Author, as appears in the article.: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
Keywords: Welfare Welfar Uncertainty Tal Monetary-policy Macroeconomic volatility Inflation target Discretion Credibility Central bank transparency
Abstract: This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.
Thematic Areas: Public administration General business,management and accounting Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous) Business, management and accounting (all)
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: carolina.manzano@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat montserrat.ferre@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0001-7160-0562 0000-0001-7160-0562 0000-0003-4959-608X
Record's date: 2025-01-28
Paper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Paper original source: Contemporary Economic Policy. 42 (4): 642-659
APA: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina (2024). Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy. Contemporary Economic Policy, 42(4), 642-659. DOI: 10.1111/coep.12667
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2024
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV