Repositori institucional URV
| Autor/s de la URV: | Farràs Ventura, Oriol / Ribes Gonzalez, Jordi |
| Autor segons l'article: | Ribes-González J; Farràs O; Hernández C; Kostalabros V; Moretó M |
| Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: | oriol.farras@urv.cat |
| Identificador de l'autor: | 0000-0002-7495-5980 |
| Any de publicació de la revista: | 2022 |
| Tipus de publicació: | Journal Publications |
| Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: | Ribes-González J; Farràs O; Hernández C; Kostalabros V; Moretó M (2022). A Security Model for Randomization-based Protected Caches. Iacr Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware And Embedded Systems, 2022(3), 1-25. DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.1-25 |
| Referència a l'article segons font original: | Iacr Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware And Embedded Systems. 2022 (3): 1-25 |
| Resum: | Cache side-channel attacks allow adversaries to learn sensitive information about co-running processes by using only access latency measures and cache contention. This vulnerability has been shown to lead to several microarchitectural attacks. As a promising solution, recent work proposes Randomization-based Protected Caches (RPCs). RPCs randomize cache addresses, changing keys periodically so as to avoid long-term leakage. Unfortunately, recent attacks have called the security of state-of-the-art RPCs into question. In this work, we tackle the problem of formally defining and analyzing the security properties of RPCs. We first give security definitions against access-based cache side-channel attacks that capture security against known attacks such as Prime+Probe and Evict+Probe. Then, using these definitions, we obtain results that allow to guarantee security by adequately choosing the rekeying period, the key generation algorithm and the cache randomizer, thus providing security proofs for RPCs under certain assumptions. |
| DOI de l'article: | 10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.1-25 |
| Enllaç font original: | https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9693 |
| Versió de l'article dipositat: | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| Accès a la llicència d'ús: | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/ |
| Departament: | Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques |
| URL Document de llicència: | https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/ |
| Àrees temàtiques: | Software Signal processing Hardware and architecture Computer networks and communications Computer graphics and computer-aided design Artificial intelligence |
| Paraules clau: | Timing attacks Security definition Randomly-mapped caches Randomization-based protected caches Pseudo-random functions Cache side-channel attacks |
| Entitat: | Universitat Rovira i Virgili |
| Data d'alta del registre: | 2024-09-07 |
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| DocumentPrincipal | DocumentPrincipal | application/pdf |
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