Author, as appears in the article.: Houba, H; Tomori, F
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Tomori, Françeska
Keywords: Water markets Stackelberg social equilibrium Social equilibrium Market power Duopoly stackelberg social equilibrium social equilibrium market power duopoly
Abstract: Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market.
Thematic Areas: Statistics, probability and uncertainty Statistics and probability Social sciences, mathematical methods Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Economics Ciencias sociales Applied mathematics
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: franceska.tomori@urv.cat franceska.tomori@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0002-6744-3100 0000-0002-6744-3100
Record's date: 2024-08-03
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Link to the original source: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/4/54
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Papper original source: Games. 14 (4):
APA: Houba, H; Tomori, F (2023). Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets. Games, 14(4), -. DOI: 10.3390/g14040054
Article's DOI: 10.3390/g14040054
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2023
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV