Articles producció científica> Gestió d'Empreses

Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador:  imarina:9321015
    Autors:  Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel; Sudholter, Peter; Vilella, Cori
    Resum:
    A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel; Sudholter, Peter; Vilella, Cori
    Departament: Gestió d'Empreses; Economia
    Autor/s de la URV: Giménez Gómez, José Manuel / Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia
    Paraules clau: average monotonicity; core; population monotonicity; Average monotonicity; Core; Nontransferable utility; Population monotonicity
    Resum: A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.
    Àrees temàtiques: Ciência da computação; Ciencias sociales; General mathematics; Management science and operations research; Matemática / probabilidade e estatística; Mathematics (all); Mathematics (miscellaneous); Mathematics, applied; Operations research & management science; Software
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat; cori.vilella@urv.cat
    Data d'alta del registre: 2025-02-19
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Enllaç font original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research. 97 (3): 383-390
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Gimenez-Gomez, Jose-Manuel; Sudholter, Peter; Vilella, Cori (2023). Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility. Mathematical Methods Of Operations Research, 97(3), 383-390. DOI: 10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    DOI de l'article: 10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2023
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications
  • Paraules clau:

    Management Science and Operations Research,Mathematics (Miscellaneous),Mathematics, Applied,Operations Research & Management Science,Software
    average monotonicity
    core
    population monotonicity
    Average monotonicity
    Core
    Nontransferable utility
    Population monotonicity
    Ciência da computação
    Ciencias sociales
    General mathematics
    Management science and operations research
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Mathematics (all)
    Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    Mathematics, applied
    Operations research & management science
    Software
  • Documents:

  • Cerca a google

    Search to google scholar