Autor según el artículo: Ferré M; Manzano C
Departamento: Economia
Autor/es de la URV: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
Palabras clave: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats
Resumen: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
Áreas temáticas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management
Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Direcció de correo del autor: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-05-21
Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286
Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ferré M; Manzano C (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286
URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Año de publicación de la revista: 2020
Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
Repositori URV