Autor según el artículo: António Osório

Departamento: Economia

Autor/es de la URV: Osório da Costa, António Miguel

Palabras clave: Strategies Repeated games Information quantity Information quality Game theory Frequent monitoring Continuous-time

Resumen: This paper examines different Brownian information structures over varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case, and on the trade-offs between information quality and quantity when making a decision whether to cooperate or defect in a prisoners' dilemma game. In the best-case scenario, the information quality gains are strong enough so that agents can substitute information quantity with information quality. In the second best-case scenario, the information quality gains are weak and must be compensated for with additional information quantity. In this case, information quality improves but not quickly enough to dispense with the use of information quantity. For sufficiently large time intervals, information degrades and monitoring becomes mostly based on information quantity. The results depend crucially on the particular information structure and on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with respect to the discounting incentives.

Áreas temáticas: Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management Interdisciplinar Engenharias iv Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous) Economics Economia Computer science applications Ciencias sociales Ciência da computação Administração pública e de empresas, ciências contábeis e turismo

Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/

Direcció de correo del autor: antonio.osoriodacosta@urv.cat

Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-3376-0164

Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-02-18

Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Enlace a la fuente original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5

URL Documento de licencia: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/

Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Computational Economics. 52 (2): 387-404

Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: António Osório (2018). Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games. Computational Economics, 52(2), 387-404. DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5

DOI del artículo: 10.1007/s1061401796855

Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Año de publicación de la revista: 2018

Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications