Articles producció científica> Economia

Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy

  • Identification data

    Identifier: imarina:9387487
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina9387487
    Authors:
    Ferre, MontserratMacaya, OscarManzano, Carolina
    Abstract:
    This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.

  • Others:

    Author, as appears in the article.: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina
    Department: Economia
    URV's Author/s: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Keywords: Central bank transparency Credibility Discretion Inflation target Macroeconomic volatility Monetary-policy Tal Uncertainty Welfar Welfare
    Abstract: This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.
    Thematic Areas: Business, management and accounting (all) Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous) Ciencias sociales Economia Economics Economics and econometrics General business,management and accounting Public administration
    licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Author's mail: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
    Author identifier: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
    Record's date: 2024-10-26
    Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Link to the original source: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/coep.12667
    Papper original source: Contemporary Economic Policy. 42 (4): 642-659
    APA: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina (2024). Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy. Contemporary Economic Policy, 42(4), 642-659. DOI: 10.1111/coep.12667
    Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Article's DOI: 10.1111/coep.12667
    Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Journal publication year: 2024
    Publication Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article

  • Keywords:

    Business, Management and Accounting (Miscellaneous),Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Public Administration
    Central bank transparency
    Credibility
    Discretion
    Inflation target
    Macroeconomic volatility
    Monetary-policy
    Tal
    Uncertainty
    Welfar
    Welfare
    Business, management and accounting (all)
    Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous)
    Ciencias sociales
    Economia
    Economics
    Economics and econometrics
    General business,management and accounting
    Public administration

  • Documents:

    DocumentPrincipal

  • Cerca a google

    Search to google scholar