Documents de treball producció científicaUniversitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

A mechanism to pick the deserving winner

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador:  PC:2284
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC2284
    Autores:  Moskalenko, Anna
    Resumen:
    A group of individuals is choosing an individual (the winner) among themselves, when the identity of the deserving winner is a common knowledge among individuals. A simple mechanism of voting by veto is proposed as an alternative to the mechanism studied by Amorós (2011). Like Amorós’(2011), the suggested mechanism implements the socially desirable outcome (the deserving winner is chosen) in subgame perfect equilibria. Keywords: Implementation, mechanism design, subgame perfect equilibrium, individuals choosing among themselves, voting by veto. JEL classification: C72, D71, D78

  • Otros:

    Editor: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Fecha: 2015
    Identificador: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/252215
    Departamento/Instituto: Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública, Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
    Idioma: eng
    Autor: Moskalenko, Anna
    Relación: Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-20
    Fuente: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
    Formato: 10 p.

  • Palabras clave:

    33 - Economia
    Elecció social
    Jocs no-cooperatius (Matemàtica)

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