Intentionality, Modularity and Time

Identificador:  TDX:2516

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/TDX2516

Autores:  Gentile, Michele

Resumen:
The scope of this thesis is to provide an explanation of psychological time which adheres to the concept of modularity of cognitive functions as formulated by Fodor. This account seeks to demonstrate that our ‘sense’ of time (and the related ability to manage time information) is the cognitive result of a series of processes carried out by two independent and neutrally isolable processing components which are part of the portion of mental architecture dedicated to modular systems. I try to demonstrate that these sub-systems can themselves be referred to as modules, as each has the potential to specialize in time processing. Within this functional architecture delimitations between these different processing methods are organised according to principles which have their basis in Fodor's modularity thesis. Using the reference of 'module' for the notion of specious present my argument proceeds to arrange time processing into a hierarchy, in order to represent time information from the early stages of perception to higher stages of cognition. If such a hypothesis is correct, it could offer useful guidelines for exploring timing ability in humans, and provide a plausible framework for future investigation of the psychological and neuronal mechanisms of time processing.