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Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:9138971
    Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina9138971
  • Autores:

    Ferré M
    Manzano C
  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Ferré M; Manzano C
    Departamento: Economia
    Autor/es de la URV: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Palabras clave: Developing-countries politicians monetary discretion commitment bureaucrats
    Resumen: © 2020, European Central Bank. All rights reserved. In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal pol-icy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector’s expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti’s model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.
    Áreas temáticas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, finance Business and management
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Direcció de correo del autor: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-05-21
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb20q5a6.htm
    URL Documento de licencia: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: International Journal Of Central Banking. 16 (5): 233-286
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ferré M; Manzano C (2020). Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy. International Journal Of Central Banking, 16(5), 233-286
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2020
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
  • Palabras clave:

    Business, Finance,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
    Developing-countries
    politicians
    monetary
    discretion
    commitment
    bureaucrats
    Finance
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business, finance
    Business and management
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