Rationality

Identificador:  imarina:5129789

Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/imarina5129789

Autores:  Calleja, Pedro; Llerena, Francesc

Resumen:
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.