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Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:9138971
    Autors:
    Ferre, MontserratManzano, Carolina
    Resum:
    © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Ferre, Montserrat; Manzano, Carolina
    Departament: Economia
    Autor/s de la URV: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Paraules clau: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats
    Resum: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
    Àrees temàtiques: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: carolina.manzano@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat montserrat.ferre@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0001-7160-0562 0000-0001-7160-0562 0000-0003-4959-608X
    Data d'alta del registre: 2025-01-28
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referència a l'article segons font original: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ferre, Montserrat; Manzano, Carolina (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2020
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications
  • Paraules clau:

    Business, Finance,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
    Developing-countries
    politicians
    monetary
    discretion
    commitment
    bureaucrats
    Finance
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business, finance
    Business and management
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