The problem of bankruptcy in the Spanish financial crisis.

Identifier:  TFG:8580

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/TFG8580

Authors:  López Valero, Marcos

Abstract:
The paper studies the policy implemented by the Orderly Bank Restructuring Fund (FROB) during the 2007 financial crisis, developing a bankruptcy game. The potential distributions of the funds committed by the FROB among financial institutions with solvency problems are considered. These distributions are based on the rule: Proportional, CEA, CEL, Talmud, Random Arrival, Shapley value, and FROB. The objective is to analyze the distributional effects according to criteria of equality, concentration, and preferential adjustment. To do this, indicators that reflect the aforementioned criteria have been used. The results show significant differences between rules, especially the capital distribution implemented by the FROB.