Documents de treball producció científicaUniversitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

A mechanism to pick the deserving winner

Identification data

Identifier: PC:2284

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2284

Authors: Moskalenko, Anna

Abstract:
A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78
Others:

Publisher: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Date: 2015
Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215
Departament/Institute: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública, Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Language: eng
Author: Moskalenko, Anna
Relation: Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
Source: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
Format: 10 p.

Keywords:

33 - Economia
Elecció social
Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Documents:

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