Articles producció científica> Gestió d'Empreses

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitve prices

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:5129434
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina5129434
    Autors:
    Atay ALlerena FNúñez M
    Resum:
    A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25¿26:71¿79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M
    Departament: Gestió d'Empreses
    Autor/s de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
    Paraules clau: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development goals
    Resum: A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25¿26:71¿79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
    Àrees temàtiques: Statistics and probability Operations research & management science Modeling and simulation Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research Interdisciplinar Information systems and management Engenharias iii Discrete mathematics and combinatorics Ciencias sociales
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Data d'alta del registre: 2024-11-23
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Top. 24 (3): 572-593
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M (2016). Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitve prices. Top, 24(3), 572-593. DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2016
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications

  • Paraules clau:

    Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics,Information Systems and Management,Management Science and Operations Research,Modeling and Simulation,Operations Research & Management Science,Statistics and Probability
    Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development goals
    Statistics and probability
    Operations research & management science
    Modeling and simulation
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Management science and operations research
    Interdisciplinar
    Information systems and management
    Engenharias iii
    Discrete mathematics and combinatorics
    Ciencias sociales

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