Articles producció científica> Economia

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:9242193
  • Autors:

    Manzano C
    Vives X
  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Manzano C; Vives X
    Departament: Economia
    Autor/s de la URV: Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Paraules clau: Treasury auctions Private information Market integration Liquidity auctions G14 Electricity auctions E58 Demand/supply schedule competition D82 D44
    Resum: We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence. Copyright © 2021 The Authors.
    Àrees temàtiques: General economics,econometrics and finance Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous) Economics, econometrics and finance (all) Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: carolina.manzano@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0001-7160-0562 0000-0001-7160-0562
    Data d'alta del registre: 2024-07-27
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Enllaç font original: https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/3675
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Theoretical Economics. 16 (3): 1095-1137
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Manzano C; Vives X (2021). Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions. Theoretical Economics, 16(3), 1095-1137. DOI: 10.3982/TE3675
    DOI de l'article: 10.3982/TE3675
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2021
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications
  • Paraules clau:

    Economics,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Miscellaneous)
    Treasury auctions
    Private information
    Market integration
    Liquidity auctions
    G14
    Electricity auctions
    E58
    Demand/supply schedule competition
    D82
    D44
    General economics,econometrics and finance
    Economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous)
    Economics, econometrics and finance (all)
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business and management
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