Documents de treball producció científicaUniversitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

  • Identification data

    Identifier:  PC:2211
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2211
    Authors:  Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia; Llerena Garrés, Francesc
    Abstract:
    In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71

  • Others:

    Publisher: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Date: 2013
    Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212194
    Departament/Institute: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública, Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Language: eng
    Author: Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, Llerena Garrés, Francesc
    Relation: Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-15
    Source: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
    Format: 13 p.

  • Keywords:

    33 - Economia
    Jocs cooperatius

  • Documents:

    DocumentPrincipal

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