Articles producció científica> Gestió d'Empreses

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitve prices

  • Identification data

    Identifier: imarina:5129434
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina5129434
    Authors:
    Atay ALlerena FNúñez M
    Abstract:
    A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25¿26:71¿79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M
    Department: Gestió d'Empreses
    URV's Author/s: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
    Keywords: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development goals
    Abstract: A generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25¿26:71¿79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
    Thematic Areas: Statistics and probability Operations research & management science Modeling and simulation Matemática / probabilidade e estatística Management science and operations research Interdisciplinar Information systems and management Engenharias iii Discrete mathematics and combinatorics Ciencias sociales
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Author's mail: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Author identifier: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Record's date: 2024-11-23
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Link to the original source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11750-016-0409-0
    Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Papper original source: Top. 24 (3): 572-593
    APA: Atay A; Llerena F; Núñez M (2016). Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitve prices. Top, 24(3), 572-593. DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
    Article's DOI: 10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2016
    Publication Type: Journal Publications

  • Keywords:

    Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics,Information Systems and Management,Management Science and Operations Research,Modeling and Simulation,Operations Research & Management Science,Statistics and Probability
    Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development goals
    Statistics and probability
    Operations research & management science
    Modeling and simulation
    Matemática / probabilidade e estatística
    Management science and operations research
    Interdisciplinar
    Information systems and management
    Engenharias iii
    Discrete mathematics and combinatorics
    Ciencias sociales

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