Autor según el artículo: Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel;
Departamento: Economia
Autor/es de la URV: Giménez Gómez, José Manuel
Resumen: This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.
Áreas temáticas: Applied mathematics Ciencias sociales Economics Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Social sciences, mathematical methods Statistics and probability Statistics, probability and uncertainty
Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Direcció de correo del autor: josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat
Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-0202-4623
Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-02-18
Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Games. 13 (6): 77-
Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Bánnikova, Marina; Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; (2022). The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting. Games, 13(6), 77-. DOI: 10.3390/g13060077
URL Documento de licencia: http://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
DOI del artículo: 10.3390/g13060077
Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Año de publicación de la revista: 2022
Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
Repositori URV