arrangements despite its interest in emulating the system at Nuremberg.

1.1.3. The IMTFE and its interpreters

Just as Gaiba found very little literature on interpreting at the Nuremberg Trial, references to the interpreters and the interpreting system at the IMTFE are sporadic and

add up to only a few lines in any given publication. Among English texts, some publications on the IMTFE and post-war Japan briefly refer to how the interpreters worked and what impact interpreting had on the proceedings. For example, Dower (1999: 458) discusses the differences between Nuremberg and the IMTFE in terms of the languages used, the mode of interpreting and the presence of monitors and language arbiters. He also comments on the impact of interpreting on the length of the proceedings, quality issues with translations and interpreting, and the scarcity of translators and interpreters (ibid.: 458, 467). These abbreviated remarks are echoed in other publications that refer to the interpreters at the IMTFE (e.g. Brackman 1987, Bix 2000, Harvey 2006).

In the field of Interpreting Studies as well, there are very few articles in English that discuss interpreting at the IMTFE. Shveitser's work (1999) may be the only publication that dedicates more than a few pages to this topic. In his article on the history of simultaneous interpreting in Russia, Shveitser shares his own experience as a Russian interpreter at the tribunal. He fails, however, to mention that the official languages at the IMTFE were English and Japanese, and that Russian interpreting was provided as a stand-alone operation for the Soviet judge who did not understand English or Japanese. His description of interpreter "cabins" separated into two (for Japanese-into-English and English-into-Japanese interpretation) (ibid.: 24) is incorrect, as most interpreters worked in both directions (Oka 2005). His claim that *Nisei* or "professional interpreters of Radio Tokyo" were used as interpreters (ibid.) is also false, since many of the interpreters came from the Japanese government. Thus, this article should not be considered a reliable source for studying interpreting at the IMTFE.

In Japan, because of the undying interest in the IMTFE, the output of publications on this historic event – written by actual participants and by Japanese journalists and experts in history, government, international law, etc. – amounts to more than one hundred, according to the Japanese National Diet Library (2005). Their references to the interpreters at the IMTFE, however, are as brief and sporadic as they are in the English texts. They generally draw attention to the disputes over translations and interpretations, the interpreting system, the attitude of some lawyers towards the interpreters, the dearth of translators and interpreters, and the unfeasibility of simultaneous interpreting. The only aspect found in the Japanese texts but absent in the English ones is the exploration

of the personal background of the interpreters and monitors by some of the authors. The person most frequently mentioned is David Akira Itami, a *Nisei* monitor, who committed suicide after the trial. His life has been a subject of interest for academics as well as fiction and nonfiction writers (e.g. Yamasaki 1983, Kinashi 1985, special issue of *Daito Forum* 2000, Kono 2003).

1.1.4. *Tokyo Saiban no Tsuyaku Kenkyu* (Watanabe 1998)

The only extensive research on interpreting at the IMTFE to date is *Tokyo Saiban no Tsuyaku Kenkyu* by Watanabe (1998). This MA thesis, written in Japanese, gives an overview of interpreting at the IMTFE, and an analysis of the interpretation during the testimony of Hideki Tojo. Watanabe first provides a brief overview of the IMTFE, describes the interpreting system, including the function of the Language Arbitration Board, and presents the rosters of the interpreters and monitors. The workings of the interpreting process are illustrated by several examples from the transcripts of the proceedings.

Watanabe then analyzes the interpreting, using Tojo's testimony as an example. She uses the term "*kainyu* (intervention)" to refer to all types of behavior of the linguists, including the monitors' interjections and direct interactions with court participants, and the interpreters' "self-corrections" and direct interactions with court participants. The *kainyu* is classified into three categories: error corrections; changes to an "easier-to-understand" version or additions of explanation; and clarifications, procedural explanations and instructions. Watanabe applies these three categories to describe the behavior of both the monitors and the interpreters. Two subcategories are also used for each of these main categories: for English-to-Japanese interpretations and for Japanese-to-English interpretations. In addition to presenting the number of occurrences in each category and subcategory, Watanabe counts the numbers of interpreting errors in three categories (omissions, additions and erroneous word choices) that were missed by the monitors.

Based on this data, Watanabe concludes that the main thrust of the *kainyu* for Japanese-to-English interpretations was a higher level of accuracy, and for English-to-Japanese interpretations it was "user-friendliness", and that the linguists' ethical views

played a part in their eagerness to help the defendant, which would not be tolerated in today's courtroom settings. As for why there were much more *kainyu* for English-to-Japanese interpretations, Watanabe points to the difficulty of understanding the language style used in the courtroom and legal terms, and of coming up with the Japanese equivalent. She also argues that the interpreter and the monitor functioned as a team, and that this system as well as the monitors' *kainyu* helped elevate the level of fairness in the trial (ibid.: 53-57). Further, Watanabe examines the disputed translations and the language arbiter's rulings on them during Tojo's testimony, emphasizing the important role the monitors played in explaining the disputes to the court and the witness, as well as in directing the disputed matters to the arbiter (ibid.:79-80).

In conclusion, Watanabe asserts that the great latitude exercised by the monitors (and occasionally by the interpreters) contributed to "fair and conscientious" (ibid.: 83) interpreting during Tojo's testimony. Referring to Shlesinger (1991) and Morris (1995), Watanabe presents interpreting at the IMTFE as a demonstrative case where the interpreters' latitude was exercised to facilitate intercultural communication in a historical courtroom event.

Watanabe's work is significant as the first academic inquiry into the interpreters at the IMTFE. The rosters she created show the number of interpreters for each language used and the number of sessions each interpreter worked, which should be very useful for researchers who pursue this subject in future investigations. Watanabe's characterization of the interpreter and monitor functioning as a team presents a valid reference to discussions on how to improve the quality of courtroom interpreting. Her argument that the interpreters' latitude helped facilitate smooth communication at the IMTFE may also interest those engaged in debates on interpreter ethics. In addition, Watanabe's assertion on the different motivations at play for *kainyu* in interpretation from English into Japanese versus from Japanese into English contributes more evidence that court interpreters use different strategies when interpreting in different directions (e.g. Berk-Seligson 1990/2002, Jansen 1995, Hale 2004).

Although Watanabe's thesis refers to key features of interpreting at the IMTFE, such as the involvement of the monitors and the Language Arbitration Board in the interpreting process and the use of consecutive interpretation, it does not delve into some

fundamental questions, such as why Japanese nationals, especially diplomats, were used as interpreters and why three ethnically and socially different groups of people engaged in three different functions in the interpreting process. It does not question the Japanese competency level of the monitors and language arbiters, either. As for the reasons for the high frequency of *kainyu* for English-to-Japanese interpretations, Watanabe could have looked into factors such as the monitor's competency, the institutional pressure and incomplete transcript recordings. In addition, the three categories Watanabe employs to describe the behavior of both the monitors and the interpreters seems to be based on her view that they were on an equal footing and shared the same activities. Watanabe's categorization of "the interpreters' *kainyu*" which includes "self-corrections" is especially problematic, as such behavior was most likely prompted by the monitors. These whispered interjections by the monitors are audible in the motion pictures, but are not reflected in the transcripts. Perhaps Watanabe did not have access to the audio records of the IMTFE proceedings, but she could have shown more awareness of the problem of depending solely on transcripts to analyze the quality of interpreting and the behavior of the interpreters.

1.2. Interpreters' behavior in the courtroom

With the increasing need for intra-societal communication due to demographic changes and legislative developments such as the 1978 Court Interpreters Act in the United States, interpreting in the courtroom has become more visible and attracted researchers' attention over the past few decades. Some early works may not have originated in the field of Interpreting Studies, but studies by practitioner-researchers have proliferated, driven mainly by their professional concerns. Research on court interpreting now has a strong presence in the field of Interpreting Studies, as is observed throughout Pöchhacker's *Introducing Interpreting Studies* (2004). For the purposes of the present case study, this section will review different approaches applied to describe interpreters' behavior in the context of courtroom proceedings.

Two of the most extensive academic inquiries into courtroom interpreting to date are Berk-Seligson's *The Bilingual Courtroom* (1990/2002) and Hale's *The Discourse of*

Court Interpreting (2004). The present study first reviews Berk-Seligson's pioneering work as one of the most influential studies in the field of research on court interpreting. It summarizes the basic approach, the research design and key findings, and discusses the gaps that can be filled in future studies. Next, a more recent study by Hale is reviewed. Hale's work is described as a more holistic, as opposed to a merely microlinguistic analysis of interpreted court proceedings. The key findings and the strengths of her study are discussed. Lastly, two different approaches to studying the behavior of court interpreters are reviewed as alternatives to the frequently-found interdisciplinary works which draw on sociolinguistics, pragmatics and discourse analysis. One is interpreter-centered approach which pays attention to the professional concerns and institutional factors that can affect the behavior of court interpreters. The other is a norm-based approach, which seeks to identify normative behavior in the choices and strategies of court interpreters, and takes into consideration the interpreters' awareness of the dynamics of the court proceedings and power relations in the courtroom.

1.2.1. The Bilingual Courtroom (Berk-Seligson 1990/2002)

One of the most cited works in the field of research on court interpreting is Berk-Seligson's *The Bilingual Courtroom* (1990/2002). It is an ethnographic study of Spanish-English interpreted judicial proceedings. Drawing on 114 hours of tape-recorded court proceedings, in-court observations and interviews, it describes the behavior of the cultural groups in the courtroom from a linguistic point of view. First, Berk-Seligson analyzes how attention is shifted to the interpreter by court proceedings and other parties, focusing on judges and attorneys drawing attention to the interpreter, the interpreter's own attention-drawing behavior and the effect of interpreting on the flow of testimony. She concludes that the interpreter is "an intrusive element" in the courtroom that affects the power of the examining attorney and brings in his/her "own measure of coercion" to court proceedings (ibid.: 96). Here, Berk-Seligson depicts court interpreters as being highly visible and having controlling power as to the flow of the testimony and the questioning.

Next, Berk-Seligson engages in linguistic analysis, focusing on the variations in the interpreters' use of active and passive grammatical forms. She links this manipulation

of grammatical case to blame avoidance and other psychological reasons. Other pragmatic features in interpretation of Spanish testimony into English are also examined. Berk-Seligson finds that interpreters alter speech styles by lengthening witness testimony with hedges, hesitation and polite forms, which results in powerless speech. Deletion of those features also occurs, resulting in shortened testimonies. In the end, Berk-Seligson argues that these alterations by the court interpreter remove some power from the examining attorney and influence the impression the witness makes on the jurors, creating a different type of verbal power relationship among the court participants.

Berk-Seligson then explores the effect of politeness, register, hedging and grammatical case in interpretation on jurors' impressions of witnesses by conducting experimental studies with mock juror evaluations of witnesses. She finds that pragmatic alterations by court interpreters do affect the impression witnesses and examining attorneys make on the jurors, and suggests that interpreters, court administrators and interpreter trainers must be made aware of the "power that resides in the interpreter's role". In conclusion, Berk-Seligson points to an increasing awareness of the importance of court interpreters by referring to some appellate cases. In the chapter added in the new edition, she reviews new research on legal interpreting, which goes beyond the courtroom settings. New developments in certification and training programs are also discussed.

Although this study originates from the perspectives of ethnography and sociolinguistics, its use of a large corpus, an experimentation (mock jurors) and in-depth analysis of linguistic and pragmatic features has placed it among the most influential studies on court interpreting. An increasing number of researchers in the field of Interpreting Studies and beyond have taken an example from Berk-Seligson's work and engaged in empirical studies on interpreting in legal settings by drawing on sociolinguistics, pragmatics and discourse analysis.

One weakness in this study – possibly as a result of the fact that Berk-Seligson herself is a sociolinguist rather than an interpreter – is the failure to take account of the role of training and distinguish in some way between trained and untrained interpreters. Of the eighteen interpreters observed and tape-recorded in her study, only six were federally certified. As for their employment status, six worked full-time in courthouses solely in the capacity of official court interpreters; another six worked officially in some

other capacity in their courthouses, but were regularly called in by judges to perform as interpreters; and the remaining six were hired as interpreters on a free-lance basis, and called in at a moment's notice. Training – particularly the teaching of strategies and of ethics – does influence the behavior of interpreters. It would be reasonable to assume that there was a difference between the behavior of the federally certified interpreters who were presumably aware of general codes of ethics and professional conduct, and the behavior of bailiffs and court clerks who were not professionally trained interpreters, for example. Unfortunately, Berk-Seligson does not pay much attention to training as a crucial variable in the behavior of interpreters.

In addition, Berk-Seligson gives no indication of the fact that normative behavior tends to develop in response to feedback from other court participants, such as judges, attorneys, defendants and witnesses. She emphasizes the “power” of court interpreters in controlling the flow of the proceedings and influencing the jurors’ impressions of witnesses and examining attorneys; yet, she does not seem to reflect on the “power” of the institution as a factor influencing the behavior of court interpreters. One exception is her comment that the addition of politeness to interpretations into English may be explained by the fact that court interpreters are employed by the court and thus feel the need to speak politely to their employer (ibid.: 154). A more comprehensive view of power relations in the courtroom setting, however, might have led to a more profound understanding of the behavior of court interpreters.

1.2.2. The Discourse of Court Interpreting (Hale 2004)

While Berk-Seligson (1990/2002) deals mainly with the description of linguistic features of interpreted court proceedings and the possible effects of interpreting on the proceedings, Hale (2004), in *The Discourse of Court Interpreting*, focuses on factors that can affect the interpreter’s behavior. Her effort to explore such factors in analyzing court interpreters’ choices is evident throughout the book.

Hale (ibid.: xv) states that her study primarily presents a microlinguistic analysis of Spanish interpreters’ renditions in Australian courtrooms, but it draws on social and professional factors to explain the behavior of interpreters. Like Berk-Seligson, Hale does not differentiate trained from untrained interpreters in her examination of the interpreters’

performance since a vast majority of court interpreters in Australia are not professionally trained. But she notes the importance of training as a factor in the behavior of interpreters and presents her critical view of past research that reaches conclusions on accuracy and professional issues based on the analysis of completely untrained interpreters (ibid.: 28).

Hale's work not only presents a thorough examination of the discourse of Spanish-English interpreted court proceedings, but also explores possible reasons for certain choices court interpreters make consciously or unconsciously. In her analysis of Spanish interpretation of attorneys' questions, she finds that certain features are omitted in the interpreters' renditions, and points to a lack of syntactic and semantic equivalence as the main reason for the omissions. Further, pragmatic equivalence is proposed to address the issue of how the illocutionary force in the attorneys' questions may be maintained.

Hale's study also finds that interpreters omit discourse markers such as "well", "see" and "now" in attorneys' questions, and suggests two reasons for this: interpreters' conscious or unconscious disregard for such markers, considering them unimportant; and the lack of direct semantic equivalence in Spanish. Remedies by pragmatic equivalence are proposed again. Hale also indicates that the omissions of discourse markers can alter the illocutionary force of attorneys' questions, and discusses the possible effect of such practice on the witnesses' answers.

In examining English interpretations of Spanish-speaking witnesses' answers, Hale concludes that interpreters alter the speech styles of witnesses by omitting or adding powerless speech features such as hesitations, fillers, repetition and backtracking. It is suggested that such alterations are likely to impact jurors' evaluation of a witness's competency and credibility. Further, interpreters' language competency and interpreting skills are discussed as a major factor in the (positive or negative) impact of such alterations.

Hale also discusses power and control in the courtroom. Unlike Berk-Seligson, however, Hale points to the shift of power that may occur between examining counsel, witness, judge and interpreter: the counsel has the most control, but the witness may initiate a shift of control by asking for clarifications of the questions or being non-responsive to the questions, and the judge may halt the flow of remarks by the counsel

and witness. It is argued that the presence of interpreters may produce a shift of power as well by affecting the counsel's questioning strategy, and that interpreting errors can impact the counsel's controlling power.

In addition, Hale presents the results of a court interpreter survey in support of her argument concerning possible reasons for court interpreters' choices. The fact that most of the respondents were Hale's former students and that she used the respondents' written translations in comparison with the data based on oral renditions may cast some doubt over the validity of this investigation. Some of the findings are nonetheless informative, especially with regard to interpreters' perception of their role. In addition, the following comment of a survey respondent is particularly enlightening as a reminder of the need to pay attention to institutional constraints as a factor in shaping the behavior of interpreters: "Time constraints and an impatient response by counsel and magistrates/judges should also be taken into consideration when analyzing interpreters' performance at court" (ibid. 233).

Although Hale's work is mainly based on a microlinguistic analysis, it does attempt to explain why court interpreters make certain choices, consciously or unconsciously, such as altering speech styles and omitting various linguistic features. In this endeavor, attention is drawn not only to linguistic aspects such as the constraints of the language pair (especially the lack of syntactic and semantic equivalence), the interpreters' linguistic competency and interpreting skills, but also to sociological and cultural aspects, such as the interpreters' own views of their role, their ethical concerns and professional norms including a disregard for discourse markers and other linguistic features. Further contextualization could be explored in future studies. For instance, an examination of the economic factors in criminal court versus conference settings may suggest a different perspective in addressing the issues of interpreters' competency, as well as training and certification programs. Overall, however, Hale's study is valuable as it goes beyond a description of linguistic features of interpreted court proceedings and draws attention to various factors that may affect the behavior of court interpreters. This type of holistic approach, encompassing linguistic, social and professional concerns, is important to achieving a better understanding of the intricacy of court interpreting and the behavior of court interpreters.

1.2.3. Institutional constraints and interpreter latitude

There have been studies that refer to institutional constraints as a major factor in the behavior of interpreters in courtroom settings. Morris (1989, 1990, 1995) discusses the highly complex interpreting arrangements at the Demjanjuk trial in Jerusalem (1987-1988), where different modes of interpreting (simultaneous, consecutive and whispering) were used for different language combinations (between Hebrew, English, Ukrainian, Yiddish, German and Russian). Morris analyzes the characteristics of each of these modes and the different types of impact they had on the court proceedings. She also observes shifts in interpretation, whether deliberate or inadvertent, and the interpreters' latitude in keeping the dynamics of interaction and distancing themselves from the speaker. In addition to the institutional adoption of a monitoring system and recording of all the utterances in the courtroom to achieve a higher degree of accuracy, Morris (1995: 42) advocates that legal practitioners and authorities drop their "unattainable insistence on verbatim translation in the courtroom" and allow interpreters to "exercise the necessary latitude in dealing with the inherent difficulties of their profession".

Drawing on her observation of the interpreting at the same trial, Shlesinger (1991) discusses the latitude interpreters exercise. Her study presents three categories of such interpreter latitude by referring to examples in the court proceedings: 1. accommodating a direct addressee; 2. introducing stylistic shifts; and 3. asserting the interpreter's own independent persona. Shlesinger indicates that shifts in interpretation do occur in the courtroom, despite the sworn requirement to "well and faithfully interpret". This study cites several reasons for such shifts, including facilitating understanding of the direct addressee, averting the risk of sounding unprofessional, feeling obliged not to waste the precious time of the court and dissociating from the speaker to be an active participant in the communication. In the summary of this article, Shlesinger calls for further discussion of the role definition of court interpreters and the extent of their latitude.

While the focus of microlinguistic analyses of interpreter-mediated discourse in the courtroom is the interpreted text or the product, these studies by Morris and Shlesinger pay close attention to the interpreter or the producer. Possibly drawing on their own experience as court interpreters, they discuss various challenges the court

interpreters face, including institutional constraints, the moral dilemmas they feel because of the participants' conflicting views of the interpreter's role, and the latitude they exercise to facilitate the interpreter-mediated communication in the courtroom despite the principles of "accuracy" and "neutrality". Although it may not be entirely possible to generalize from the unusual interpreting arrangements of the Demjanjuk trial, the type of interpreter-centered approach reflected in these studies and their awareness of the institutional constraints on the behavior of interpreters are instrumental to studying the factors underlying certain choices, strategies and behavior of interpreters in courtroom proceedings.

1.2.4. Norm-based approach

In contrast to much of the research into court interpreting drawing on pragmatics, sociolinguistics and discourse analysis, there are not many studies that apply concepts and theories originating in Translation Studies to discuss the behavior of interpreters in courtroom settings. One exception is Jansen's case study (1995) of Spanish-Dutch court interpreting, in which he explores the nature of norms governing the court interpreter's strategies. Referring to the theories of Toury (1980) and the descriptive "Manipulation School" (Hermans 1985), Jansen argues that the interpreter internalizes these norms during the socialization process and chooses the most appropriate translational solution in a specific situation. Accordingly, he advocates going beyond a mere linguistic comparison between source and target texts and examining the interpreter's performance in a sociocultural context.

The hypothesis of Jansen's study is that the situation in which court interpreters work has a direct bearing on their interpreting strategies. He analyzes two interpreter-mediated court proceedings to see if the interpreter's choices are affected by how she perceives her own position in the situation, which "is based on an awareness of the power relations and ideological fundamentals of the institution" (ibid.: 15). He surveys various factors in courtroom settings, including the aims and organization of the trial, the ideologies and roles of the various parties, and the inter-relationship between the interpreter's behavior and these elements. The study finds that the interpreter tends to simplify the institutional discourse when translating for the defendant, and renders the

defendant's remarks in a standardized (non-simplified) register. Jansen explains that these interpreting strategies were guided by the norms that reflected the complex dynamics of the situation. In the end, he argues that interpreters cannot be neutral, as their behavior reflects the position they are forced to take in the dynamics of institutional and power relations.

A few attempts have been made to apply a norm-based approach to interpreting research (e.g. Shlesinger 1989, Harris 1990, Schjoldager 1995/2002, Jacobsen 2001, Diriker 2004, Inghilleri 2005). Due to the complex nature of interpreting, however, as Shlesinger (1999) points out, it is difficult for researchers to determine whether a strategy used by interpreters is attributable to their cognitive constraints or reflects norm-governed behavior. Since the courtroom has much greater institutional constraints than other settings, Jansen may have found the behavior of courtroom interpreters predominantly governed by the institutional norms. The fact that he observed an academically trained professional interpreter may explain his apparent unawareness of the interpreter's cognitive constraints. He does, however, admit that one of the limitations of his study is that it is a case study which, by definition, cannot claim to reflect general norms. As Shlesinger (1999: 65-66) suggests, future studies may take up an extensive discussion on norms in courtroom interpreting on the basis of much larger corpora.

2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses the overall theoretical framework applied in the present study. It introduces the view of interpreting as a social activity and the need for broad contextualization, and describes sociocultural approach that is taken throughout this study. In addition, an explanation is provided for the three sets of notions that are employed as the basis of the in-depth analyses of three important, sociopolitical features of interpreting at the IMTFE.

2.1. Sociocultural approach

The premise of the present study is that interpreting is a social practice that is conditioned by various factors of the situation in which interpreting takes place. It is based on the view that interpreting occurs to serve in fulfilling the objective of a given communicative, therefore social activity, and not in isolation from the historical, social, political or cultural context of the setting in which the interpreter operates. Therefore, in examining the interpreting in a historical event and analyzing the behavior of interpreters, this study goes beyond a mere listing of ostensible facts about a given interpreting activity or a microlinguistic analysis of interpreted texts. Rather, it pays attention to the historical and political context of the setting and the social and cultural background of the interpreters in pursuit of answers to various questions concerning interpreting phenomena. This overall approach is in line with the recent trend in research on translation and interpreting to focus on sociocultural aspects of translational activities.

“Social” and “cultural” approaches are gaining ground in Translation and Interpreting Studies as is evident by the themes of recent conferences and publications (e.g. “Translation and Interpreting as a Social Practice” conference in Graz, Austria, 2005, “Bourdieu and the Sociology of Translation and Interpreting” Special Issue of *The Translator*, 2005). The most indicative work of all is *Sociocultural Aspects of Translating and Interpreting*, edited by Pym, et al. (2006) with 18 contributions on social and cultural aspects of translating and interpreting in a wide variety of contexts. In its introductory chapter, Pym (ibid. 1-25) offers a set of methodological frameworks to address various

questions concerning the “sociocultural approach” in Translation Studies, such as its definition, its elements and their inter-relations. First and foremost, Pym advocates that sociocultural approaches should focus on translators instead of just the social aspects of source and target texts. According to him, this focus on human mediators necessarily leads the researcher to inquire into social and cultural factors that may affect their behavior. This is in contrast with the approaches found in sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics and cultural studies, which focus primarily on translations and interpreted texts.

In addition, Pym argues that sociocultural approaches in Translation and Interpreting Studies should look into the overlapping or complex positions of mediators. Pym also provides clarification to the terms “social” and “culture”: “the sociological” is partly quantitative, associated with relations between people, while “the cultural” is more qualitative, related to signifying practices; cultural factors (e.g. language use or translators’ strategies) are what is observed in Translation Studies, while social factors (e.g. the social groups translators belong to) tend to explain those cultural factors (ibid. 14-15). According to Pym, these social and cultural factors should be looked at holistically along with concepts such as “translation culture, social systems, regimes, interculturalities” (ibid. 25) that are appropriate to the settings in which translators/interpreters work.

Pym’s call for a mediator-focused approach with attention to social contexts is an extension of the four principles he proposed for research into translation history in his *Method in Translation History* (1998a). These principles are: 1. translation history should address the social causation of why given translations were produced in a particular time and place; 2. the chief object of translation history should be translators, not translations, as human translators are the key to understanding why translations took place; 3. the focus on translators should involve considerations as to the social contexts in which they worked, and they should be viewed as “interculturalities” instead of belonging to the target culture only; and 4. translation history should be relevant to addressing problems of the present time.

The present study attempts to embrace these propositions in undertaking its first objective which is to examine the interpreting phenomena found in a historical event. It

addresses the reasons why the three-tier interpreting system was devised at the IMTFE by investigating the social and cultural background of the linguists and the historical and political context of the trial. The discussion of negotiated norms in the interpreting procedures is in keeping with the present study's attention to the interpreters' role in interactions among the participants of a communicative event. The analysis of the position of the Japanese American monitors in the inter-relations among the court participants directly addresses the complexity of "interculturals". Further, the description of the training programs for military linguists during World War II in the United States and the selection process of interpreters in this highly politicized setting may enhance our understanding of U.S. language policy in the current context of "the global war on terror". The second aim of the present study is also in line with the sociocultural approach discussed above, since it is to analyze the linguists' behavior by linking it to their sociocultural background and positions in the power constellation of the tribunal.

In reviewing the evolution of Interpreting Studies, Pöchhacker (2004, 2006) identifies five "paradigms" as the main research traditions in the discipline. They focus on the Interpretive Theory of Translation (IT), cognitive processing (CP), neurolinguistics (NL), translation theory, in particular, target-oriented text production (TT) and dialogic discourse-based interaction (DI). It is in the TT paradigm that the present study finds its closest kin.

The focus on the idealized interpreting process of the IT paradigm may still be referred to in the context of training, but its "intuition-based naturalistic methods" (Pöchhacker 2006: 225-226) are seen as irrelevant to any in-depth academic inquiry into interpreting, as demonstrated by the recent body of works which overwhelmingly represent other approaches. The CP and NL paradigms which mainly draw on cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics seem too far removed from the view of interpreting as a social practice in this study. The focus on interaction in the DI is a departure from the specific focus on the cognitive aspects of conference interpreting, and its view of interpreters as mediators of communicative events certainly indicates an awareness of sociological aspects of interpreting. Its tendency to draw on sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and pragmatics along with sociology, however, suggests that the text-focused approaches and limited contextualization in the DI paradigm are not broad enough to

support an examination of interpreters' standing and behavior in the power constellation of a political setting, such as that discussed in the present study.

In contrast, Pöchhacker argues that the TT paradigm, which is mainly shaped by German functionalist approaches and Descriptive Translation Studies, "addresses textual and interactional as well as socio-cultural concerns" (ibid. 230). This inclusiveness is also rephrased in Pöchhacker's notion (2005: 693) of a "socio-cognitive perspective" for a more holistic understanding of interpreting, paying attention not only to mental operations but also to the macrotext, which includes "institutional constraints and functional concerns" (ibid.: 690). In this "socio-cognitive" view, interpreters' behavior is accounted for based on a combination of various factors such as their awareness of where they stand in the power relations, their cognitive limitations and professional norms. As Shlesinger (2001: 166) points out, it is indeed difficult to tease apart "the deliberate/conscious/norm-driven features of performance from those which are constrained by the limits of cognition, of knowledge, of experience etc."

The present study aspires to embrace this holistic approach in Interpreting Studies in the examination of the linguists' behavior, taking into consideration their cognitive issues as well as their standing in the power constellation of the tribunal as a whole. Because of the following two reasons, however, the focus of this study is more geared to the social, political and cultural factors. First, with the limited availability of (audio) data, it is almost impossible to engage in in-depth research into the mental operations of the interpreters. Secondly, the IMTFE was a highly politicized setting in which the interpreting arrangements were also dictated by the political and social concerns of the party in power. Therefore, this study attempts to describe and explain the phenomena of interpreting mainly from the socio-political-cultural perspectives based on the extensive research on the sociopolitical context of the tribunal and sociocultural backgrounds of the linguists, while paying attention to the cognitive factors of interpreting to the extent it can be based on the transcripts and the available audio records.

In sum, the overall theoretical framework of the present study is to describe and explain an interpreter-mediated event mainly in sociocultural terms. It means that this study: 1. views interpreting as a social practice conditioned by the institutional objective of the communicative event; 2. focuses on interpreters, particularly on their sociocultural

background and hierarchical position in the setting in which they operate; 3. attempts to explain why certain interpreting phenomena take place by examining the background of the interpreters and the social, political and cultural contexts of the setting; and 4. examines the link between interpreters' behavior and their awareness of the power relations of the setting.

2.2. Concepts in sociopolitical aspects of interpreting

Within the overall theoretical framework described above, Chapter 5 in the present study draws on three sets of concepts to examine three sociopolitical features of interpreting at the IMTFE. First, in the discussion of the most salient characteristics of the interpreting arrangements, namely that three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists engaged in three different functions in the interpreting process, the notions of “trust, power and control” are applied in order to explore why the tribunal arrived at these unusual arrangements to address its interpreting needs. Second, to analyze the court's learning process as a user of interpreting, the concept of “negotiated norms” is drawn on by first referring to Toury's model of natural/native translators (interpreters), and then focusing on the interactive aspect of norm-building and the interpreter's cognitive limitations as a factor in that process. Lastly, in the examination of the complex nature of the Japanese American monitors' position in the inter-relations among the court participants, reference is made to Cronin's notion (2002: 55-58) of “heteronomous” and “autonomous” interpreting systems. Below is a detailed discussion of these three sets of notions.

2.2.1. Trust, power and control

In an interpreter-mediated event, when different parties represent different interests, the party wielding the authority to select the interpreters will most likely avoid using interpreters who seem to have a conflict of interest, due to suspicions that they may act “in bad faith” to advance their own agenda. Such suspicions arise from the “power” that the interpreters are perceived to possess.

Using his prototypical model of a (bilingual) interpreter working between two monolingual parties, Anderson (1976: 218-221) argues that “the interpreter’s position as the person in the middle has the advantage of power inherent in all positions that control scarce resources”, and that the interpreter can monopolize the means of communication. Laster and Taylor (1994: 111) point to this “power” as the reason lawyers try to regulate and constrain the interpreter’s role as “neutral machines or ‘conduits’”. The user’s fear that interpreters may exercise such “power” to advance their own interests is not completely unwarranted. Examples of such interpreters include the one who deliberately misinterpreted for a Gaelic poet defendant in 18th century Ireland (Cronin *ibid.*: 55), and the sign language interpreter in Ukraine who delivered her own political message on television while pretending to be interpreting the 2004 election results (Zarakhovich 2005).

The user’s mistrust of the interpreter arising out of an absence of shared interest or affiliation has been discussed throughout the history of interpreting: William of Rubruck in the 13th century suspected that his Armenian interpreters was distorting the original message in their interpretation (Bowen 1995: 254-255); European embassies complained about the incompetency and disloyalty of Levantine dragomans in the Ottoman era (Lewis 2004: 25-26); in the 1820 trial of Queen Caroline of England, the defense was concerned about the impartiality of the Italian interpreter provided by the prosecution (Morris 1999: 19); and, more recently, Sophia Coppola (2003), the director of the famed movie *Lost in Translation* (2003), voiced her skepticism over the lengthy renditions of the interpreter who worked for her in Tokyo. In today’s context of the Iraq war, the inventor of IraqComm, a portable two-way interpreting device, suggests that human interpreters are perhaps not entirely trusted and that “[t]he interpreter may have their own agenda” (Kristin Precoda, director of SRI, quoted in Abate 2006).

In response to such concerns about trust, the party in power may establish a system to regulate and control the interpreter. Hermans (2000: 4-7) discusses several historical examples, such as interpreters during the European discovery of America and *Oranda tsuji* (Dutch interpreters) in 17th-19th century Japan, to point out the “tight controls on translators and interpreters to guarantee their trustworthiness, to ensure that they speak exclusively with their masters’ voice”. Referring to the “overseers of the

dragomans” in Ancient Egypt, Pym (1998a: 186) also draws attention to the institutionalization of translation where “hierarchical control is established; boundaries are maintained”. Within this institution, according to Cronin (ibid.: 58), “[t]he role of interpreters throughout history has been crucially determined by the prevailing hierarchical constitution of power and their position in it.”

These sociopolitical aspects of interpreting are patent in the hierarchical structure of interpreting and the role of each linguist group during the IMTFE. A subsequent chapter will explore why the tribunal devised the three-tier structure of interpreting system, focusing on issues of trust, power and control.

2.2.2. Negotiated norms

One of the most influential concepts in Translation Studies has been the notion of norms, developed by Toury (1978/2000) mainly in the context of literary translation to refer to regularities in translational behavior. Toury’s view of translation as a norm-governed activity has inspired many translation scholars to focus on the target text and culture, instead of the correspondence between the source and the target texts; to describe and explain translational activities, instead of prescribing them; and to pay attention to the sociological and cultural aspects of translational phenomena beyond the linguistic features of texts.

In the field of interpreting research, the first attempt to apply the notion of translational norms was launched by Shlesinger (1989), who referred to logistic and methodological difficulties (mainly the lack of large corpora) in identifying norms in interpreting. In response, Harris (1990) presented a list of interpreting norms based on his experience as a practicing interpreter and trainer of interpreters. In addition to norms such as professional interpreters speaking in the first person, team-interpreting, and working only into their A language (in Western Europe) in simultaneous interpreting settings, he referred to the “honest spokesperson” norm, which requires interpreters to “re-express the original speakers’ ideas and the manner of expressing them as accurately as possible” (ibid.: 118). In the mid-1990s empirical research on interpreting was conducted by directly drawing on the notion of norms. Jansen (1995) explored the nature of norms governing the interpreter’s strategies in his case study of Spanish-Dutch court

interpreting. Schjoldager (1995/2002) used a larger corpus of interpreted texts to search translational norms in interpreting.

In his contribution to the debate on norms and translation (Schäffner ed. 1998), Gile questioned Shlesinger's view on insufficient corpora and offered several ways to pursue research into norms in interpreting. He also pointed to a critical difference between translation and interpreting in how norm-based strategies develop: "Interpreting strategies are at least partly norm-based", but "many of them primarily address cognitive constraints." (ibid. 100) In addition, Gile raised the interesting question of how different the norms can be depending on the setting, such as in the training environment and in the professional environment, and under different perspectives, such as the interpreters' own views on their performance and the users' expectations of the interpreters' performance.

More recently, the discussion of translational norms in interpreting seems to have taken two main avenues. One approach concerns the issues of norms and cognitive constraints as drivers of interpreting strategies. Following up on her discussion of norms in interpreting, Shlesinger (1999) points to the normative behavior of interpreters commonly found in various studies on courtroom interpreting: court interpreters simplify the renditions when addressing the defendant and elevate the register of renditions when addressing the court. She also observes condensation as well as other strategies operating as norms in simultaneous interpreting settings by drawing on a variety of literature. Then, most importantly, Shlesinger presents a strong case for potential problems with studies that solely focus on the cognitive aspect of interpreting by referring to the challenge she herself faced in an experiment on the processing capacity of interpreters. In conclusion, she emphasizes the importance and difficulty of determining whether a strategy used by interpreters is attributable to their cognitive constraints or reflects norm-governed behavior.

The other approach focuses on the sociology of interpreting. Starting with Toury's notion of norms and incorporating Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field and Bernstein's pedagogic discourse, Inghilleri (2003) presents a theoretical model to examine translation norms in interpreting. She uses asylum hearings as examples to argue that norms are realized in and through interactions between the interpreter and various other participants of the interpreted event. Further, in her discussion of the status of

public service interpreters, Inghilleri (2005) applies Bourdieu's concept of "a zone of uncertainty" (weak positions situated in the gaps between different fields). Whether this model can be used in settings other than social service settings, however, is unclear. As Inghilleri (*ibid.*: 72) mentions, conference interpreting may be an exception to this theoretical framework. Also, it would be interesting to see whether interpreters' cognitive constraints could be integrated into Inghilleri's model of norm development.

In the present study, the examination of how the interpreting procedures developed during the early stages of the IMTFE proceedings first refers to Toury's discussion (1995: 241-258) of natural/native translators (interpreters). (Toury uses the term "translator(s)" when the focus of his discussion apparently is interpreters. The present study cites Toury's original language, but adds "interpreter(s)" in parentheses to indicate that the term refers to interpreters in addition to translators in the narrow sense.) This is because the personnel who were involved in the interpreting process at the IMTFE were what Toury refers to as natural/native translators (interpreters): bilinguals who develop their interpreting skills on the job without prior professional training to become interpreters.

In describing how a bilingual speaker grows into the role of a translator (interpreter) without formal training, Toury points to the internalization of feedback from the environment the translator (interpreter) is in. This process is also referred to as "socialization". Toury acknowledges the interactional aspect of the communicative activity, which involves feedback from various players such as the receiver of the translated utterance, the originator of the utterance and the commissioner of the communicative event. According to Toury, such feedback embodies norms that determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of various aspects of the translation activity, and inappropriate translational behavior (i.e. nonconformity to norms) is sanctioned. He argues that those who internalize the feedback and conform to the acquired norms will be recognized as translators (interpreters).

What is missing in Toury's model is a description of the interpreter's part in the very interactional aspect of communication to which he refers (*ibid.*: 248). Toury (1998: 15, 20) does mention in his subsequent work that norms can result from the constant negotiations over what is to be agreed upon within a given group, and suggests an inquiry

into whether the translators themselves have power in the negotiation of translational norms. Pym (1998b: 113) points out, however, that this suggestion is just a reflection of Toury's initial interest in who may participate in the negotiation of norms and that there is much to be done to focus on the people involved in the negotiation process.

In interpreted events, especially in dialogue interpreting settings, the involvement of the interpreter is more noticeable than that of translators because of the immediacy of the interactional discourse. As Wadensjö (1998) argues throughout her influential book *Interpreting as Interaction*, the interpreter is an engaged participant in the interactional discourse of the interpreted event. Inghilleri (2003, 2005) is keenly aware of this interactional aspect of interpreting in her discussion of the formation of norms. In order to reflect the interpreters' involvement in the negotiation process of norm-building, Toury's model of natural/native translators (interpreters) should include feedback from the interpreters to their users and commissioners.

It should also be noted that norms develop as part of rationalizing the cognitive limitations of interpreters (Shlesinger 1999: 73). Such limitations may include the inability to interpret an excessively long segment at a time in the consecutive mode and to properly interpret a highly technical speech without access to background information in advance. For example, the way simultaneous interpreters work in teams and take turns can be considered as a norm developed based on interpreters' cognitive constraints, since they cannot keep up quality performance for a long time (Moser-Mercer et al. 1998).

Starting with Toury's model of natural/native translators (interpreters) and drawing on the notion of "negotiated norms", a subsequent chapter analyses the exchanges on interpreting issues between the tribunal, the interpreters (through their spokespersons) and other participants to illustrate the interactional nature of norm-development in interpreted events and the interpreters' cognitive constraints as a factor in that process.

2.2.3. "Heteronomous" and "autonomous" interpreters

There will be a detailed discussion in Chapter 5 on the Japanese Americans who worked as monitors at the IMTFE. In examining the place of the *Nisei* monitors in the inter-relationships among the court participants, Cronin's notion (ibid.: 55-58) of

“heteronomous” and “autonomous” interpreting systems is drawn on to illustrate the complex nature of the standing of these monitors.

In discussing the issue of control in interpreting in colonial contexts, Cronin (ibid.) refers to the difficulty the colonizers had in dealing with the “doubleness” or “duplicity” of interpreters. He examines two types of interpreter procurement systems used by colonizers: heteronomous and autonomous. A heteronomous system involves recruiting native people by force or through inducements, and teaching them the colonizer’s language. The colonizers find a danger in this system that the interpreters, the returned natives, regain their “nativeness” and become manipulative and untrustworthy. Cronin (ibid.: 57) states, “The interpreter is returned to his language and culture of origin, he has retraced the path from his B language to his A language, but the origins have now become uncertain, a potential site for duplicity.” Due to the colonizers’ concern about such interpreters, a shift to autonomous systems of interpreting takes place. Under an autonomous system, colonizers train their own people in the languages of the colonized so that they can work as loyal interpreters. Cronin (ibid.: 57-58) refers to this shift in the context of tour guidebooks as well.

The shift from heteronomous to autonomous systems can also be observed in Lewis’s (2004) account of the interpreters who worked in negotiations, mainly on commerce, between the Ottoman government and the various European embassies in Istanbul during the Ottoman era. Since none of the government officials on either side spoke the languages of their counterpart, each party procured interpreters on its own.

The Ottoman side first used renegades as interpreters. They were mainly Hungarians, Poles, Germans and Italians who had abandoned Christianity and moved to the Ottoman land. Those renegades were gradually replaced by Greeks, who were Ottoman subjects. Prominent Greek families in Istanbul sent their sons to Italy for schooling, and upon their return they served the Ottoman government as interpreters. In the sense that these Greek dragomans were not Muslims (i.e. they were not part of the mainstream “insiders” of the Ottoman Empire), this was a heteronomous way of procuring interpreters.

The European embassies relied on Levantines, mainly Catholics of Italian origin living in Turkey as descendants of the Crusaders and traders. Since they were considered

“not really European” but “local” (ibid. 25), this interpreting arrangement can be viewed as a heteronomous system as well. Almost from the start, the European powers found problems with the Levantine interpreters. One of the complaints was their disloyalty. They were accused of selling their services to the highest bidder, exchanging secrets with colleagues and selling secrets they obtained on the job. Another complaint was that they were too afraid of the Ottoman authority to do the job properly. As subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, the Levantine interpreters were too scared to deliver any unpleasant message faithfully.

The embassies became seriously concerned about this problem, and soon the European powers started to train their own people as interpreters – the shift to autonomous systems. Young Englishmen, Frenchmen, Austrians and Russians were assigned to learn Turkish, and eventually started working side by side with Levantine dragomans. As for the Ottoman side, the shift to an autonomous interpreting system was prompted by the Greek independence. The world order was changing, and the Ottomans felt it unsafe to entrust the interpreting post to non-Muslims. They started learning European languages and later established a translation office where their own people worked as interpreters and translators (ibid.: 27-28).

One of the interesting facts about the autonomous interpreters in the Ottoman government is that they did more than interpreting and translating. They were involved in foreign affairs, implementing the policies and drafting diplomatic documents. The newly established translation office “became the main avenue to power in Turkish bureaucratic politics” (ibid. 28). By definition, autonomous interpreters are “insiders” who are expected to behave in the interest of their ruler. The ruler may then direct its trusted interpreters to engage in other related functions as well – in this case, in diplomacy.

Oranda tsuji in 17th-19th century Japan is another example of autonomous interpreters who did more than interpret. When Japan started its seclusion policy in the early 17th century and the Dutch traders became the only Westerners to have contact, however limited, with Japan, the Japanese government established a system in which only about twenty educated families could hold the position of official Dutch interpreters. These hereditary interpreters were government officials with hierarchical titles, and engaged in trade-related administrative matters as well (Torikai 2004). They also

functioned as informants who gathered information on world affairs from Dutch traders and literature and delivered it to the central government. They were scholars who introduced Western sciences and technologies to Japan as well. The cases of *Oranda tsuji* and Ottoman interpreters suggest that one of the differences in the characteristics of autonomous and heteronomous interpreters can be found in whether or not they engage in an administrative function in the system of their ruler in addition to working as interpreters.

In the subsequent discussion on the Japanese American linguists, Cronin's concepts of heteronomous and autonomous interpreting systems, and the notion of autonomous interpreters as their ruler's administrators will be visited in order to analyze those *Nisei* monitors' position and role in the power constellation of the IMTFE.

3. Research methodology

This chapter explains the methods applied in carrying out the present study. Two different approaches are used to address the two objectives: historical and archival research for describing and analyzing the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE; and case-study research, examining the hypothesis that links the linguists' behavior to their position in the power constellation of the setting. Below is a discussion of the general perspective of the research methods, the materials used to collect data, the rationale for the selection of the focus area and the strategies for data analysis in the present study.

3.1. Historical and archival study

Williams and Chesterman (2002: 65-67) discuss case studies, corpus studies, survey studies, and historical and archival studies as examples of empirical research in Translation Studies. The research methodology of the first part of the present study fits into the category of historical and archival research, which is based on the examination and analysis of historical records and other archival information. As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, the present study focuses on people, in this case the linguists, rather than texts, and seeks answers for why certain interpreting phenomena took place in this historical event by examining its social, political and cultural contexts. Accordingly, in addition to a detailed analysis of the transcripts and documents concerning the preparation and operation of the court procedures, the personal backgrounds of the linguists involved in the interpreting process are investigated. A wide variety of materials described below, including the transcripts, military documents and interviews, are examined in order to establish a fuller contextualization of the setting.

Besides the two sets of transcripts of the IMTFE court proceedings (one in English and the other in Japanese), relevant tribunal documents such as the IMTFE Charter, memoranda issued between the tribunal, the defense counsel and the prosecution, and the proceedings in chambers are examined. Also studied are an index of language corrections issued by the Language Arbitration Board and the language-related portions of the index of court rulings attached to the court proceedings.

Since the IMTFE was prepared and operated, in effect, by the U.S. military under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), correspondences, minutes of internal meetings, memoranda and other types of documents issued by various sections of the SCAP concerning language issues are also studied in detail. In addition, since almost all the American linguists who worked for the IMTFE had been affiliated with the U.S. Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), their rosters, organizations and other relevant documents are examined as well. These documents were primarily obtained from: the U.S. National Archives in Maryland (mainly its *RG 331: Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II*; *RG 238: National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records*; and *RG 554: Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and United Nations Command*), the MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives in Virginia, the Japanese American Veterans Association, and the Archives at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Pertinent documents issued by the Japanese government prior to and during the IMTFE, such as the appointments of court interpreters by the Foreign Ministry and minutes of meetings with the defense counsel, were collected at the Japanese National Diet Library, the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and the National Archives of Japan in Tokyo.

Also consulted was a wide range of literature written by IMTFE and other war crimes trial participants, historians and journalists about the Japanese war crimes trials, the occupation of Japan, the internment of Japanese Americans during the war and other pertinent topics. Some footage available at the U.S. National Archives from the films recorded by the U.S. military during the IMTFE, a Japanese documentary film on the trial and photographs taken in the courtroom during the proceedings and used in various books were examined as well.

As for the interviews, the present study refers to both interviews newly conducted by the author and the transcripts of those conducted by others in the past. During the interview with Takashi Oka, one of the interpreters, the author asked questions concerning topics ranging from his family and educational background to what he had

been doing before, during and after the IMTFE. There were a number of email exchanges with him for follow-up questions after the interview concerning the interpreting procedures and other interpreters.

There are references to the transcript of an interview with Masakazu Eric Shimada, another interpreter, conducted in 2000 by Kondo and Watanabe. Based on this transcript and information obtained from Oka, the author sent follow-up questions to Shimada's daughter, Yuri Furuno, who answered the questions on behalf of Shimada, now 94 years old and living in Australia. There was communication with Shimada's granddaughter, Stephanie Leah Shimada, as well. Also used is a 1980 taped interview of Lardner Moore, one of the language arbiters, conducted by his son George Moore, a history professor, and the author's interview with George Moore.

In addition, interviews were conducted with people who were involved in the MISLS, the Yamashita trial in Manila and other "Class B/C" war crimes trials. Video-taped interviews of MISLS graduates available on the Internet were also studied (e.g. www.densho.org, www.njajs.org/misnorcal/#). Since the interviewees' memory of events that happened 60 years ago may not always be clear, any new information obtained in the interviews was corroborated by another source, such as government documents or an interview with another person.

3.2. Case study

The second part of the present study fits into the category of case studies. A case study is an in-depth examination of a single case. It can be used to generate hypotheses by finding "the first line of evidence" (Gerring 2004: 40), and also can be used to test hypotheses by falsification (e.g. identifying "black swans" to falsify the hypothesis that all swans are white (Popper 1956/1983)). Although both qualitative and quantitative data is used, a case study is primarily qualitative research because of its limited number of samples within the case. The present study mainly focuses on the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo. Some numerical data is referred to, but qualitative approach is used to describe and analyze the behavior of the interpreters and the monitors during Tojo's testimony by drawing on the social and cultural backgrounds of the linguists as well as the political

context of the setting. It also discusses whether findings in this examination support the hypothesis that links interpreters' behavior to their hierarchical positions.

The main reason to focus on Tojo's testimony is to minimize the influence of cognitive limitations on the interpreters' behavior and seek sociocultural elements as the predominant factors in accounting for their behavior. As discussed in the previous chapter, interpreters' behavior, choices or strategies cannot be explained solely by the sociocultural context of the setting. They may be based on a combination of various factors such as their cognitive limitations and professional norms and their awareness of where they stand in the power relations. In this regard, Shlesinger points out "the difficulty of teasing apart the deliberate/conscious/norm-driven features of performance from those which are constrained by the limits of cognition, of knowledge, of experience etc." (2001: 166), and emphasizes the importance of excluding or minimizing the possibility of commingling the two factors: cognitive limitations and norm-based strategies (1999:73-74).

It is in an effort to minimize this possibility that Tojo's testimony was selected as the main object of the case study. Tojo was one of the last witnesses in the trial and his testimony took place in the twentieth month of the courtroom proceedings. Interpreters who had shown conspicuous cognitive limitations such as late response and memory problems must have been dismissed by that time. In fact, of the 27 Japanese-English interpreters whose names appear in the transcripts, only three interpreted in more than 200 sessions (Watanabe 1998: 10-11). Also, in light of the fact that Tojo was considered the most influential figure in Japan's wartime actions and his testimony in court was attracting close attention from the world, the most competent, knowledgeable and experienced interpreters were probably assigned to Tojo's testimony.

By focusing on these linguists, the present study hopes to identify social, political and cultural factors as the chief drive for their behavior. Notwithstanding whatever difficulties they may have had in coping with the cognitive demands of the task, as Shlesinger suggests (*ibid.*), their output may have reflected norms that evolved as a rationalization of their own cognitive limitations. Measures to address such problems must have been established over the course of the more than 19 months of courtroom proceedings that had taken place by the time Tojo took the witness stand. The

conspicuously reduced number of in-court discussions on interpreting issues after the first five months of the trial is proof of that.

In addition, Tojo's testimony was selected for this case study because it provides one of the largest numbers of samples of interpretations and interjections for a single witness. During its question-and-answer sessions, which were among the longest of all the testimonies by the defendants, each of the three main monitors worked more than one session. Thus data is available for comparing the behavior between different monitors. Further, by focusing on Tojo's testimony, Watanabe's findings (1998) on the interpreting and the interjections by the monitors during his sessions can be referred to as well.

There is also an examination of the interpreted testimonies of Sadao Araki, Kingoro Hashimoto (Japan's military and political leaders during the war) and other Japanese witnesses for defense. This is to see if the interpreters and monitors behaved differently when Major Lardner Moore, who was fluent in Japanese, was the language arbiter, compared to the time of Tojo's testimony when Captain Edward Kraft who was not proficient in Japanese was the language arbiter. The question-and-answer sessions of Araki, Hashimoto and Japanese witnesses who testified between Araki and Hashimoto were chosen because they were most comparable to Tojo's, with Japanese witnesses produced by defense being examined by the prosecution, the defense counsel and the president of the tribunal. Araki and Hashimoto were the only defendants who testified in the presence of Moore, whose last day in court was September 25, 1947, according to the transcripts.

In this case study, the linguists' behavior is described by focusing on the nature of their interjections and the interactions between the court, the interpreter, the monitor and the language arbiter. Due to the limited availability of the audio records of Tojo's testimony (the total length of the available portions at the National Archives is approximately 280 minutes out of nine half-day sessions) this examination mostly refers to what is reflected in the transcripts in English and Japanese. The present study, however, is fully aware of general issues of using transcripts as the source for examining interpreters' behavior and issues specific to the transcripts of the IMTFE court proceedings.

There are potential problems in resorting to transcripts alone in interpreting research. Relying on the written language (transcripts) alone to study interpreters' performance or behavior may invite microlinguistic comparisons between the source and target texts. In light of the orality ("natural language use for immediate communication" (Pöchhacker 2004: 138)) of interpreting, the examination of interpreters' performance should pay attention to how the interpretation is rendered and how it sounds to the listener in addition to what is said in the rendition. In this regards, Poyatos (1997/2002) advocates a model called "the basic triple structure" of verbal language, paralinguistic and kinesics to be applied in understanding phenomena of interpreting.

Although there are ways of capturing paralinguistic features such as hesitation, pauses, intonation and nonverbal phenomena in transcripts (e.g. Edwards and Lampert 1993), Gile's experiment (1999) points to the unreliability of using transcripts as the sole source for examining interpreters' performance. In this experiment, some variations were found in the assessment of the quality of interpreting between the assessors given visual input (transcripts) and those given auditory input. As Gile (ibid: 67-68) suggests, transcripts are useful to the extent that they can point to errors and omissions undetected during the analysis of the audio input. However, depending solely on transcripts to analyze interpreters' performance or behavior should be avoided, as they do not fully signify how the interpreting or the interpreters' behavior plays out in the communicative discourse.

In the case of the IMTFE, the absence of notation for inaudible kinesic features such as gestures and gaze in the transcripts may be irrelevant because the interpreters were situated in the booth away from their listeners. It poses a problem, however, that the transcripts do not capture hesitation, pauses, intonation and other paralinguistic features in the interpreters' renditions. In Chapter 6, four categories are applied to describe the behavior of the monitors: 1. correcting interpreting errors; 2. rephrasing a portion or entire sentence of the interpreters' rendition; 3. directly interacting with the witness and other court participants; and 4. other types of interjections. One of the areas to be explored in the analysis of these interjections is the presumed reasons for the monitors' interjections. It is a challenge, however, to engage in such analysis if the transcripts are the only source of information.

In the first category of monitors' interjections, it is not difficult to identify why the monitors interjected, since interpreting errors such as omissions, additions and meaning errors are easily identifiable in the transcripts. In the second category of interjections, however, it is not clear-cut in the transcripts why the monitors presented their versions of renditions after the interpreters' renditions which seem to be error-free (i.e. no omissions, additions, meaning or grammatical errors) and not to warrant an intervention by the monitor. In other words, these interjections seem unnecessary as far as what is reflected in the transcripts is concerned.

The reason for this could be that a given interpretation was delivered in such a way that it did not sound "quite right" to the monitor, who then jumped in to offer his version of rendition. Without the audio record, it is not feasible to determine what element in the original interpretation, whether it was intonation, hesitation or pause, may have prompted the monitor to redo the rendition in those cases. Or these interjections may simply be attributable to the monitors' insufficient capacity to quickly and accurately evaluate the interpreter's performance or over-eagerness to demonstrate the monitor's own active involvement in the interpreting process. That is why the present study does not attempt to reach a conclusion as to why the monitors engaged in such behavior; rather it tries to lay out multiple possibilities based on various factors such as the linguists' backgrounds, competency and positions in the power constellation of the IMTFE.

Aside from the general issues of using transcripts, there is a problem specific to the IMTFE transcripts. A comparison between the available audio records and their corresponding transcripts indicates that the transcripts are accurate but not complete, as they did not include interjections whispered to the interpreters by the monitors. (The audio indicates that such whispered interjections took place only when the interpreter was interpreting from Japanese into English.) Due to the limited availability of the audio records, adding missing interjections to the transcripts is not possible, either. Because of this, the present study does not engage in discussing what Watanabe (1998) calls "self-corrections" by the interpreters since at least some of them were prompted by the monitors' whispered input and it cannot be determined if they were really "self"-corrections.

It should also be noted that despite the overall qualitative approach and the incompleteness of the transcripts, the present study refers to some numerical data. As mentioned above, with the number of samples, the incomplete transcripts and the limited availability of audio records, it was not feasible with the materials at hand to conduct the type of research that would involve quantification. In Chapter 6, however, some tables with numbers of various types of interjections are used nonetheless, to summarize the characteristics of interjections by the monitors and the interpreters. These tables are not used to determine the patterns in the linguists' behavior, but rather, to provide general and relative frequencies of interjections among the different monitors and among the different categories, in support of the interpretive analysis in which the present study aims to engage.

In summary, the present case study applies qualitative methods, and attempts to describe the quality of the linguists' behavior, drawing on their social and cultural backgrounds and hierarchical positions in the power structure of the IMTFE. It is an interpretive examination of the materials by the author as a practicing interpreter and researcher. Although one can generalize on the basis of a single case if the case is carefully and strategically chosen (Flyvbjerg 2004/2007: 393-395), given the specific political nature of the IMTFE setting, this study does not attempt to reach a conclusion on the universality of interpreters' behavior in the courtroom setting. Rather, it intends to introduce one way of describing and analyzing interpreters' behavior and to seek any findings which may support its hypothesis linking interpreters' behavior and their awareness of where they stand in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate.

4. Interpreting at the IMTFE

This chapter provides an overview of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, including a discussion of the historical context of the IMTFE, the languages used, the recruitment of the interpreters, the functions of each linguist group, translation disputes, and the effect of interpreting on the proceedings. The personal profiles of some linguists are also introduced.

4.1. The IMTFE

Towards the end of World War II, on July 26, 1945, three Allied nations - the United States, the United Kingdom and China - issued the Potsdam Declaration to lay down the terms of the Japanese surrender. Included in the declaration was a reference to “stern justice ... be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon prisoners”. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, Emperor Hirohito’s announcement of surrender was broadcast to his subjects on August 15. The official ending of World War II was marked when the Instrument of Surrender was signed by the Japanese government on September 2, 1945 on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

Prosecution of war criminals had been discussed among the Allied nations in the early 1940s, which led to the establishment of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) in October 1943 to start gathering evidence of war crimes. Based on its investigation, the Special Far Eastern and Pacific Committee of the UNWCC recommended on August 25, 1945, that Japanese war criminals be “surrendered to or apprehended by the United Nations for trial before an international military tribunal”. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur was given the authority to prepare for, establish and operate the tribunal.

The occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers started on August 28. MacArthur arrived in Japan as SCAP on August 30, and one of the first occupational operations he directed was to arrest and prosecute Japanese war criminals. On September 11, MacArthur ordered the arrests of 39 individuals suspected of having committed war

crimes, including wartime Prime Minister and War Minister General Hideki Tojo. More arrests followed. Within a few months, a total of over 100 suspects were detained in Sugamo Prison in Tokyo. Although the charter for the Nuremberg Trial had already been announced on August 8, it took months for its Tokyo counterpart to be established. One reason for this delay is identified as the difficulty of attempting to apply the Nuremberg Charter's definition of war crimes (A: crimes against peace, B: conventional war crimes, and C: crimes against humanity) to the Japanese (Dower 1999: 455).

Meanwhile, President Truman appointed Joseph Keenan, former head of the U.S. Justice Department's criminal division and a political figure, to serve as chief prosecutor for the trial of Japanese war criminals. Keenan arrived in Japan on December 6 with a team of 39 lawyers and aides. Unlike at Nuremberg where the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union each had its own prosecution team, there was only a single prosecution team at Tokyo. It was led by Keenan and consisted of representatives from the Allied Powers. The International Prosecution Section (IPS) was established on December 8 (the fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor Attack according to the Japanese calendar) within the offices of the SCAP, and started investigations to prepare for the indictment. It was not until January 19, 1946, however, that the jurisdiction, functions and procedural guidelines of the tribunal were announced with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (commonly known as the Tokyo Charter). This charter was drafted by the U.S. prosecution team by following the model of the Nuremberg charter, and was approved and announced by MacArthur. It was later amended upon consulting the other Allied nations.

With the charter in place, each of the nine signatories to the Japanese Instrument of Surrender nominated a judge, and MacArthur officially appointed them on February 15. They were from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, the Republic of China, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The Australian judge, Sir William Webb, was appointed president of the tribunal despite concerns that he had been the chief investigator for the Japanese army's atrocities against Australian prisoners of war and might be biased against the Japanese defendants. He remained president throughout the trial. Prompted by the call of the Far Eastern Commission (the Allied Powers' highest policy-making agency for the occupation of Japan) for further

representations on the bench, MacArthur amended the tribunal charter on April 26 to add judges from India and the Philippines, making a total of 11 judges to preside over the tribunal.

As the IPS interrogated “Class A” suspects in Sugamo Prison, Japanese lawyers were retained to represent them. Concerned about these lawyers’ unfamiliarity with the Anglo-American law of the tribunal, however, the Japanese government requested MacArthur on February 14 to provide British and American lawyers for the defense. Since British lawyers were not permitted by U.K. law to practice under a foreign jurisdiction, arrangements were made to bring 15 lawyers from the United States. Despite urgent requests, however, they did not arrive in Tokyo until May 17, two weeks after the opening of the trial.

On April 29, the indictment was formally lodged with the tribunal. There were a total of 28 “Class A” defendants. They were top military and political leaders in wartime Japan, and were accused of “crimes against peace”, “conventional war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”. Despite challenges from Australia, China and the Philippines, the SCAP decided against prosecuting Emperor Hirohito for the sake of their larger occupation effort to construct a democratic Japan in a less disruptive fashion (Dower *ibid*: 296-301, Maga 2001: 33-42). It also failed to bring to justice some of those who had committed serious war crimes such as biological and chemical warfare and experimentations on Chinese and Russian prisoners of war and civilians, and forced prostitution of Korean women (Dower 1999: 465, Bix 2000: 617, Drea 2006: 4-7, Awaya 2006: 81-114).

The tribunal convened on May 3, 1946, with the often-quoted statement by President Webb that “[t]here has been no more important criminal trial in all history”. The case for the prosecution started right away and lasted until January 24, 1947. The case for the defense followed and lasted until January 12, 1948. Rebuttals and summations by both sides were concluded on April 4, and the court adjourned until November 4 when the delivery of judgment (verdict) began. With the completion of the sentencing, the tribunal adjourned on November 12, 1948. The length of the trial in Tokyo is often cited as one of the major differences from the Nuremberg Trial, which concluded in less than one year. According to Bradsher (n.d.: 180-181), the language

difficulty is generally believed to have been the major cause of the excessive length of the tribunal, but there were other factors for the prolonged proceedings such as the complexity of the subject matter and the absence of relevant official records. A total of 419 witnesses testified in 818 court sessions over 417 days, and 779 affidavits and depositions were presented. Admitted exhibits in the form of documents totaled around 30,000 pages, and the English transcript of the court proceedings, excluding exhibits and judgment, numbered 48,488 pages.

During the trial, two of the defendants died of natural causes, and one had a mental breakdown and was found incompetent to stand trial. The remaining 25 were all found guilty by a majority vote of the judges. (The judgment was not unanimous. Separate opinions were submitted by the judges from the Philippines, France, the Netherlands and India, and President Webb.) Seven, including Hideki Tojo, were sentenced to death by hanging; sixteen, including Sadao Araki and Kingoro Hashimoto, to life imprisonment; and two to lesser terms. The executions took place in Sugamo Prison on December 23, 1948 (the birthday of Emperor Hirohito's son, the current Emperor Akihito; traditionally in Japan, the birthday of the reigning emperor is celebrated as a national holiday). Four of the imprisoned died while serving their sentences, but the Japanese government paroled the rest in 1956 and released them unconditionally in 1958.

Although the IMTFE played the important role of exposing some of the Japanese military's atrocities in China and other Asian regions to the world and to the citizens of Japan who had been kept in the dark about some of its wartime activities (Oka 2005), the emperor and many notorious war criminals were never prosecuted. It has also been criticized by historians and actual participants of the proceedings as victor's justice, an exercise in revenge and a U.S.-led theatrical "showcase" trial with political whims (e.g. Pal 1953, Minear 1971, Röling and Cassese 1993, Dower *ibid.*). The validity of the IMTFE has been a controversial issue for the past sixty years in Japan, and has become one of the major themes of revisionist views on Japan's wartime actions. Discussions on the IMTFE have been gaining momentum recently in the context of former Prime Minister Koizumi's controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine where "Class A" war criminals are enshrined.

The legality or legitimacy of the IMTFE does not fall within the direct scope of the present study; however, the political nature of this trial must be taken into full consideration. Deeply connected to the underlying fact that the IMTFE was essentially a trial led by the U.S. military authority against its defeated enemy were the selection of the interpreters, establishment of the interpreting arrangements, and development of the interpreting procedures. With an awareness of this political context, the following sections will examine the “who, what, where, when, why and how” of interpreting at the IMTFE.

4.2. Languages

The use of interpreting and translation at the IMTFE was set forth in the tribunal charter. Under the title “Fair Trial for Accused”, Article 9 (b) states, “Language. The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as needed and requested (Amended Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, April 26, 1946).” Accordingly, interpretation between English and Japanese (in the consecutive mode as discussed below) was offered throughout the trial, but Russian simultaneous interpretation was also available as a Soviet-operated standalone arrangement for the Soviet judge who understood neither English nor Japanese. (As a courtesy, one of the three channels of the interpreting equipment was offered to the Russian interpreting (Brackman 1987: 213-214).)

During the trial, the tribunal also used interpreters of Chinese, French, Dutch, German, Russian and Mongolian when witnesses or prosecutors spoke in these languages. The transcripts of the proceedings, however, indicate that the tribunal had not anticipated or prepared for issues involving the use of languages other than English and Japanese. During the early stages of the trial, a significant amount of time was spent inside and outside the courtroom discussing whether the use of “non-official” languages should be permitted in court at all.

For example, when General Ching The-Chun of the Republic of China, the first Chinese-speaking witness, appeared on July 22, 1946, the initial arrangement was to

provide relay interpreting with Japanese as the pivot language between Chinese and English. In other words, Chinese or English was consecutively interpreted into Japanese; then, the Japanese interpretation was consecutively interpreted into English or Chinese. This was because the Language Section, which managed all the linguists for the tribunal, could not find a Chinese-English interpreter. Although there was a Chinese member of the prosecution, concerns about the propriety of having him interpret for a witness produced by the prosecution prevented him from assuming the role of Chinese-English interpreter. As a result, the defense side became concerned about this “double translation” for being “a very imperfect translation” (TP: 2,300-2,301). The president of the tribunal, who had not been informed of this issue before, handed down a ruling on the spot to use a secretary of Judge Mei Ruao (the Republic of China) as Chinese-English interpreter, as suggested by the prosecution. Since then, English became the pivot language in relay interpreting between the three languages. The poor performance of this ad hoc interpreter drew questions from both the defense and the prosecution and frequently disrupted the court proceedings. Finally, during the testimony of Henry Pu-Yi (former Emperor of Manchukuo) who appeared as a witness for the prosecution, the president of the tribunal personally appealed to General MacArthur (Letter from W. F. Webb, President of IMTFE to General Douglas MacArthur, August 20, 1945) for Chinese-English interpreters. MacArthur responded by sending his own interpreter to the court on August 26 and trying to bring more interpreters in from Shanghai.

Having an ad hoc interpreter for the pivot language presented a challenge to the Japanese interpreters as well. According to Oka (2005), the most difficult task for him during the entire court proceedings was to relay the Chinese interpreter’s hard-to-follow Chinese-to-English interpretation into Japanese. The problems with this arrangement are probably what prompted the IMTFE to ask the tribunal in Nuremberg about its system of handling multiple languages at the same time. A telegram from the Secretariat of the IMTFE to its counterpart in Nuremberg, dated August 23, 1946, inquires about the following nine points:

1. How many languages are spoken in the court?
2. How many language translations are spoken simultaneously over the translator device?

3. What is the total number of interpreters and monitors used at any one time?
4. Are the interpreters in the open court or behind glass walls?
5. What is the distance between witness box and interpreters?
6. More than one court reporter for each language needed by the interpreter?
7. Where are official court reporters seated, near witness or near interpreters?
8. How much space is used by interpretation personnel involving interpreters, monitors and others?
9. How are counsel, witness and interpreters speech activities coordinated?

Almost four months after the start of the trial, this belated inquiry illustrates the tribunal's unpreparedness for the use of a third language in court. The response from Nuremberg (dated August 27, 1946) gives a concise answer to each of the questions:

1. Number of languages spoken in courtroom --- four. (By use of special arrangement any fifth language may also be used.).
2. Three language translations are spoken simultaneously over the equipment. That is, speaker uses one court language, interpreters interpret into other three.
3. Total number of interpreters in use at one time --- twelve, with one monitor.
4. Interpreters are in open court behind unroffed (sic) glass partitions.
5. Distance between witness box and interpreters --- fifteen feet, but distance is immaterial as both are mutually connected by microphones, earphones, and wires.
6. Number of court reporters for each language depends on proficiency of individual reporter. For safety, we have been using two reporters for each language at any one time. Total of about nine reporters for each language to provide coverage for a six hour working day.

7. Official court reporters are seated between witness stand, prosecution, and defense speaking position. They are also between the bench and the dock, at approximately the center of the courtroom. Again position not important as are connected with wires and earphones to both speaker and interpreters.

8. Space needed by interpreter personnel --- two tables, six interpreters at each, with comfortable movie type seats. Space approximately six by fifteen feet. Monitor sits at one end of interpreter tables. In addition, two positions necessary for technical personnel, one in the court room before console three by ten feet to maintain constant volume level on various microphones. Other can be located outside courtroom but should be able to see into courtroom to maintain general check on amplifiers and system as a whole.

9. Speech activities coordinated as follows: Prosecution and defense speak from single table with microphone. They address the court in turn. Earphones provided at table. Judges have individual microphones and earphones and recognize speakers as they wish. Witness stand also has a microphone and earphones. In questioning witness, the prosecution or defense uses own language which is interpreted simultaneously into witnesses language so that he understands as soon as question is completed. Witness then answers in own language which in turn is simultaneously interpreted into prosecutors or defense's language. There is no delay between question and answer. Wish to emphasize that interpretation is simultaneous, that interpretation into all three language begins as the speaker begins speaking is finished within a few seconds of the time the speaker is finished. Requires highly skilled and highly trained personnel. Interpreters responsible for knowing the language of the speaker, so if Russian prosecutor approaches speaking stand, three interpreters who interpret respectively Russian into English, Russian into French, and Russian into German, are ready and waiting to start interpreting as soon as Russian prosecutor begins speaking. Interpreters listen and interpret at the same time.

This correspondence indicates that the court in Nuremberg, going into the ninth month of the proceedings, had a well-established interpreting system in place with a good understanding of the interpreters' competency requirements. This instructive information, however, must have been not very useful at Tokyo because of the absence of simultaneous interpreting as discussed below.

When the French prosecutor, Robert L. Oneto, opened his case in French on September 30, 1946, the defense raised an objection, citing non-compliance with the charter, difficulty of monitoring the accuracy of interpretation and delay in the

proceedings. The objection was overruled. When Oneto read documents at the lectern, however, he did so in English because having everything translated into French beforehand would have been too taxing. Because of his accent, however, the interpreters and the court reporter could not understand him. A long discussion followed and the irritated President Webb made a ruling to use English only, suggesting an English native speaker from the prosecutor's team take the lectern. The next day, after a long argument on the use of French, Oneto started speaking French again despite the court's ruling. Webb took it as "almost contempt" (TP: 6746) and adjourned the court. According to Brackman (*ibid.*: 215-216), who observed the trial as a journalist and witness, upon the French judge's threat to resign the following morning, Webb decided to allow the use of French, ending the debate that took up two days of court time. Oneto asked his American colleague to read documents for the sake of the interpreters and the court reporter, and took the lectern for other proceedings, speaking in French. There was no relay interpreting involved. English-French, French-Japanese and English-Japanese interpreters were available, and the speaker's language was interpreted into the other two languages concurrently.

The Soviet prosecution team also stirred up a dispute as it insisted upon the use of the Russian language. The defense raised an objection complaining that the use of the French language had already disrupted, delayed and prolonged the court proceedings and that allowing the use of Russian would further hinder the fair and smooth operation of the court. They argued again that this was not compliant with the tribunal charter that stipulated English and the language of the accused to be used to conduct the court proceedings. Further, the defense insinuated that political considerations were behind the court's decision to allow the Russian prosecutor to speak in Russian and that this had been arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to the IMTFE. Webb called this line of argument offensive, claimed that the charter did not exclude a third language, and made a ruling that the tribunal would allow the language of any of the countries represented on the court (*ibid.*: 7087-7088). This debate over the use of the Russian language occupied the whole afternoon session on October 4, 1946. During the Soviet stage of the case for the prosecution, the speaker's language was interpreted into the other two languages concurrently and there was no relay interpreting involved.

Later in the proceedings, during the testimony of a German-speaking witness, German-Japanese and German-English interpreters were provided, while relay interpreting was used for testimonies in Dutch and Mongolian with English and Russian as the pivot language, respectively.

4.3. Recruitment of interpreters

The organization of the IMTFE included the Tribunal Secretariat headed by a U.S. army colonel, whose functions included the supervision of the Language Section. The Language Section had a U.S. military officer as its chief and arranged interpreters and monitors to meet the language requirements of the tribunal. The transcripts indicate that four different officers worked as the chief at different times during the trial. Most of the comments by the Language Section Chief recorded in the transcripts, however, were introduced in the initial stage of the proceedings by the first language chief, Ensign David Hornstein, a graduate of the U.S. Navy's Japanese language school.

To recruit monitors (to check the interpreters' performance) and language arbiters (to make rulings on translation and interpreting disputes), the Language Section looked into those who had worked in military intelligence as translators and interpreters during the war and were working in some functions of the occupational operations in Japan as military personnel or discharged civilians after the war. Four *Nisei*, David Akira Itami, Sho Onodera, Hidekazu Hayashi and Lanny Miyamoto, were selected as monitors. U.S. Army Major Lardner Moore and Captain Edward Kraft were appointed as language arbiter at different times.

The interpreters were recruited mainly from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the pool of translators who had already been working in various sections of the SCAP, such as the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), which had been moved to Japan from its wartime location in Australia, and the IPS. According to Oka (2005) and Shimada (2000) who were among those translators, the recruitment and testing of interpreters took place in January and February 1946. The test consisted of having the candidates interpret in a simulated trial. Some orientation on court procedures was given to those who passed the test, but there was virtually no training for interpreting

before being sent to the courtroom because no one was qualified to train interpreters (Shimada *ibid.*: 18). There was no Japanese counterpart of Colonel Léon Dostert, an experienced interpreter from the United States who brought the simultaneous interpreting system to Nuremberg and trained some interpreters before the trial (Gaiba *ibid.*: 34-38). According to Shimada (*ibid.*: 18-19), about 15 people were hired as interpreters at the beginning, but many of them left after only a brief attempt. The makeup of the interpreter team was very fluid for the first three months of the trial, but it subsequently settled down with about 10 interpreters.

The Japanese nationals who were hired as interpreters included Japanese government officials with overseas experience, people who were educated in the United States and those who grew up in bilingual households and were educated at international schools in Japan. The transcripts record a total of 27 Japanese-English interpreters, but only a handful of them worked regularly throughout the trial. The interpreters who worked most frequently were: Toshiro Shimanouchi, Kazumasa Shimada, Takashi Oka, Tomio Mori, Masahito Iwamoto and Makoto Taji (Watanabe 1998: 10-11).

Documents issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (September-October 1946) indicate that the diplomats who were appointed by the ministry to work as court interpreters at the IMTFE (Mori, Jun Tsuchiya, Shimanouchi and Masao Yamanaka at the initial stage) received a monthly salary of 1,800 yen (the equivalent of five U.S. dollars at that time), plus 100 yen *per diem* from the tribunal. In light of the fact that the Japanese government established a price control regulation with the introduction of the new yen and set up “500 yen a month” as the standard living expense in 1946 (Gunji Joho *n.d.*), interpreting at the IMTFE was a well-paid job for Japanese citizens in those days.


The monitors and language arbiters were paid based on the U.S. military pay scale, but their designations in the scale and the exact amount of their pay are not known. One document on the roster of the Army civilian linguists show that Onodera and Hayashi were given the “CAF (clerical, administrative and fiscal service)-11” rating of the pay scale as of December 31, 1948. Another document issued by the Army’s war crime division shows that the minimum yearly salary for “CAF-12” was \$6,235.20 and “CAF-9” was \$4,479.60. Based on these numbers, the monitors at the IMTFE were probably

paid about \$470 per month. Considering the fact that high school teachers at the American School in Tokyo received \$244 per month in 1947 (according to a fund-raising request issued by the IMTFE Office of the General Secretary), the monitors seem to have earned fairly good salaries.

4.4. Interpreting system


The IMTFE was held in the auditorium of the former Japanese Military Cadet School in Ichigaya, Tokyo, which was requisitioned by the U.S. forces in August 1945. (The auditorium is now called Ichigaya Memorial Hall, located on the premises of the Defense Ministry of Japan.) The building was renovated for the tribunal by the Japanese government at a cost of nearly 100 million yen (approximately \$280,000 at that time). The cinematic lighting hung from the ceilings was a source of the “most oppressive” (Webb, TP: 2,262) heat, and the court was adjourned for several days in July 1946 to install air-conditioning.

For the first month of the trial, the interpreters and the monitors were situated at a table inside the bar, next to those for the prosecution and the defense. During a one-week break in June 1946, an interpreters’ booth was set up on the platform behind the seats for high-ranking officers of the occupation forces and their guests. Below are a photo and a diagram of the courtroom.



IMTFE Courtroom (Interpreter booth is on the upper right.)


Source: Zusetsu Tokyo Saiban (Hiratsuka 2002)



Source: *Zusetsu Tokyo Saiban* (Hiratsuka 2002)

There were also two sections of seats on the lower platform, one for the prosecution and the other for the defense team. On one side of the floor was the judges' bench. The defendants sat on the other side, facing the bench. In the middle of the floor were the witness box, tables for the prosecutors and the defense counsel, and their lectern. Near the auditorium entrance were seats for journalists; those on the bench side for the international press and those on the defendants' side for the Japanese press. Seats for the public gallery were placed on the balcony opposite the platform, and family members of defendants sat there as well.

The interpreter booth was placed in the space formerly designated for the imperial seat, which was used by Emperor Hirohito when he attended the cadet school's ceremonial events. According to the Japan Defense Agency (2006) (presently, the Ministry of Defense), until the end of the war, the stairs to the imperial seat were for the exclusive use of the Emperor, but now they were used by the people who worked in the interpreters' booth and the judges who walked through the platform to reach the bench during the trial.



Monitor Itami, Interpreter Mori and Court Reporter (from left) (Source: Zusetsu Tokyo Saiban)

IBM equipment, identical to that used at Nuremberg (see Gaiba (1998: 38-40) for detail), was also installed. When the tribunal resumed on June 14, 1946, the interpreters, monitors, court reporters, and recording and equipment technicians worked from the booth (some photographs give the impression that it was divided into several booths, but it was actually not divided (Oka 2005)), and the people in the courtroom were able to listen to the interpretation through headsets. There were three channels in this system. Channel 1 was for English and channel 2 for Japanese. As mentioned earlier, the third channel was for Russian interpretation as a standalone arrangement for the Soviet judge who did not understand Japanese or English. The microphones were placed in front of the president of the tribunal, at the lectern for the prosecutors and defense counsel and the witness stand, and in the interpreter's booth. According to some journalists who observed the proceedings (Asahi Shimbun Hotei-kisha-dan 1948: 252), the microphones were so sensitive that the headset users could hear interpreters engaging in off-the-record private conversations and turning pages of documents.

Despite the availability of the IBM equipment, unlike Nuremberg, the predominant mode of interpreting at the IMTFE was consecutive, simply because the tribunal came to the conclusion that simultaneous interpretation between English and Japanese was not achievable. According to Oka (ibid.), Itami, who was considered the lead monitor, strongly insisted that simultaneous interpretation between English and Japanese was impossible. Simultaneous interpreting was used only when the speaker read a document and its translation was available to the interpreter. In effect, this was nothing more than simultaneous reading of a prepared translation, and it was actually delivered by the monitor, not the regular interpreters.

The use of the consecutive mode of interpreting enabled interjections by the monitor who sat next to the interpreters in the booth. Lamps were installed in front of the president of the tribunal, at the lectern for the prosecutors and defense lawyers, and at the witness stand. A steady light indicated that interpretation was being delivered, and a blinking light indicated a request to the speaker to pause for interpreting.

Two to four interpreters were assigned to each morning or afternoon session, and they took turns to interpret every thirty minutes (Oka ibid.). Based on the audio of the films recorded during the trial and Shimada's interview (2000: 22-23), however, the turn-

taking took place in a flexible fashion under the direction of the monitor, depending on the requirements of a particular procedure and the competency of the assigned interpreters. (Some interpreters interpreted in two directions, Japanese into English and vice versa, and others only in one, Japanese into English or vice versa.) The interpreters worked for two days and had the third day off, making it a four-day-a-week job. The teams were assigned by the chief of the Language Section. According to Shimada (*ibid.*: 24), the core members of the team, who worked on a regular basis, were Shimanouchi, Shimada, Oka, and later Taji.

As for the monitor and language arbiter, one monitor was usually assigned to each morning or afternoon session. The language arbiter sat in the prosecution team's seating area on the lower platform throughout the court proceedings. The arbiter engaged in action when a dispute or confusion over translation or interpretation arose or when he announced the language arbitration board's ruling on a disputed translation or interpretation.

The following is an example of how the monitor and language arbiter worked. On September 11, 1947, in the direct examination of the defendant Sadao Araki who was a military and political leader of wartime Japan, the monitor corrects the interpreter's error and responds directly to President Webb's follow-up question on the correction:

Mr. McManus (defense counsel): Then what was it you said that was misinterpreted by the paper, General?

Araki: *Sono jijo o ohanashisureba, ima no Keizaikai wa kyuni kite chotto hanashi o shitekureto iu kotode atte, toji tosei-keizai no tameni geta o hake, hadashi de aruketo iu yona koto ga atta node, sayona koto dewa ju-nen no niju-nen noto choki no koto wa shinbo dekinai...*

(The fact is that the Economic Association came [to me] suddenly and asked me to make a few remarks. At that time due to the controlled economy there were calls for wearing wooden clogs or walking barefoot; under such circumstances, it would be impossible to endure things that would last for a long time such as ten or twenty years.)

Interpreter: The facts of the situation are as follows: This Political and Economic Research Association came to me suddenly and asked me to make a few remarks. At that time the question of controlled economy was being discussed and it was being advocated that people should go barefoot and wear wooden clogs instead of shoes. In such a state of affairs it would be difficult to

conduct a long-range war for ten or twenty years, and it was my opinion that in such a state of affairs a long protracted war, lasting ten or twenty years, Japan could not endure such a protracted war – such an affair. Not war, an affair.

The Monitor (Itami): Strike out the “war” and just say, with such an idea it would be impossible for Japan to endure an affair which may last ten or twenty years.

The President: Who said strike out “war,” the witness or the interpreter?

The Monitor: The interpreter, sir. That was a correction by the monitor.

The President: Did the witness at any time use the word “war?”

The Monitor: No, sir.

On the following day, Moore delivered the corrected version of the interpretation for the record:

Language Arbiter (Major Moore): If the Tribunal please, I offer the following language corrections: Record page 28,235, line 23, delete from “state” to the end of the paragraph and substitute “case it would be impossible to endure for a long period of ten or twenty years.”

The nature of interjections by the monitors, the interpreters and the language arbiter is examined in detail in Chapter 6.

4.5. Translators and translation disputes

The language arbiter who ruled on interpreting disputes was also involved in translation matters. Most of the rulings he announced actually concerned errors in the translation of exhibits admitted in the trial. A brief description of how the translation of documents was handled should provide a fuller picture of the system by which the language needs were addressed during the IMTFE.

In accordance with the tribunal charter and the rules of procedure, all the documents submitted as evidence had to be accompanied by their translation into English

or Japanese, as the case might be. In addition, any prepared statements addressed in court, such as the closing arguments and the judgment, had to be translated in advance for the court participants as well as the interpreters and monitors. A shortage of translators was a great concern for the defense counsel. Towards the end of the prosecutor's case in November, the defense attorneys had emergency meetings and requested the Legal Section of the SCAP to urgently provide 25 translators and 5 interpreters to prepare for their case. The language used in the relevant documents indicates the seriousness and urgency of the problem. A document from the defense attorneys to a court administrative officer dated November 25, 1946, states, "the defense is confronted with an overwhelming task which cannot be discharged without additional personnel" and "it would be a tremendous embarrassment to the Supreme Commander, the Tribunal and the Defense should the presentation of the case of the Defense break down because of inability to process and clear those documents without undue delay".

A total of about 230 translators (175 on the prosecution side and 55 on the defense side) worked on an enormous amount of documents, including 30,000 pages of exhibits admitted as evidence. The translators included *Nisei* linguists dispatched from the ATIS, but the ATIS did not have a sufficient number of competent translators. A SCAP document on a survey of linguist requirements, dated January 29, 1946, states that "A"-rated translators "who can freely and independently translate written Japanese into accurate English and rapidly scan Japanese documents including those written in styles other than *Kaisho* [block script]" accounted for only 2.2% of the entire Japanese translators at the ATIS. And there were various functions of the occupation forces they had to serve in besides the IMTFE. To address the language needs, therefore, many Japanese nationals, mainly academics and English-major university students, were hired to work as translators. Harries (1989) describes why Japanese translators were brought in by the prosecution team in preparation for the trial:

Out of a total staff which by January 1946, had swollen to seventy, only five could read Japanese, and Keenan had no option but to request the Japanese government to supply 50 or so English speaking Japanese nationals – "Hobson's choice," as he put it. Eventually some two hundred Japanese nationals were employed on the staff of the IPS, which may have contributed to the

constant breaches of security that plagued the trial; the British list of proposed defendants, for example, was leaked to the press almost as soon as it was notified to Keenan.

Yukio Kawamoto (2005), a *Nisei* linguist who later worked for the U.S. State Department, talks about how he met his future wife during the IMTFE. When he was working on the translation of the diary of Marquis Koichi Kido (Emperor's closest advisor), he did not understand Kido's elegant cursive writing. He was assisted by a Japanese woman, his future wife, who rewrote the diary in standard style for him. The Japanese who were involved in the translation during the trial included such notable people as Shigeto Tsuru, a renowned Harvard-educated economist, and Mayumi Moriama, who later became a member of the parliament and Minister of Justice.

The practice of "team-translation" is evident in some accounts of the IMTFE. For example, Ichiro Kiyose, the chief defense counsel, himself translated Hideki Tojo's affidavit into English and his American colleague, George Blewitt, edited it (*Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Saiban Kisha-dan* 1995: 157). The translation of the Kido diary had "screeners" versions and "exact" versions, suggesting that it was translated in two stages, perhaps by different groups of translators. The most systematic endeavor was the translation of the judgment, which took nearly three months to finish. Nine *Nisei* and 26 Japanese translators worked on the 300,000-word document, a professor of international law from Tokyo University checked their translation, and the head of the Japanese language section of the Ministry of Education edited it for style. These people, together with about 30 stenographers and typists, worked in "Hattori House" (residence of then president of K. Hattori & Co., presently Seiko Corporation) under heavy security guard, and were not allowed to leave the premises. According to Stephanie Leah Shimada (2007), the interpreter Shimada's granddaughter, her grandmother and father once a month visited Shimada who was working as one of the translators, but saw him only at the gate and could not get into the House.

There were a great number of disputes over translations presented as evidence during the trial. According to a document issued by the Language Arbitration Board in May 1948, there were a total of 433 corrections made by the board in response to questions raised by the tribunal, the prosecution and the defense. Here is an example of

how a translation issue was addressed. Alfred Brooks, defense counsel, points out a problem with the English translation of the Japanese word “*nankin-jotai*” (under house arrest) in an exhibit the prosecution lodged during the court proceedings on August 28, 1946. The exhibit is a telegram concerning how the Japanese army treated Henry Pu-Yi (then-Emperor of Manchukuo).

Brooks: On the line in here, I think it is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6th line, on the words “light confinement” there is some question as to the translation from the original telegram; and we would like for the arbiters to check and see if that really means that it was “light confinement” as a prisoner or if it connotes protective custody. The Japanese characters, as I am told by the Japanese, do not mean that a man is placed as a prisoner status which “light confinement” might be interpreted by the Court, but it is a different connotation such as “protective custody,” and I think the Court arbiters can check this on the original telegram. That is one thing that is very important on this document especially.

President: We will ask Major Moore to advise us on the point in due course. Meanwhile, proceed with your further comments.

Later during the same session, Brooks takes issue with the English translation of the Japanese word “*tsuredasu*” (take away) in another exhibit the prosecution submitted. It concerns how the Japanese army relocated then-Empress of Manchukuo (the wife of Henry Pu-Yi). Brooks also adds follow-up comments on the translation of “*nankin-jotai*”.

Brooks: If the Tribunal please, on this exhibit 303, in the fourth line it reads: “and has attempted to abduct the Empress to Manchuria.” The Japanese word used on that line is “tsuredasu,” t-s-u-r-e-d-a-s-u, and is not the Japanese word, “yukai,” “yukai” meaning “to abduct,” and “tsuredasu” meaning “to take away.” I checked that, and I think it is correct. It changes the meaning. I think the context bears out it was not an abduction plan.

President: Like the prior correction, it is not really substantial; but we will have it noted.

Brooks: I also checked on Exhibit 297. The word used there – Japanese word there – of the so-called “light confinement” is “nankinjotai,” which is, as I understand, means “protective custody.” It does not mean “as a prisoner” – protecting from someone.

President: Yes.

At the beginning of the morning session on the following day, August 29, 1946, the arbiter Moore announces the ruling of the Language Arbitration Board on the translation of “*nankin-jotai*”.

Language Arbiter (Major Moore): If the Tribunal please, I refer to the disputed passage in document 1767-291, exhibit 297. The Japanese term in question, translated literally, would read “condition of light confinement.” We recommend that it be rendered “protective restraint” in order to make it harmonize with the context.

President: The correction will be made.

This particular correction was announced and recorded relatively quickly after the question was raised, but in some cases, the corrections were not announced or reflected in the records in a timely manner. In fact, the correction of the translation of “*tsuredasu*” in the example above was not formally recorded until December 26, 1947, one year and four months after the challenge by the defense. Such delays or absence of admission of corrections to the record caused concerns among some participants about the lasting impression the first incorrect translations may have cast. For example, in his 1977 interview (Röling and Cassese 1993: 53), the Dutch judge B.V.A Röling commented on a translation error that troubled him during the deliberation period.

I remember that one document did not fit at all into this development from peace to war, I sent the document to the Translation Office [Language Arbitration Board] ... when it came back, it was apparent that previously it had been wrongly translated. The correct translation, made by the official Translation Office, fitted perfectly into its chronological context. So I called upon my colleagues to meet in chambers, and said: I have a problem. We have a document that was wrongly translated. ... My proposal was to use the correct translation for our judgment. It was refused. We would have had to re-open the session and introduce the correct translation, so they said, because the wrong translation had been used in Court, and that was the evidence that was before the judges. I found that to be utter nonsense, especially as the Japanese had used the Japanese text, the original text, so they had nothing to do with a faulty English translation. I don't know whether the majority opinion made use of the wrong translation, but it would be a silly

business to render a judgment on the history of Japan knowing that a wrong translation was used. And it might have had a certain influence on Hirota's sentence. ... [First documents] were translated by the prosecution staff. Only if a translation was criticized by the defense was it submitted to the Translation Office.

The error Rōling is referring to is the mistranslation of one of the titles the defendant Koki Hirota held. "Cabinet Councillor" was mistranslated as "Supreme War Councillor". The error remained uncorrected in the judgment. This incident is often pointed to by some Japanese critical of the trial as one of the reasons why Hirota, the only civilian among the defendants, was sentenced to death.

4.6. Profiles of some linguists

The personal profiles of some of the linguists are reviewed below. This should shed light on the political, social and cultural conditions of Japan and the United States during the pre-war and wartime period. The personal backgrounds of these linguists are referred to in the examination of the three-tier structure of the interpreting process in Chapter 5, as well as in the analysis of the behavior of interpreters and monitors during the interpreted testimonies of Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses in Chapter 6.

4.6.1. Interpreters

As previously mentioned, of a total of 27 Japanese-English interpreters recorded in the transcripts, only a handful worked regularly throughout the trial. According to Watanabe (1998: 10-11), the interpreters who worked most frequently were as follows:

Toshiro Henry Shimanouchi	419 sessions
Kazumasa Eric Shimada	323 sessions
Takashi Oka	289 sessions
Tomio Mori	216 sessions
Masahito Iwamoto	170 sessions
Makoto Taji	160 sessions
Naoshi George Shimanouchi	61 sessions

Masutani (first-name unknown)	69 sessions
Hideki Masaki	55 sessions
Jun Tsuchiya	52 sessions
Masao Yamanaka	42 sessions

More than half of these interpreters were with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The rest were Japanese nationals who had grown up in bilingual households and/or schooling. Here, the interpreters who worked in the sessions examined in Chapter 6 are profiled.

According to the information contained in his sister's memoriam (ATPAM.com 2005) and the clarifications provided via email by his son, Ken Shimanouchi (2007) (the Japanese ambassador to Brazil), **Toshiro Henry Shimanouchi**, who interpreted in the greatest number of sessions, was born in Saga, Japan, in 1909, and moved to the United States with his family in 1912. His father, until his death in an internment camp, was the publisher of a Japanese language newspaper. Upon graduating from Occidental College in 1931, Shimanouchi could not find work in California because he had not been able to obtain U.S. citizenship, and moved back to Japan. He started working for the MOFA during the war. He had a distinguished career with the Ministry, with assignments including serving as Japanese Consul General in Los Angeles and Ambassador to Norway. **Naoshi George Shimanouchi**, his younger brother, was also with the MOFA.

Masakazu Eric Shimada was born in 1912 to a Japanese mother and a German father who was a railway engineer hired by the Japanese government. He was educated in Japanese schools, but as a child had a lot of exposure to various languages spoken in the society of foreigners in Japan. He studied English writing at a university preparatory school and learned spoken English from an American missionary. While studying in the faculty of economics at Keio University, Shimada started working for HAVAS, a French news agency that later became Agence France-Presse (AFP). He also studied French at Athénée Française in Tokyo. He learned writing articles in French through "on-the-job training". When Japan was losing its grounds in the battlefields, Shimada was drafted. He was already over 30 years old, and was given the lowest of the three categories for physical fitness as soldier. Shimada never engaged in combat; instead he took care of

horses in China, and procured food and worked as an interpreter for his superiors in Indonesia after studying the languages for a few months at a local elementary school.

When the war ended, his battalion was on the Talaud Islands, Indonesia, having been deserted by the other Japanese troops. Shimada helped his superior with his English at the time his battalion was being disarmed and released by the Australian troops. Shimada was then separated from the rest of the Japanese soldiers for treatment of tropical ulcer. Following his recovery, he was hired by the ATIS office on Morotai Island. One of the assignments Shimada had was to work as interpreter at the war crimes trial on Ambon Island in January 1946. In this largest-ever war crimes trial, 93 Japanese personnel were tried by the Australian military. (According to Shimada's granddaughter (*ibid.*), the Australian film "Blood Oath" (1991) is partly based on his story.) Shimada then landed on Kure in Hiroshima Prefecture with the Australian troops and continued working in the ATIS. From there, Shimada was recruited as a court interpreter for the IMTFE. He was given a test during the one-week court recess in June 1946, with Shimanouchi and Itami as examiners. He interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi during the trial. After the IMTFE, he received the GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) scholarship to study journalism at Columbia University in New York, where he saw Onodera, one of the monitors, who was working at the New York Office of a Japanese newspaper at that time. Back in Japan, he had a successful career as a journalist with UPI. He is retired and now lives in Brisbane, Australia, with his daughter, Yuri Furuno, a translation scholar.

Takashi Oka was a student at Rikkyo (St. Paul) University in Tokyo at the time of the IMTFE. He was born in Tokyo in 1924. His mother was a diplomat's daughter who lived in the United States and Canada from age 12 to 20. His father worked for an American company. Oka grew up speaking English to his mother and Japanese to his father. He went to an American school in Tokyo from first to fifth grade, and attended Japanese high schools. He had to give up on his hope of going to college in the United States due to the political climate of that time and entered Rikkyo University instead in 1944. During the war, he was unable to dedicate much time to his studies because students at that time had to serve the country by working in munitions factories and on farms. After the war, he was hired as a translator by the IPS, which was preparing for the

IMTFE. His work was mainly to check Japanese-into-English translations done by others. Oka took the test for court interpreters at the IMTFE in January or February 1946. Although he was the youngest interpreter at the trial, Oka interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi and Shimada.

After the last day of the summations by the prosecution and the defense on April 16, 1948 (there was no court session until November 4 when the judgment stage started), he left Japan to study at a university in the United States. He obtained a BA from Principia University and an MA in international and regional studies from Harvard University. When he completed his doctoral course work at Harvard, he was recruited by the Christian Science Monitor. Thus his long, distinguished career as a journalist started. His assignments included Tokyo Bureau Chief for the Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times, and the Editor-in-Chief for Newsweek Japan. After serving as Senior Advisor for the Liberal Party of Japan, he retired in Washington, D.C. At the time of the interview (2005), Oka was working towards completing his doctoral dissertation on political affairs in Japan for the past 25 years to be submitted to Oxford University.

There is not much information available on **Tomio Mori**. According to documents issued by the MOFA, his title was “Embassy Third Secretary” at the time the Ministry appointed him as one of its three employees to become court interpreters at the initial stage of the IMTFE.

Masahito Iwamoto was born in Tokyo in 1891. His parents were prominent figures in the Japanese literary world. His mother’s translation of *Little Lord Fauntleroy* (Frances Hodgson Burnet) is considered one of the most successful literary translations of that time in Japan. His father was an influential writer and editor. Iwamoto’s daughter, Mari, was a renowned violinist. According to Oka (2005), Iwamoto was married to an American Quaker who was a university lecturer, and was working at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo when the IMTFE started seeking interpreters. Oka says that Iwamoto was a traditional man and applied for a court interpreter position because he wanted to serve the Emperor as his final duty should the Emperor be called upon to testify at the IMTFE.

Makoto Taji became one of the main interpreters at the later stages of the trial. According to Oka (2006), he was raised in a bilingual household with an English mother and his English was excellent.

Hideki Masaki and **Masao Yamanaka** were sent by the MOFA to work as interpreters at the IMTFE. Masaki's father, Jinzaburo Masaki, was a well-known "Imperial Way Faction" general in the Japanese Army, who was arrested after the war as a Class A war criminal suspect and was almost indicted. Hideki Masaki interpreted for his father during the interrogations. When Jinzaburo Masaki testified for the defense during the IMTFE, his son Hideki was not assigned as interpreter. Masaki joined the Ministry in 1931. Starting in 1959, he served as interpreter to the Emperor for about 30 years. Masaki died in 2001 at the age of 93. Yamanaka's background is not known except that he was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of his appointment as court interpreter at the IMTFE.

4.6.2. *Monitors*

There were four *Nisei* who worked as monitors: David Akira Itami, Sho Onodera and Lanny Miyamoto worked throughout the trial, while Hidekazu Hayashi worked sporadically throughout the proceedings. As previously mentioned, the most discussed figure of all the monitors was **David Akira Itami**, who was considered the leader of the monitor team. According to Kinashi (1985), the special issue of *Daito Forum* (2000) and Otake (2005), Itami was born in California in 1911, moved to Japan at the age of three and was raised and educated there until the age of 19. He once volunteered for the Japanese Imperial Army, but was rejected due to what was officially described as inadequate health. According to Kinashi (ibid.), Itami speculated that it was due to his dual citizenship. At the time he left Japan in 1931, Itami had been studying Chinese classics and Indian philosophy at Daito Bunka Gakuin, currently Daito Bunka University, in Tokyo. Upon his return to California, Itami attended the University of California at Los Angeles before becoming a reporter for a newspaper for the Japanese American community in California.

After Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, he was sent to an internment camp just as nearly 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans on the west

coast of the United States were. He volunteered from the camp in June 1942 to teach at the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) in Minnesota, and later worked in military intelligence during the war. He broke coded conversations (spoken in the dialect of the region where he grew up) between Japanese government officials and for this and many other intelligence activities he received the Legion of Merit, the highest medal for non-combatants. After the IMTFE, Itami stayed on with the Translator and Interpreter Service of the SCAP as a translator for the Korean War, but in 1950 at the age of 39 he shot and killed himself. In Otake's article (ibid.), Itami's friend, Kinashi, and Itami's daughter discuss the prejudice Itami experienced for being an Asian in American society and being *Kibei* in the *Nisei* community. Further, they cite the emotional strains he suffered during the IMTFE as one of the reasons for his suicide. *Futatsu no Sokoku* ("Two Homelands") (Yamasaki 1983), a novel based on Itami's life, was a bestseller in Japan in the 1980s, and a TV drama series (*Sanga Moyu* ("Mountains and Rivers Burning")) based on the novel was aired on NHK (the Japanese public broadcasting company) in 1984.

According to *the Japanese American Internee Data File* at the U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, **Sho Onodera** was born in Washington State in 1917 and educated in Japan for seven years before going back to the United States to attend high school. He was a sales clerk before being sent to an internment camp. In June 1942, he left the camp to receive training at MISLS. Given that Onodera was one of Itami's students in the most advanced class at MISLS (*Album and Roster of the Military Intelligence Service Language School*), his Japanese must have been good, but probably not at the "native" level in some aspects. According to Yukio Kawamoto (2005), his Seattle-born cousin, Onodera, admired Itami's proficiency in the Japanese language, especially his mastery of Chinese characters, and his deep understanding of the Japanese culture. After working at the IMTFE and other "Class B/C" war crimes trials, Onodera returned to the United States to attend Oberlin College. He did not complete his studies to obtain a degree, but was hired as a correspondent for a Japanese newspaper and ran its New York office. He died before he reached 60.

Much of the background of **Lanny Miyamoto** is unknown. According to *the Internee Data File*, Miyamoto was born in California in 1921, and between age 10 and 15

was educated in Japan. Back in the United States, he had two years of college education. Before being sent to an internment camp, Miyamoto worked as a fruit and vegetable packer. Like Itami and Onodera, he left the camp in June 1941, but his name is not found in the roster of the MISLS. After the IMTFE, he returned to the United States and ran a photo shop while teaching the Japanese martial art *judo* in the Baltimore area (Kawamoto *ibid.*). According to Shimada (2000) and Oka (2005), Miyamoto was the youngest of all the monitors and his Japanese was rather weak to function as a monitor. In fact, Oka (*ibid.*) did not believe that Miyamoto was *Kibei*. One of his former *judo* students (Anderson 2005) said that Miyamoto died around 2001.

According to Kawamoto (*ibid.*), **Hidekazu Hayashi** was *Kibei*. The length of his education in Japan is not known. He graduated from the University of California at Berkeley, but could not find a job because of the discrimination against Japanese Americans. He landed a job with a major Japanese trading company and worked in New York and Mexico. He called himself “Pancho” as well. He was never with the U.S. army, but taught Japanese at the exclusive Japanese school run by the U.S. Navy during the war. Hayashi’s name cannot be found in *the Internee Data File*, but his name is included in the Supplementary MIS Register as a civilian instructor at the Navy’s school in Boulder, Colorado. This indicates that due to his teaching job Hayashi did not have to go to an internment camp since this classified elite Navy school protected its *Nisei* instructors from being sent to camps (Slesnick 2006: 93-94). After working as a monitor at the IMTFE, he tried to work as an interpreter for the U.S. State Department, but that endeavor did not work out very well. He died a long time ago.

4.6.3. *Language Arbiter*

The first language arbiter, Major **Lardner Moore**, was born into an American missionary family in Osaka, Japan, in 1898, and home-schooled in Japan until he went to college in Texas. He returned to Japan to work as a missionary in 1924, but was sent back to the United States after being briefly interned in Japan when the war between the two countries broke out. He joined the Army and was assigned to be in charge of the translation team at a military intelligence center in Maryland (McNaughton 2006: 219). After the war, Moore was assigned to Japan and served as the first language arbiter

during the IMTFE. He left the IMTFE and the army in September 1947 and resumed his work as a missionary. He later became the president of Shikoku Christian College in Kagawa, Japan. Moore retired to Oregon where he died in 1987.

Moore's fluency in Japanese led him to play an active role during the trial, especially in its early stages. As discussed in the following chapter, he was essentially a broker between the tribunal and the linguists, and President Webb seemed to hold him in high regard. Moore also seems to have been close to some judges. According to his son, George Moore (2005), Moore socialized with the New Zealander judge and others, taking them on excursions around Tokyo.

The transcripts reflect, however, that there was one disconcerting incident that Moore caused, involving the interpretation of Chinese, not Japanese. During the testimony of Henry Pu-Yi on August 26, 1946, the examining defense counsel asked for a clarification of the witness's answer. Moore as language arbiter responded. The chief prosecutor questioned Moore's ruling by pointing out his unfamiliarity with the Chinese language. In response, Moore said (TP: 4,300), "Mr. President, since my qualifications have been called in question, I hope the Tribunal will indulge me in saying that I have had thirty years of experience in oriental (sic) question and answer; and it is an established fact that an oriental (sic), when pressed, will dodge the issue." Confirming that Moore didn't understand Chinese, President Webb responded, "you said a thing which you should not have said. It is quite beyond your province to comment on the nature of evidence given by orientals (sic); and I ask you to withdraw that comment." Moore apologized. According to his son, George Moore (ibid.), Lardner Moore came home late that day. He was so upset with this incident that he had to walk around the Imperial Palace once (about 3.2 miles) in order to get himself "adjusted" before heading home. Moore (1980) says that the Chinese judge wanted to have him removed from the trial, but Webb protected him.

After Moore was discharged in September 1947, Captain Edward Kraft assumed the arbiter position. Much of Kraft's background remains unknown, but the records of MISLS show that he studied elementary-level Japanese for a year. These classes at MISLS were set up just for Caucasian Army officers who had first studied in a separate

Japanese language program at the University of Michigan in order to prepare for studying at MISLS.

4.7. Effect of interpreting on the proceedings

The effect of interpreting on the IMTFE proceedings is briefly discussed by historians and actual participants of the proceedings in their accounts of the IMTFE. Such references generally point to: 1. the excessive length of the trial contributed to by the consecutive mode of interpreting and by language disputes; 2. the impact of interpreting on the ways examining lawyers asked questions to witnesses; and 3. the possible effect of inadequate interpretations on the outcome of the trial.

First, as for the length of the trial, the consecutive mode of interpreting and the process of resolving interpreting and translation issues are often cited as the major contributors to the excessive length of the IMTFE (i.e. 2.5 years as opposed to a little over 10 months of the Nuremberg Trial). Dower (1999: 458) notes that the unavailability of simultaneous interpreting forced the speakers to pause after each sentence until the consecutive interpretation was completed, and refers to comments by a prosecution member (Horowitz 1950: 538) that “the speed of the trial was reduced to one-fifth of its normal pace” during the examinations of witnesses. Bradsher (n.d.: 180) points to the difficulty of interpretation and translation between English and Japanese, which led to the extensive time spent on resolving the language issues during the IMTFE.

Secondly, there are discussions of the impact of interpreting on the ways examining lawyers asked questions to witnesses. For example, Smith (1996) argues that the consecutive mode of interpreting and the competency level of interpreters “handicapped lawyers for both sides in getting at the truth” because those factors forced the counsel to limit their remarks to “short sentences in elementary language”. He points to the fact that having to submit documents in advance was also taxing for the lawyers. This issue of interpreting affecting the ways lawyers ask questions is not actually limited to the case of the IMTFE. Gaiba (1998: 101-103) discusses the complaints of lawyers during the Nuremberg Trial that they had to speak slowly for the interpreters; and that, therefore, the spontaneity and momentum of their examinations was lost. Even in

modern-day settings, the impact of interpreting on lawyer's questioning is often discussed in research on court interpreting (e.g. Berk-Seligson 1990/2002, Hale 2004).

Lastly, there are references to whether the difficulty of interpretation between English and Japanese and the performance of the interpreters impacted the judges' impression of the witnesses and the outcome of the trial. Dower (ibid.: 467) refers to the unnatural features of interpreted language by saying that "the English interpretation tended to be more cryptic than the original statements". Maga (2001: 57) points to the issue of explicitation by the interpreters:

[T]he Japanese language was simply less direct than English. That meant that defendants attempted to "circumvent points" not in an effort to hide guilt but in the endeavor to answer questions that seemed to them strangely direct. The interpreters themselves would attempt to convey Japanese answers to the tribunal in the direct manner that the English-speaking lawyers expected. Consequently, the language issue went beyond the bad translation of a word or two.

Kojima (1971: 50-52) also refers to the Japanese witnesses' avoidance of directness and explicitness in their testimony as being attributable to the speech style unique to the Japanese language and culture, and argues that this rhetorical style challenged the interpreters, irritated the president, and worked against the Japanese witnesses. According to Kojima (ibid. 257-258), *Nisei* monitors' interpretations into Japanese (as manifested in their interjections) were hard to follow and those into English were "too rough" because the *Nisei* did not fully understand the nuance and complex language of the testimonies by Japanese witnesses. Kojima believes that the problems with the interpretations undoubtedly disrupted the proceedings, limited the ability of the defendants and their counsel to express themselves, and negatively affected the judges' understanding of the testimonies by Japanese witnesses. Despite these language difficulties, Dower (ibid.) states, "No one suggested that translations and interpretations were deliberately skewed or even fundamentally inaccurate."

Dower (ibid.) also mentions that "no one on the victor's side ever dwelled much either, on what it meant to be judged (and, for seven men, condemned to death) in translationese." According to Kojima (ibid.: 258), however, Webb said in an interview after his retirement that "[i]f the Japanese lawyers had been more proficient in English, or

the interpreters had been more competent, it might have affected the judgment of the trial.”

In short, the use of interpreting, especially in the consecutive mode, and the language issues and the process of resolving them did affect the length of the trial. The interpreting also impacted the ways lawyers examined witnesses. There seems no evidence, however, of intentional misinterpretations or seriously flawed interpretations during the IMTFE. With the exceptions of Webb’s comments above, there has been no argument that the trial would have had a different outcome if the interpreting had been handled differently or if the interpreters had been more competent.

5. Sociopolitical aspects of interpreting at the IMTFE

This chapter presents a detailed discussion of social and political aspects of interpreting at the IMTFE. Namely, it examines: 1. the issues of trust, power and control manifested in the three-tier structure of the interpreting process; 2. the interactional aspect of norm-building process and the interpreters' cognitive limitations as a factor in that process during the development of the interpreting procedures; and 3. the ambivalent nature of the *Nisei* linguists' standing in the inter-relations of the court participants.

5.1. *The interpreter, the monitor and the language arbiter*

As previously discussed, one of the highly unusual features of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE was the presence of three tiers of linguists. The first tier consisted of the interpreters who interpreted the proceedings. They were all Japanese nationals. The second tier comprised the monitors. Four *Nisei* worked as monitors. They monitored the interpretation, and interjected to correct what they perceived as interpreting errors or problems, coordinate the turns of speakers and add explanations to the interpretation for the court participants. They also simultaneously read the translations of the closing arguments, the judgment (verdict) and other prepared statements as the speaker read aloud out of such texts. The last tier was the Language Arbitration Board, which consisted of one member appointed by the tribunal and one each by the defense and the prosecution. It ruled on any disputed translations and interpretations. The member appointed by the tribunal was designated language arbiter, and announced the rulings on language disputes in court. Two Caucasian military officers played this role at different times over the course of the trial.

Why did the IMTFE devise this three-tier system of linguists to address its interpreting needs? Why did three ethnically and socially different groups of linguists engage in three different functions in the interpreting process? These questions will be explored by drawing on the concepts of trust, power and control.

5.1.1. The tribunal's explanation of the Language Arbitration Board

There is an official explanation in the Judgment as to why the Language Arbitration Board was established. The “Part a, Section I Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal” states:

[T]he need to have every word spoken in Court translated from English into Japanese, or vice versa, has at least doubled the length of the proceedings. Translations cannot be made from the one language into the other with the speed and certainty which can be attained in translating one Western speech into another. Literal translation from Japanese into English or the reverse is often impossible. To a large extent nothing but a paraphrase can be achieved, and experts in both languages will often differ as to the correct paraphrase. In the result the interpreters in Court often had difficulty as to the rendering they should announce, and the Tribunal was compelled to set up a Language Arbitration Board to settle matters of disputed interpretation (The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 1948).

This statement basically refers to the difficulty of interpretation between Japanese and English, and acknowledges that there can be more than one correct version in translations and interpretations. This official account of the Language Arbitration Board presents potential research topics for Interpreting Studies, such as different strategies used in simultaneous interpreting for different language pairs, and the definition of “accuracy” or “fidelity” of interpretation. It does not, however, explain why the monitor was appointed, and why three different socio-ethnic groups were engaged in three different functions. In pursuit of an answer, let us step back a little and examine the use of interpreters in Japanese war crimes trials that took place before the IMTFE.

5.1.2. Military trials in Manila and Japanese interpreters at the IMTFE

Prior to the establishment of the IMTFE on January 19, 1946, there were U.S. military trials against two Japanese generals, Tomoyuki Yamashita and Masaharu Homma, in Manila, the Philippines. Correspondences by the U.S. military concerning interpreting at the trials and a book written by one of Yamashita's attorneys indicate that serious problems with the military interpreters were uncovered during the proceedings.

For example, there is a military correspondence that discusses three officers who had been appointed as court interpreters but refused to take the interpreter's oath, citing

their own lack of qualification in spoken Japanese (CINCAFPAC Manila 1945). In response to this incident, the Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, asks in a message dated October 28, 1945 (one day before the Yamashita trial convened), "Why was competent interpreter personnel not selected in sufficient time to prevent this outrageous failure?"

Yamashita had a personal interpreter named Masakatsu Hamamoto. The Harvard-educated Hamamoto had been a civilian interpreter attached to the Japanese army during the war. He was indispensable to the communications that took place outside the courtroom such as in discussions between Yamashita and his counsel and in Yamashita's psychiatric evaluations. But Hamamoto was not permitted to act as an official court interpreter because he was also a prisoner of war.

According to A. Frank Reel (1971: 145-146), who was one of Yamashita's defense attorneys,

[t]he official court interpreters were divided into two groups – American *Nisei* soldiers, whose Japanese was fairly good when restricted to elementary or "kindergarten" expressions but whose English left much to be desired, causing them frequently to take liberties in altering counsel's questions to fit their knowledge of the languages, and a number of American naval and marine officers, whose English was excellent but whose Japanese was spotty and required constant use of translation dictionaries.

This account is confirmed by Suelo Ito (2006) who was one of the seven *Nisei* interpreters working at the Yamashita trial. Ito, a Hawaiian *Nisei*, states that he learned only military Japanese and never learned standard Japanese during his nine-month training at MISLS. He admits the fact that he had difficulty interpreting legal language and "had to consult dictionaries all the time".

To address this problem, Hamamoto was permitted to sit beside Yamashita during the trial to do whisper-interpreting from English into Japanese. Reel writes (*ibid.*), "This was a *tour de force* of stupendous proportions that had the effect of shortening the proceedings by many weeks, for, without Hamamoto, the court interpreters would have had to translate the entire trial for the accused." Hamamoto, however, was not allowed to interpret Yamashita's testimony into English for the court. Yamashita requested Ted

Yajima, the best *Nisei* interpreter at the trial, to interpret his testimony (Ito *ibid.*). Still, concerned about Yajima's competency, Yamashita said to him before taking the witness stand: "Yamashita wants no mistakes. On long sentences I will repeat them twice. Listen carefully – with the brain as well as with the ear." (Reel *ibid.*: 146)

Throughout the trial, the official interpreters' renditions were slow and required frequent pauses. Reel (*ibid.*:14-15, 148) uses such adjectives as "painstaking", "bumbling" and "exasperating" in references to the official interpreters in his book. In addition, discussions over disputed translations took much of the time in court. There was even an incident in which newspaper reporters who had pointed out interpreting errors were called to testify in court and elaborate on their opinions (*ibid.*: 45-49).

Yamashita was sentenced to death by hanging on December 7, 1945 (the fourth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack), and executed on February 23, 1946. Interviews with Takashi Oka (2005) and Masakazu Shimada (2000) confirm that the recruiting and testing of Japanese interpreters for the IMTFE took place in January and February 1946. Documents that explicitly link the interpreting problems in Manila to the tribunal's decision to open its interpreter search to Japanese nationals have not been located. A number of correspondences (in *the Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II* in the National Archives), however, clearly suggest that the Legal Section of the SCAP, which established the procedural guidelines of the IMTFE, was aware of the interpreting problems in Manila. The IMTFE could not afford to have the same problems, given the fact that it was an international forum and not a U.S. military trial, and that it had attracted close attention from all over the world. The tribunal must have recognized the need for competent interpreters, regardless of nationality or civilian status, who could facilitate smooth proceedings. This can explain the inclusion of Japanese nationals in the interpreting arrangements. This view is supported by Shimada's remarks (*ibid.*: 20-21), discussed below.

5.1.3. *Nisei* monitors

As previously discussed, many of the recruited interpreters were working for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the IMTFE. One of these diplomat interpreters even had a father who had been a "Class A" war crime suspect and testified

for the defense at the IMTFE. Shimada was a former soldier with the Japanese Imperial Army. Given the fact that three foreign ministers, two diplomats and 17 military leaders were included among the 28 defendants, these interpreters were, in effect, interpreting in a trial in which their former superiors' lives were at stake.

Just as it is hard to imagine former Nazi members interpreting at Nuremberg, it is conceivable that the tribunal was concerned about its interpreters' "impartiality" and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation; hence, the tribunal decided to establish a system to regulate and control the interpreters' work. Documents that explicitly describe such concerns on the part of the tribunal and the decision to monitor the interpreting have not been found, but interviews with Shimada (2000) and Oka (2005, 2006) generally support such a supposition. According to Shimada (*ibid.*: 20-21), the tribunal's Language Section selected four *Nisei* to supervise the Japanese interpreters because the chief of the section did not understand the Japanese language.

The fact that all the prepared translations, such as the closing arguments and the judgment, were rendered by the *Nisei* monitors indicates the tribunal's preference for using non-Japanese rather than Japanese citizens. Shimada says (*ibid.*: 34):

It was a given from the beginning, and it was expected. Whether it's the judgment or something else, it's the Americans who should be interpreting. Everything! But because they were not competent, Japanese were hired ... There were no such [capable American] people. Something formal, like the arraignment - things that were presented at the beginning and the end of the trial - were prepared in writing beforehand. They were translated, Japanese lawyers checked them, and Americans read [the translations at the trial]. So, we never said anything like "Tojo, death by hanging!"

5.1.4. *Language arbiter*

As cited in the judgment, the Language Arbitration Board was established as a "referee" to settle disputes over translations and interpretations. When a translation or interpretation was challenged by the defense or the prosecution, the tribunal president referred the matter to the language arbiter. After deliberation among the board members outside the courtroom, the language arbiter announced the ruling in the following court session. Major Lardner Moore was the first language arbiter. According to Moore (1980),

a naturalized Japanese-American lawyer represented the prosecution, and a Japanese citizen who had been the editor of an English magazine represented the defense. Moore says he let these two members of the board discuss and agree on the rulings and merely reported their decisions to the court.

After Moore was discharged, Captain Edward Kraft assumed the arbiter position. The roster of the MISLS indicates that Kraft had studied Japanese in elementary level classes at MISLS for only one year. According to Moore (*ibid.*), however, Kraft was more involved in the board's deliberations and he "had his own ideas about what's to be done".

The Language Arbitration Board probably served to minimize the time spent discussing interpreting and translation disputes in court. In addition, the language arbiter most likely kept an eye on the monitors as well. All the *Nisei* monitors were *Kibei*, who suffered even greater prejudice than other Japanese Americans, as they were suspected of being "pro-Japanese" because of their prior education and experience in Japan (Kono 2003). The SCAP may have been concerned that these monitors were sympathetic to the Japanese defendants because of their background, and thus wanted to deter them from being too accommodating of the defendants' needs. The language arbiter, a Caucasian military officer, may have functioned to address such concerns, and to give the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge of the procedure.

The absence of high-ranking Japanese Americans at the time could explain in part why Caucasian military officers fulfilled the role of language arbiter. Organizational planning documents of the tribunal (in *the Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II* in the National Archives) called for an officer of a specific military rank to fill each of the high positions in the respective sections, including the Language Section. (This is an example of hierarchical positions dictating their own roles, regardless of their competency.) Designated as "enemy aliens", Japanese Americans were never allowed in the Navy's Japanese language schools (Slesnick 2006: 2-3). Even those who went to the Army's language school were not commissioned until toward the end of the war. This wartime segregation may also explain the absence of *Nisei* in higher positions in the Language Section.

5.1.5. Summary

The trustworthiness of translators and interpreters has long been an issue in the ethics of the profession. Often professional practice itself can be seen as a set of procedures for gaining and maintaining the trust of clients and end-users. In interpreting, such procedures may include monitoring the work of interpreters. The best documented monitoring system is probably that of the Nuremberg Trial. However, considering the fact that the interpreting errors were sometimes corrected by the interpreters themselves by checking the daily transcript against the verbatim recording (Gaiba 1998: 71, 97-98, Less 2005, 2006), it seems more reasonable to characterize this system as a means to ensure the smooth operation of the interpreting arrangements in a formal international setting during the nascent stage of simultaneous interpreting, rather than as a means to police the interpreter's behavior.

The interpreter monitoring system at the IMTFE was quite different. As previously discussed, in the sociopolitical context, when a party in power has to rely on interpreters who do not have shared interests or affiliations, the party may set up a system to regulate and control the interpreters out of concern over their trustworthiness. This scenario is evident in the case of the IMTFE: The tribunal wanted to use U.S. military personnel as interpreters, but found them incompetent and had to resort to bilingual Japanese nationals. The tribunal did not trust the "impartiality" of those Japanese interpreters, and was wary of appearing dependent on people of the defeated nation. Therefore, it used four Japanese Americans to monitor the interpretation. The language arbiter (a Caucasian U.S. army officer) may also have functioned to keep an eye on the Japanese American monitors, who may have been suspected of being sympathetic to the defendants, and to maintain the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge. And all of these linguists were under the supervision of the chief of the Language Section, usually a navy officer who had studied Japanese at the navy's exclusive language school but did not have a good command of the language.

In short, this hierarchical structure of linguists functioned as a display of authority and a check against any "bad faith" harbored by those who did not seem to share the same interests with the tribunal. Although the transcripts show that the monitors did correct some interpreting errors, they also indicate that there were a number of seemingly

unnecessary or invalid interjections by the monitors, as described in Chapter 6. The incompetency of some monitors is referred to in Shimada's interview (*ibid.*: 21, 23) as well. Asked if he believed that the monitors were needed for achieving a higher level of accuracy, Oka (2006) answered, "Whether or not the monitoring was needed has nothing to do with interpreting. It was a political matter. In a nutshell, [the tribunal] didn't fully trust the Japanese interpreters, and that's why the monitor and the language board were established." As Lefevere (1992: 2) suggests, it may be "important to remember that trust is invested in the producer of the translation, not necessarily in the product itself." In some political settings, "[t]rust may be more important than quality." (Lefevere *ibid.*)

5.2. The making of an interpreter user

Another important feature of interpreting at the IMTFE was that none of the interpreters had received professional training, which affected the interpreting procedures. Since simultaneous interpreting between Japanese and English was deemed impossible, the consecutive mode of interpreting was used, which enabled the court participants to stop the proceedings and discuss issues concerning the interpreters' performance and the interpreting procedures. The transcripts both in English and Japanese contain a number of such discussions, especially during the first year of the proceedings.

While the IMTFE interpreters were untrained "chance" or "natural" interpreters, the tribunal seemed equally inexperienced in using the service of interpreters. Some remarks made by the court during early stages of the trial indicate its lack of understanding of how interpreting works. However, through repeated appeals by the defense, especially by the Japanese lead counsel, the chief of the Language Section and the language arbiter, the tribunal came to terms with the interpreters' requirements and became an effective user of interpreters over time. The change in the court's attitude toward interpreting is clearly recognizable over the first year of the trial when most of the discussions on interpreting took place. Below is an examination of such exchanges among various participants of the court.

5.2.1. Changes in the court's attitude

On May 3, 1946, the first day of the court session, the chief of the Language Section pleaded with the president of the tribunal, Australian judge William Webb, informing him that the interpreter would not be able to interpret unless the speaker paused when directed. The court did not take any actions in response to this plea. On May 6, Major Moore as the language arbiter delivered a formal request from the Language Section to the court that the speakers wait until the interpretation was completed, as the interpreters were not being given enough time to interpret and many of the remarks were not being interpreted. Webb responded by suggesting that for the sake of saving time a summary would be sufficient for the proceedings. The chief of the Language Section reminded him of the charter article on language, which called for the provision of interpreting between English and Japanese to assure the defendants a fair trial, but Webb still insisted upon a summarized interpretation. This discussion ended with the other counsel's remarks that the planned installation of simultaneous interpreting equipment would solve the problem by enabling the simultaneous reading of prepared translations. (As previously mentioned, for the first month of the trial, the interpreters and the monitors were situated at a table inside the bar, next to those for the prosecution and the defense. During a one-week break in June 1946, an interpreters' booth was set up on the platform and the IBM equipment was installed.)

On May 14, the interpreter was struggling because the speaker was reading a prepared statement without pause and the Japanese translation was not available to the interpreter. In response to the interpreter's request to the speaker to break down his remarks, Webb said, "Well, this interpreter has no difficulty in reading passage for passage. I do not see why he cannot string them all together" (TP: 204). He directed the speaker to complete his statement anyway. The interpreter's incomplete and inaccurate renditions caused a disruption of the court proceeding. Moore explained that the differences in sentence structures made interpreting between English and Japanese difficult. Webb still responded, "Well, I cannot understand yet why he can interpret paragraph for paragraph ... and yet not be able to string those paragraphs together" (ibid.: 216). Moore suggested providing the interpreter with the translation beforehand for prepared speeches. In addition, the chief of the Language Section conveyed a strong

request from the defense team for “a complete and accurate translation verbatim”, not a summarization. Webb’s ruling was to continue summarization and provide a full translation to the defense later. Despite the Japanese lead counsel’s repeated objections, which included reminding the president of the charter article on language, Webb insisted that the speaker read the whole text without “interruptions” by the interpreter, promising to provide a full translation at a later time.

On May 15, in response to the defense’s persistent requests to have the Japanese translation of prepared remarks furnished beforehand to the interpreters and the defense, Webb finally granted permission for such a procedure and for sentence-by-sentence interpreting.

On July 23, the use of relay interpreting for a third language became an issue when the first Chinese-speaking witness testified. In response to the Japanese lead counsel’s complaints about incomplete interpretations due to the complexity of relay interpreting involving the Chinese language, Webb argued that (*ibid.*: 2,405-2,406):

Well, as I explained before, all this interpretation of every word is not required in the interests of justice. It is required in the interests of propaganda. That is the whole point. This elaborate system of interpreting every word does not obtain in any national court. We try murderers there. We try men who cannot speak the English language, but we do not have all of this interpreting. I would like the Japanese to understand that. The Charter really is mostly concerned with the Japanese people understanding what is happening in this Court. It is not required in the interests of justice.

There is no record in the proceedings of a formal objection by any court participant to this controversial statement by Webb. Some discussion on this matter, however, must have taken place outside the courtroom. Two days later, on July 25, Webb relayed to the court Moore’s complaint that the unnecessary length of questions would make the interpreter’s task the most difficult, and added that making the translations available to the interpreters could mitigate the difficulty of their task. Further, drawing on Moore’s feedback, Webb referred to the difficulty of interpreting questions asked in the negative form, and suggested using the affirmative form when possible. He then told the counsel, “I again urge counsel to make their questions short and clear, and to give due

notice of any passage from a report or other document which they desire to be read to the witness.” (ibid.: 2,478)

On August 19, when Chief Prosecutor Keenan pointed out an interpreting error (probably prompted by his bilingual colleague), Webb asked for clarification from the interpreter. Observing the interpreter being pressed, Moore said, “any question of the translation in open court simply puts an added burden on the translators and is irritating to them” (ibid.: 3,981), and offered his explanation of the error. This indicates Moore’s appreciation of the difficult task of interpreting and his effort to protect the interpreters.

On October 11, based on a discussion he had had with Moore the day before, Webb stressed to the court the following three points: “We should all speak into the microphone, speak slowly, and speak in short sentences if possible” (ibid.: 8,776). Later, in response to a prosecutor’s complaint at being stopped by the interpreter, Webb said, “... our very efficient translators are always doing their best ... They have a most difficult task and they are doing it admirably. That is the opinion of the Tribunal.” (ibid.: 9,178)

With these words - five months after the start of the trial – it appears that the court had become more appreciative of how interpreting works and how difficult it can be. This was the result of the persistent requests and patient explanations from the Language Section based on the interpreters’ feedback and from the defense team. (A number of references to out-of-court discussions between Webb and Moore in the transcripts indicate that Language Arbiter Moore was the main broker between the interpreters and the court.) The court had to listen to such requests and explanations and come to terms with the interpreters’ requirements in order to function and proceed under the circumstances.

Almost a year after the tribunal convened, Webb stopped showing any sign of his unfamiliarity with the workings of interpreting and his impatience with the interpreters. Evidence of this is seen in his request on April 29, 1947, that “all documents, including running commentaries of counsel, be presented to the Language Division forty-eight hours in advance in order to insure simultaneous interpretation, and that the Language Division be notified in advance of any deviations from the planned order of presentation.” (ibid.: 21,281)

There seems to have been great efforts to respond to his request. A memorandum dated May 8, 1947, from the General Secretary to Webb indicates that Webb was immediately notified of any violation of these procedures:

1. The Language Division, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, reports that Mr. Logan of the Defense Section failed on the morning of 8 May 47, to inform the Language Division of a change in the planned order of presentation of evidence. The Division was not notified that the witnesses, Shoichi AMANO and Sadao USHIJIMA were to be called, and they were not supplied affidavits of the said witnesses.
2. This is in violation of the order as stated by the President of the International Military Tribunal on Friday, May 2, 1947, Page 21281 of the Record.

In response, Webb writes, “[a]s soon as any violation of the Tribunal’s order takes place, the officer concerned should report to the President, even if he is then presiding in Court”. This shows Webb’s eagerness to address the interpreters’ needs that had been communicated to him.

5.2.2. Toury’s natural/native translators and negotiated norms

As previously discussed, in Toury’s model of natural/native translators (interpreters), a bilingual speaker without formal training grows into the role of a translator (interpreter) by internalizing the feedback from various players such as the speaker, the receiver of the translated speech and the commissioner of the communicative event. According to Toury (1995: 241-258), such feedback embodies norms that determine the appropriateness and inappropriateness of various aspects of the translational event, and those who conform to the acquired norms will be recognized as translators (interpreters).

In the context of the IMTFE, the interpreters were what Toury calls “natural/native translators (interpreters)”. These Japanese interpreters were bilingual because of their family, educational or professional backgrounds, but had never received formal training to become interpreters. Although some orientation on court procedures was given after they were recruited by the IMTFE, there was virtually no training for interpreting before they started working in the courtroom (Shimada 2000:18). They had to learn to work as interpreters over the course of the trial. During the proceedings, the

interpreters received feedback, just as described in Toury's model, in the form of comments, requests or orders by the court, namely the president of the tribunal, and other participants such as the prosecutors, the defense counsel, the defendants and other witnesses.

As indicated above, however, the interpreters did not simply internalize such feedback and conform to the norms as Toury's model suggests. They responded to the feedback and explained their inability to accept certain norms that were reflected in the feedback. (The interpreters' response was conveyed mainly through the language arbiter and the chief of the Language Section as they were not allowed to speak officially on their own behalf.)

During the IMTFE, the court (as the commissioner and user of the interpreters) expected certain "norms" as to how interpreting should be done at the beginning. Those norms, however, were adjusted over time in response to the interpreters' needs, which were largely based on their cognitive limitations of not being able to interpret an excessively long passage at a time or to properly interpret a prepared speech read out of a text without access to its translation in advance. In order to move forward with the court proceedings, the tribunal had to come to terms with the unfamiliar constraints the interpreters presented and accommodate their requirements and needs. This signifies a negotiation of norms between the interpreter and the interpreter user, which is absent in Toury's model. The "expectancy norms" (Chesterman 1993: 9-11) the court tried to enforce for the interpreting procedures at the beginning were now being adjusted in response to the interpreters' feedback.

5.2.3. Summary

As illustrated above, there was a great deal of "trial and error" in the interpreting procedures during the initial stage of the IMTFE, as the interpreters were not professionally trained and the interpreter users were also unfamiliar with interpreting. At the beginning of the trial, the tribunal tried to enforce its expectancy norms as to how interpreting should be done. Those norms were:

1. The speaker may complete his remarks, however long they may be, before the interpreter starts his rendition in the consecutive mode;
2. A summarization in lieu of a full interpretation is sufficient; and
3. The speaker may read a prepared document and have it interpreted without submitting the translation beforehand.

These initial expectancy norms, however, were challenged by the language arbiter and the chief of the Language Section on behalf of the interpreters, and by the defense counsel. The interpreters could not interpret a long passage at a time in the consecutive mode or a speech that was read aloud from a document without access to the translation. The cognitive limitations of the interpreters were communicated to the tribunal mainly by Language Arbiter Moore. Complaints about not getting full and accurate interpreting, and therefore not getting a fair trial, were raised by the defense counsel.

To actually function and proceed with the trial, the tribunal's expectancy norms were negotiated and changed to accommodate the feedback from the interpreters (expressed through their spokespersons) and other players in the court proceedings. The new norms that developed over the first year of the trial were:

1. Speakers break down their remarks into short segments;
2. The interpreter delivers a full interpretation, not a summarization; and
3. The translation is provided to the interpreter beforehand when the speaker reads from a document.

The present study indicates that norms in interpreting are partly developed in the process of addressing the cognitive constraints of interpreters, such as their inability to interpret an excessively long passage at a time in the consecutive mode and to properly interpret a speech read from a prepared text without access to the text or its translation in advance. Further, the interactional aspect of norm-building whereby norms are negotiated among the participants, including the interpreter, in the communicative event suggests that the process of "the making of a 'native/natural' translator" (Toury 1995: 248) is also that of "the making of a translator (interpreter) user".

5.3 The complexity of the standing of Nisei linguists

Most of the American linguists who worked as monitors and language arbiters for the tribunal, and as translators and interpreters for the prosecution and the defense, had been affiliated with the Japanese language schools operated by the Army and the Navy during the war. An examination of the historical background of those language programs should shed light not only on factors to be considered in the analysis of the linguists' behavior in Chapter 6, but also on the development of U.S. language policy in the context of national security, which will be touched upon in Chapter 7. Below is a historical account of the birth of the military Japanese language schools in the United States, focusing on the complex circumstances under which *Nisei* became involved in the training for military intelligence, and the difficulties those *Nisei* linguists experienced prior to the IMTFE. An attempt is made to describe the position of the *Nisei* linguists in the inter-relationships among the court participants by drawing on Cronin's notions (2002: 54-59) of "heteronomous" and "autonomous" interpreting systems.

5.3.1. Japanese language schools run by the Army and the Navy

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a division of the Army on the west coast of the United States started a program to train military intelligence personnel with Japanese language skills in preparation for an anticipated war with Japan. This classified school opened in the Presidio of San Francisco on November 1, 1941, with four Japanese American teachers and 60 students (58 *Nisei* and two Caucasians). After six months of intensive training, most of the 45 graduates were sent to various theaters to work in intelligence, while some of them stayed as instructors.

Soon after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, all Japanese Americans were reclassified as 4-F (physically, mentally or morally unfit for military service), and later as 4-C (Enemy Aliens: not acceptable for military service because of nationality or ancestry). Almost all 5,000 *Nisei* in the military were discharged or forced to engage in menial work. In February of 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which resulted in the forced relocation of nearly 120,000 Japanese and

Japanese Americans on the west coast to internment camps. The Army's Japanese school also moved to Minnesota in late May, 1942.

By that time the valuable contribution by the first graduates of the school had been reported back from the warfront and the Army was becoming acutely aware of the need for more *Nisei* linguists for military intelligence. The school was reorganized under the direct supervision of the War Department, and reopened on June 1, 1942 as the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS). Given the proven value of Japanese linguists in various theaters, the U.S. government started recruiting several hundreds of *Nisei* from the internment camps to train at MISLS, while continuing to detain their families and friends in the camps as "enemy aliens".

More than 6,000 *Nisei* received six months of rigorous training at MISLS, and were sent mainly to the Pacific theater. They served in the ATIS and in other units as interrogators, translators, interpreters, code breakers and "cave flushers". Some of them were "loaned" to the Navy as it did not accept *Nisei* enlistments. (The Navy's Japanese schools, discussed below, did not produce many competent linguists.)

Nisei linguists translated captured enemy documents, interrogated Japanese prisoners of war, persuaded Japanese soldiers and civilians to surrender, and participated in propaganda activities. According to a 1945 report, they had translated 20.5 million pages by the end of the war (Military Intelligence Service Research Center). One of the most vital tasks they engaged in was the translation of the Japanese Navy's "Z Plan" which called for a counterattack in the Pacific. The knowledge obtained through the translation of these intercepted documents led to a significant victory for U.S. forces. This is considered by historians as "one of the greatest single intelligence feats of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area (Bradsher 2005)".

Nisei linguists were also indispensable during the occupation of Japan. The enrollment at MISLS actually peaked after the war to address the language needs of various operations of the occupation. The focus of instruction was shifted from military to civilian language and Japanese culture. More than 5,000 *Nisei* linguists worked in occupied Japan. They functioned as a "bridge" between the occupation forces and Japanese authorities and civilians. Their duties covered a variety of areas including intelligence, disarmament, civil affairs, education and finance. They even participated in

the drafting of the Japanese Constitution and the formation of the National Police Reserve (which later became the Japanese Self-defense Force).

The Navy took a totally different approach. Because of its exclusion policy against individuals of Japanese ancestry, the Navy recruited only Caucasians for its Japanese language programs. Such programs were first established at the University of California at Berkeley and Harvard University in October 1941. Since the instructors were mostly Japanese or *Kibei*, the program at Berkeley was moved to the University of Colorado at Boulder due to the forced evacuation of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the west coast. Given an increasing enrollment, another branch of the Boulder program was established in Stillwater, Oklahoma. There were two groups of students: One was made up of those who had been born and raised in Japan or China as members of missionary or business families; and the other was made up of those who were “language-oriented *Phi Beta Kappa* college graduates who might be able to learn Japanese quickly” (Slesnick 2006: 2). After one year of intensive training, graduates were commissioned regardless of their Japanese proficiency (Keene 2006), and started working in interrogation, code-breaking, translation, interpreting and other language-related capacities. After the war and the occupation of Japan, a number of those who had studied with the Navy’s elite Japanese programs had careers as Japan specialists in academia, the U.S. Foreign Service, intelligence community and business (Slesnick *ibid*: 307-335). Especially in university circles, they are called “Godfathers of Japanese Studies” (Woo 2006), the most notable of whom is Donald Keene, Professor Emeritus of Japanese Literature at Columbia University in New York.

5.3.2. *Complex psychology of Nisei linguists*

All of the four *Nisei* who worked as monitors during the IMTFE lived through the very difficult times that Japanese Americans experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. Even prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there had been strong anti-Japanese sentiment which was reflected in a series of laws passed by the U.S. Congress and some states, including the Immigration Act of 1924 which banned further immigration from Japan. In those days, because of the level of prejudice and discrimination against Japanese Americans, the only jobs available to them were as “houseboys, gardeners and fruit and vegetable salesmen”

(Michi Itami quoted in Otake 2005), and even after receiving higher education they still tended to work within their own communities.

All the monitors were *Kibei* whose experience was even harsher because of their prior experience and education in Japan. Reasons why *Kibei* received education in Japan varied, ranging from their immigrant parents' economic hardship to their desire to teach their U.S.-born children the Japanese language and cultural heritage. But when they returned to the U.S, they were "out of steps with their *Nisei* peers" (Niiya 2001: 243) and there was prejudice against *Kibei* within the Japanese American community (Kono 2003, Otake 2005).

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor created fierce hatred toward Japanese Americans. The following testimony in 1944 before a congressional committee by Army General John L. DeWitt, administrator of the internment program, epitomizes the war hysteria directed against Japanese Americans in those days: "A Jap's a Jap. ... I don't want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. ... American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. ... But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map."

At the same time, realizing the need for linguists in the war operations, the Army searched for qualified *Nisei* to train for military intelligence. It was a challenging task. Hosokawa (1969/2002: 397) writes:

The vast majority of *Nisei* were too thoroughly Americanized. Of the first 3,700 men interviewed, only 3 percent proved to speak Japanese fluently. The next 4 percent could be considered fairly proficient in the language. Another 3 percent knew just enough so that they could be thrown into intensive training; only one *Nisei* in ten understood a useful amount of his ancestral tongue. And even the best of them had to be taught military vocabulary and usage. Almost invariably the best qualified were *Kibei*, thanks to their education in Japan. Ironically, they as a group had been the first to be condemned as potentially the most likely to be disloyal.

Thousands of *Nisei*, including several hundred from internment camps, volunteered to go to MISLS to teach or train for military intelligence as they felt the need to prove their loyalty to the United States. To some *Nisei*, it was the only way to escape the dreadful life of the camps as well (McNaughton 2006: 106). As previously mentioned,

however, they were never admitted to the Navy's elite Japanese language schools, and even in the Army they did not get commissioned until towards the end of the war. Since the Army needed commissioned officers to lead its language teams but could not find many Caucasians who could keep up with *Nisei* in class at MISLS, it even established a preparatory Japanese program for Caucasians at the University of Michigan in 1943 so that they could survive the training at MISLS and get commissioned upon graduation. McNaughton (ibid.: 130) describes *Nisei*'s view of this situation as follows: "This discrimination rankled the *Nisei*. From their point of view, the War Department did not trust them enough to grant them commissions as second lieutenants. It was especially grating for the college *Nisei*, who felt they met all the qualification for commissioning but one – race."

In the early stages of the war, *Nisei* linguists had to fight prejudice and suspicions of disloyalty within the U.S. Army while serving in the Pacific (McNaughton 1994, 2006). In fact, *Nisei* linguists were kept out of most signals intelligence work (code breaking) because of the security reasons (McNaughton 2006: 214-219). Caucasian leaders of language teams "were secretly instructed to keep an eye on their *Nisei* enlisted men while overseas to make sure they were translating and interpreting accurately and not providing misleading or false information". (ibid. 115) (Also see the testimonial videos by Japanese American veterans in the Military Intelligence Service Resource Center website: <http://www.njahs.org/misnorcal/#>)

Despite the adversity, *Nisei* served extremely well in military intelligence and earned recognition for their valuable contribution. Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir, the ATIS commander, wrote in his autobiography (in Hosokawa ibid: 399):

Had it not been for the loyalty, fidelity, patriotism, and ability of these American *Nisei*, that part of the war in the Pacific which was dependent upon intelligence gleaned from captured documents and prisoners of war would have been a far more hazardous, long-drawn-out affair. The United States of America owes a debt to these men and to their families which it can never fully repay.

Along with MacArthur's famous statement: "Never in military history did an army know so much about the enemy prior to actual engagement" (e.g. Niiya ibid.), the

following remarks of General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, are often quoted (Bradsher 2006: 161):

... the *Nisei* saved 1,000,000 American lives and shortened the war by two years ... they collected information on the battlefield, they shared death in battle ... in all they handled between two and three million Japanese documents. The information received through their special skills proved invaluable to our battle forces.

Such recognition, however, was not openly discussed until much later after the war due to the highly classified nature of the work. What kind of emotional and psychological states were these *Nisei* linguists in during the war? A number of testimonials by *Nisei* linguists discuss both their pride in having proved their loyalty to the United States and their humiliation, resentment and ambivalence about being sent to internment camps by the same government that later took advantage of them in the war against the country of their parents (e.g. essays by *Nisei* in www.discovernikkei.org). One of the interviewees, who worked as a translator at the IMTFE, mentioned the resentment he felt when he was sent to the Pacific from MISLS with a dog tag bearing the address of the internment camp where his parents were detained (Kawamoto 2005). McNaughton (1994) provides the following insight into how these American *Nisei* linguists may have viewed their opponents, the Japanese:

At a deeper level of analysis, for those who joined the Military Intelligence Service to become linguists the way they served was more specific to their heritage, and thus psychologically more complex. Whether translating captured diaries or radio messages, or interrogating prisoners of war, they had to confront issues of identity and heritage in ways that most other American soldiers could not even imagine. Although for most of them, learning the Japanese language was a major challenge involving six months of hard work, the knowledge and appreciation of Japanese culture and society they had absorbed from their parents and upbringing gave them a unique perspective on the enemy they faced. They had a capacity, all too rare at that time, for seeing their opponents as human beings, rather than animals.

The 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team, which consisted of *Nisei* soldiers, is much celebrated as the most decorated unit in U.S. military

history, but they fought in Europe and did not face the Japanese as an enemy in the battlefields. In contrast, *Nisei* linguists were constantly exposed to the language and culture of their ancestors, and had to confront Japanese people as enemies. Many of the captured documents they translated were personal diaries of Japanese soldiers (Ichikawa 2005). Some linguists had brothers and relatives in the Japanese Army. There are stories about *Nisei* linguists running into their Japanese relatives in the battlefields or being mistaken for Japanese soldiers. It is often discussed that some *Nisei* linguists felt torn between the fear of confronting their relatives and friends in combats and the desire to serve the country of their birth (e.g. Military Intelligence Service Research Center, the Hawaii Nikkei History Editorial Board). Some linguists worked for the post-blast investigation team on the damage caused by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since Hiroshima was the prefecture that produced the most emigrants to the United States, many of them were distressed by the dropping of the atomic bomb. There is a *Kibei* linguist who found out that his brother was a victim of the bombing when he served in occupied Japan (NHK 2006). Some *Nisei* linguists may have felt guilty about working to defeat the country of their parents (Bigham 2003). While concerned about their families and friends in the internment camps in the United States, they were also concerned that their families and relatives in Japan might be persecuted because of their connections. Further, they had their own fears of being tortured as traitors if caught by the Japanese (Fukuhara in NHK 2006).

Itami, Onodera, Hayashi and Miyamoto arrived in occupied Japan under these difficult and complex circumstances. They started working as monitors at the IMTFE with prior experience of the emperor-worshipping nationalistic education in Japan, the forcible relocation to internment camps, and the activity in military intelligence for the government who treated them as “enemy aliens”. These historical, social, cultural and political contexts of the monitors’ backgrounds are referred to in the following chapter, which examines their behavior during the interpreted testimonies of Japanese witnesses.

5.3.3. “Autonomous” or “heteronomous”?

The ambivalent nature of the position of the *Nisei* monitors in the inter-relationships among the court participants can be described by drawing Cronin’s notions (ibid. 54-59)

of “heteronomous” and “autonomous” interpreting systems. In colonial contexts, Cronin refers to the “doubleness” or “duplicitous” of interpreters who are recruited and trained in the following two types of systems: a heteronomous system in which native people are recruited by force or through inducements, and then are taught the colonizer’s language; and an autonomous system which involves colonizers training their own people in the languages of the colonized to be used as interpreters.

In the interpreting system at the IMTFE, the “doubleness” or “duplicitous” is most conspicuous in the monitors. It is clear that for the U.S. military, which administered the operational procedures of the trial including those for interpreting, the language arbiters (Caucasian military officers) were “autonomous” since they were U.S. Army’s own officers. One of them even studied the Japanese language at institutions the Army established. The Japanese interpreters were “heteronomous” to the court administrator since they were “natives”, mainly provided by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, a “native” institution. The U.S. military was never involved in training these “native” interpreters, either.

The case of monitors is more complex. The monitors were “autonomous” in the sense that they were Americans who were recruited and trained by the U.S. military. Since they were all *Kibei* monitors, however, there are some “heteronomous” characteristics found in their background. Their education and experience in Japan was prompted by their “native” parents, not by the U.S. military. They were born in the U.S., but were raised by their “native” parents who sent them to the “native” land to acquire its language and culture as their own. When they were recruited as military linguists, it was practically “through inducements” (to get out of or avoid the internment camps and prove their loyalty to the United States) in the fight against the “native” people by making use of their “native” skills. In other words, for the tribunal the Nisei monitors were “autonomous” by affiliation, but they were also “heteronomous”, having acquired the language as “native” and were suspected that they might “go back native”. In this conjuncture, the monitors’ “language and culture of origin” is not very clear.

As discussed previously, one of the characteristics found in certain autonomous interpreters, such as Ottoman interpreters and *Oranda tsuji*, is that they engage in administrative functions of their ruler’s government in addition to interpret. Although the

Nisei monitors supervised the Japanese interpreters inside the booth, they did not work in any administrative capacity of the trial itself. In this regard as well, the position of the *Nisei* monitors was “in-between” in the hierarchy.

Whether the complexity of this “doubleness” or “duplicity” of the monitors was manifested in their behavior is examined when the nature of their interjections and interactions with the interpreters and the court are analyzed in Chapter 6.

5.3.4. Summary

The four *Nisei* monitors came to the IMTFE under difficult and complex circumstances. They were all *Kibei* who suffered even greater prejudice and discrimination than other Japanese Americans because of their education and experience in Japan. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, they were sent to internment camps (except Hayashi who taught at the Navy’s Japanese school), but were recruited by the U.S. Army as it had become more acutely aware of their value in military intelligence. During the war, these *Nisei* monitors worked as translators, interrogators and in other language-related capacities, while their families and friends were detained in the camps. They were among those who tried to prove their loyalty to the United States by playing crucial roles in military operations against the country of their parents. They constantly had to confront the language and people of their own heritage in hostile settings, while fighting against the suspicion of disloyalty within the U.S. Army. They also feared being caught, tortured and killed by the Japanese Army as traitors.

The *Nisei* monitors had gone through this extremely difficult wartime experience before being assigned to work at the IMTFE. The complexity of their position in the inter-relationships among the court participants is apparent: They were hired by the government that had treated them and their families unjustly, in a trial against leaders of their ancestral homeland. And in their function as linguists, they used skills deeply rooted in their own heritage. There is no way to actually know what kind of emotional and psychological states the *Nisei* monitors were in during the IMTFE. However, the complex nature of their background, which may be referred to as “doubleness” and “duplicity”, is considered in Chapter 6 as an important factor that may have affected their behavior during the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo.

6. Behavior of the linguists

The overall approach of the present study is to view interpreting as a social activity and pay attention to its social, political and cultural contexts in order to describe and explain interpreting phenomena. Accordingly, the discussion of the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE in Chapters 5 and 6 focused on the political and historical context of the IMTFE, social and cultural backgrounds of the linguists, and their hierarchical positions and roles in the interpreting process. The analysis of the linguists' behavior in the present chapter attempts to go beyond a mere text analysis and aims at a contextualized examination as well. Special focus is placed on the different positions of the linguists in the power constellation which reflects the social, political and cultural context of the IMTFE, such as power relations between Caucasian military officers and *Nisei* linguists, between Japanese government officials and U.S. occupation personnel, and between different linguists with different ages and language proficiency levels. Findings of this analysis are examined to see whether they support the hypothesis of the present study: interpreters' awareness of their standing in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate affects their behavior, choices and strategies in interpreting.

The focus of the analysis is the interpreted testimony given by Hideki Tojo, former Japanese Prime Minister and War Minister. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Tojo's testimony was chosen on the assumption that the most competent and experienced interpreters had been assigned to this task because Tojo was one of the last witnesses to testify, appeared toward the end of the court proceedings, and attracted close attention as the person who was considered most responsible for the war crimes of all the accused. One year and seven months after the start of the trial, various interpreting issues including procedural problems and interpreters' cognitive limitations had already been addressed as examined in detail in Chapter 6. By examining the sessions in which the interpreting procedures were well-established and were conducted with the most competent interpreters, this case study aims to focus on the linguists' standings in the power constellation of the IMTFE as a major driver for their behavior, rather than focusing on the interpreters' competency or procedural issues.

Tojo's testimony also represents one of the most available segments of the trial films stored at the U.S. National Archives. Having access to audio records helps mitigate the problem of relying solely on the transcripts, as discussed in Chapter 4. In addition, Tojo's testimony was selected for this study because it provides one of the largest numbers of samples of interpretations and interjections for a given witness. Since the question-and-answer sessions were among the longest of all the testimonies by the defendants, with each of the three main monitors working more than one session, the data provided can be used for comparing the behavior of the different monitors as well.

In this chapter, the team of interpreters, the monitor and the language arbiter who were assigned to each of the nine sessions of Tojo's testimony are introduced first. There is a summary of personal profiles of these linguists, including their family and educational backgrounds, language proficiency and work history to the extent that such information is relevant to the analysis of their behavior during Tojo's testimony.

Secondly, the nature of interjections by the monitors is studied. Four categories are applied to describe the interjections: 1. correcting errors in interpretation such as omissions, additions and meaning errors; 2. rephrasing a portion or entire sentences of the interpreters' renditions with occasional explanatory remarks; 3. directly interacting with the witness and other court participants; and 4. other types of interjections such as interrupting the interpreters' renditions and completing the interpretations, and off-the-record input whispered to the interpreters. Within the scope of what is reflected in the English and Japanese transcripts and in the available audio records, an attempt is made to examine the monitors' ability to correct errors and to explore what drove the monitors to rephrase the interpreters' renditions or to directly address the witness and the court. Whether different monitors showed different behavior in light of their different backgrounds is also considered.

Thirdly, the interpreters' behavior is examined. The nature of the interjections by the interpreters, albeit very few, is studied to identify the possible reasons for actions such as providing explanations on interpreting and procedural matters to the witness. Their reactions to the monitors' interjections, especially to their unwarranted corrections, are also discussed.

Fourthly, the activities of the language arbiter are described, including how he interacted, if at all, with the interpreters and the monitors. Since Captain Edward Kraft, who had only one year of Japanese language training, was the only arbiter throughout Tojo's testimony, some sessions in which Major Lardner Moore worked are also reviewed. This is to see whether the interpreters and monitors behaved differently when they had Moore, who was fluent in Japanese, as language arbiter. According to the transcripts, Moore's last day in court was September 25, 1947. For the present study, the testimonies of Sadao Araki, Kingoro Hashimoto and several Japanese witnesses for the defense were selected from the last sessions in which Moore participated, because they are most comparable to Tojo's sessions: Like Togo, these witnesses were all produced by the defense side, either as defendants or as witnesses for defendants, and all three monitors in Tojo's sessions worked during their testimonies as well. It is assumed, as in the case of Tojo, that by the 16th month after the start of the trial only competent interpreters were working and the interpreting procedures had been well-established; therefore the effect of the interpreters' competency and procedural glitches on the behavior of the interpreters and the monitors is assumed to have been minimal.

In the summary section, findings in the analysis of the linguists' behavior are reviewed to determine whether they support the hypothesis of the present study. Special attention is paid to the linguists' choices, strategies and behavior in interpreting and monitoring in relation to their social and cultural backgrounds and their positions in the power constellation of the IMTFE.

6.1. Linguists who worked during Tojo's testimony

Hideki Tojo was a general of the Japanese Imperial Army and served as War Minister and Prime Minister during much of the war. He was considered most responsible for Japanese war crimes of all the defendants, and was accused and found guilty of most counts of the war crimes at the IMTFE. Tojo first took the witness stand on December 27, 1947. After the reading of his affidavit, the direct examination by Tojo's lawyer started in the afternoon session of December 30. The direct examinations and cross examinations by other defense lawyers followed. The cross examination by Chief Prosecutor Keenan

took place from the morning session of December 31 to the afternoon session of January 6, 1948. The cross examination by President Webb on behalf of the judges followed. Tojo's testimony ended in the morning session of January 7, 1948 at the conclusion of redirect examination by his lawyer. The following are the interpreters and monitors who worked during those six days of testimony by Tojo. Kraft worked as language arbiter throughout these sessions.

Date	Monitor	Interpreters
December 30, 1947 (PM)	Onodera	Masaki, Oka, Shimanouchi
December 31, 1947 (AM)	Onodera	Iwamoto, Taji, Shimanouchi
January 2, 1948 (AM)	Miyamoto	Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji, Yamanaka
January 2, 1948 (PM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Shimada, Mori
January 5, 1948 (AM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji, Mori
January 5, 1948 (PM)	Onodera	Shimanouchi, Oka, Mori
January 6, 1948 (AM)	Itami	Shimanouchi, Mori, Taji, Oka
January 6, 1948 (PM)	Onodera	Oka, Shimanouchi, Mori, Shimada
January 7, 1948 (AM)	Miyamoto	Shimanouchi, Iwamoto, Mori, Taji

(The interpreters' names are in the same order as they appear in the Japanese transcripts of the court proceedings. The transcripts do not show which interpreter interpreted a given portion of the proceedings. There is no reference to any names of the linguists in the English transcripts except to Kraft as language arbiter.)

As monitor, Onodera worked in four sessions, Itami in three sessions and Miyamoto in two sessions. As for the interpreters, Shimanouchi worked in all nine sessions, Oka and Mori in six sessions, Taji in five sessions, Shimada and Iwamoto in two sessions and Masaki and Yamanaka in one session.

Their personal profiles are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Highlights of their backgrounds, however, are briefly reviewed below for the purposes of identifying some

elements that may explain certain behavior these linguists displayed during Tojo's testimony.

6.1.1. Monitors

All of the monitors who worked during the IMTFE were *Kibei*. David Akira Itami, who was considered the leader of the monitor team, was born in California in 1911 and lived in Japan from age 3 to 19. He had once volunteered for the Japanese Imperial Army, but was rejected due to what was officially stated as inadequate health. At the time he left Japan in 1931, Itami had been studying Chinese classics and Indian philosophy at university. Once back in California, Itami worked as a reporter for a newspaper for the Japanese American community until he was sent to an internment camp. He volunteered from the camp to teach at the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) in Minnesota; and later worked in military intelligence during the war. Because of his contributions to military intelligence he received the highest medal for non-combatants. After the IMTFE, Itami stayed with the Translator and Interpreter Service as a translator, but in 1950 at the age of 39 he shot and killed himself. As their attempt to explain his suicide, his family and friends point to the prejudice Itami experienced for being an Asian in American society and being *Kibei* in the *Nisei* community and the emotional strains he suffered during the IMTFE.

Sho Onodera was born in Seattle in 1917 and educated in Japan for seven years before he went back to the United States to attend high school. After Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor, Onodera was sent to an internment camp, but he left the camp to receive training in military intelligence. Given that Onodera was one of Itami's students in the most advanced class at MISLS, his Japanese must have been good, although probably not at the "native" level in some aspects. Onodera highly regarded Itami's proficiency in the Japanese language, especially his mastery of Chinese characters and his deep understanding of the Japanese culture. Before the IMTFE, Onodera worked as chief interpreter at the first U.S. military trial held in Japan against Japanese war criminals. The trial transcripts suggest that he struggled with the task of interpreting. After working at the IMTFE as a monitor and subsequent "Class B/C" war crimes trials as a court

interpreter, Onodera returned to the United States to attend college, and later worked as a New York correspondent for a Japanese newspaper.

Lanny Miyamoto was born in California in 1921. He had five years of schooling in Japan between age 10 and 15. He studied at college for two years in the United States. Miyamoto was sent to an internment camp, but left the camp like Itami and Onodera. It is not known whether he received training in military intelligence. After the IMTFE, he returned to the United States and ran a photo shop and also worked as a *judo* instructor. Miyamoto was the youngest of all the monitors, and some Japanese interpreters found his Japanese rather weak to function as a monitor (Shimada 2000, Oka 2005).

In brief, Itami, Onodera and Miyamoto were all *Kibei*, with their schooling in Japan for fifteen, seven and five years, respectively. They were 36, 30 and 26 years old at the time they worked as monitors during Tojo's testimony. Being the oldest person with the highest level of proficiency in the Japanese language, Itami was considered the leader of the monitor team.

6.1.2. Interpreters

A total of eight interpreters worked during Tojo's testimony: Shimanouchi (Toshiro) in all nine sessions, Oka and Mori in six sessions, Taji in five sessions, Shimada and Iwamoto in two sessions, and Masaki and Yamanaka in one session.

Toshiro Henry Shimanouchi was born in 1909 in Saga, Japan, and moved to the United States with his family in 1912. His father, until his death in an internment camp, was the publisher of a Japanese language newspaper. Upon graduating from university in 1931, Shimanouchi was unable to find work in California because he didn't have U.S. citizenship. He returned to Japan, where he started working for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) during the war. He had a distinguished career with the Ministry after the IMTFE.

Takashi Oka was a university student in Tokyo at the time of the IMTFE. He was born in Tokyo in 1924. Oka grew up speaking English to his mother who had spent many years in North America and Japanese to his father. He went to an American school in Tokyo from first to fifth grade, and then attended Japanese high schools. He had to give up on his hope of going to college in the United States due to the war. After the war, he

was hired as a translator by the IPS which was preparing for the IMTFE, and worked as an interpreter during the proceedings. Although he was the youngest interpreter at the trial, Oka interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi and Shimada. After the IMTFE, he studied in the United States and became a prominent journalist.

Tomio Mori had the title of “Embassy Third Secretary” at the time the MOFA appointed him as one of its three employees to become court interpreters at the initial stage of the IMTFE.

Makoto Taji became one of the core interpreters later during the trial. He grew up in a bilingual household with an English mother.

Masakazu Eric Shimada was born in 1912 to a Japanese mother and a German father. He was educated in Japanese schools but studied French and English privately as well. Shimada worked for a French news agency as a journalist before being drafted by the Japanese Imperial Army. When the war ended, his battalion was on an Indonesian island. Shimada was hired by the ATIS there and later sent to its office in Japan to work as a translator. From there he was recruited as a court interpreter for the IMTFE. He interpreted most frequently after Shimanouchi during the trial.

Masahito Iwamoto was born in Tokyo in 1891. His parents were prominent figures in the Japanese literary world. Iwamoto was married to an American Quaker who was a university lecturer. Iwamoto was working at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo when the IMTFE was seeking interpreters. According to Oka (*ibid.*), Iwamoto was a traditional man and applied for a court interpreter position because he wanted to serve the Emperor as his final duty should the Emperor be called upon to testify at the IMTFE.

Hideki Masaki and Masao Yamanaka were sent by the MOFA to work as interpreters at the IMTFE. Masaki was born in 1908 and joined the MOFA in 1934. Masaki’s father was a well-known general in the Japanese Imperial Army, who was arrested after the war as a Class A war criminal suspect but never indicted in the IMTFE. Masaki interpreted for his father during his interrogation, but did not interpret during the father’s testimony at the IMTFE. Starting in 1959, Masaki served as interpreter for the Emperor Hirohito for about 30 years. Yamanaka was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of his appointment as court interpreter at the IMTFE.

In short, four of the eight Japanese interpreters who worked during Tojo's testimony were diplomats from the MOFA. The rest had bilingual and bicultural upbringings because of their family and educational backgrounds. Most of the interpreters were older than the two junior monitors, Onodera and Miyamoto.

There is no way to even speculate on the views that these interpreters held, collectively or individually, on the IMTFE. It is a fact, however, that they were hired by the former enemy of their country; and they were interpreting in a trial in which their former superiors and leaders were accused of committing war crimes for which they could face the death sentence. At the same time, in the case of the interpreters dispatched from the Foreign Ministry, they were among the government people who led the post-war reconstruction efforts under the direction of General MacArthur. To cooperate with the U.S. occupation authority for a successful conclusion of the IMTFE was also in their interest in the larger strategic plan for transforming post-war Japan to a democratic nation.

It should also be noted that the interpreters had relatively privileged backgrounds and were among the elite in Japanese society as evidenced by prominent family members, education at private international schools and overseas posts as government representatives. This is in stark contrast to the backgrounds of the monitors who, as sons of immigrants, had to fight prejudice and discrimination in American society.



Hideki Tojo at the witness box (Source: Zusetsu Tokyo Saiban)

6.2. *The monitors' behavior*

According to Watanabe (1998: 19), during Tojo's testimony the interpreters interpreted a total of 1,178 English utterances into Japanese and 845 Japanese utterances into English; and the number of the interjections by the monitors was 161 for interpretation from English into Japanese (18 per session on average), and 35 for interpretation from Japanese into English (four per session on average). This means that the monitor interjected 13% of the times when the interpretation was from English into Japanese and 4% of the times when the interpretation was from Japanese into English. These statistics, however, merely cover the interjections recorded on the English and Japanese transcripts. As previously discussed, checking the transcripts against the available audio records indicates that the transcripts are accurate but do not reflect the monitors' interjections whispered to the interpreters. Revising the transcripts of Tojo's entire testimony based on the audio recording is not possible since the total length of the audio portions accessible at the National Archives represents only about 20% of the entire sessions. The following examination of the monitors' interjections, therefore, is not based on the exact numbers of the various types of interjections by different categories; rather, it is based on an

interpretive analysis by the author to the extent that the interjections are reflected on the transcripts and the audio of the available films.

First a typology of the interjections is discussed, using four categories (error corrections, rephrasing, direct interactions with court participants, and other types of interjections) and citing some examples for each category. Presumed reasons for rephrasing, direct interactions with court participants, and interrupting the interpreters to complete the renditions are explored. Based on a summary of the numbers of interjections in the four categories by different monitors, interpretive findings on the behavior of individual monitors are discussed with consideration to their backgrounds and language proficiency.

6.2.1. Error Corrections

Although none of the tribunal's official documents clearly defines the role of the monitor, the transcripts and the motion pictures indicate that one of the main functions of the monitor was to correct interpreting errors. As reflected in the transcripts and the audio records, the monitors corrected errors found in the interpreters' renditions such as omissions, additions and meaning errors. Here is an example of the monitor adding information that was omitted in the interpreter's rendition. This is Chief Prosecutor Keenan's objection to a question for Tojo by defense counsel in the morning session of January 7, 1948. Shimanouchi, Iwamoto, Mori and Taji worked as interpreters and Miyamoto worked as monitor in the session.

Keenan: Mr. President, I object to that question as being an improper one, a sheer waste of time.

Interpreter: *Tadaima no shitsumon wa dato de nai to iu riyu no moto ni, igi o moshitamemasu.*

(I object based on the reason that the question just asked is not appropriate.)

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Mattaku jikan no kuhi desu.*

(It is a total waste of time.)

It is a valid interjection, but the proceedings probably would not have been affected without it since the omission did not affect the meaning of the passage as a

whole, and also Tojo did not have to respond to this statement. The monitor's interjection in the following example, however, may have been considered significant by the court participants. This is from the afternoon session of January 6, 1948. Shimanouchi, Oka, Shimada and Mori were the interpreters and Onodera was the monitor.

Keenan: ... You have told us that the Emperor on repeated occasions made known to you that he was a man of peace and did not want war, is that correct?

Interpreter: ... *Anata wa sude ni hotei ni taishite, nihon tenno wa heiwa o aisuru hito de aru to iu koto o maemotte anata-gata ni shirashimete atta to iu koto o moshimashita. Kore wa tadashii desune.*

(... You told the court that the Japanese Emperor had made known to you that he was a man who loved peace. Is this correct?)

Monitor (Onodera): *Sore o kurikaeshite osshai mashita.*

([He] said that repeatedly.)

The phrase "on repeated occasions" was an important modifier for the prosecutor who was directed by MacArthur to grant total immunity to the emperor and tried to depict the emperor as a pacifist who delegated authority to the militarist advisors (Dower 1999: 459-460, Bix 2000: 610-612). This examination took place amid the great endeavor by the IPS and Tojo himself, in coordination with MacArthur's office and the Japanese government, to offset the damaging slip Tojo made during his testimony of December 31, 1947. Responding to a defense lawyer's question on that occasion, Tojo inadvertently implicated the emperor in Japan's war activities by stating "there is no Japanese subject who would go against the will of His Majesty: more particularly, among high officials of the Japanese government" (TP: 36,251). According to Oka (ibid.), what made the most lasting impression of the entire trial for him was the laborious effort Keenan and Tojo made never to expose the emperor, and the exchanges between them and the frustrated President Webb who had wanted to see the indictment of the emperor. Oka says that the concerted effort by Keenan and Tojo to protect the emperor was obvious to the court participants including the interpreters in the booth. Although it cannot be determined whether Onodera's interjection took place as part of his ordinary course of activity or

with his keen awareness of the significance of the missing information, it must have been appreciated by Keenan and by those who were involved in the efforts to protect the emperor.

In addition to inserting information that was missing from the interpreters' renditions, the monitors also interjected to strike information added by the interpreters, though this practice was infrequent. In the following example, Onodera corrects the addition made by the interpreter in the afternoon session on December 30, 1947. Masaki, Oka and Shimanouchi worked as interpreters in the session.

Logan (defense counsel): ... Now, is it not true that Marquis KIDO was only one of a large number of advisors to the Emperor, considering these Cabinet members and members of the Supreme Command, and that Marquis KIDO had no say whatsoever in the final determination of decisions?

Interpreter: ... *Kido wa kono tenno o hosasuru hiyo ni tasu no mono no tatta hitori ni suginakatta node atte, saigo ni tosui ni kansuru kettei ni kanshitewa, nanra no hatsugen ga nakatta to iu nowa jijitsu dewa arimasendeshitaka.*

(Isn't it true that Kido was only one of the many people who assisted this emperor and had no say whatsoever in the final command-related decisions?)

Monitor (Onodera): *Tosui-ken jiko to iunowa sakujoshimasu. Donna saigo no kettei ni kanshitemo kettei-ken ga nai to iu noga jijitsu dewa arimasenka.*

(Delete "the command-related matters". Isn't it true that [he] had no right to make decisions, no authority regarding any final decision?)

Besides adding omitted information and deleting added information, the monitors corrected a range of errors from simple ones with numbers to gross meaning errors. Below is an instance in which Monitor Itami corrects the interpreter's error on a number in Tojo's answer in the morning session on January 5, 1948. The interpreters were Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji and Mori.

Tojo: *Gunji-teki chokusetsu no koi wa mada so hageshiku wa arimasen. Shikashinagara sono keikaku ga atta koto wa meikaku de arimasu. Sore wa shoko-shorui 3567-go narabini 3660-go, kore o goran ni nareba yoku owakarini narimasu.*

(The direct military action is not that fierce yet. However, it is clear that the plan existed. You will

see it very well if you look at the Exhibits 3567 and 3660.)

Interpreter: Well, direct military actions were not—there was not any active military—there was not any active—direct and active military action, but that there were plans it is abundantly clear if you will see exhibit 3567 and 3860.

Monitor (Itami): 3660 instead of 3860.

There were cases in which the interpreter's error was such that the main message of the statement as a whole changed. In the following example, the interpretation of President Webb's remarks in response to defense counsel's objection during the morning session on January 2, 1948, gave a meaning that was the exact opposite of the original. Monitor Miyamoto immediately corrected the error. The interpreters were Oka, Taji, Shimanouchi and Yamanaka.

The President: He was not asked any question that bore on guilt or innocence. He was merely asked his opinion on the law. If I am asked whether I think aggressive war is a crime and I say that I think it is not a crime, am I guilty of anything?

Interpreter: *Shonin wa yuzai ka mujitsu ka to iu koto ni taishite nanra shitsumon o ukete orimasen. Shonin wa tanni horitsu no kaishaku ni tsuite shitsumon o uketani sugimasen. Moshi watashi ga shinryaku senso wa hanzai de aruka inaka to iu mondai ni tsuite kikareta baaini hanzai nari to kotaeta nara watashi wa sokode yuzai ni narimasuka?*

(The witness has not been asked any questions about being guilty or innocent. The witness was only asked a question about the interpretation of the law. If I am asked whether or not aggressive war is a crime and I answer it is a crime, will I be found guilty?)

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Shinryaku senso wa hanza de nai to watashi wa kotaeta to sureba, watashi wa tsumi o okashia koto ni narimasuka?*

(If I answer that aggressive war is not a crime, will it mean that I committed a crime?)

Since Webb's statement was part of his exchanges with the defense counsel and Keenan, and was not directed to Tojo, the interpreting error in Japanese probably would not have impacted the proceedings. The meaning error in the example below, however, could have induced a different answer from the witness without the monitor's correction.

It took place in the afternoon session on January 2, 1948. The monitor was Itami. Shimanouchi, Shimada and Mori worked as interpreters in the session.

Keenan: Well, the Emperor thought this procedure very strange, didn't he? And he said so to KIDO.

Interpreter: *Shikashi, kono tetsuzuki, kono yarikata wa domo hiyo ni hen da to iu funi tenno wa kangaeta no dewa arimasenka. Soshite Kido mo mata so iu funi kangaeta no dewa arimasenka.*

(However, didn't the emperor think that this procedure, this way of doing seemed very strange? And didn't Kido think that way as well?)

Monitor (Itami): *Tenno wa so kangae Kido ni so itta no dewa arimasenka.*

(Didn't the emperor think so and say so to Kido?)

All the examples above are valid corrections with grounds easily recognized in the renditions by the interpreters. During Tojo's testimony, the number of such corrections was about five to six per session on average. (The interpreter interpreted a total of 225 utterances per session on average.) Approximately 94% of those corrections concerned interpretations from English into Japanese. Possible reasons for this phenomenon will be discussed later.

Although the number of occurrences is small, there were cases in which the monitor erred in his attempted correction or did not catch an error made by the interpreter. In the example below from the morning session on January 2, 1948, Monitor Miyamoto erroneously corrects the interpreter's rendition. Oka, Taji, Shimanouchi and Yamanaka worked as interpreters in the session.

Keenan: Well, wouldn't you say the plain truth of the matter was that the YONAI Cabinet did not seize the opportunity of making the best of the situation for Japan in its plan for expansion and taking advantage of the turn of events in the European War? Isn't that a rather fair summation of the situation?

Interpreter: *Shikashi, jijitsu o sekirara ni ieba kekkyoku Yonai naikaku wa toji no jokyō o toraete soreno kikai o riyo shite toji no zenbu no josei o riyoshite Nihon no kakuchō o hakarukoto, soshite Yōroppa no josei ni umaku binjosuru koto o shinakatta to iu noga genin de atta to iu no ga jijitsu dewa arimasenka?*

(However, if the bare truth is told, wouldn't it be true that it was because the Yonai cabinet did not seize the situation of that time to make use of the opportunity and make use of the overall situation of that time to seek Japan's expansion, and did not take advantage of the developments in Europe?)

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Chotto shusei itashimasu. Yonai naikaku wa tojino oshu senso no tenkanki o riyoshi, Nihon no kakuchō kakudai o surutame ni sono jiki o riyoshi, kokeiki o riyoshinakatta to iu jotai o tadashiku itta koto ni narimasenka?*

(Let me modify it a little. Wouldn't it be correctly referring to the situation that the Yonai cabinet made use of the turning point in the European War at that time and made use of that time for Japan's expansion and enlargement, and didn't make use of the good opportunity?)

Monitor Miyamoto's rendition is not intelligible in Japanese. In addition, he erroneously corrected "josei (the developments)" to "tenkanki (the turning point)" for the Japanese translation of "the turn of events". The monitor's erroneous correction, however, does not seem to have confused Tojo. His response was "that view is one-sided" and the proceedings moved on. It should also be noted that Miyamoto started with a self-referential comment ("Let me modify it a little") before presenting his version of interpretation.

In the following example during the same session, the errors are unchecked by Monitor Miyamoto, and Keenan ends up correcting one of them, prompted by his Japanese-speaking colleague.

Keenan: Now, lastly, and not as all unimportant is the third item of losses of the Imperial Army, including the Nomonhan Incident, killed, 109,250 Japanese.

Interpreter: *Sarani kore wa jūyō na mondai dewa nai keredomo, kono shita ni sarani suji ga arawarete orimasu. Sore wa Nomonhan ni okeru mono o fukumu tokoro no nihon-gun no songai to natte orimashite 19,250 to arawarete orimasu.*

(In addition, although this is not an important issue, but there is another number that appears below this. It states that it is the losses the Japanese Army suffered including the one in Nomonhan, and it says 19,250.)

Tojo: *Sore wa itsu no koto desu.*

(What point in time are you referring to?)

Keenan: Just a moment. My colleague, Mr. Maxon, who speaks the Japanese language, calls my attention to the fact that the translation was, “not important.” I said, “not unimportant,” and I wish it was translated.

Interpreter: *Tadaima watashi no doryo de arimasu Nihon-go o hanasu kensatsukan no chukoku ni yoreba, watashi wa juyo de aru to itta no o juyo de nai to iu guaini yakusarete iru so desu. Teisei shite kudasai.*

(According to the advice from my colleague, a Japanese-speaking prosecutor, it appears that the part I said important is translated as unimportant. Please make a correction.)

Tojo: *Teisei, wakarimasita ga, hajime kara itte kudasai. Kekkyoku nani o otazune ni naruno desuka.*

(The correction noted. Please state it from the beginning. What do you want to ask after all?)

Interpreter: I understand the correction, but may I have the whole question repeated? What are you asking me?

Monitor Miyamoto failed to notice two interpreting errors in this case, one with the litotes and the other with the number in Keenan’s statement. These examples of erroneous corrections and unchecked errors suggest that the monitors were not always reliable checkers on the accuracy of interpretation. How the interpreters reacted to the monitor’s erroneous corrections is discussed later.

6.2.2. *Rephrasing*

In addition to correcting patent errors found in the interpreters’ renditions, the monitors presented their versions of renditions by changing the wording and sentence structures and adding information after the interpreters’ seemingly error-free renditions (i.e. no omissions, additions, meaning or grammatical errors). During Tojo’s testimony, such rephrasing interjections occurred about nine times per session on average and approximately 94% of them concerned interpretation from English into Japanese.

In many of these cases, the interpreter’s rendition reflected in the transcript does not seem to warrant an intervention by the monitor and the monitor’s version does not seem to show any improvement. In other words, these interjections seem unnecessary as

far as what is reflected in the transcripts is concerned. In the following example, the interpretation of a question by Keenan in the morning session of January 2, 1948, has no addition or omission and delivers the original meaning coherently. Monitor Miyamoto, however, gives his rendition of the question anyway. Oka, Taji, Shimanouchi and Yamanaka worked as interpreters.

Keenan: And the next entry is “The Booty”; and it includes “Arms, 482,257.” Wouldn’t that indicate that that was attempting to get an exact figure?

Interpreter: *Sono tsugi no kisajiko wa senrihin to natte orimasu. Soshite buki to iu kou ni 482,257 to kaite arimasu. Kore o mitemo hijoni seikakuna suji o arawaso to shiteiru funi natte orimasenka?*
(The next entry is “The Booty”. And it states 482,257 under the item “Arms”. Looking at this, doesn’t it appear to be trying to present a very accurate number?)

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Seikakuna suji o motomeyo to doryoku shiteiru to iukoto ga ukagawaremasenka, soreni yotte?*
(By that, can’t you sense that it is making efforts to seek an exact number?)

In the following examples of seemingly unnecessary interjections, it is presumed that the monitors’ intention was to provide more “clarity” in order to help Tojo understand the questions by offering more explicit versions of renditions. The instance below concerns explicitation of anaphoric references. It was during the morning session on January 2, 1948. Miyamoto was the monitor, and Oka, Taji, Shimanouchi and Yamanaka worked as interpreters.

Keenan: I withdraw that question for the moment, and ask you this: do you recall that the United States entered in to the World War in 1917?

Tojo (through Interpreter): Yes, very well.

Keenan: That didn’t cause any convulsion in Japan, did it?

Interpreter: *Sore ga tame ni Nihon ni oite doran ga shojita to iu koto wa nakatta no dewa arimasenka.*

(That didn’t cause a convulsion in Japan, did it?)

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Beikoku ga sekai-sen ni sansensita koto ni yotte, nihon ni eikyo o oyoboshita koto wa arimasen deshou.*

(The U.S. entry into the world war did not affect Japan, did it?)

The following example involves a metaphor used by Tojo and Keenan. Monitor Onodera interjects to add information in order to make what is implied by the analogy explicit. It is from the afternoon session of January 6, 1948. The interpreters were Shimanouchi, Oka and Mori.

Tojo (through Interpreter): I shall reply to that question from two directions. The first, the effect of the Nine-Power Treaty on Japan is something like this: A ten-year old child having been given clothes to fit its age, now having reached the age of eighteen years finds that the clothes are becoming somewhat torn. Japan was trying and trying to mend those tears, but since her body had grown that was impossible.

Keenan: Well, I suggest to you that there was a possibility of sticking a pin in now and then in the process of mending the dress. Would you accept that revision?

Interpreter: *Shikashi kimono o shuzen suru baai ni wa, tokidoki hari o sasu to iu koto mo arimasu. Soiu koto wo anata wa mitomemasuka.*

(However, sometimes sticking in a pin happens when the kimono is mended. Would you accept such a thing?)

Monitor (Onodera): *Sunawachi hari o sasu to moshimasu no wa sono tokidoki ni atatte kaizen subeki wa kaizenshi aratamubeki koto wa aratameru to iu koto o anata wa mitomemasuka.*

(In other words, as to the reference to sticking in a pin, would you accept that at appropriate times improvement is made to what should be improved and correction is made to what should be corrected?)

Tojo (through Interpreter]: That is perfectly true, but the body grew too quickly for that, and the child's parents wouldn't mend those tears for her.

In the instances above, the monitors' interjections probably helped Tojo understand the questions more clearly. The added explanation in the following example, however, seems to go beyond that. The interpreter's rendition already has some

explicitation, but Itami further added more explicit information in his own version of interpretation for Keenan's question in the morning session on January 6, 1948. Shimanouchi, Mori, Taji and Oka worked as interpreters.

Keenan: Was this principle of making the population of China contribute to the preparation for war with Soviet Russia based on the experience derived by the Kwantung Army from using the population of Manchuria for the same purpose?

Interpreter: *Tadaiima no shisakuyoryo no nakani kaite arimasu tokoro no genjumin o taisosen junbi ni shiseshimeru to iu koto wa Kanto-gun ni oite genjumin o sono maeni taisosen junbi wa tsukatta keiken kara kite orunodesuka?*

(Did the idea of using local people for the preparation for war against the Soviets, which is written in the "General Outline of Administration", come from the Kwantung Army's prior experience of using local people for war against the Soviets?)

Monitor (Itami): *Imano tokoro o setsumei shimasu. Hokushi ni chuoseifu o kensetsu seshimete hokushi no genjumin o taisosen junbi ni shiseshimeru to iu koto wa Kanto-gun wa katte Manshu ni oite Manshu no genjumin wo soiu senso junbi ni shiseshimeta keiken ni motozuita tokoro kara detamono de arimasuka?*

(Let me explain about this. Did the idea of establishing a central government in Northern China and using local people of Northern China for the preparation for war against the Soviets come from the experience that the Kwantung Army once used local people in Manchuria for the preparation for such war?)

The line of questions by Keenan in this part of the session concerned a document called the General Outline of the Administration. The interpreter made the term "the principle" in Keenan's question more explicit by specifying that it referred to this document. This would have been sufficient for Tojo to understand the question, but Itami further added information by explaining the contents of the document, which seems totally unwarranted. He even starts with a self-referential remark to indicate that he is going to provide an explanation of the question to Tojo.

There were cases in which the monitor's explicitation confused the witness. In the example below from the morning session of December 31, 1947, Tojo responds directly to the information that is added by Monitor Onodera, which results in the discourse

taking a different direction from the original questioning. Iwamoto, Taji and Shimanouchi worked as interpreters in this session.

Keenan: You advocated the process of peace terms being arranged between China and Japan in 1941 while there was a huge Japanese army occupying a large part of China, is that not correct?

Interpreter: *Shina no hiyo ni hiroi chiiki o bakudai na kazu no nihon-gun ga senryo shitsutsu aru aida ni ...*

(While an enormous number of Japanese troops were in the process of occupying a very large area in China ...)

Monitor (Onodera): ... *aida ni, anata wa 1941-nen nisshi-kan no wahei no joken o teiji shita no dewa arimasenka.*

(During that time, didn't you present peace terms between Japan and China in 1941?)

Tojo: *Motto hakkiri itte kudasai.*

(Please say it more clearly.)

Interpreter: May I have that question repeated? It was not quite comprehensible.

Keenan: Will you please answer that question directly without making a speech?

[NO INTERPRETATION]

Monitor (Onodera): We are trying to get an accurate translation on this last one. We have not done so yet.

Tojo: *Ima no ron, mo sukoshi hakkiri itte kudasai.*

(Please state the statement a little more clearly.)

Monitor (Onodera): *Shina no kodai na chiiki ni nihon no taigun ga chuzai shite oru toki ni oite, anata wa shina to nihon to no aida no heiwa joken, wahei kosho nado to iu koto o tsuzukete otta no dewa arimasenka. Soiu mujun shita jotai ni oite...*

(While a large Japanese army was stationed in a large area in China, weren't you continuing to have peace terms between China and Japan, peace negotiations or something? In such contradicting situation ...)

Tojo: *Hitotsu mo mujun shite orimasen ga, tozen tsuzukemashita.*

(It is not contradicting at all, but naturally I continued.)

Interpreter: There is no inconsistency in the situation. I naturally continued such efforts for peace.

In an effort to help Tojo understand Keenan's question, Onodera added the term "*mujun shita*" (contradicting), rather strong language in Japanese. Because of this term that Onodera added at his liberty, Tojo ended up responding directly to the language instead of responding to a correct interpretation of Keenan's original question.

As illustrated in the examples in this section, the monitors rephrased a portion or the entire sentences of the interpreters' renditions even when they seemed to be free of errors. These instances almost always occurred for English-to-Japanese interpretations of the questions. The rephrased renditions by the monitors were more explicit than the original renditions by the interpreters, and occasionally contained explanatory information added by the monitors. There was a case in which the monitor's added explanation impacted the way Tojo responded and changed the discourse of the proceedings.

6.2.3. Direct interactions with the witness and the other court participants

During Tojo's testimony, the monitors occasionally interacted with Tojo by directly explaining procedural and translation issues to him, asking clarifications from him, and responding to his questions. There are two to three such instances in each session. For example, on examination by defense counsel on December 30, 1947, Monitor Onodera clarified with the witness the portions explicated by the interpreter in order to see if the interpreter's choice was correct:

Tojo: *Watashi no seikaku to shite mata watashi no hoshin to shite juyonaru tokoro no gaiko ni tsukimashite wa kore wa tougai sekininsha, sunawachi gaimu daijin to sodan shimasu. Gunji ni kanshite wa kare niwa issai yokai sasemasen.*

(Both by my nature and as my policy, on important foreign affairs I consult the person responsible, that is the Foreign Minister. As for military affairs, I do not allow him to interfere at all.)

Interpreter: Both by my nature and as a matter of policy, on all important matters concerning foreign affairs I consulted that Foreign Minister; and as for military affairs, I did not allow HOSHINO to interfere.

Monitor (Onodera): *Kare niwa yokai sasemasen to iu nowa gaimu daijin no kotodesuka?*
(When you say “I do not allow him to interfere”, are you referring to the Foreign Minister?)

Tojo: *Hoshino no koto desu.*
(I’m referring to Hoshino.)

There were times when Tojo asked for clarification of the interpretation, and the monitor, on behalf of the interpreter, responded to him directly. For example, in response to a question by Keenan on December 31, 1947, Tojo asks for clarification and Monitor Onodera gives a direct response:

Keenan: By the year 1941, Mr. TOJO, can you give us a rough estimate of the number of Chinese troops—of Japanese troops that had been dispatched to China in the previous decade?

Interpreter: *1941-nen genzai de sono kako junenkan Shina ni haken sareta Nihongun no kazu o nobete kudasai. Daitai no kazu o... Heiryoku o.*
(As of 1941, please tell me the number of Japanese troops that had been sent to China over the past ten years. A rough estimate... of the troops.)

Tojo: *Shina ni haken sareta Nihon no heiryoku su desuka?*
(The number of the Japanese troops that were dispatched to China?)

Monitor (Onodera): *So desu.*
(That’s right.)

In addition, the monitors sometimes offered the witness explanations on the procedural and translation issues that concerned him. In the following example from the morning session on January 7, 1948, when the proceedings were resumed after a recess and the interpretation of the last question before the recess was going to be retranslated, Monitor Miyamoto explained this procedure to Tojo.

Monitor (Miyamoto): *Shonin, sakihodo no shitsumon o mo-ichido iikae mashite yomiage masukara yukkuri kiite kudasai.*

(Mr. Witness, the previous question will be rephrased and read out, so please take time to listen to it.)

Also, there were cases of discrepancies in the numbering of pages and paragraphs between the exhibit in Japanese the witness was given and the English translation the examiner used to ask questions. The monitor interjected to guide Tojo to the appropriate page or paragraph in the document he had. The following is such an instance in the morning session on January 5, 1948. Keenan refers to an exhibit and Monitor Itami refers the witness to the relevant page in the Japanese original.

Keenan: And that exhibit likewise, 541, contains the decision of the Liaison Conference of 27 July 1940. In the English version it is referred to on page 3, item 2.

Interpreter: *Soshite sono houtei-sho niwa mata Showa 15-nen 7-gatsu 27-nichi no renrakukaigi-ketteijiko wo mo fukun de arimasu. Kono bunsho no eibun no ho dewa 3-peji no dai-2-ko ni sore ga awarete orimasu.*

(Then, that exhibit includes the decision items of the Liaison Conference of July 27, Showa-15. It appears in item 2, on page 3 of the English version of this document.)

Monitor (Itami): *Nihongo wa bessatu dai-2 to natte orimasu.*

(It is the separate volume number 2 in Japanese.)

Besides the numbering issues, there were confusing incidents in which the witness was handed an original Japanese document as exhibit and the examiner referred to a word or phrase mistranslated by the translator in the English translation of the document. The following took place during the afternoon session on January 2, 1948. Keenan quoted from an English translation of a Japanese document and used improperly translated words, but the interpreter did not translate those words back to Japanese and used the corresponding word in the original Japanese document instead. Monitor Itami interrupted the interpretation and explained the situation to Tojo. Shimanouchi, Shimada and Mori worked as interpreters in the session.

Keenan: Well, to simplify the matter, Mr. TOJO, and to come back to KIDO diary, I will quote his language. He said that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister, and I suggest to you that that was the language of Kido and not my own. Do you say KIDO was wrong about that?

Interpreter: *Soredewa mondai o kantan ni suru tame ni watashi wa futatabi Kido nikki ni modori sono naiyo kara inyo shimasu. Kare wa sono nakade rikusou yori konin ni Tojo o naiso...*

(Then, to simplify the matter, I am going back to Kido diary again and quoting from it. It says that the War Minister unofficially reported of Tojo as his successor to the emperor by *naiso*...)

Monitor (Itami): *Sorewa Nihon-bun no genbun niwa naiso to arimasuga, kensatsukan no yomareta eibun niwa himitsuri ni tenno ni suisenshita aruiwa sousenshita to iu kotoba ga arimasu.*

(Here, the Japanese original text says “*naiso*”, but the English text the prosecutor read says “secretly recommended to the emperor” or “recommended to the throne”.)

“*Naiso*” means “an unofficial report from his subject to the throne”. Keenan used an improper translation for “*naiso*” – “secret recommendation”. If Monitor Itami had not intervened, Tojo might have continued answering the question without knowing this error.

All the examples above in providing explanations to Tojo probably helped him and the court avoid possible confusion arising from procedural or interpreting issues. Itami’s following interjection in the morning session of January 6, 1948, however, seems to go beyond this and Itami sounds almost as if he was advising Tojo who was pressed hard by Keenan with a rhetorical question. During the session, Shimanouchi, Mori, Taji and Oka worked as interpreters.

Keenan: But you still insist that when the Foreign Minister of Japan at that critical moment was sending a message to his own ambassador that he was employing diplomatic language that had various meanings and not using a direct instruction?

Interpreter: *Sorede anata wa nao kono judai naru jiki ni oite Nihon no gaimu daijin ga sono taishi ni taishite tsushin o okuru toki ni, iroiro na imi ni torero tokoro no gaikouteki jirei o mochiite ori, soshite chokusainaru kunrei o hasshite oranakatta to iukoto o shuchou nasaru no desuka?*

(Then, do you still assert that at the critical time the foreign minister of Japan sent his ambassador a correspondence which used diplomatic language that could be interpreted in various ways and didn't convey a direct instruction?)

Monitor (Itami): *Chotto sono ten o setsumei shimasu. Shonin, gokai no nai yoni. Kono kunrei no nakani tsukatte aru kotoba wa gaikojo no kotoba de aruka doka, soretomo sonotori no koto o imishite orunoka to iu imi no shitumon de arimasu.*

(Let me explain a little on this point. Mr. Witness, please do not misunderstand. This question means to ask whether the language included in the instruction is diplomatic language or it means what it says.)

The monitors also interrupted Tojo and told him to break down his answer for the interpreter. Although these instances are not reflected in the transcripts, Monitor Miyamoto's blunt interruption "*chotto matte* (Wait a second.))" is heard frequently in the audio records. As far as the transcripts and the available audio are concerned, there is nothing to indicate that the monitors interrupted the examining counsel. A less intrusive way – a flashing light – was used to remind them to break down their questions. It is not known whether the monitors had to interrupt Tojo because he did not pay attention to the light. Regardless, the monitors probably felt less inhibited about interrupting Tojo than the examining counsel.

In addition to interacting with the witness, the monitor communicated to the court on behalf of the interpreter to explain issues in interpretation and directly respond to the court's questions about interpreting. In the example below from the morning session on January 5, 1948, Tojo's answer included a quote from a document, which prompted Monitor Itami to interject to explain issues related to the English translation of the document.

Tojo (through interpreter): Very well, I have many more. Next, in paragraph "c" of what he calls "Point 3 of Article □" he writes the following—he makes the following silly remark, however, right in this part as follows: "c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take these back."

Monitor (Itami): This again is a quotation from the IPS translation of the HARADA diary. In

regard to the words “enemy sympathizers” we have some doubts, but we have just read it from the text.

Tojo (through interpreter): The next is item 3. HARADA states: “In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations.”

Monitor (Itami): It seems that there are some translation errors in this English passage, but we have to reserve our correction for later.

The monitor also requested, on behalf of the interpreter, that the Japanese and/or English court reporters read out from their records when the interpreter had trouble recalling the speaker’s remarks or when clarification was needed before rendering the interpretation. In the example below, Monitor Itami asks both the Japanese court reporter and the English court reporter to read from their records in response to Tojo’s question on the interpretation. It took place during the morning session of January 5, 1948. Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji and Mori worked as interpreters.

Tojo: *Imi ga wakarimasen. Ima nowa yakushikata ga warui no dewa naika?*

(I don’t understand the meaning. Isn’t that interpretation bad?)

Interpreter: Well, I cannot quite understand. Maybe the translation is wrong. May I have it again?

Monitor (Itami): English reporter first, will you please? We will translate it again.

[Whereupon, the question was read by the official court reporter as follows: And you will also agree, I take it, that in appointing the Prime Minister of Japan SAIONJI was exercising the most important governmental function that there was, isn’t that true?]

[Whereupon, the Japanese court reporter read.]

Monitor (Itami): No correction.

As seen in these examples, the monitors functioned as spokespersons for the

interpreters, who were not allowed to speak on their own behalf in the courtroom. In today's courtroom in the United States, when interpreters make statements themselves in their capacity as interpreters, the standard practice is for them to refer to themselves in the third person ("The interpreter would like to clarify with the witness" or "By the interpreter: Could the court reporter repeat the question, please?") (Mikkelsen 2000). During the IMTFE, this arrangement of a clear division of labor, in which the interpreter interpreted the proceedings and the monitor communicated the difficulty the interpreter might be experiencing to the pertinent party, probably helped the court minimize confusion arising from interpreting issues.

6.2.4. Other types of interjections

Watanabe (ibid.) discusses a number of self-corrections made by the interpreters. This observation assumes that the interpreters spontaneously made corrections of their own renditions. As far as the available portions of Tojo's filmed testimony are concerned, however, all the "self-corrections" by the interpreters for Japanese-to-English interpretations were prompted by the monitor's whispered input. Such input was quickly interjected in Japanese when the interpreter misspoke or struggled to come up with the next words.

This may be due to the monitors' inability to quickly offer their own version of interpretation after the interpreter's rendition. Or it may be because the monitors were more disciplined when they offered their versions of renditions in English. This aspect of the monitors' behavior is discussed in detail below.

There were also instances in which the monitor interrupted the interpreter's rendition and finished up the rendition. The reason could be the interpreter struggling to come up with words or the personal style of interjection by a particular monitor. Due to the limited availability of the audio records, however, what might have driven the monitors to interrupt the interpreters cannot be determined.

In addition, when the examiner quoted a passage from a translated exhibit and the interpreter's back translation into Japanese did not match the original Japanese, the monitor intervened to offer the language used in the original document. Since the monitors were given the task of simultaneously reading the translations when the

speakers read out of a prepared document, they probably maintained the pertinent documents by their side in the booth. That seems to explain why they were prepared to address issues arising from the discrepancies between the back translation of translated documents and the original documents.

6.2.5. Different monitors, different behavior?

Table 1 is a summary of the interjections by the different monitors. Again, this is based on what is reflected in the transcripts and the available audio records. It shows the numbers of interjections in different categories by the session. The four categories used in the discussion of typology of the monitors' interjections are also applied here. For the first category, error corrections, and the second category, rephrasing, the interjections are divided into interpretations from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English. For the third category, direct interactions with court participants, there are two subcategories: interactions with Tojo, and interactions with other court participants such as Chief Prosecutor Keenan, the president, defense counsel and court reporters. As for the fourth category, other types of interjections, interjections to interrupt the interpreter and complete the interpreter's rendition are examined with two subcategories: for interpretations from English into Japanese and for interpretations from Japanese into English.

Although this table does not represent a complete list of the occurrences of interjections due to the unavailability of the audio records of the entire sessions, it can be used to see the frequencies of interjections relative to the different monitors and the different categories. The following are some characteristics observed in the behavior of different monitors.

The first observation that must be made is the high frequency of Monitor Miyamoto's rephrasing interjections for English-to-Japanese interpretations. Assuming that only competent interpreters were assigned to Tojo's testimony and considering that the interpreters were assigned across the different sessions in various team formations, it would be fair to state that Miyamoto's frequent rephrasing was more attributable to his own style of interjections rather than to the performance of the specific interpreters who happened to be assigned to Miyamoto's sessions. He interrupted the interpreters and

finished up their renditions most frequently as well. Miyamoto almost never interjected after interpretation into English. His interactions with Tojo and other court participants were fewer than those of other monitors.

Secondly, this summary of monitor interjections finds Itami least inhibited in any type of interjections. He was very active in terms of explaining the interpreting and procedural issues to the court as well. It should be noted, however, that Itami rephrased the interpreters' renditions least frequently of all the monitors.

Finally, in the case of Monitor Onodera, there was nothing conspicuous in his behavior compared to that of the other two monitors. He made quite a few valid corrections. In rephrasing, interacting with court participants, and completing the interpreter's rendition, Onodera does not seem to have engaged in anything out of line with the commonly observed behavior of the monitors. He did not provide seemingly unwarranted explanations as often as Itami did or interrupt the interpreter to complete his rendition as frequently as Miyamoto did.

Table 1 Monitors' behavior during Tojo's testimony (December 30, 1947- January 7, 1948)

Interpreters	Examiners defendant/country	Error corrections		Rephrasing		Direct interactions		Interrupt & complete		
		E → J	J → E	E → J	J → E	w/ Tojo	w/ others	E → J	J → E	
Sho Onodera										
12/30/ '47 PM	Masaki, Oka Shimanouchi	Blewett (Tojo) Fujii (Hoshino) Howard (Kimura) Logan (Kido) Somiya (Oka)	3	0	5	1	1	2	0	0
12/31/ '47 AM	Iwamoto, Taji Shimanouchi	Logan Keenan (US) Brannon(Shimada)	10	0	17	0	4	1	2	0
1/5/'48 PM	Shimanouchi, Oka Mori	Keenan	5	0	5	0	3	0	0	0
1/6/'48 PM	Oka, Shimanouchi Mori, Shimada	Keenan Blakeney (Togo)	5	0	5	1	0	0	0	0
Total (average per session)			23 (5.8)	0	32 (8)	1 (0.5)	8 (2)	3 (0.8)	2 (0.5)	0
David Itami										
1/2/'48 PM	Shimanouchi Shimada, Mori	Keenan	4	1	4	1	2	0	0	1
1/5/'48 AM	Shimanouchi, Oka Taji, Mori	Keenan	5	1	4	0	4	6	3	0
1/6/'48 AM	Shimanouchi Mori, Taji, Oka	Keenan	4	1	7	2	2	4	1	0
Total (average per session)			13 (4.3)	3 (1)	15 (5)	3 (1)	8 (2.7)	10 (3.3)	4 (1.3)	1 (0.3)
Lanny Miyamoto										
1/2/'48 AM	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji, Yamanaka	Keenan	4	0	16	4	0	2	3	0
1/7/'48 AM	Shimanouchi Iwamoto, Mori, Taji	Blewett	8	0	14	0	1	1	3	0
Total (average per session)			12 (6)	0	30 (15)	4 (2)	1 (0.5)	3 (1.5)	6 (3)	0

6.3. *The interpreters' behavior*

In principle, the interpreters were not to speak on their own behalf. On occasion, however, they responded directly to questions by the witness and the court. Further, they sometimes spontaneously provided an explanation on procedural matters to the witness. Although the number of such interjections is very small (about a dozen over the nine sessions), their nature is examined below to ascertain what might have prompted the interpreters to “break the rule” and speak out. There is also a discussion of how the interpreters reacted to errors in what the monitor offered as corrections.

6.3.1. *Directly responding to the witness and the court*

On several occasions, the interpreter provided a quick answer directly in response to Tojo's request for clarification. The following is an example from the morning session of December 31, 1947. Onodera worked as monitor and Iwamoto, Taji and Shimanouchi worked as interpreters.

Keenan: We will pass to another subject for a moment. Did the United States have anything to do with Japan embarking upon its career in Manchuria in 1931?

Interpreter: *1931-nen Nihon ga Manshu ni okeru kodo o kaishisuru ni atatte Beikoku wa nanika soreni kankei arimashitaka?*

(Did the United States have anything to do with Japan embarking upon its activity in Manchuria in 1931?)

Tojo: *Eikoku desuka, Beikoku desuka?*

(The United Kingdom or the United States?)

Interpreter: *Beikoku, Amerika.*

(The United States, America.)

In the following example from the morning session of January 6, 1948, Keenan asks if he missed the interpretation and the interpreter responds without interpreting Keenan's remarks into Japanese. Oka, Taji, Shimanouchi and Mori worked as interpreters

and Itami worked as monitor.

Keenan: Was there something said by the witness that I didn't get the translation of? Perhaps the Court did.

Interpreter: The witness asked if another question had been asked.

In these instances, the interpreters were perhaps reacting instinctively or did not feel the need to defer to the monitor because they were dealing with simple questions that could be resolved with only a few words. There is nothing in the transcripts that suggests the court or the monitors disapproved of such behavior by the interpreters.

6.3.2. Recovering interrupted interpretation and interrupting to let the witness speak

When the interpreter was interrupted and missed an opportunity to interpret Tojo's answer in its entirety, the interpreter inserted the missed part in his next rendition. In the following example from the afternoon session of January 2, 1948, Tojo has no problem with the interpretation and starts giving an answer. Monitor Itami, however, interrupts Tojo's answer and gives his version of the interpretation of the pending question. The interpreter misses the opportunity to interpret. Tojo continues his answer. When the interpreter has a chance to interpret, he inserts the missed interpretation at the beginning of his rendition. Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji and Yamanaka worked as interpreters in this session.

Keenan: I am suggesting to you, Mr. TOJO, that it would be possible for things to be happening in Tokyo that you knew about and helped to plan without your being there. You will agree that was a possibility, will you not?

Interpreter: *Shikashi hitotsu no kanosei no mondai de arimasuga, anata ga Tokyo ni inakutemo Tokyo de okotte orukoto ni tsuite anata ga shitteta to iukoto wa oini ariurukoto da to iukoto o kiiteoru no de arimasuga, so dewa arimasenka?*

(But as a possible matter, isn't it true that it is quite possible that you knew what was happening in Tokyo even if you were not in Tokyo?)

Tojo: *Watashi niwa sozo dekimasen.*

(I can't imagine.)

Monitor (Itami): *Anata ga shitte orukoto de ari, soshite anata ga ritsuan moshikuwa keikaku no sokushin o enjoshita to iu yona dekgoto ni tsuite shitte orieta de aro to iu noga shitsumon de arimasu.*

(The question means that you could know it and you could know the matters you planned or helped promoting the plan.)

Tojo: *Oriemasen. Oriemasen to iukoto wa ima watashi ga itta tori.*

(It's impossible. It's impossible as I have just said.)

Interpreter: Just prior to the Japanese rendition, the witness said, "I cannot imagine." His last reply was, "I could not have known."

The interpreters' desire to render everything the witness says is apparent in the following example from the same session when the interpreter advised Keenan that the witness had more to say.

Tojo: *Sore wa sono tori. Tadashi...*

(That's right, but...)

Interpreter: Yes, as you say, but—

Keenan: You finally, in your affidavit, have referred to it as a war, have you not?

Interpreter: Before Mr. Prosecutor's question was put, the witness was just about to state his next answer.

Keenan: I question that, Language Section, or whoever is making that statement, but if the witness wishes to make some other statement I do not wish to cut him off. I am looking at him.

Since the interpreters were not supposed to speak on their own behalf, the number of this type of interjections by the interpreters was very small. In fact, after being challenged by Keenan in this instance, the interpreters never interrupted the speaker for the rest of Tojo's testimony.

6.3.3. *Explaining to the witness*

On a few occasions, the interpreter offered the witness explanations on procedural matters. In the following example, Keenan refers to a document in his question during the morning session on January 2, 1948. The interpreter interjects to warn about a possible confusion in the translation. Miyamoto worked as monitor, and Shimanouchi, Oka, Taji and Yamanaka worked as interpreters in this session.

Keenan: Now, I will ask you to refer to that document, exhibit 541—you have it there with you – “1. Basic Policy.” Will you look at that; and I want to call your particular attention to the second sentence. Have you read it?

Interpreter: *Dewa, anata no temoto ni aru sono shorui o mite kudasai. Sokoni 1. Konpon Hoshin to iu no ga arimasu. Soshite dai-2 banme no bunsho o tokuni chuishite mite kudasai. – Eigo no 2 banme no bunsho desukara atehamaranai kamo shiremasen. Yomimashitaka?*

(Now, please look at the document you have. There it contains “Basic Policy”. And please pay particular attention to the second passage. – It is the second passage in English, so it may not be relevant. - Did you read it?)

Tojo: *Yonde imasuyo.*
(I’m reading it.)

Interpreter: Yes, I am reading it. All right.

Keenan: Does it not say, as to basic policy, and I quote: “First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center.”

Interpreter: *Ko iu funi kaite arimasenka? “Mazu kokoku o kakushin to shi Nichi-Man-Shi no kyoko naru ketsugo o konpon to suru Daitoa no shin-chitsujo o kensetsusuru ni ari.”*

(Doesn’t it say, “First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center”?)

Tojo: *Sore wa arimasu. Chotto matte kudasai. Sore wa tashikani arimashita.*
(It’s here. Please wait a moment. It was certainly here.)

Interpreter: Yes—will you wait just a moment?

Interpreter: *Nihon-bun no 1-peji desu. 1. kihon-hoshin no naka desu.*
(It's the first page of the Japanese text. It's in "1. Basic Policy".)

Tojo: *Arimashita.*
(There it is.)

Interpreter: Yes, I have found it.

This type of help was offered by Monitor Itami in other sessions. In this particular session, the interpreters may have felt the need to step in because Monitor Miyamoto did not seem to bring this issue to Tojo's attention.

6.3.4. *Interpreters' reaction to erroneous correction by the monitors*

As previously discussed, during Tojo's testimony there were a number of instances in which the monitors rephrased seemingly error-free renditions of the interpreters or corrected interpretations erroneously. The transcripts and the available audio recordings indicate that the interpreters never objected to those interjections, with one exception. It took place in the morning session on January 2, 1948. Monitor Miyamoto makes an erroneous correction earlier in the session, changing the interpreter's word choice "*josei* (situation, developments)" to his choice "*tenkanki* (turning point)" as the Japanese translation for "the turn of events" (See pp. 116-117). The interpreter does not react. When Miyamoto interrupts the interpreter's rendition to make the same mistake for the second time, the interpreter interjects to correct Miyamoto's error.

Keenan: Well, the point of the question is that we are talking about the world being on the threshold of a stupendous historic change that affected the policy of Japan. Now, one of the reasons you have ascribed was the turn of events that took place in the European War. And you further stated, Mr. TOJO, that the fall of France about the 17th of June, 1940—

Interpreter: *Wareware ga ima hanashite iru koto wa, sunawachi sekai wa nihon no kokusaku ni eikyo o oyoboshita tokoro no rekishiteki ichidaitenki ni hochaku shiteiru to iu koto de arimashite, sono riyu no hitotsu to shite...*

(What we are discussing now is that the world was facing a historical, big turning point which affected the national policy of Japan, and one of the reasons was...

Monitor (Miyamoto): Oshu ni okeru tenkanki o riyu no hitotsu toshite anata wa agete orimasu.
(You cite the turning point in Europe as one of the reasons.)

Interpreter: Oshu no josei no suii ...
(The developments in the situation in Europe...)

The interpreter probably felt compelled to intervene and correct the monitor's error, given that Miyamoto was perceived as the youngest monitor with a poor command of Japanese.

6.3.5. Interpreters' behavior with different monitors

Table 2 is a summary of the interpreters' behavior. It does not contain what Watanabe (ibid.) calls "self-corrections" because they may have been prompted by the monitors' off-the-record whispered interjections. This summary contains nothing that may indicate interpreters behaving differently when they had different monitors. Their interaction with Tojo and other participants was minimal. Their interjections were mainly meant to help Tojo clearly understand the questions he was asked and the procedural matters that concerned him, and to guide him to the appropriate pages and passages of exhibits. The interpreters interrupted the proceedings to let Tojo complete his answers as well. They were diligent about providing full interpretation of Tojo's testimony. Whenever they missed the opportunity to interpret a part of or entire statement of Tojo, they tried to insert the missed interpretation at the beginning of the next rendition. The interpreters never objected to erroneous corrections or seemingly unnecessary rephrasing by the monitors, except the one occasion that was discussed above.

Table 2 Interpreters' behavior during Tojo's testimony (December 30, 1947- January 7, 1948)

Interpreters	Examiners defendant/country	Direct response		Explaining		Recovering missed interpretation	Interrupt to let Tojo speak
		To Tojo	To the count	To Tojo	To the court		
Sho Onodera							
12/30/47 PM	Masaki Oka Shimanouchi	Blewett (Tojo) Fuji (Hoshino) Howard (Kimura) Logan (Kido) Somiya (Oka)	1	0	0	0	0
12/31/47 AM	Iwamoto, Taji Shimanouchi	Logan, Keenan (US) Brannon (Shimada)	1	0	0	0	2
1/5/48 PM	Shimanouchi Oka, Mori	Keenan	0	0	1	0	0
1/6/48 PM	Oka, Mori Shimada Shimanouchi	Keenan Brakeney (Togo)	0	0	0	1	0
		Total	2	0	1	1	2
David Itami							
1/2/48 PM	Shimanouchi Shimada, Mori	Keenan	1	0	0	0	3
1/5/48 AM	Shimanouchi Oka Taji, Mori	Keenan	0	0	1	0	0
1/6/48 AM	Shimanouchi Mori Taji, Oka	Keenan	0	1	0	0	2
		Total	1	1	1	0	5
Lanny Miyamoto							
1/2/48 AM	Shimanouchi Oka Taji, Yamanaka	Keenan	0	1	2	0	1
1/7/48 AM	Shimanouchi Iwamoto, Mori, Taji	Blewett	0	1	0	0	0
		Total	0	2	2	0	1

6.4. *Language arbiter*

The transcripts reflect that during Tojo's testimony Captain Edward Kraft, the language arbiter, spoke on five language issues. Only one of them was addressed at the time the issue arose, but the other four were addressed four to sixteen days after the issues had been referred to the Language Arbitration Board. At the beginning of the afternoon session on January 2, 1948, for example, Kraft makes a correction of the transcript as follows.

Language Arbiter: If the Tribunal please, the following language correction is submitted: Reference page 35,600, line 10, delete "I heard what the contents of the telegram were about" and substitute "I asked what that telegram was about, for which..."

The sentence he refers to was part of the testimony by Yasumasa Matsudaira, a witness for the defense, on December 17, 1947. The monitor did not catch the error at that time. The defense may have found it in the transcripts and brought the issue to the Language Arbitration Board. The ruling was announced sixteen days later.

In the following example, at the beginning of the afternoon session on January 5, 1948, Kraft made a correction on the translation error for the Japanese word "*joshu* (assistant)" that was brought up by defense counsel during his examination of Tojo on December 30, 1947.

Language Arbiter: If the Tribunal, please, the following language correction is submitted: Reference: Record page 36,314, lines 7-9 and exhibit No. 3655, page 14, Item 82, lines 7-8. Delete: "In the first place, the Secretary-General of the Cabinet was to be chosen as my right-hand man" and substitute: "But because I needed an assistant, it was necessary for me first to choose the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet."

The issue with the translation of "*naiso*" was brought up on January 2, but the proceedings continued without a consensus on its correct translation. During another questioning on "*naiso*" in the following session on January 6, Kraft interjects as follows.

Language Arbiter: The word in question seems to be "*naiso*", which, literally translated, means

“informal recommendation.”

The Language Arbitration Board must have discussed this issue and decided on the correct translation during the recess. In the following example, in response to Tojo’s objection to the translation of “*taian*”, Kraft insists that the original translation was correct.

Language Arbiter: The word in question is “*hantai teian*.” It should be translated “counterproposal”.

Tojo pointed out the original Japanese word was “*taian*”. It was mistranslated as “counterproposal”, which was then back-translated to “*hantai teian*”. Kraft was not aware of this problem and believed that the original was “*hantai teian*”. He then offers another translation for “*hantai teian*”.

Language Arbiter: Correction: the former correction is “opposing proposal” instead of “counterproposal”. I am sorry; it was mistake.

This was not much different from the first translation, and did not convey the meaning of “*taian*” – which is more like “response”, based on Tojo’s explanation. Without a clear agreement reached among the parties, the court proceeded and Keenan moved on with a new question.

In the following example, on January 6, 1948, Tojo is asked about Pu-Yi and answers, “*watashi no fumei de arimasho*” about trusting Pu-Yi and being betrayed by him. It was interpreted as “It must have been my lack of virtue.” Defense counsel Blewitt objected to it. The matter was referred to Kraft.

Blewitt: If the Tribunal please, may I have that answer which refers to lack of virtue referred to the Language Section? I am informed by my associate counsel that it is not perfectly clear.

Keenan: I am suggesting to the President that it is not worthwhile to take the time of this court, but I suppose we will have to follow the ordinary rule.

President: It is referred accordingly. Captain Kraft.

Language Arbiter: The word in question is “fumei”; translated, “lack of insight”.

There is nothing in the transcripts to indicate how Kraft came up with “lack of insight” on the spot. There must have been a quick discussion on this issue within the Language Section personnel in the courtroom. It is not realistic to assume that Kraft, with one-year Japanese training, could by himself have come up with a translation of this classical Japanese word used by educated men.

6.5. Linguists' behavior with different arbiters

As previously mentioned, Kraft had had only one year of training in Japanese at MISLS and was probably incapable of fully understanding many utterances in Japanese in the courtroom, including Tojo's testimony, the interpreters' renditions and the monitors' interjections. It is now examined whether the interpreters and monitors behaved differently when Major Lardner Moore, who was fluent in Japanese, was the language arbiter. Tables 3 and 4 are summaries of the behavior of the monitors and interpreters during the interpreted testimonies of Sadao Araki (September 11, 12 and 15, 1947), several Japanese witnesses for the defense (September 15, 16 and 17, 1947) and Kingoro Hashimoto (September 18 and 19, 1947). In addition to the same interpreters and monitors who worked during Tojo's testimony, Naoshi Shimanouchi (Toshiro's younger brother) worked as an interpreter and Hidekazu Hayashi, who sporadically worked as a monitor, was on the monitor team during these sessions in September 1947.

Since these sessions had different witnesses, different teams of interpreters and different examining prosecutors and defense lawyers from those in Tojo's sessions, simple quantitative comparisons cannot be made between Tables 1 and 2, and Tables 3 and 4. It is clear, however, that there is nothing in Tables 3 and 4 distinctively different from Tables 1 and 2. Just as during Tojo's sessions, the monitors do not seem to be inhibited about providing explanations to the Japanese witnesses, seeking clarifications from the court participants, and rephrasing seemingly error-free English-to-Japanese interpretations and adding explanatory information.

Table 3 Monitors' behavior during testimonies of Japanese witnesses (September 11-19, 1947)

Monitors and witnesses	Interpreters	Examiners (defendant/country)	Error corrections		Rephrasing		Direct interactions		Interrupt & complete	
			E → J	J → E	E → J	J → E	w/ witness	w/ others	E → J	J → E
Sho Onodera										
9/11/47 PM Araki	Oka, Shimada Shimanouchi (N)	Blakeney (Togo) Comyns-Carr (UK)	5	0	6	0	1	1	0	0
9/12/47 AM Araki	Iwamoto, Taji Shimanouchi Yamanaka	Comyns-Carr	9	0	8	0	0	4	0	0
9/17/47 PM Kuwashima, Yazaki, Watase, Hattori	Shimanouchi Oka Mori	Nyi (China) Warren (Doihara) Ivanov (USSR)	14	0	10	0	1	0	1	0
Total (average per session)			28 (9.3)	0	24 (8)	0	2 (0.7)	5 (1.7)	1 (0.3)	0
David Itami										
9/11/47 AM Araki	Shimanouchi Shimada, Mori	McManus (Araki)	10	0	3	0	0	2	0	0
9/16/47 PM Aizawa	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji, Mori	Warren Nyi	5	1	5	0	0	5	2	1
9/17/47 AM Aizawa, Shibayama, Kuwashima	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji, Mori	Nyi Warren Brooks (Minami)	11	1	9	1	4	7	1	0
9/19/47 AM Hashimoto, Ugaki, Miyano		Taverner (US) Hayashi (Hashimoto) Kanzaki (Hata)	5	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
Total (average per session)			31 (7.8)	4 (0.5)	19 (4.8)	1 (0.3)	4 (1)	15 (3.8)	3 (0.8)	1 (0.3)
Lanny Miyamoto										
9/15/47 PM Masaki, Omori, Todoroki, Nakamura, Arita, Ishiwata	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji Yamanaka	Comyns-Carr McManus (Araki)	10	1	8	0	2	0	2	0
9/16/47 AM Iimura, Iwamatsu, Yokomizo, Matsumoto Takamura, Tomita, Nakajima, Matsuyama,	Shimanouchi Iwamoto, Mori, Taji	Sugawara (Araki) Brown (US)	8	1	6	0	0	0	1	1
Total (average per session)			18 (9)	2 (1)	14 (7)	0	2 (1)	0	3 (1.5)	1 (0.5)

Table 4 Interpreters' behavior during the testimonies of Japanese witnesses (September 11-19, 1947)

Monitors and witnesses	Interpreters	Examiners defendant/country	Direct response		Explaining		Recovering missed interpretation	Interrupt to let Tojo speak
			To Tojo	To the count	To Tojo	To the court		
Sho Onodera								
9/11/47 PM Araki	Oka, Shimada Shimanouchi (N)	Blakeney (Togo) Comyns-Carr (UK)	0	1	0	0	0	0
9/12/47 AM Araki	Iwamoto, Taji Shimanouchi Yamanaka	Comyns-Carr	1	0	0	0	1	0
9/17/47 PM Kuwashima, Yazaki, Watase, Hattori	Shimanouchi Oka Mori	Nyi (China) Warren (Doihara) Ivanov (USSR)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total			1	1	0	0	1	0
David Itami								
9/11/47 AM Araki	Shimanouchi Shimada, Mori	McManus (Araki)	0	0	0	0	0	0
9/16/47 PM Aizawa	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji Mori	Warren Nyi	0	0	0	0	0	0
9/17/47 AM Aizawa, Shibayama, Kuwashima	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji Mori	Nyi Warren Brooks (Minami)	0	0	0	0	3	0
9/19/47 AM Hashimoto, Ugaki, Miyano		Taverner (US) Hayashi (Hashimoto) Kanzaki (Hata)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total			0	0	0	0	3	0
Lanny Miyamoto								
9/15/47 PM Masaki, Omori, Todoroki, Nakamura, Arita, Ishiwata	Shimanouchi Oka, Taji Yamanaka	Comyns-Carr (UK) McManus (Araki)	0	0	0	0	0	0
9/16/47 AM Iimura, Iwamatsu, Yokomizo, Matsumoto Takamura, Tomita, Nakajima, Matsuyama,	Shimanouchi Iwamoto, Mori Taji	Sugawara (Araki) Brown (US)	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total			0	0	0	0	1	0

For instance, in the morning session of September 17, 1947, Monitor Itami directly responds to a question by President Webb, and explains this exchange in English to the

witness, Kenshiro Shibayama (a witness for defendant Kenji Dohihara), in order to keep him informed of the situation.

Brooks (defense counsel): Now, Mr. Witness, when, where and why did you call on General MINAMI?

Shibayama (through interpreter): ... In my recollection, the time was, if I am not mistaken, the night of the 19th of June...

President: Surely not in June.

Shibayama (through interpreter): I was mistaken; September 19th.

President: But he said June. It wasn't a mistranslation, was it?

Interpreter: *Saisho ni wa 6-gatsu to iimashita ga, sore wa honyaku no ayamari de wa nakatta desho ne.*

(You said June first, but wasn't it an error with the translation?)

Monitor (Itami): It was not a mistranslation.

Monitor (Itami): *Sodewa arimasen to henji shimashita.*

(I answered that it was not the case.)

In the example below from the morning session of September 19, 1947, Monitor Itami actively engages with the examining American prosecutor, Frank Tavenner, to help the interpreter find the pertinent document and page, and asks the court reporter to repeat his question at the end in order to assist the interpreter to get back with his task. The witness is defendant Kingoro Hashimoto.

Tavenner: There will be pointed out to you that part of the exhibit beginning with the question: "You published a book, did you not, or were you author of it, entitled 'Inevitability of the Renovation'?"

Monitor (Itami): What page is this, Mr. Tavenner?

Tavener: Page 15,687 of the transcript. If I may say to the Language Section, it is on page 6 of the English; that is, the English copy of the exhibit.

Monitor (Itami): Thank you. Mr. Tavener, does your assistant have the page in Japanese? It will be easier for us to find the page that way.

Tavener: Page 12 of the Japanese translation.

Monitor (Itami): Thank you, sir.

Tavener: I am not going to read it, so it is not necessary for you, probably, to look it up.

Monitor (Itami): Will you repeat Mr. Tavener's question, please?

[Whereupon, the question was read by the official court reporter as follows: ...]

The following example shows that Monitor Onodera rephrases the interpreter's seemingly error-free rendition into Japanese and adds an explanation, presumably to help the witness fully understand the question. This is from the afternoon session of September 17, 1947. The original utterance is a question by Chinese prosecutor Nyi. The witness was Kanju Yazaki, testifying on behalf of defendant Dohihara. Iwamoto, Shimanouchi (Toshiro) and Taji worked as interpreters during the session.

Nyi: Do you know that not long after he wrote you the letter which you refer to in your affidavit General DOHIHARA was summoned back to Japan and he was given an important assignment to head a Kikan or an organ called the DOHIHARA Organ to work for the withdrawal of Chinese Generals from current hostilities?

Interpreter: *Anata wa konokoto o shitte orimashitaka. Anata ga sensei-kojutsusho ni oite nobeta tegami o, anata ga juryoshita ato ni, Dohihara shogun wa nihon ni yobikaesarete, soshite hijona juyona chii o ataerareta no desu. Kono chii wa Dohihara-kikancho to iu chii de arimashite, kare no ninmu wa shina ni okeru shina no shoukan-ren o kijun seshimeru koto de atta node arimasu.*

(Do you know this? After you received the letter you mentioned in your affidavit, General Dohihara was summoned back to Japan and given a very important position. This position is called Dohihara Kikancho, and his assignment was to make the Chinese officers in China stop

engaging in hostilities.)

Monitor (Onodera): *Kijun saseru, aruiwa senjo kara tettai saseru. Tsumari senso o sasenai yoni suru to iu ninmu.*

(To make them stop engaging in hostilities, or make them withdraw from the battlefields. In other words, an assignment to make them not engage in war.)

Although it was very infrequent, the transcripts indicate that the interpreters also spoke on their own behalf to seek clarification and to direct Japanese witnesses to the pertinent pages and paragraphs of exhibits. In the following example, during the afternoon session of September 11, 1946, the interpreter asks the court reporter to repeat the question without deferring to Monitor Onodera. The examining prosecutor was Arthur Comyns-Carr from the United Kingdom. Oka, Shimada, Shimanouchi (Naoshi) worked as interpreters.

Comyns-Carr: Do you say that whatever was done and decided at that time when you first – soon after you took office, was not concerned with all of the Four Eastern Provinces?

Interpreter: Will the reporter please repeat the question?

During the afternoon session of September 18, 1946, Monitor Hidekazu Hayashi and the interpreter jointly assist Hashimoto in finding the passage relevant to the question asked by Prosecutor Tavenner. During this session, Mori, Shimanouchi (Naoshi) and Shimada worked as interpreters.

Tavenner: The reference, if the Tribunal please, to that excerpt, is on page 15,678 of the transcript beginning with the words “Do you know anything about the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?” and extending down to the question, “You belong to the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai?”

[Whereupon, the witness was shown a place in the document before him.]

Interpreter: *Tadaima no bassui ga genkyu shiteorimasu no wa, hotei-kiroku o goran ni nareba sono 15678 peji ni arimasu. Do-peji no shimai yori no 4-gyome kara, tsugi no peji no ue yori 4-gyome made, tsugini shiteki shitai bubun wa, hotei-kiroku 15675 peji no shitumon-oto de*

arimasuga, toa-kyoei-ken ni tsuite nanika shitte iruka to iu tokoro kara hajimarimasu. Sorekara anata wa dai-nippon-sekisei-kai no kaiin desuka, to iu tokoromade.

(What this excerpt refers to on page 15678 if you see the court transcript. From the fourth line from the bottom on that page to the fourth line from the top on the following page; what I want to point to next is the questions and answers on page 15675 of the court transcript, and it starts from “do you know anything about the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?” From there to “are you a member of Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai?”)

Monitor (Hayashi): *Nihon-bun dai-2-pe-ji no mannaka no ho desu. Hitotsu maru ga tsuite iru tokoro no sugu shita, sorekara sono tsugi no peji no onaji maru ga itsutsu tsuite iru tokoro no sugu shita.*

(It is about the middle of the second page of the Japanese text. Right below the part with one circle, then right below the part with five of those same circles on the following page.)

Hashimoto: *So ittemo chotto wakaranai na.*

(Even if you say so, I have hard time finding it.)

Interpreter: *Yomimasu to anata wa dai-toa-kyoei-ken nit suite, nanika shitte imasuka. Soshite saigo wa anata wa dai-nippon-sekiseikai ni zokushite imasune.*

(If I read it, “do you know anything about the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?” Then, the last is “you belong to the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai, don’t you?”)

Hashimoto: Tsumari to iu tokoro made desuka.

(Up to “*tsumari* (in other words)”?)

Monitor (Hayashi): *Sorega shaisho de, sono tsugi no wa sono tsugi no peji ni natte orimasu.*

(That’s the first one, and the next one is on the following page.)

As illustrated above, the monitors and the interpreters do not seem to have behaved differently when Moore was language arbiter than they did during Tojo’s sessions with Kraft as arbiter. Despite his proficiency in Japanese, Moore never interfered with the interjections by the monitors and interpreters. The only activities he engaged in, as reflected in the transcripts during the sessions from September 11 to September 17, were the announcements of rulings of the Language Arbitration Board on language disputes that had been brought before the board in previous sessions. The only exception to this was when Moore interjected to provide clarification to the court about the

interpreter's renditions. In that instance, during the afternoon session of September 12, 1947, Prosecutor Comyns-Carr seeks clarification on the interpretation of an answer by Araki, the interpreter responds, and then Moore adds an explanation for the court. Shimada, Shimanouchi (Toshiro) and Yamanaka worked as interpreters.

Comyns-Carr: Now, would you look, General, at page 118 of the book which you have seen before? Let this gentleman find the page for you. Are you there using these words – please read, Language Division, from document 2406, page 118 – “It must be, at present, the first resolution toward the Manchurian questions to let Europe and America understand the existence of a spirit whereby we shall push ahead by brushing everything aside, in the event of anyone laying obstacles in our way”?

Araki: *Kaite arimasu.*
(It is so written.)

Interpreter: Yes.

Comyns-Carr: And, then, please turn to page 21 of the book. Did you there say this: “Various countries of the Far East have been the objects of oppression by white races. The awakened Imperial country, Japan, cannot tolerate their high-handedness anymore. It is the duty of the Imperial Japan resolutely to oppose the action of any power, so long as it is against the Imperial policy”?

Araki: *Kaite aru.*
(It is so written.)

Interpreter: It is so written.

Comyns Carr: Did he say, “It is so written”?

Interpreter: Yes, sir.

Language Arbiter (Moore): Mr. President, the answer to the former question came through as “Yes.” It should have been, as this one, “It is written there.”

President: Thank you, Major.

Although Moore played an active role during the initial stage of the trial as discussed in detail in Chapter 6, his engagement with the court proceedings during his last days of duty as language arbiter was minimal. To the extent it is reflected in the transcripts, there is no indication of the monitors and interpreters behaving differently with Moore as language arbiter than with Kraft as language arbiter. The transcripts also suggest that Moore never tried to deter the interpreters and monitors from engaging in any particular behavior.

6.6. The behavior of the linguists and their positions in the hierarchy

Through examination of the interpreted testimony of Hideki Tojo at the IMTFE, some characteristics of the behavior of the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process have been identified. The behavior of the linguists is now analyzed in relation to their positions in the hierarchy of the interpreting process. The findings in this analysis are then examined to determine if they support the present study's hypothesis that links interpreters' behavior to their awareness of where they stand in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate.

6.6.1. Analysis of the behavior of the linguists

The interpreters were at the bottom of the hierarchy in the Language Section at the IMTFE. As examined in detail in Chapter 5, the tribunal resorted to using Japanese nationals despite its preference for Americans since it could not find competent American interpreters. To deter these Japanese interpreters from engaging in anything "in bad faith" and to maintain the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge, the tribunal established a system in which Japanese Americans monitored the interpreters' performance, while the Language Arbitration Board led by a U.S. military officer ruled on language disputes. As indicated in Shimada's interview (*ibid.*: 34), the interpreters were fully aware of these circumstances.

The examination above shows that the interpreters kept the instances of speaking on their own behalf to a minimum and did not object to the monitors' seemingly

unnecessary rephrasing or erroneous attempts of correction. This behavior can be explained by the interpreters' position in the hierarchy of the linguists. Although there is no written rule found in the archival records that prohibited the interpreters from speaking on their own behalf during the proceedings, the interviews with Oka (*ibid.*) and Shimada (*ibid.*) confirm that in principle they were not allowed to overstep the hierarchal boundaries to provide any input other than the actual interpretation. Shimada (*ibid.*: 21, 23) claims that the interpreters were much more competent than the monitors, that the monitors, excluding Itami, were not competent enough to correct interpreting errors, and that the monitors actually depended on the interpreters. The interpreters, however, probably felt that they were not in a position to protest against or complain about the monitors' undue interjections. Shimada (*ibid.*: 23, 25) compares the relation of the interpreter and the monitor to a race horse and a jockey, implying that the interpreter (the horse) couldn't stop the monitor (the jockey) to tell him that his direction was wrong.

Occasionally, the interpreters provided a quick answer directly in response to the witness or other court participants who requested clarification of the interpretation. All of these instances involved simple questions, and the interpreters probably did not feel the need to defer to the monitor. There is no indication in the transcripts or the audio records that the tribunal disapproved of such actions by the interpreters. In addition, although the number of instances is small, the interpreters interjected to offer the witness explanations on procedural matters, mainly concerning exhibits and their translations. These actions indicate the interpreters' desire to keep Tojo informed of the courtroom situation. They also tried to ensure that Tojo's statements were fully interpreted. Whenever the interpreter missed an opportunity to interpret Tojo's answer in its entirety, the interpreter inserted the missed interpretation in his next rendition. The interpreters' efforts to render everything Tojo said are apparent. Further, the few instances in which the interpreters stopped the speaker indicate their eagerness to let Tojo complete his remarks. All these observations suggest that whatever views the individual interpreters may have had of Tojo, they seem to have made efforts to put him on an equal footing with the court participants who understood English.

Overall, the interpreters do not seem to have behaved differently when they had different monitors (with different ages and proficiency levels in Japanese) or different

language arbiters (with different proficiency levels in Japanese). No matter who was assigned to a given session as monitor or language arbiter, the interpreters were aware that he was supervising them and they had to show him due deference. As discussed earlier, the only instance in which they acted against the monitor was when the interpreter corrected an erroneous correction made repeatedly by Monitor Miyamoto. The interpreter probably felt compelled to step in, out of his sense of ethics or professionalism, so that Tojo would not get confused by Miyamoto's incorrect correction.

The monitors were positioned in the middle tier of the hierarchy in the Language Section. As reflected in the transcripts and interviews with Shimada and Oka, their main task was to monitor and supervise the Japanese interpreters who were at the bottom of the hierarchy. The monitors were supervised by the chief of the Language Section as shown in the IMTFE organizational charts and documents. Considering that the language arbiter, and not the monitors, had the authority to make final rulings on language issues, the monitors were presumably positioned below the arbiter in the hierarchy.

Although the functions of the monitors are not clearly defined in the IMTFE official documents, the transcripts and audio records of the trial indicate that their main duty was to monitor the interpreters' performance and correct interpreting errors. This seems to be what the tribunal expected of the monitors as well. For example, there is a report prepared by a U.S. military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hornaday (n.d.), that describes the issues the IPS faced during the trial, and refers to interpreting as "the biggest single problem for IPS & IMT." It goes on to say, "Jap [sic] nationals unsatisfactory unless monitored (Handicap, lack of knowledge of English)" and "U.S. Niseis [sic] unsatisfactory. Handicap – lack of knowledge of Japanese." This document suggests that the tribunal did not have confidence in the Japanese interpreters and expected the *Nisei* monitors to compensate for the interpreters' deficiencies.

As discussed above, the monitors did check the interpretation and corrected whatever errors they spotted. Watanabe (ibid.) argues that the interpreters and the monitors functioned as a team, which contributed to a higher level of accuracy in the interpretation. Shimada (ibid.: 23) refers to the aspect of team efforts as well by citing the fact that the monitors helped the interpreters by taking notes for numbers. Although there were instances in which the monitors missed interpreting errors or made erroneous

corrections, the monitors did, insomuch as they could, fulfill the role that the tribunal (as the commissioner and user of the interpreted event) had presumably expected them to play – to be checkers of the accuracy of interpretation.

The poor assessment of the interpreters' performance in Hornaday's report, however, could have been based on his perception of what may have been going on in the interpreting booth, rather than being based on the reality of the situation. The monitors' behavior summarized in Table 1 indicate that more than 90% of the interjections the monitors engaged in to correct errors, rephrase the interpreters' renditions, and interrupt the interpreters and complete their renditions took place in response to interpretations from English into Japanese and the interjections were delivered in Japanese. Considering the fact that none of the people who supervised the monitors during Tojo's testimony had a good command of Japanese, the tribunal may have had the impression that the monitors were busy correcting the interpreters' errors, therefore satisfying its expectations, without actually understanding the appropriateness and effectiveness of those corrections. Shimada (*ibid.*: 21) confirms that the tribunal was not aware of issues with the monitors due to its lack of command of the Japanese language and it believed that the monitors were effectively supervising the interpreters.

There are several possible reasons why most of the monitors' interjections were in response to interpretations from English into Japanese. Watanabe (*ibid.*: 55) points to the difficulty the interpreters probably experienced in understanding courtroom language in English and coming up with the Japanese equivalent. This is a plausible explanation. On the one hand, the Japanese interpreters may have had difficulty with legal terms and language style specific to courtroom proceedings in English, but they presumably had a complete comprehension of utterances in Japanese. On the other hand, the *Nisei* monitors may have struggled to understand Japanese terms and language styles specific to the Japanese military and imperial court system, but they presumably had a full comprehension of utterances in English. This fact that the monitors probably had a better understanding of the source language when it was English may explain why most of their interjections were for English-to-Japanese interpretations. Without understanding the source language, there would be no way of "correcting interpreting errors".

There is another possible reason for the monitors' self-restraint when it came to interpreting into English. When an interjection was uttered in English in response to Japanese-to-English interpretation, the tribunal could understand and compare the original interpretation by the interpreter and the monitor's version. Concerned about the speed of the proceedings, which is mentioned in the transcripts and a number of archival records, the tribunal probably did not have the patience to listen to two versions of interpretation unless they were significantly different. Being sensitive to their employer's needs, the monitors may have been more disciplined and selective when they interjected in English. This aspect of court interpreters' behavior is also reported in Hale's survey (2004: 233). One of her respondents pointed to "time constraints and an impatient response by counsel and magistrates/judges" as a factor to be considered in analyzing the performance of court interpreters.

Lastly, many of the monitors' interjections directed to English-to-Japanese interpretations can be attributable to their eagerness to help Tojo and their awareness that none of their supervisors fully understood the nature of their interjections in Japanese. As illustrated in the examples above, the monitors tried to make sure that Tojo fully understood the questions he was asked by rephrasing the interpreters' renditions and adding explanatory remarks when they felt he might have trouble understanding. Regardless of their ethical views or opinions on Tojo, it is clear that they tried to assist him to overcome not only the language barrier but also the culture barrier stemming from the Anglo-U.S. legal system so that he would not be placed in a disadvantageous position during the trial. Being aware that neither the language arbiter nor the chief of the Language Section during Tojo's testimony had a good command of Japanese, the monitors probably did not feel very inhibited about assisting Tojo in Japanese. This can be seen as an example of interpreters, monitors in this case, exerting their power as the party who monopolizes and controls the communication means (Anderson 1976: 218-221).

As for the possible reasons for seemingly unnecessary interjections, whether in Japanese or English, it could be that a given interpretation was delivered in such a way that it did not sound "quite right" to the monitor, who then jumped in to offer his version of rendition. As Gile's experiment (1999) suggests, the quality assessment of interpreting

varies depending on whether the data is presented in the audio form or in transcription. Even if an interpretation by the interpreter “looks” fine and error-free in the transcription, it may have “sounded” problematic to the monitor. Without the audio records, it is not feasible to determine what element in the original interpretation, whether it was intonation, hesitation or pause, may have prompted the monitor to redo the interpreter’s rendition.

In addition, these seemingly unnecessary interjections may simply be attributable to the monitors’ insufficient capacity to quickly and accurately evaluate the interpreters’ performance. The data in Table 1 shows that the average number of rephrasing interjections (mostly for English-to-Japanese interpretations) per session was 6, 8.5 and 15 for Itami, Onodera and Miyamoto, respectively. With his appreciation of the variety of lexical and semantic usage of the Japanese language based on his 17 years of education in Japan, Itami was probably better equipped than other monitors to accept the wide range of word choices and language styles rendered in Japanese by the interpreters. The fact that Miyamoto, who had the weakest command of Japanese, rephrased the interpreters’ renditions far more frequently than other monitors, and that Itami did so least frequently of all the monitors, may support the argument that these seemingly unwarranted interjections occurred partly due to the limitations in the monitors’ knowledge of Japanese language usage and vocabulary.

This aspect of the monitors’ competency also leads to another possible reason for the seemingly unnecessary interjections: the monitors’ eagerness to demonstrate their own active involvement in the interpreting process. This is especially applicable in the case of Miyamoto. The fact that Miyamoto was eager to jump in to present his own version of renditions could be explained by his desire to prove that he was a functioning monitor despite his youth and his weak Japanese. The Language Division and the tribunal were not capable of assessing his interjections in Japanese and they may have thought that he was busy correcting the poor renditions by the interpreters. The same type of phenomenon is also reported in Takeda’s survey (2005) of Japanese interpreters who work in litigation in the United States at the present time. A respondent of the survey reveals that check interpreters, who are routinely hired to check the accuracy of the interpretation of the official interpreter in corporate litigation settings, sometimes

interject to comment on trivial points in the interpreter's rendition just to give the appearance to their client that they are working, and therefore needed.

In addition to correcting interpreting errors, rephrasing interpreters' renditions, and interrupting the interpreters and completing their renditions, the monitors directly interacted with Tojo and other court participants during his testimony. They responded to questions asked by Tojo, the president and the examining counsel, and asked them for clarifications concerning their remarks and procedural matters, presumably on behalf of the interpreters who were not supposed to speak on their own behalf. The monitors also functioned as communication coordinators during the court proceedings by interrupting the examining counsel to let Tojo complete his remarks, asking Tojo to break down his remarks in shorter segments, requesting the court reporters to read out the records to assist the interpreters when they missed the original remarks, directing Tojo and the court to appropriate pages and passages in translated exhibits, and providing explanations on interpreting issues to Tojo and the court.

All these activities by the monitors were hardly ever observed in the initial stage of the trial, when Language Arbiter Moore played a major role in being a "spokesperson" for the interpreters and explaining interpreting issues to the court, as examined in Chapter 5. Once the procedural issues in interpreting were addressed, however, Moore seems to have become less active and let the monitors handle almost all the in-court interpreting issues, as indicated in the examination of the sessions in September 1947. During Tojo's testimony, however, with Kraft as language arbiter, the monitors may have felt even more responsible for addressing language issues as they were the only people in the supervisory positions of the Language Section with Japanese proficiency. This overall situation saw a number of direct interactions with Tojo and the other court participants. No evidence is found in the transcripts or in the available audio to suggest that the tribunal took issue with such behavior on the part of the monitors.

Among these direct interactions with Tojo and other court participants, the explanations the monitors provided to Tojo seem to have gone beyond the scope of their presumed role as checkers of the accuracy of interpretation. As discussed above, some explanatory information added by the monitors sounded almost like advice to Tojo. Again, the monitors' behavior in this regard was probably driven by their awareness that

neither the chief of the Language Section nor the language arbiter had a full command of Japanese and by their eagerness to help Tojo understand the questions. An attempt to link the monitors' behavior to their personal ethical views, sympathy toward the former leader of their parents' country, and respect for Tojo's honorable attitude in the court proceedings would go nowhere without supporting evidence. The question why the interpreters and monitors tried to help Tojo has gone unanswered by either of the two surviving interpreters (Oka and Shimada), possibly out of concern about political implications their response may have. It would also fall in the realm of speculation to suggest that Caucasian military officers would have never behaved in the same way as the *Nisei* monitors in assisting Tojo.

As for the behavior of the individual monitors, Miyamoto was very active in rephrasing the interpreters' renditions and interrupting the interpreters to complete their renditions. Almost all of his interjections were for English-to-Japanese interpretations and were delivered in Japanese. As mentioned above, these types of behavior are most probably related to his language competency and youth.

Itami's interjections sometimes seem to have gone beyond the scope of his job. His efforts to help Tojo understand the questions are apparent in the transcripts. Kinashi (1985: 112) claims in his biography of his friend, Itami, that Itami assisted Tojo as much as he could in his capacity as monitor because he could see through Tojo's quality as a sincere soldier. Kinashi (*ibid.*:120) also states that Itami took his job as monitor very seriously because of his awareness of the consequences that interpreting errors could have, and that Itami also questioned the validity of the IMTFE itself. According to Kinashi, Itami was very distressed about the mistranslation of the title of defendant Koki Hirota and its possible link to his death sentence (see pp 68-69). There is no other material available that supports Kinashi's views of Itami, but Itami's daughter, Michi (in Otake 2005), recalls that Itami suffered emotionally from the strains of the trial and had a nervous breakdown. Nothing in the transcripts and audio records suggests that the stress Itami may have felt affected his behavior during Tojo's testimony. No information has been found in official documents to indicate that the Language Section was concerned about Itami's mental health or his behavior.

Onodera did not seem to engage in any type of activity in an excessive manner. His performance at the IMTFE may have led him to interpreting assignments at subsequent “B/C Class” war crimes trials. Onodera is the only monitor who is referred to as a court interpreter of those trials in a number of documents (e.g. Shimanouchi 1973, MISLS Registry).

Despite his top position in the hierarchy of the interpreting process as language arbiter, Captain Kraft did not seem to have a significant impact on the court proceedings themselves. According to Moore (1980), Kraft “had his own ideas about what’s to be done” during the Language Arbitration Board’s deliberations on language disputes. In the courtroom, however, due to his limited Japanese capability, he was probably not aware of the nature of the interjections in Japanese made by the monitors and the interpreters, and could not intervene in any of their activities. He was a “figure head” (Kawamoto 2005) and was basically reporting the rulings of the Language Arbitration Board to the court. This is in contrast to Moore’s active engagement with the court as discussed in Chapter 5. Based on the interviews and documents reviewed so far, it appears that, during Tojo’s testimony, the higher a person was in the linguist hierarchy, the less competent that person was in his second language. The tribunal, however, still kept turning to the language arbiter for disputed translations and interpretations.

6.6.2. Linguists’ behavior and the power constellation

In the analysis above, some features of the behavior of the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process during Tojo’s testimony at the IMTFE were identified in relation to their positions in the hierarchy of the interpreting organization. Some of the findings in the analysis support the hypothesis of the present study: interpreters’ awareness of their positions in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate affects their choices, strategies and behavior in interpreting.

Being aware of their position at the bottom of the hierarchy, the Japanese interpreters kept the instances of speaking on their own behalf while on the record to a minimum. Although they felt that not all the monitors were competent enough to be checking their performance (Shimada *ibid.*; Oka *ibid.*), they did not object on the record to the seemingly unnecessary interjections or erroneous corrections by the monitors who

were positioned above in the hierarchy as their supervisors. The interpreters were aware of the political aspect of the monitoring system, which arose from the tribunal's aversion to the appearance of depending on citizens of the defeated nation (Shimada *ibid.*, Oka *ibid.*), and they did not wish to disrupt the system that the tribunal, as their commissioner and user, had established. The only exception to the interpreters' submissive behavior was when Monitor Miyamoto made the same erroneous correction twice and the interpreter interjected to correct the error.

Although the number of incidents was very small, the interpreters did interact directly with Tojo and the other participants to respond to their questions and help them understand about the interpreting and procedural issues. Those exchanges were quick and concise, and probably within the scope of what was tolerated by their supervisor. The interpreters must have learned on the job over the course of the proceedings, through the interactions with the other court participants, to what extent they were allowed to engage in such activity. On a couple of occasions, they interrupted the speaker to let Tojo complete his remarks. This type of actions was probably driven by their eagerness to ensure that Tojo had fair opportunity to speak for himself, but may have been perceived by certain court participants as inappropriate. As examined above, on one occasion Prosecutor Keenan questioned the interpreter's comments that Tojo had more to say. This challenge by Keenan may have deterred the interpreters from interrupting the speaker again. There were no more incidents of interpreters stopping the speaker in the remaining sessions of Tojo's testimony.

The behavior of the monitors also seems to have been affected by their awareness of where they stood in the power constellation of the IMTFE. The monitors' seemingly unnecessary interjections in Japanese can be explained partly by their eagerness to display their authority as the interpreters' supervisors. This was especially the case with Monitor Miyamoto who may have felt insecure about how his youth and his weak Japanese were viewed by the Japanese interpreters who were mostly mature, elite government officials. To the interpreters, the monitors' frequent interjections would be a reminder of their power relations. To the tribunal, without understanding the content of such interjections in Japanese, the appearance that the monitors were frequently correcting the interpreters' renditions would validate its assumption that the Japanese

interpreters were not trustworthy and that their work had to be monitored by people from their own “camp”.

One of the reasons for the much lower frequency of interjections in English can be the monitors’ self-control in deference to the needs of the tribunal. The tribunal was concerned about the speed of the proceedings being delayed by interpreting and language disputes. It did not have the ability to understand the interjections in Japanese, but it could tell the difference in the interpreters’ renditions and the monitors’ versions if they were in English. Therefore, the monitors probably did not wish to irritate the tribunal by excessively interjecting in English, and restrained themselves from making insignificant corrections in response to Japanese-to-English interpretations.

Language Arbiter Kraft does not seem to have impacted the court proceedings. As the person positioned at the top of the interpreting hierarchy, any language disputes that arose during the proceedings were referred to Kraft. As discussed before, he was a “figure head” who did not have the capability of spontaneously engaging in discussions on language issues on the record due to his weak command of Japanese. He simply announced the decisions of the Language Arbitration Board as needed. The presence of Kraft, a Caucasian military officer, near the prosecutors’ team and far from the interpreters’ booth, and his announcements of the rulings of the Language Arbitration Board in court must have contributed to the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge of the court proceedings of the IMTFE.

Although these findings seem to support the hypothesis that points to the interpreters’ position in the power relations as a factor in their behavior, there are other elements in the linguists’ behavior during Tojo’s testimony that are not directly related to their positions in the hierarchy of the interpreting process. Most notable may be the fact that regardless of their different positions in the hierarchy, both the interpreters and the monitors tried to ensure that Tojo received fair treatment from the language perspective. An examination of what may have motivated them to assist Tojo would probably call for attention to their personal ethical views and professionalism, and their opinions on Tojo and the validity of the IMTFE itself. With just two surviving interpreters, who seem hesitant to provide clear answers on this subject, this would be a challenging endeavor.

In summary, the present case study has provided evidence to support the hypothesis that links the interpreters' behavior to their relative position in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate. At the bottom of the hierarchy in the interpreting process at the IMTFE, the Japanese interpreters kept the instances of speaking on their own behalf to a minimum and almost never objected to the monitors' erroneous corrections or seemingly unnecessary rephrasing of their own renditions. The monitors being in the middle tier of the interpreting hierarchy, their seemingly excessive interjections in Japanese can be explained as a display of authority to the Japanese interpreters and as a way of ensuring the tribunal that they were working effectively to correct errors committed by the interpreters, even though the tribunal did not understand the nature of their interjections in Japanese. The much lower frequency of monitors' interjections in English can be attributed to their consideration for the needs of their employer – the tribunal. Concerned about the speed of the court proceedings, the tribunal probably did not have the patience to listen to and consider two versions of interpretation unless there was a material difference between the two. The monitors may have refrained from excessively interjecting in English to avoid irritating the tribunal. The transcript shows practically no instances of spontaneous activity by Language Arbiter Kraft, with his limited command of the Japanese language. His presence on the floor of the courtroom and official announcements of rulings on language disputes, however, must have enhanced the appearance of the U.S. military being in charge of the entire court procedures, including those for language needs.

7. Reflections on today's context

The present study has examined the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE and analyzed the behavior of the linguists during the testimonies of Japanese witnesses. It now briefly reflects the relevance of this study to issues of today's world. This exercise is in response to Pym's call (1998a: x) for "the priority of the present". Pym (ibid.) argues that "[w]e do translation history in order to express, address and try to solve problems affecting our own situation", and "the past is an object that must be made to respond to our questions, indicating categories and potential solutions that we had not previously thought of." In line with this principle in the study of translation history, the present research attempts in this chapter to take up questions of the current situation. The focus is placed on two important aspects of interpreting at the IMTFE to address some interpreting issues of the present time. One is the complex and ambiguous position of *Nisei* linguists, described as "in-between", "doubleness" or "duplicity" in the sociological model of interpreting. The role of heritage languages used in war and government policy for recruiting interpreters in times of conflict are discussed to reflect on the situations of linguists in U.S. military settings in the context of the current "global war on terror". The issues of trust, power and control in interpreting are also discussed. The other is the norm-building process observed in the interpreting procedures during the initial stage of the IMTFE. It is examined whether the interactional aspect of norm development can be found in the context of present-day courtroom interpreting. The efforts of different parties, including court interpreters, court administrators and attorneys, to address the issues of court interpreting are reviewed, and the interactions between those parties in the negotiation of interpreting arrangements are analyzed.

7.1. War and interpreters

In Chapter 6, the complex and ambiguous standing of *Nisei* linguists was examined as being neither "autonomous" nor "heteronomous". They were born in the United States to Japanese immigrants. Despite being American citizens, they were forcibly relocated to internment camps as "enemy aliens" because their parents came from the country which

attacked Pearl Harbor. In need of Japanese translators and interpreters for military intelligence, the U.S. Army recruited *Nisei* from the camps to train at its Japanese language school and sent them to various theaters of war while keeping their families and friends in the camps. The heritage language for these *Nisei* linguists was the means to escape the incarceration in the camps and offered an opportunity for them to prove their loyalty to the land of their birth.

Nisei linguists used their heritage language in the fight against the homeland of their parents, yet did this for the same government that had sent them to internment camps. In translating personal diaries of Japanese soldiers, interrogating Japanese prisoners of war, persuading Japanese soldiers and civilians to surrender, and interpreting for the post-blast investigations of the atomic bombs, these *Nisei* linguists constantly had to confront the people of their own cultural heritage as enemies.

As “outsiders” or “in-between”, *Nisei* linguists faced complex and difficult challenges. There was discrimination and prejudice against *Nisei* linguists within the U.S. Army at the early stage of the war. Despite their remarkable performance, they did not get commissioned until towards the end of the war. They always worked under the supervision of Caucasian officers who did not have a good command of Japanese. The Navy’s elite Japanese language schools never admitted *Nisei* students. While they worried about their families and friends in the camps, *Nisei* linguists also feared being captured by the Japanese and tortured as traitors, and were concerned about their relatives in Japan who might face persecution. Among *Nisei*, *Kibei* – like the four monitors for the IMTFE – were discriminated against even within the Japanese American community as being different and suspected of being “pro-Japanese”.

Since they were branded as “enemy aliens” and not really “insiders” of American society, *Nisei* linguists are not what Cronin (2002: 55-59) refers to as “autonomous interpreters” who are procured by those commissioning interpreting services from within their own people. At the same time, *Nisei* linguists are not “heteronomous interpreters” who are recruited from the native community (Cronin *ibid.*) or people of the opposing party, either, because they were not “native” Japanese. There is complexity and ambiguity in this aspect of *Nisei* linguists’ position being “double”, “overlaps” or “in-between”.

There have been discussions that draw parallels and contrasts between the treatment of Japanese Americans after Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the treatment of Muslim immigrants in the United States after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. Although there has been no forcible relocation of Arab Muslims, some argue that the indefinite detention and surveillance of Muslim non-citizens as "dangerous enemy aliens" resembles what Japanese Americans experienced during World War II (See various articles on "Parallels between Japanese-American Internment and Post-9/11 Treatment of Arab Americans" on the website of *Discovery Nikkei*). Another parallel found between the two situations is a surge of the need for interpreters and translators in military and intelligence operations, and the U.S. government's dependence on "enemy aliens" for their language skills to meet such needs.

The demand for speakers of Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Urdu, Kurdish, Pashto and other languages has risen drastically for military and intelligence activities since the 9/11 terror attacks. Recognizing the vital needs of developing language skills and cultural expertise within the military, the U.S. Department of Defense increased the budget for language training by \$361.8 million between 2006 and 2010. In January 2005, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap was released, and President George W. Bush earmarked \$114 million for the National Security Language Initiative. According to a 2006 report, the requirement for Arabic interpreters and translators increased from 6,200 to 7,200 and from 450 to 700 for those with Pashto and Dari for Afghanistan operations over the previous year (*Inside the Army* July 24, 2006).

The U.S. government has been recruiting linguists from various sources. Viewing language skills and local expertise as part of its essential capabilities in defense, the military trains its soldiers in various languages including Arabic, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, Korean, Kurdish, Pashto and Urdu at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, which started as the Army's Japanese language school to train *Nisei* for military intelligence in 1941. However, only about 5% of the linguists trained there are heritage language speakers, and it takes about three years and \$300,000 to certify someone as a military linguist (*Lincoln Journal Star* May 18, 2006). To address the ever-increasing need for speakers of what the Roadmap calls "emerging languages", the military has been recruiting first-generation immigrants or foreign-born speakers of those

languages and teaching them English so that they can be deployed as interpreters and translators for the U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition, the U.S. government uses contractors to procure interpreters and translators as well. This is probably due to the government's inability to quickly locate enough linguists to meet the language needs and the Bush administration's general inclination to rely on the private sector to operate and manage government-initiated projects. The Army's Intelligence and Security Command recently awarded new five-year contracts worth over \$5 billion to three companies to supply thousands of interpreters and translators in Iraq and Afghanistan and at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba. According to news reports on these contractors, most of the linguists hired by them are locally procured. They are subject to the background security check and "counterintelligence/force protection screening" the U.S. government designates. The locally procured linguists function not only as interpreters and translators but also as those who can teach local culture, tradition and customs and provide intelligence tips to Americans.

There are autonomous interpreters, heteronomous interpreters and those who are in-between in this overall picture of how the U.S. government recruits linguists for its military operations. American-born citizens trained to become military linguists are considered autonomous interpreters as they are "insiders" of American society. Since such training takes time and it cannot meet the urgent need for interpreters and translators in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government resorts to local linguists supplied by private contractors. Clearly, they are heteronomous interpreters as they are "natives". It is difficult, however, to depict foreign-born military linguists recruited by the U.S. military as autonomous or heteronomous interpreters. They are "natives" in the sense that they were born and lived in countries where Arabic, Dari, Pashto, etc. are spoken. But they are now residents of the United States as American citizens or permanent resident aliens. They are recruited and trained by the U.S. military and become a part of American troops. In this regard they may be considered "insiders". This ambivalent nature of the standing of foreign-born military linguists is similar to that of *Nisei*, especially *Kibei*, linguists during World War II and the occupation of Japan.

While much of the information on *Nisei* linguists was unknown until it was declassified in the early 1970s, snippets of the situations regarding military linguists in Iraq and Afghanistan have been reported by the media since the conflicts began. There have been a number of journalistic articles on challenges these linguists face, and issues of trust seem to be the common thread in many of those reports.

For instance, Glionna and Khalil (2005) report on foreign-born military linguists fighting two wars in Iraq: one against Iraqis who see them as traitors, and the other against the cultural insensitivity and mistrust shown by other soldiers in their own units. Their motivation to join the Army varies, including an expedited citizenship process, monetary incentives, and an opportunity for higher-paying jobs after the military career. Since they undergo the military's rigorous background check and training, they are presumably more trustworthy, from the U.S. military's point of view, as members of their own units than contracted civilian interpreters. However, they have to overcome the prejudice and suspicion against them within the army just as the *Nisei* linguists did. As neither autonomous nor heteronomous interpreters, these foreign-born military linguists may be facing psychologically difficult situations of feeling compelled to prove their loyalty to the United States and confronting the people of their cultural heritage just as the *Nisei* linguists during World War II.

The plight of locally hired civilian interpreters in Iraq and Afghanistan has been attracting media attention as well. Some of those Iraqis started working for Americans as they embraced the U.S.-led construction efforts, but for others money was the main reason. Their monthly salaries are \$600-\$1,000 while many Iraqis live on less than \$100 a month (Krane 2007). Although their language skills and knowledge of local culture and customs are essential to the U.S. military operations, they don't seem to be treated as trustworthy associates. Packer (2007) observes in his extensive report on Iraqis who work for Americans that even in highly dangerous operations Iraqi interpreters are given inferior or no body armor; and that Iraqi interpreters who work at the U.S. Embassy are subject to background checks and regular lie-detector tests, "a permanent shadow of suspicion lay over them" (ibid.: 61), and because of the trust issue Iraqis have been replaced by Jordanians despite their lack of knowledge on Iraqi affairs.

The highly dangerous nature of the job of those locally hired interpreters has been frequently reported. They are killed on the job, helping American troops in combat without proper armor protection; and they are killed off duty by insurgents who see them as traitors and pro-American collaborators. According to U.S. Department of Labor statistics, a total of 199 interpreters hired by Titan (the largest contractor to supply linguists) have been killed in Iraq and another 491 have been injured (*Inter Press Service* August 11, 2006). Without proper protection from the U.S. government, many Iraqi interpreters fled their country to escape the daily killings and intimidation, and became refugees in neighboring countries. In response to this situation, the U.S. Senate recently passed a bill to grant special visas to those Iraqi interpreters who risked their lives to work for Americans and had to flee their country.

As illustrated above, in war and other types of conflicts interpreters whose allegiance seems to be somewhat blurred because of their affiliation with the languages and cultures of both conflicting parties face complex and difficult challenges stemming from issues of trust and cultural identity. In the case of *Nisei*, especially *Kibei*, linguists during World War II, they were placed in the middle of the fierce conflict between the country of their birth and the country of their cultural heritage. Viewed as “enemy aliens”, they were not fully trusted by their own government and military, and they also had to confront the country of their ancestors with language and cultural skills deeply rooted in that country. In the context of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, foreign-born military linguists and locally hired civilian linguists are in a similar situation. They do not seem to be fully trusted by the U.S. government, while they face the difficult issue of being viewed as traitors and are targeted by their own people or people of their cultural heritage. As the situations develop and more information become available, further research on the interpreters and translators who work in the midst of the current conflicts should be conducted in future studies.

7.2. *Negotiations in courtroom interpreting*

One of the features of interpreting at the IMTFE examined in Chapter 6 concerned how interpreting procedures developed over the first year of the court proceedings. Since the

interpreters were not professionally trained and the interpreter users were unfamiliar with interpreting, there was a great deal of “trial and error” in the interpreting procedures during the initial stage of the IMTFE. At the beginning of the trial, the tribunal tried to enforce its expectancy norms as to how interpreting should be done. These expectancy norms were challenged by the supervisors of the interpreters on their behalf mainly based on the interpreters’ cognitive limitations, such as their inability to interpret long passages in the consecutive mode without pauses or a speech read aloud from a document when they had no access to the translation. In order to actually proceed with the trial and use the interpreters effectively, the tribunal’s expectancy norms were negotiated and changed to accommodate the feedback from the interpreters (expressed through the language arbiter and the chief of the Language Section). The new norms developed for interpreting procedures included that speakers would break down their remarks into short segments and that the translation would be provided to the interpreter beforehand when the speaker was to read from a document.

The findings in this examination suggest that norms in interpreting are partly developed in the process of addressing the cognitive constraints of interpreters, and negotiated among the participants of the communicative event, including the interpreter. In this model, both the interpreter and the interpreter user learn to become functioning players of the communicative event by participating in the negotiation process of establishing norms as to how interpreting should be done.

In the context of today’s courtroom settings as well, the issues of interpreter users’ expectancy norms are often discussed by researchers in cases where they find gaps between such expectancy norms and the interpreters’ perception of their own role or interpreters’ cognitive capacity. For example, Morris (1999b) examines the issues stemming from conflicting views of court interpreters: On the one hand, the court and attorneys may view interpreters as a mechanical conduit between them and language-handicapped defendants and witnesses; on the other hand, such defendants may find interpreters to be a linguistic and psychological haven for them. Morris discusses the additional stress court interpreters may feel because of these conflicting perceptions, and briefly states that some interpreters learn to cope with such issues based on experience

and professionalism and some undertake action, collective or otherwise, to seek more understanding of the issues from the court participants.

There are a number of different avenues court interpreters use in order to draw attention to the challenges they face from the users and commissioners of interpreting. Some court interpreters may write articles for journals for legal professionals. For instance, Cardenas (2001) voices her concerns in a journal for the American Judges Association about the legal professionals' lack of interest in interpreter-related problems based on her own experience as a court interpreter, and tries to rectify the misconceptions of legal professionals about the function of court interpreters. Court interpreters may collectively present their position on various interpreting issues to the interpreter users and administrators. The most organized efforts to date may be a series of position papers published by the National Association of Judicial Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT, www.najit.org) in the United States. The papers deal with several issues in the practice of court interpreting, such as summary interpreting and different modes of interpreting. The information in the papers is offered as general guidelines and practical suggestions for court administrators, interpreter users and interpreters. The Association also issues its code of ethics and professional responsibilities and requires its members to comply with this code.

In response to the suggestions and general information on the practice provided by court interpreters, the court administrator and interpreter users may engage in discussions with interpreters and implement programs to address the issues presented by interpreters. At professional and academic conferences on court or community interpreting such as Critical Link and the NAJIT Conferences, participants from the legal community often interact with practicing interpreters in the discussion of issues and possible solutions for the practice of court interpreting. Informed legal professionals may conduct research on court interpreting and share its findings with interpreters. Foley (2006), for example, discusses potentially conflicting views of the concept of client as used by court interpreters and lawyers. McCaffrey (2000), a practicing attorney, reports her experience of teaching law students how to work with court interpreters. In addition, there are a number of programs court administrators operate to address the needs and requirements of court interpreters. In California, court interpreters, interpreter users and

court administrators make up the Court Interpreters Advisory Panel that assists in the development of the state's policies concerning court interpreters. Various administrative offices of courts in some states in the United States issue guidelines on how to work with court interpreters as well.

These efforts to address issues and challenges court interpreters face in today's courtroom can be seen as a process of negotiating norms among interpreters, their users and commissioners. Court administrators, judges and attorneys may expect interpreters to behave in certain ways. For example, one of the NAJIT position papers addresses the issue of onsite simultaneous interpretation of a sound file, such as the recording of a 911 call. In this context, the court or attorneys may expect court interpreters to provide on-the-spot interpretation of evidence in the form of videos or audio tapes in a language other than English in order to save time and money. In response, court interpreters, individually or collectively (as in the case of NAJIT), may assert that under these circumstances they are not capable of providing quality interpretation that can stand as evidence. The court or attorneys may then accommodate the interpreters' feedback and change the procedure for handling such evidence. Through this "negotiation" the norm in dealing with evidentiary sound files in a language other than English can be agreed upon by the parties, and the court and attorneys may become more effective users of interpreters.

Court interpreting may be the most conspicuous area of interpreting in which this process of "negotiated norms" can be observed because interpreting in courtroom settings is more regulated, institutionalized and documented and such negotiations are more visible than in any other types of interpreting. How norms in interpreting are negotiated among different participants in other settings may be explored in future studies.

8. Conclusion

This final chapter of the present study restates the research objectives, and reviews the theoretical framework and research methods used in the study. The main sections of this chapter summarize the results of this study and discuss their implications for the field of Interpreting Studies and some interpreting-related issues in today's world.

8.1. Review of research objectives, theoretical approach and methods

The present study started with the view that interpreting is a social practice which is conditioned by various social, political and cultural factors of the setting in which interpreting takes place. Accordingly, this research aimed at a broad contextualization of interpreting phenomena. The focus of the study was the interpreting arrangements and behavior of the linguists who were involved in the interpreting process at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). The IMTFE, more commonly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal or Tokyo Trial, took place from May 1946 to November 1948 to try 28 Japanese war criminals. Interpretation between Japanese and English was provided throughout the court proceedings: Japanese nationals interpreted the proceedings, Japanese Americans monitored the performance of the interpreters, and Caucasian military officers, acting as language arbiters, made rulings on disputes over translations and interpretations.

There were two main objectives in this research. One was to examine this little-researched interpreted event in history, and to describe and explain some distinct features of interpreting at this trial. Despite the unique features of interpreting at the IMTFE, and the historical significance of the trial itself as the Japanese counterpart of the Nuremberg Trial, there had been very few studies done on the interpreters and interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE. Therefore, the present study first attempted to introduce an overview of interpreting at the trial and engage in an in-depth analysis of important characteristics of the interpreting phenomena. The other aim of this study was to analyze the behavior of the linguists during the testimonies of Japanese witnesses, and explore if the findings would support the hypothesis that links the behavior of interpreters to their

awareness of where they stand in the power constellation of the setting in which they operate.

The overall approach to this research was to describe and explain interpreting phenomena in sociocultural terms. Accordingly, this study paid close attention to the social, political and cultural contexts of the IMTFE in order to examine why certain interpreting arrangements were made, and focused on the sociocultural backgrounds of the linguists, instead of microlinguistic analysis of the interpreted texts, in order to link their behavior to their hierarchical positions at the trial. Three sets of concepts were applied in the analysis of three features of interpreting at the IMTFE: the notions of “trust, power and control” to explore the reasons why the tribunal devised the three-tier organization to meet its interpreting needs; the concept of “negotiated norms” to analyze how the interpreting procedures developed during the initial stage of the trial; and the notion of “autonomous and heteronomous” interpreters to describe the position of the *Nisei* linguists in the power relations of the IMTFE.

Two methods were used to fulfill the two objectives of the study, respectively. The first was historical and archival research. This research drew on a wide variety of historical documents and archival records, including the transcripts of the court proceedings in English and Japanese, IMTFE court documents, military correspondences and government documents, collected from the U.S. National Archives, the Japanese National Diet Library and other institutions. This study also consulted a number of publications on the IMTFE and the U.S. occupation of Japan, and interviews with some linguists and their families. Special attention was paid to the historical and political context of the trial and the social and cultural backgrounds of the linguists.

The second objective of this study was addressed by a case-study method. The focus was the interpreted testimonies of Hideki Tojo, former Prime Minister and War Minister in wartime Japan, and other Japanese witnesses. These witnesses were selected based on the assumption that only the competent interpreters were working and the interpreting procedures had been well-established by the time they took the witness stand from September 1947 to January 1948. This was in an attempt to minimize the effect of the issues of interpreter competency and procedural glitches so that the present study could focus on the sociocultural aspects as a major factor in the examination of the

behavior of the linguists. Given the specific political nature of the IMTFE and the limited availability of audio records, this study did not engage in the generalization or quantification of interpreters' behavior in the courtroom setting. Rather, it presented a qualitative way of studying choices, strategies and behavior of interpreters and identified phenomena which can be taken to support the hypothesis of this research.

8.2. Summary of key findings

The first objective of the present study was addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 provided an overview of the interpreting arrangements and the linguists involved in the interpreting process. First, the historical and political background of the IMTFE was briefly introduced. It was emphasized that this study would pay attention to the political nature of the trial, which was essentially guided by the U.S. strategy for the occupation of Japan, in the examination of why certain interpreting arrangements were established.

Secondly, the languages used in interpreting were explained. In accordance with the charter of the tribunal, interpretation between Japanese and English was provided throughout the trial, but Russian interpretation was also furnished as a Soviet-led standalone arrangement for the Soviet judge. The use of a language other than English and Japanese and the practice of relay interpreting were controversial issues that were resolved after long courtroom discussions during the initial stage of the trial. As a result, French and Russian interpreters were used when prosecutors spoke in those languages, and Chinese, Dutch, German and Mongolian interpreters were also used for witnesses who testified in those languages.

Thirdly, this study examined how the linguists were recruited. Monitors and language arbiters were tapped from those who had worked in military intelligence during the war and were working in some functions of the occupation of Japan. Four *Kibei* were selected as monitors. Two army officers were appointed as language arbiter at different times. About half of the Japanese interpreters came from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The rest included people who had been educated in the United States and those who had grown up in bilingual households and/or with bilingual education in Japan. After passing a test which had the candidates interpret in a simulated trial, these Japanese

interpreters were given some orientation on court procedures and sent to the courtroom. There was virtually no training for interpreting because no one was qualified to provide such training.

Fourthly, the interpreting system, including the location of the interpreting booth, the equipment and the mode of interpreting, was described in detail. The IMTFE took place in the auditorium of the former Japanese Military Cadet School in Tokyo. After working at a table next to those for the prosecution and the defense for the first month of the trial, the interpreters and the monitors moved to the interpreter booth built on the platform that had been used exclusively for the emperor before the end of the war. IBM equipment, identical to that used at Nuremberg, was installed, but the consecutive mode of interpreting was used predominantly throughout the trial because the tribunal had concluded that simultaneous interpreting between Japanese and English was impossible. Only when the speaker spoke from a prepared text whose translation was available, did the monitor read aloud the translation simultaneously. The use of the consecutive mode enabled the monitor, sitting next to the interpreter in the booth, to interject corrections when he found any error or problem with the interpreter's rendition. The language arbiter sat in the prosecution's seating and became active when a dispute over translation or interpretation arose or when he announced the Language Arbitration Board's ruling on a disputed translation or interpretation.

There was also a brief description of how translators worked during the IMTFE. The tribunal charter required all the documents submitted as evidence to be accompanied by their translation into English or Japanese, as the case might be. A total of about 230 translators worked on an enormous amount of documents, including 30,000 pages of exhibits admitted as evidence. The translators included *Nisei* linguists dispatched from the U.S. military as well as many Japanese nationals. The practice of "team-translation" was evident. For the translation of the judgment, nine *Nisei* and 26 Japanese translators worked for three months to translate the 300,000-word document, with a Japanese law professor and an authority on the Japanese language acting as editors. The present study found a record that showed a total of 443 corrections of translations made by the Language Arbitration Board during the trial.

As for the personal profiles of some linguists, about half of the Japanese interpreters were diplomats. Others were individuals with bilingual family or educational backgrounds. The four monitors were all *Kibei* who received some years of education in Japan. They all had been sent to internment camps as “enemy aliens” and volunteered from the camps to train and work in military intelligence during the war, except one who taught at the Navy’s Japanese school. The first of the two language arbiters was born into an American missionary family in Japan and was fluent in Japanese. The other arbiter had only one year of training at the Army’s Japanese school.

Lastly, some comments by historians on the effect of interpreting on the IMTFE proceedings were briefly introduced. They generally referred to the excessive length of the proceedings caused, in part, by the consecutive mode of interpreting and the language disputes; the impact of interpreting on the manner in which lawyers examined the witnesses; and the possible effect of inadequate interpretations on the outcome of the trial. None of them, however, argued that there were intentional misinterpretations or seriously flawed interpretations during the IMTFE.

Chapter 5 presented a focused examination of three important aspects of interpreting at the IMTFE. First, the notions of “trust, power and control” were discussed: when a party in power has to rely on interpreters who do not have shared interests or affiliations, the party may set up a system to regulate and control the interpreters out of concern over their trustworthiness. This scenario was evident in the three-tier interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE. The tribunal had to resort to bilingual Japanese nationals because it could not find competent American interpreters, but it did not trust the “impartiality” of the Japanese interpreters and was loath to appear dependent on citizens of the defeated nation. The tribunal therefore used four *Nisei* to monitor interpretations. The language arbiter, a Caucasian U.S. military officer, may also have functioned to keep an eye on the *Nisei/Kibei* monitors who may have been suspected of being sympathetic to the Japanese defendants and to maintain the appearance that the U.S. military was in charge. The present study argued that this hierarchical organization functioned as a display of authority and a check against any “bad faith” harbored by those who did not seem to share the same interests with the tribunal.

The second portion of this in-depth analysis dealt with how the interpreting procedures developed over the first year of the IMTFE in which none of the interpreters had received professional interpreter training and the users of interpreting were also unfamiliar with how interpreting worked. The tribunal had “expectancy norms” at the beginning of the trial as to how interpreting should be done, but they were negotiated and adjusted to accommodate the feedback from the interpreters (through the language arbiter and the language section chief). The norms agreed upon among the parties for the interpreting procedures were mainly based on the cognitive limitations of the interpreters, such as their inability to interpret a long segment at a time in the consecutive mode and to properly interpret a speech read out from a prepared text without access to its translation. The analysis emphasized the interactional aspect of norm-building and the interpreter’s cognitive limitations as a factor in that process. This research concluded that the process of “the making of a native/natural translator (interpreter)” (Toury 1995: 248) is also that of “the making a translator (interpreter) user”.

In the last segment of Chapter 5, Cronin’s notion (2002: 54-59) of “autonomous and heteronomous interpreters” was applied to describe the ambiguous position of the *Nisei* monitors. On the one hand, they were “autonomous” in the sense that they were Americans who were recruited and trained for military intelligence by the U.S. military during the war. On the other hand, they were “heteronomous” as reflected in some “native” characteristics”: i.e. having been raised by “native” parents who sent them to the “native” land to acquire its language and culture as their own and later recruited by the U.S. military “through inducements” (to escape or avoid the internment camps and prove their loyalty to the country of their birth). This study pointed to the complexity of the position of the *Nisei* monitors in the inter-relationships among the court participants of the IMTFE. They were hired by the government that had treated them and their families unjustly, in a trial against leaders of their ancestral homeland; and they used skills deeply rooted in their own heritage in working as monitor.

Chapter 6 addressed the second objective of this study. It examined the behavior of the linguists during the interpreted testimonies of Hideki Tojo and other Japanese witnesses by focusing on the nature of interjections by the monitors and interpreters and of the interactions between interpreters, monitors, language arbiters and other court

participants. This interpretative analysis provided some evidence to support the hypothesis that links the interpreters' behavior to their relative positions in the power relations of the setting. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the Japanese interpreters kept the instances of speaking on their own behalf to a minimum and almost never objected to the monitors' erroneous corrections or seemingly unnecessary rephrasing of their renditions.

This study suggested that with the monitors being in the middle tier of the interpreting system, their seemingly excessive interjections in Japanese could be explained as a display of authority to the Japanese interpreters and as an appeal to the tribunal that they were working effectively to correct errors committed by the interpreters even though the tribunal did not understand the nature of their interjections in Japanese. The much lower frequency of monitors' interjections in English could be attributed to their consideration for the needs of their employer – the tribunal. Concerned about the speed of the court proceedings, the tribunal probably did not have the patience to listen to and consider two versions of interpretation unless there was a material difference between the two. Accordingly, the monitors may have restrained themselves from excessively interjecting in English to avoid irritating the tribunal.

As for the language arbiter who worked during Tojo's sessions, this research hardly found any spontaneous activity by this Caucasian Army officer. However, his presence close to the seating of the prosecution team in the courtroom and his official announcements of rulings on language disputes must have enhanced the appearance of the U.S. military being in charge of the entire procedures, including those for language needs.

Chapter 7 presented a brief reflection on language-related issues in today's world. An attempt was made to draw parallels and comparisons between some features of interpreting at the IMTFE and issues interpreters face at the present time. Two themes were discussed. First this study reflected on the situation of linguists who are involved in the current "global war on terror" by referring to the *Kibei* linguists who worked for the IMTFE. In war and other conflicts, interpreters whose allegiance seems to be somewhat blurred because of their affiliation with the languages and cultures of both conflicting parties face complex and difficult challenges stemming from issues of trust and cultural identity. This research dealt with these issues in detail in the case of *Kibei* linguists, and

argued that a similar situation might be faced by foreign-born military linguists in the U.S. Army and locally hired civilian linguists in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. They do not seem to be fully trusted by the U.S. government and they face the difficult issue of being viewed as traitors and targeted by their own people or people of their cultural heritage. This study suggested further investigations to be conducted with respect to translators and interpreters who work in the middle of today's conflicts, as the situations develop and more information becomes available.

Secondly, the notion of "negotiated norms" used in examining the development of the interpreting procedures at the IMTFE was applied to account for how interpreting-related issues are addressed in the context of today's courtroom settings. This study pointed to the gaps between interpreter users' expectancy norms and the interpreters' perception of their own role, or their cognitive capacity. Court interpreters and their users and administrators find various avenues, such as trade journals, conferences and advisory committees, to address issues and challenges faced by court interpreters, and to communicate their positions to each other. Norms in court interpreting may develop based on what is agreed upon among these parties. The present research viewed this process as norm-development through negotiations between interpreters, their users and their commissioners. It was suggested that this norm-building process may be more observable in court settings because they are more regulated, institutionalized and documented than other settings.

8.3. Implications and future research

The findings of the present study, summarized above, have reinforced the view that interpreting is a social practice. The influence of the political and social aspects of the setting was evident in the interpreting arrangements at the IMTFE, especially in the hierarchical organization of linguists, with three ethnically and socially different groups of people engaged in three different functions. In addition, the data available suggested that the linguists' awareness of where they stood in the power constellation of the IMTFE affected their behavior in interpreting and monitoring. All these findings point back to the notion that interpreting does not occur in a vacuum, and that it is conditioned by social,

political and cultural contexts of the setting in which the interpreted event takes place. Although the IMTFE may be considered a unique case because of its highly political nature, the author hopes that some issues this study addressed, such as trust, ethics, power relations and negotiated norms, will be revisited for an enhanced understanding of language-related issues in today's society.

The author also hopes that this study represents a contribution to the field of Interpreting Studies, mainly in the following two areas. One is the addition of new information to the collective knowledge base of this young academic discipline. The extensive research that drew on a wide variety of materials, including previously classified documents and interviews with some participants of the trial, has provided a wealth of information on various aspects of interpreting arrangements and interpreting at the IMTFE, which had previously been studied very little. In particular, the discovery of documents that indicated the failure of the military interpreters in the trials in Manila provided strong evidence to explain why the tribunal arrived at the three-tier interpreting arrangements. In addition, the detailed examination of the *Nisei* linguists during and after World War II provided information that could be referred to in discussions of issues such as language policy, heritage language, and the sociological model of the position of interpreters.

The other contribution of the present study may be the broadening of perspectives in interpreting research. Perhaps due to the increasing visibility of court and community interpreting, and perhaps in response to Cronin's call (2002) for a "cultural turn", studies that pay attention to social factors of the setting in which interpreting takes place seem to be on rise in the field of Interpreting Studies (see various articles in Pym et al. 2006). This study also directly addressed social and political issues to describe and explain interpreting phenomena. It is the author's hope that this research is seen as part of this emerging research paradigm and as contributing to a further widening of the horizons of Interpreting Studies.

It should be noted that the greatest challenge the author faced in undertaking the present study consisted in the limitations of the data used. Despite the attempt not to depend solely on the transcripts, the audio records were not available in their entirety. In addition, the two surviving interpreters proved unwilling to provide straight answers as to

why the linguists seemed to have made great efforts to help Tojo. This may be due to the possible political implications of their answers. The IMTFE is still a topic of political debate in Japan. When asked if his father, Toshiro Shimanouchi, who interpreted in more than 400 sessions during the IMTFE, had left any sort of memoirs or interviews, Ken Shimanouchi (2007), the Japanese Ambassador to Brazil, responded: “There is no way I would have let him do such a thing.” The problem of incomplete data may be something researchers have to address in some way when dealing with materials from the past.

In conducting future research, cases in which more complete data is available should be taken up to investigate interpreters’ choices, strategies and behavior. Such data should consist of the transcript, video and audio recordings of interpreting and original utterances, and interviews with the interpreters and users of their services. Materials may be found in court records, and in videos on TV and on the Internet as well. Of special interest to researchers seeking a link between interpreters’ behavior and various aspects of the setting may be the risk-avoidance strategy used in interpreting that comes under scrutiny for its accuracy. Examples include: interpreting for a political figure on sensitive issues (e.g. Baker 1997); interpreting at an international organization which provides verbatim records of interpreting to the public; interpreting on webcasts that can be accessed repeatedly by any number of listeners; and deposition interpreting that is concurrently checked by a check (monitor) interpreter, recorded and transcribed, with the transcription of interpretation being used as evidence in a trial. The notion of “risk management” in translation as proposed by Pym (2004) may prove particularly promising for future studies which seek to explain how the social, political and institutional factors may shape the strategy of interpreters in such settings.

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Appendix

Defendants

Defendant	Count	Sentence
General Sadao Araki	1, 27	Life
General Kenji Dohihara	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54	Hanging
Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto	1, 27	Life
Field Marshal Syunroku Hata	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 55	Life
Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36	Life
Baron Koki Hirota	1, 27, 55	Hanging
Naoki Hoshino, Chief Cabinet Secretary	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
General Seishiro Itagaki	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54	Hanging
Okinori Kaya, Finance Minister	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
Marquis Koichi Kido	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
General Heitaro Kimura	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54, 55	Hanging
General Kuniaki Koiso	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 55	Life
General Iwane Matsui	55	Hanging
Yosuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister		Died during the trial
General Jiro Minami	1, 27	Life
General Akira Muto	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54, 55	Hanging
Marshal Osami Nagano		Died during the trial
Admiral Takazumi Oka	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
Shumei Okawa		Removed
General Hiroshi Oshima	1	Life
General Kenryo Sato	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
Mamoru Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister	27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 54	7 years
Admiral Shigemitsu Shimada	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
Shiratori Toshio, Foreign Ministry	1	Life
General Teiichi Suzuki	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life
Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	20 years
General Hideki Tojo	1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 54	Hanging
General Yoshijiro Umezu	1, 27, 29, 31, 32	Life

Count 1: as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law

Count 27: waging unprovoked war against China

- Count 29: waging aggressive war against the United States
- Count 31: waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth
- Count 32: waging aggressive war against the Netherlands
- Count 33: waging aggressive war against France (Indochina)
- Count 35 & 36: waging aggressive war against the U.S.S.R.
- Count 54: ordered, authorized, and permitted inhumane treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) and others.
- Count 55: deliberately and recklessly disregarded their duty to take adequate steps to prevent atrocities

Judges

The President

Sir William Webb, Australia, Justice of the High Court of Australia

Mei Ju-ao, Republic of China, Attorney and Member, Legislative Yuan
Edward Stuart McDougall, Canada, Former Judge, King's Bench Appeal Side
Henri Bernard, France, Chief Prosecutor, First Military Tribunal in Paris
Radhabinod Pal, India, Lecturer, University of Calcutta Law College
B.V.A. Röling, Netherlands, Professor of Law, Utrecht University
Harvey Northcroft, New Zealand, Judge Advocate General of New Zealand
Delfin Jaranilla, Philippines, Attorney General, Supreme Court Member
Lord Patrick, U.K., Judge, Senator of the College of Justice
John P. Higgins, U.S., Chief Justice, Massachusetts State Superior Court
Myron C. Cramer, U.S., replaced Judge Higgins in July 1946
I.M. Zarayanov, U.S.S.R., Member, Military Collegium of the Supreme Court

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Chief of the Japanese Defense Section: Somei Uzawa

Associate Chief of the Japanese Defense Section: Ichiro Kiyose

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Araki	Yutaka Sugawara	Lawrence McManus	Sakae Ichikawa Takaaki Hasuoka Jiro Tokuoka
Dohihara	Naoyoshi Tsukazaki Kinjiro Ota	Franklin Warren	Takahisa Kato Shigeharu Kimura Tameo Hongo Kinjiro Ota
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Hata	Masayoshi Kanzaki	A.G. Lazarus James Freeman	Tomoharu Kokubu Taitaro Imanari
Hiranuma	Rokuro Usami	Samuel J. Kleiman Franklin Warren	Hisao Yanai Kunio Sawa Yoichi Mori Tameo Hongo
Hirota	Tadashi Hanai	David F. Smith George Yamaoka	Yoshiro Ando Goro Morishima Masao Hirota Shinichi Shibasawa Yanai Hisao
Hoshino	Goichiro Fujii	George C. Williams Joseph C. Howard	Masao Migita Reisuke Matsuru
Itagaki	Hanzo Yamada	Floyd. J. Mattie	Tomoharu Sasagawa Junkichi Ban Ryosuke Kaneuchi
Kaya	Tsuruo Takano	Roger S. Rutchick Michael Levin E. R. Harris	Yasumichi Tanaka Kenji Fujiwara Masamichi Yamagiwa Wataru Narahashi
Kido	Shigetaka Hozumi	William Logan Jr.	Takutaro Sakuta Takahiko Kido
Kimura	Tokisaburo Shiohara	Joseph C. Howard	Koretsune Tatsumi Akira Abe Tameo Hongo Tadakatsu Tanaka
Koiso	Shohei Samonji	Alfred. W. Brooks	Kazuya Takagi

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Matsuoka	Shunzo Kobayashi	Franklin Warren	Kenichiro Matsuoka
Minami	Kintaro Takeuchi Toshio Okamoto	William J. McCormack Alfred W. Brooks Joseph C. Howard	Seiji Hara Chihiro Saeki Tatsuo Matsuzawa Geiichi Kondo Sukeo Arimatsu Yasuma Oda
Muto	Shoichi Okamoto	George A. Furness Roger. F. Cole	Seiji Hara Keizo Osumi Chihiro Saeki
Nagano	Hachiro Okuyama	John. G. Brannon	Shimao Iwai Kunji Kanase Shigeo Yasuda
Oka	Shinji Somiya	Franklin Warren Samuel Allen Roberts	Isamu Suzuki Tetsuichi Kurashige Seiichiro Ono Kenji Enomoto Tatsuo Inagawa Kenji Okoshi Juji Enomoto
Okawa	Shinichi Ohara	Alfred Brooks	Ryosuke Kanauchi Fumiko Fukuoka
Oshima	Naoyoshi Tsukazaki Tatsuoki Shimanouchi	Owen Cunningham	Fujio Uchida Nobuhiko Ushiba Jugo Saigo Tatsuoki Shimanouchi
Sato	Ichiro Kiyose Hyoichiro Kusano	James. N. Freeman John G. Brannon	Isaburo Kazuma Chikao Fujisawa Matsutarō Inoue
Shigemitsu	Kenzo Takayanagi Hisao Yanai	George A. Furness	Rokuro Usami Hisao Yanai Kazuichi Miura Shizuo Kanaya
Shimada	Yoshitsugu Takahashi	Edward P. McDermott E.R. Harris John. G. Brannon	Juzo Yamane Isamu Suzuki Masajiro Takigawa

			Shimao Iwai Shigeo Yasuda Hisashi Saito Hachiro Okuyama
Shiratori	Somei Uzawa Nobuo Naritomi	Charles B. Caudle	Yoji Hirota Shin Sakuma
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Togo	Shigenori Hozumi Haruhiko Nishi	George Yamaoka Ben Bruce Blakeney	Taganobu Yoshinaga Tadashi Sakaya Shigetaka Hozumi Katsumi Niro Denjiro Kato Motoharu Shichida
Tojo	Ichiro Kiyose	George F. Blewitt	Tokisaburo Shiohara Masatoshi Matsushita Kinjiro Kawakita Hiroshi Uchiyama Shinichi Ohara
Umezu	Shotaro Miyake Mitsuo Miyata	Ben Bruce Blakeney	Kisaku Ono Sumihisa Ikeda Yoshikazu Umezu

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