Autor según el artículo: Calleja P; Llerena F
Departamento: Gestió d'Empreses
Autor/es de la URV: Llerena Garrés, Francisco
Resumen: On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
Áreas temáticas: Sociologia i política Social sciences, mathematical methods Social sciences (miscellaneous) Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales
Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
Direcció de correo del autor: francisco.llerena@urv.cat francisco.llerena@urv.cat
Identificador del autor: 0000-0002-4898-8404 0000-0002-4898-8404
Fecha de alta del registro: 2024-09-07
Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Social Choice And Welfare. 48 (1): 197-220
Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Calleja P; Llerena F (2017). Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Social Choice And Welfare, 48(1), 197-220. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z
Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Año de publicación de la revista: 2017
Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
Repositori URV