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A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation

  • Datos identificativos

    Identificador: imarina:6090570
    Autores:
    Crutzen BFlamand SSahuguet N
    Resumen:
    © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
  • Otros:

    Autor según el artículo: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N
    Departamento: Economia
    Autor/es de la URV: Flamand, Sabine Charlotte M
    Palabras clave: Vote Sharing rules Proportional representation Perspective Open lists Multiple prizes Elections Cultivate Contests Closed lists
    Resumen: © 2019 We develop a model of a team contest for multiple, indivisible prizes. Team members exert costly effort to improve their team's success. We analyze two intrateam allocation rules. Under a list rule, prizes are allocated according to a predetermined list. Under an egalitarian rule, prizes are allocated according to a fair lottery. We show that which allocation rule maximizes team success depends on the degree of complementarity between members' efforts and the convexity of the individual cost of effort function. We then apply the model to the context of elections under proportional representation with both open and closed lists. We derive conditions under which closed lists generate stronger incentives than open lists. Our results offer a rationale for the lack of evidence on the negative incentive effects of closed lists.
    Áreas temáticas: Finance Economics and econometrics Economics Economia Ciencias sociales Business and management
    Acceso a la licencia de uso: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
    ISSN: 00472727
    Direcció de correo del autor: sabine.flamand@urv.cat
    Identificador del autor: 0000-0003-2124-4592
    Fecha de alta del registro: 2023-02-18
    Versión del articulo depositado: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
    Enlace a la fuente original: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272719301719
    Referencia al articulo segun fuente origial: Journal Of Public Economics. 182 (104109):
    Referencia de l'ítem segons les normes APA: Crutzen B; Flamand S; Sahuguet N (2020). A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation. Journal Of Public Economics, 182(104109), -. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    URL Documento de licencia: https://repositori.urv.cat/ca/proteccio-de-dades/
    DOI del artículo: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109
    Entidad: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
    Año de publicación de la revista: 2020
    Tipo de publicación: Journal Publications
  • Palabras clave:

    Economics,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
    Vote
    Sharing rules
    Proportional representation
    Perspective
    Open lists
    Multiple prizes
    Elections
    Cultivate
    Contests
    Closed lists
    Finance
    Economics and econometrics
    Economics
    Economia
    Ciencias sociales
    Business and management
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