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A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

  • Identification data

    Identifier: imarina:6090570
    Authors:
    Crutzen BFlamand SSahuguet N
    Abstract:
    © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N
    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Flamand, Sabine Charlotte M
    Keywords: Vote Sharing rules Proportional representation Perspective Open lists Multiple prizes Elections Cultivate Contests Closed lists
    Abstract: © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
    Thematic Areas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 00472727
    Author's mail: sabine.flamand@urv.cat
    Author identifier: 0000-0003-2124-4592
    Record's date: 2023-02-18
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Link to the original source: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272719301719
    Papper original source: Journal Of Public Economics. 182 (104109):
    APA: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N (2020). A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation. Journal Of Public Economics, 182(104109), -. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Article's DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2020
    Publication Type: Journal Publications
  • Keywords:

    Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
    Vote
    Sharing rules
    Proportional representation
    Perspective
    Open lists
    Multiple prizes
    Elections
    Cultivate
    Contests
    Closed lists
    Finance
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business and management
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