Articles producció científica> Economia

Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals

  • Identification data

    Identifier: PC:1186
    Authors:
    António Osório
    Abstract:
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.03.006
  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: António Osório
    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Osório da Costa, António Miguel
    Keywords: Monitorització freqüent Frequent monitoring Information characteristics Public monitoring
    Abstract: In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. (1991). In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
    Research group: Grup de Recerca en Organització i Decisió Econòmiques
    Thematic Areas: Economia i empresa Economía y empresa Economics and business
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 0167-6377
    Author identifier: orcid.org/0000-0003-3376-0164
    Record's date: 2015-07-24
    Last page: 292
    Journal volume: 43
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
    Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2015
    First page: 288
    Publication Type: Article Artículo Article
  • Keywords:

    Teoria de jocs
    Teoria de la informació
    Contractes
    Monitorització freqüent
    Frequent monitoring
    Information characteristics
    Public monitoring
    Economia i empresa
    Economía y empresa
    Economics and business
    0167-6377
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