Departament: Economia
Autor/s de la URV: Esteve-González, Patricia
Paraules clau: Incentius Risc moral Incentivos Riesgo moral Moral hazard Incentives
Resum: This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship. In the first period, there is an incumbent who provides a service. In the second period, there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider. The agents¿ effort is non-contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems. The principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by choosing the weight of past effort and the degree of substitutability between past and current efforts. The results show that, when the principal does not value contest effort, considering past effort as the relevant effort in the contest is optimal. When the principal values contest effort and effort cost increases, decreasing substitutability between efforts is optimal.
Grup de recerca: CREIP
Àrees temàtiques: Economia i empresa Economía y empresa Economics and business
ISSN: 0167-7187
Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0003-3740-1396
Data d'alta del registre: 2016-10-05
Pàgina final: 269
Volum de revista: 48
Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
Enllaç font original: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716301126
URL Document de llicència: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
DOI de l'article: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.008
Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Any de publicació de la revista: 2016
Pàgina inicial: 244
Tipus de publicació: Article Artículo Article
Repositori URV