Repositori URV

Identificador: imarina:6627329

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina6627329

Autores:
Steinegger, BenjaminArenas, AlexGomez-Gardenes, JesusGranell, Clara

Resumen:
Human behavioral responses play an important role in the impact of disease outbreaks and yet they are often overlooked in epidemiological models. Understanding to what extent behavioral changes determine the outcome of spreading epidemics is essential to design effective intervention policies. Here we explore, analytically, the interplay between the personal decision to protect oneself from infection and the spreading of an epidemic. We do so by coupling a decision game based on the perceived risk of infection with a susceptible-infected-susceptible model. Interestingly, we find that the simple decision of whether to protect oneself is enough to modify the course of the epidemics, by generating sustained steady oscillations in the prevalence. We deem these oscillations detrimental and propose two intervention policies aimed at modifying behavioral patterns to help alleviate them. Surprisingly, we find that pulsating campaigns, compared to continuous ones, are more effective in diminishing such oscillations.