Author, as appears in the article.: Calleja P; Llerena F
Department: Gestió d'Empreses
URV's Author/s: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
Abstract: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
Thematic Areas: Sociologia i política Social sciences, mathematical methods Social sciences (miscellaneous) Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales
licence for use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Author's mail: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
Author identifier: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
Record's date: 2024-09-07
Papper version: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
Licence document URL: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Papper original source: Social Choice And Welfare. 48 (1): 197-220
APA: Calleja P; Llerena F (2017). Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Social Choice And Welfare, 48(1), 197-220. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
Entity: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Journal publication year: 2017
Publication Type: Journal Publications
Repositori URV