Articles producció científica> Economia

Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games

  • Identification data

    Identifier: imarina:5131420
  • Authors:

    António Osório
  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: António Osório
    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Osório da Costa, António Miguel
    Keywords: Strategies Repeated games Information quantity Information quality Game theory Frequent monitoring Continuous-time
    Abstract: This paper examines different Brownian information structures over varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case, and on the trade-offs between information quality and quantity when making a decision whether to cooperate or defect in a prisoners' dilemma game. In the best-case scenario, the information quality gains are strong enough so that agents can substitute information quantity with information quality. In the second best-case scenario, the information quality gains are weak and must be compensated for with additional information quantity. In this case, information quality improves but not quickly enough to dispense with the use of information quantity. For sufficiently large time intervals, information degrades and monitoring becomes mostly based on information quantity. The results depend crucially on the particular information structure and on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with respect to the discounting incentives.
    Thematic Areas: Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management Interdisciplinar Engenharias iv Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous) Economics Economia Computer science applications Ciencias sociales Ciência da computação Administração pública e de empresas, ciências contábeis e turismo
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Author's mail: antonio.osoriodacosta@urv.cat
    Author identifier: 0000-0003-3376-0164
    Record's date: 2024-09-07
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Link to the original source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5
    Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Papper original source: Computational Economics. 52 (2): 387-404
    APA: António Osório (2018). Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games. Computational Economics, 52(2), 387-404. DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5
    Article's DOI: 10.1007/s1061401796855
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2018
    Publication Type: Journal Publications
  • Keywords:

    Computer Science Applications,Economics,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Miscellaneous),Management,Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications
    Strategies
    Repeated games
    Information quantity
    Information quality
    Game theory
    Frequent monitoring
    Continuous-time
    Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Management
    Interdisciplinar
    Engenharias iv
    Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous)
    Economics
    Economia
    Computer science applications
    Ciencias sociales
    Ciência da computação
    Administração pública e de empresas, ciências contábeis e turismo
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