Innovation, Market Structure, and Cooperative R&D Strategies

Identificador:  TDX:2621

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/TDX2621

Autors:  Ibáñez Zárate, Guiomar

Resum:
Given the competitive environment, and growing complexity, risks and costs of innovation, many firms consider cooperation as a key innovation strategy to develop competitive advantages. These collaborative strategies can take different forms, as research joint ventures (RJVs), mergers and acquisitions, among others. Nevertheless, cooperation agreements may have undesirable repercussions on market competition and therefore, on consumer welfare. Hence, in this thesis, I analyse collaborative innovation considering the market competition. The first chapter, entitled “Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures: The Effect of Collusion” (joint with Ricardo Flores-Fillol and Bernd Theilen), analyses theoretically the effect of RJVs on consumer welfare in an international context when collusion can occur in the product market. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish between domestic and international RJVs and be more benevolent with international RJVs. The second chapter, “Innovation and Horizontal Mergers in a Vertically Related Industry”, analyses theoretically the effects of horizontal mergers on innovation and consumer welfare in an industry with suppliers and retailers. The retailers can undertake R&D activities to reduce their unit costs. I find that horizontal mergers among suppliers are detrimental to innovation and consumer welfare. Differently, horizontal mergers among retailers can be both innovation and consumer welfare enhancing in sufficiently small markets. The third chapter, “The Determinants of Partner Choice for Cooperative Innovation: The Effect of Competition”, analyses empirically how market competition affects firms’ partner choice for cooperative innovation. I find that competition affects negatively the propensity to cooperate with customers and firms within the same group. High and intermediate levels of price-elasticity affect positively the propensity of cooperation with suppliers and competitors, respectively. By contrast, price elasticity discourages collaboration with universities. The present study provides original evidence of the role of market competition as determinant of partner choice for cooperative innovation.