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Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:9387487
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina9387487
    Autores:
    Ferre, MontserratMacaya, OscarManzano, Carolina
    Resumen:
    This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.

  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina
    Departamento: Economia
    Autor/es de la URV: Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat / Manzano Tovar, Carolina
    Palabras clave: Central bank transparency Credibility Discretion Inflation target Macroeconomic volatility Monetary-policy Tal Uncertainty Welfar Welfare
    Resumen: This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.
    Áreas temáticas: Business, management and accounting (all) Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous) Ciencias sociales Economia Economics Economics and econometrics General business,management and accounting Public administration
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Direcció de correo del autor: montserrat.ferre@urv.cat carolina.manzano@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-4959-608X 0000-0001-7160-0562
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-10-26
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Contemporary Economic Policy. 42 (4): 642-659
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Ferre, Montserrat; Macaya, Oscar; Manzano, Carolina (2024). Central bank communication: Inflation target transparency with fiscal policy. Contemporary Economic Policy, 42(4), 642-659. DOI: 10.1111/coep.12667
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2024
    Tipo de publicación: info:eu-repo/semantics/article

  • Palabras clave:

    Business, Management and Accounting (Miscellaneous),Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Public Administration
    Central bank transparency
    Credibility
    Discretion
    Inflation target
    Macroeconomic volatility
    Monetary-policy
    Tal
    Uncertainty
    Welfar
    Welfare
    Business, management and accounting (all)
    Business, management and accounting (miscellaneous)
    Ciencias sociales
    Economia
    Economics
    Economics and econometrics
    General business,management and accounting
    Public administration

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