Author, as appears in the article.: Ferré M; Manzano C
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
Keywords: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats
Abstract: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
Thematic Areas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
Record's date: 2023-05-21
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Link to the original source: https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb20q5a6.htm
Papper original source: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286
APA: Ferré M; Manzano C (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2020
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV