Author, as appears in the article.: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina
Department: Economia
URV's Author/s: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
Keywords: Central bank transparency Credibility Discretion Inflation target Macroeconomic volatility Monetary-policy Tal Uncertainty Welfar Welfare
Abstract: This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.
Thematic Areas: Business, management and accounting (all) Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous) Ciencias sociales Economia Economics Economics and econometrics General business,management and accounting Public administration
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
Record's date: 2024-10-26
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Papper original source: Contemporary Economic Policy. 42 (4): 642-659
APA: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina (2024). Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy. Contemporary Economic Policy, 42(4), 642-659. DOI: 10.1111/coep.12667
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2024
Publication Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Repositori URV