On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

Identifier:  PC:2220

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2220

Authors:  Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel

Abstract:
In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.