Autor según el artículo: Houba, H; Tomori, F
Departamento: Economia
Autor/es de la URV: Tomori, Françeska
Palabras clave: Water markets Stackelberg social equilibrium Social equilibrium Market power Duopoly stackelberg social equilibrium social equilibrium market power duopoly
Resumen: Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market.
Áreas temáticas: Statistics, probability and uncertainty Statistics and probability Social sciences, mathematical methods Mathematics, interdisciplinary applications Economics Ciencias sociales Applied mathematics
Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Direcció de correo del autor: franceska.tomori@urv.cat franceska.tomori@urv.cat
Identificador del autor: 0000-0002-6744-3100 0000-0002-6744-3100
Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-08-03
Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Games. 14 (4):
Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Houba, H; Tomori, F (2023). Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets. Games, 14(4), -. DOI: 10.3390/g14040054
Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Año de publicación de la revista: 2023
Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
Repositori URV