Author, as appears in the article.: Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel;
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
Keywords: Peace, justice and strong institutions
Abstract: This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
Thematic Areas: Statistics, probability and uncertainty Statistics and probability Social sciences, mathematical methods Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Economics Ciencias sociales Applied mathematics
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0003-0202-4623
Record's date: 2024-11-23
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Papper original source: Games. 13 (6): 77-77
APA: Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; (2022). The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting. Games, 13(6), 77-77. DOI: 10.3390/g13060077
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2022
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV