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Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:5129789
    Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina5129789
    Autores:
    Calleja PLlerena F
    Resumen:
    On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Calleja P; Llerena F
    Departamento: Gestió d'Empreses
    Autor/es de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
    Resumen: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
    Áreas temáticas: Sociologia i política Social sciences, mathematical methods Social sciences (miscellaneous) Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    Direcció de correo del autor: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-09-07
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0966-z
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Social Choice And Welfare. 48 (1): 197-220
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Calleja P; Llerena F (2017). Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Social Choice And Welfare, 48(1), 197-220. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
    DOI del artículo: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2017
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications

  • Palabras clave:

    Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (Miscellaneous),Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
    Sociologia i política
    Social sciences, mathematical methods
    Social sciences (miscellaneous)
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales

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