Autor segons l'article: Ferré M; Manzano C
Departament: Economia
Autor/s de la URV: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
Paraules clau: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats
Resum: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
Àrees temàtiques: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management
Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
Data d'alta del registre: 2023-05-21
Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Referència a l'article segons font original: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286
Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ferré M; Manzano C (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286
URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Any de publicació de la revista: 2020
Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications
Repositori URV