Collective decision-making under the influence of bribers and temporal constraints

Identificador:  TDX:2303

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/TDX2303

Autores:  Bannikova, Marina

Resumen:
I study the connection between corruption and structural characteristics of parliaments: number of seats, the number of parties represented, and decision rules adopted. Applying analytical and computational approaches, and running simulations, I show that the average number of deputies needed to be bribed decreases as the number of parties increases, so bribery is encouraged by a growing number of parties. I also investigate two ways in which time may affect decision-making. First, I suggest an iterative voting procedure in which delay to reach a decision is costly. For two voters and two options, with a fixed voting order, I prove that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the voter who votes first obtains his most preferred option at the beginning of the procedure. If the fixed order is reversed once at some stage, I identify the condition under which the voter initially voting the second obtains this most preferred option, also at the beginning. Second, I propose another iterative voting procedure, allowing voters to change their votes, but now with a deadline: a stage such that, if no decision has been taken by then, the worst outcome results. I show that (i) if there is enough time for all the voters to change their vote, a decision will be taken, and (ii) if there is an alternative preferred by a majority of the voters, this alternative will be finally chosen. I add an experimental study indicating that even with less time necessary for every voter to change his vote, the voters will agree with a decision anyway.