Articles producció científica> Economia

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:9242193
  • Autores:

    Manzano C
    Vives X
  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Manzano C; Vives X
    Departamento: Economia
    Autor/es de la URV: Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Palabras clave: Treasury auctions Private information Market integration Liquidity auctions G14 Electricity auctions E58 Demand/supply schedule competition D82 D44
    Resumen: We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence. Copyright © 2021 The Authors.
    Áreas temáticas: General economics,econometrics and finance Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous) Economics, econometrics and finance (all) Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Direcció de correo del autor: carolina.manzano@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0001-7160-0562
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-02-19
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/3675
    URL Documento de licencia: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Theoretical Economics. 16 (3): 1095-1137
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Manzano C; Vives X (2021). Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions. Theoretical Economics, 16(3), 1095-1137. DOI: 10.3982/TE3675
    DOI del artículo: 10.3982/TE3675
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2021
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
  • Palabras clave:

    Economics,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Miscellaneous)
    Treasury auctions
    Private information
    Market integration
    Liquidity auctions
    G14
    Electricity auctions
    E58
    Demand/supply schedule competition
    D82
    D44
    General economics,econometrics and finance
    Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous)
    Economics, econometrics and finance (all)
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business and management
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