Author, as appears in the article.: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M
Department: Gestió d'Empreses
URV's Author/s: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
Abstract: A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25¿26:71¿79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
Thematic Areas: Statistics and probability Operations research & management science Modeling and simulation Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research Interdisciplinar Information systems and management Engenharias iii Discrete mathematics and combinatorics Ciencias sociales
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
Record's date: 2024-09-07
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
Link to the original source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11750-016-0409-0
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Papper original source: Top. 24 (3): 572-593
APA: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M (2016). Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitve prices. Top, 24(3), 572-593. DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
Article's DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2016
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV