Articles producció científicaEconomia

The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador:  imarina:9289110
    Autores:  Bannikova, Marina; Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel
    Resumen:
    This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
  • Otros:

    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Bannikova, Marina; Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel (2022). The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting. Games, 13(6), 77-77. DOI: 10.3390/g13060077
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Games. 13 (6): 77-77
    DOI del artículo: 10.3390/g13060077
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2022
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2025-02-19
    Autor/es de la URV: Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
    Departamento: Economia
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
    Autor según el artículo: Bannikova, Marina; Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Áreas temáticas: Statistics, probability and uncertainty, Statistics and probability, Social sciences, mathematical methods, Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications, Economics, Ciencias sociales, Applied mathematics
    Direcció de correo del autor: josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat
  • Palabras clave:

    Subgame perfect equilibrium
    Sequential voting
    Peace
    justice and strong institutions
    Fixed ordering
    Alternate ordering
    Applied Mathematics
    Economics
    Mathematics
    Interdisciplinary Applications
    Social Sciences
    Mathematical Methods
    Statistics and Probability
    Statistics
    Probability and Uncertainty
    Ciencias sociales
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