Autor segons l'article: Biondo, A. E.; Burgio, G.; Pluchino, A.; Puglisi, D.;
Departament: Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques
Autor/s de la URV: Burgio, Giulio
Paraules clau: Tax policy Tax evasion Tax compliance Rates Morale Monte carlo simulations Economics Complex networks Agent-based model
Resum: In this paper we study tax evasion by means of a unified framework, based on a behavioral approach, where each individual decision with respect to tax compliance is driven by either personal evaluations of the available information, correlated to income and the perception of the quality of the public good, and social influences, derived by the known decision of neighbors. Our model relies on individual utility functions and describes the tax-evasion problem by means of a personal evolutionary scheme, in which each citizen dynamically adapts her behavior as a response to changing economic and social factors. We will show basic economic intuitions on the relevance of penalties, imitation, satisfaction and risk aversion by means of an analytical model and its agent-based companion version, in order to analyse different elements influencing tax evasion and their dynamic effects. In particular, it is shown how the tax-evasion probability changes as a function of the risk-aversion and specific focus is dedicated to the role played by non-monetary elements of utility in inducing high levels of tax compliance also at substantially reduced fines.
Àrees temàtiques: General business,management and accounting Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous) Business, management and accounting (all) Administração, ciências contábeis e turismo Administração pública e de empresas, ciências contábeis e turismo
Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: giulio.burgio@urv.cat
Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0002-6333-4847
Data d'alta del registre: 2022-09-03
Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Enllaç font original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00191-022-00776-5
Referència a l'article segons font original: Journal Of Evolutionary Economics. 32 (3): 797-826
Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Biondo, A. E.; Burgio, G.; Pluchino, A.; Puglisi, D.; (2022). Taxation and evasion: a dynamic model. Journal Of Evolutionary Economics, 32(3), 797-826. DOI: 10.1007/s00191-022-00776-5
URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
DOI de l'article: 10.1007/s00191-022-00776-5
Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Any de publicació de la revista: 2022
Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications