Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

Identificador:  PC:2263

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2263

Autors:  Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva); Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Atay, Ata

Resum:
A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78