Articles producció científica> Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques

Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:9285441
    Autores:
    Matamalas, Joan TPoncela-Casasnovas, JuliaGomez, SergioArenas, Alex
    Resumen:
    Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the T â' S plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in monoplex and multiplex. Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don't (incoherent). This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas.
  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Matamalas, Joan T; Poncela-Casasnovas, Julia; Gomez, Sergio; Arenas, Alex
    Departamento: Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques
    Autor/es de la URV: Arenas Moreno, Alejandro / Gómez Jiménez, Sergio / Matamalas Llodrà, Joan Tomàs
    Palabras clave: Prisoner dilemma Humans Human Game theory Game Cooperative behavior Cooperation Community networks Community care Animals Animal
    Resumen: Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the T â' S plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in monoplex and multiplex. Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don't (incoherent). This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas.
    Áreas temáticas: Zootecnia / recursos pesqueiros Saúde coletiva Química Psicología Odontología Nutrição Multidisciplinary sciences Multidisciplinary Medicina veterinaria Medicina iii Medicina ii Medicina i Materiais Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Letras / linguística Interdisciplinar Geografía Geociências Farmacia Engenharias iv Engenharias iii Engenharias ii Enfermagem Educação física Educação Economia Ciências biológicas iii Ciências biológicas ii Ciências biológicas i Ciências ambientais Ciências agrárias i Ciência de alimentos Ciência da computação Biotecnología Biodiversidade Astronomia / física
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Direcció de correo del autor: joantomas.matamalas@urv.cat sergio.gomez@urv.cat alexandre.arenas@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0002-7563-9269 0000-0003-1820-0062 0000-0003-0937-0334
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-09-28
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://www.nature.com/articles/srep09519
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Scientific Reports. 5 9519-
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Matamalas, Joan T; Poncela-Casasnovas, Julia; Gomez, Sergio; Arenas, Alex (2015). Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks. Scientific Reports, 5(), 9519-. DOI: 10.1038/srep09519
    DOI del artículo: 10.1038/srep09519
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2015
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
  • Palabras clave:

    Multidisciplinary,Multidisciplinary Sciences
    Prisoner dilemma
    Humans
    Human
    Game theory
    Game
    Cooperative behavior
    Cooperation
    Community networks
    Community care
    Animals
    Animal
    Zootecnia / recursos pesqueiros
    Saúde coletiva
    Química
    Psicología
    Odontología
    Nutrição
    Multidisciplinary sciences
    Multidisciplinary
    Medicina veterinaria
    Medicina iii
    Medicina ii
    Medicina i
    Materiais
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Letras / linguística
    Interdisciplinar
    Geografía
    Geociências
    Farmacia
    Engenharias iv
    Engenharias iii
    Engenharias ii
    Enfermagem
    Educação física
    Educação
    Economia
    Ciências biológicas iii
    Ciências biológicas ii
    Ciências biológicas i
    Ciências ambientais
    Ciências agrárias i
    Ciência de alimentos
    Ciência da computação
    Biotecnología
    Biodiversidade
    Astronomia / física
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