Autor segons l'article: Ribes-González J; Farràs O; Hernández C; Kostalabros V; Moretó M
Departament: Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques
Autor/s de la URV: Farràs Ventura, Oriol / Ribes Gonzalez, Jordi
Paraules clau: Timing attacks Security definition Randomly-mapped caches Randomization-based protected caches Pseudo-random functions Cache side-channel attacks
Resum: Cache side-channel attacks allow adversaries to learn sensitive information about co-running processes by using only access latency measures and cache contention. This vulnerability has been shown to lead to several microarchitectural attacks. As a promising solution, recent work proposes Randomization-based Protected Caches (RPCs). RPCs randomize cache addresses, changing keys periodically so as to avoid long-term leakage. Unfortunately, recent attacks have called the security of state-of-the-art RPCs into question. In this work, we tackle the problem of formally defining and analyzing the security properties of RPCs. We first give security definitions against access-based cache side-channel attacks that capture security against known attacks such as Prime+Probe and Evict+Probe. Then, using these definitions, we obtain results that allow to guarantee security by adequately choosing the rekeying period, the key generation algorithm and the cache randomizer, thus providing security proofs for RPCs under certain assumptions.
Àrees temàtiques: Software Signal processing Hardware and architecture Computer networks and communications Computer graphics and computer-aided design Artificial intelligence
Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: oriol.farras@urv.cat
Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0002-7495-5980
Data d'alta del registre: 2024-09-07
Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Enllaç font original: https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9693
URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Referència a l'article segons font original: Iacr Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware And Embedded Systems. 2022 (3): 1-25
Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ribes-González J; Farràs O; Hernández C; Kostalabros V; Moretó M (2022). A Security Model for Randomization-based Protected Caches. Iacr Transactions On Cryptographic Hardware And Embedded Systems, 2022(3), 1-25. DOI: 10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.1-25
DOI de l'article: 10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.1-25
Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Any de publicació de la revista: 2022
Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications