Market power in California’s water market

Identificador:  PC:3625

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC3625

Autors:  Bos, Charles; Hagerty, Nick; Houba, Harold; Ansink, Erik; Tomori, Françeska

Resum:
We estimate market power in California’s thin water market. Market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California’s water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited. Keywords: Water markets, Market power, California, Cournot-Nash. JEL classification: C72, D43, Q25