Author, as appears in the article.: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Flamand, Sabine Charlotte M
Keywords: Vote Sharing rules Proportional representation Perspective Open lists Multiple prizes Elections Cultivate Contests Closed lists
Abstract: © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
Thematic Areas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
ISSN: 00472727
Author's mail: sabine.flamand@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0003-2124-4592
Record's date: 2023-02-18
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
Papper original source: Journal Of Public Economics. 182 (104109):
APA: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N (2020). A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation. Journal Of Public Economics, 182(104109), -. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2020
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV