Author, as appears in the article.: Ferré M; Manzano C

Department: Economia

URV's Author/s: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina

Keywords: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats

Abstract: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.

Thematic Areas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management

licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/

Author's mail: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat

Author identifier: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562

Record's date: 2023-05-21

Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Link to the original source: https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb20q5a6.htm

Licence document URL: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/

Papper original source: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286

APA: Ferré M; Manzano C (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286

Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Journal publication year: 2020

Publication Type: Journal Publications