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Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:5129789
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina5129789
    Autors:
    Calleja PLlerena F
    Resum:
    On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Calleja P; Llerena F
    Departament: Gestió d'Empreses
    Autor/s de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
    Resum: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
    Àrees temàtiques: Sociologia i política Social sciences, mathematical methods Social sciences (miscellaneous) Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Data d'alta del registre: 2024-09-07
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enllaç font original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0966-z
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Social Choice And Welfare. 48 (1): 197-220
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Calleja P; Llerena F (2017). Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Social Choice And Welfare, 48(1), 197-220. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
    DOI de l'article: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2017
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications

  • Paraules clau:

    Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (Miscellaneous),Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
    Sociologia i política
    Social sciences, mathematical methods
    Social sciences (miscellaneous)
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales

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