Razón práctica y significado de las normas jurídicas. Una crítica desde el perspectivismo a la teoría de Atienza y Ruiz Manero

Identificador:  imarina:9475564

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina9475564

Autores:  Fallada-García-Valle; J-R

Resumen:
Departing from the debate between Atienza and Ruiz Manero on the one hand, and Mendonca, Moreso and Navarro on the other, on the characterization of the types of legal norms and their relationship with practical reasoning, Atienza and Manero’s thesis that the meaning of legal norms is determined by the legal authority is criticized. To this end, the theory of the legal statements of these authors is examined in connection with Atienza’s theory of argumentation. Then, that thesis is criticized for its unidirectional, univocal and monistic approach to law. Finally, it is concluded that a more complex and accurate understanding of legal norms requires considering the full range of their possible perspectives, including those of their addressees. © 2025, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico. All rights reserved.