Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

Identifier:  PC:2278

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2278

Authors:  Osório, António (António Miguel)

Abstract:
In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the 'bad' and 'good' news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a 'selective' use of information; otherwise there is a 'mass' use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a 'fine' use of information; otherwise there is a 'non-selective' use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.