Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

Identificador:  PC:2230

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2230

Autores:  Manzano, Carolina; Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat

Resumen:
In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.