Documents de treball producció científicaUniversitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set

  • Identification data

    Identifier:  PC:2242
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2242
    Authors:  Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia; Llerena Garrés, Francesc
    Abstract:
    In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989) with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991)

  • Others:

    Publisher: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Date: 2014
    Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/228404
    Departament/Institute: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública, Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Language: eng
    Author: Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia, Llerena Garrés, Francesc
    Relation: Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-07
    Source: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
    Format: 11 p.

  • Keywords:

    33 - Economia
    Jocs cooperatius

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