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A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

  • Dades identificatives

    Identificador: imarina:6090570
    Autors:
    Crutzen BFlamand SSahuguet N
    Resum:
    © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
  • Altres:

    Autor segons l'article: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N
    Departament: Economia
    Autor/s de la URV: Flamand, Sabine Charlotte M
    Paraules clau: Vote Sharing rules Proportional representation Perspective Open lists Multiple prizes Elections Cultivate Contests Closed lists
    Resum: © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
    Àrees temàtiques: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
    Accès a la llicència d'ús: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 00472727
    Adreça de correu electrònic de l'autor: sabine.flamand@urv.cat
    Identificador de l'autor: 0000-0003-2124-4592
    Data d'alta del registre: 2023-02-18
    Versió de l'article dipositat: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enllaç font original: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272719301719
    Referència a l'article segons font original: Journal Of Public Economics. 182 (104109):
    Referència de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N (2020). A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation. Journal Of Public Economics, 182(104109), -. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    URL Document de llicència: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    DOI de l'article: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    Entitat: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Any de publicació de la revista: 2020
    Tipus de publicació: Journal Publications
  • Paraules clau:

    Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
    Vote
    Sharing rules
    Proportional representation
    Perspective
    Open lists
    Multiple prizes
    Elections
    Cultivate
    Contests
    Closed lists
    Finance
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business and management
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